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Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in the Spanish Supreme Court: The Case of Administrative Review
International Review of Law and Economics (2017)
  • Lucia Dalla Pellegrina, University of Milano-Bicocca
  • Nuno Garoupa
  • Fernando Gómez Pomar
Abstract
This paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Spain in the specific area of administrative review for the period 2000-2008, controlling for dissent suppression effort. The estimated ideal points allow us to identify political clusters in the Supreme Court which seem inconsistent with the formal and traditional views that a career judiciary is politically not strongly aligned. At the same time, we find evidence that confirms a trend favoring consensus and dissent avoidance.
Keywords
  • judicial behavior,
  • empirical legal studies,
  • Spanish Supreme Court,
  • ideal point,
  • ideology,
  • dissent avoidance,
  • career judiciary
Disciplines
Publication Date
2017
Citation Information
Lucia Dalla Pellegrina, Nuno Garoupa and Fernando Gómez Pomar. "Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in the Spanish Supreme Court: The Case of Administrative Review" International Review of Law and Economics Vol. 52 (2017) p. 16 - 28
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/126/