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Article
Spousal Conflict and Divorce
Journal of Labor Economics
Document Type
Article
Disciplines
Publication Version
Published Version
Publication Date
1-1-2012
DOI
10.1086/666654
Abstract
The optimal balance between keeping marriages intact, despite spousal conflict, and allowing for divorce is a subject of policy debate in the United States. To explore the trade-offs, I construct a structural model with information asymmetries, which may generate inefficient outcomes. Parameters are estimated using data from the National Survey of Families and Households. I find that eliminating separation periods decreases the conflict rate by 9.2% of its baseline level and increases the divorce rate by 4.0%. Perfect child support enforcement decreases the frequency of conflict and divorce by 2.7% and 21.2%, respectively, and reduces the incidence of inefficient divorces.
Copyright Owner
The University of Chicago
Copyright Date
2012
Language
en
File Format
application/pdf
Citation Information
Oleksandr Zhylyevskyy. "Spousal Conflict and Divorce" Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 30 Iss. 4 (2012) p. 915 - 962 Available at: http://works.bepress.com/oleksandr-zhylyevskyy/5/
This is an article from Journal of Labor Economics 30 (2012): 915, doi:10.1086/666654. Posted with permission.