
Article
Wrongful Convictions do Lower Deterrence,
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
(2012)
Abstract
The conventional result of the theory of the public enforcement of
law is that wrongful convictions of innocents are detrimental to deterrence.
This proposition has been challenged recently. In some cases, wrongful
convictions do not jeopardize deterrence because they impact equally
the innocent and the guilty. Therefore deterrence does not change.
We show that, in general, wrongful convictions do lower deterrence.
We prove that wrongful convictions do not jeopardize deterrence only
in very limited circumstances or under unlikely assumptions.
Keywords
- law enforcement,
- deterrence,
- wrongful convictions,
- mistakes of identity,
- mistakes of act
Disciplines
Publication Date
2012
Citation Information
Nuno Garoupa and Matteo Rizzolli. "Wrongful Convictions do Lower Deterrence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics Vol. 168 Iss. 2 (2012) p. 224 - 231 Available at: http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/94/