The emotions of white racism and antiracism

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nation, and the period of Swedish solidarity with the antiracist, anti-colonial, anti-apartheid movements, during which Swedishness was configured as incompatible with racism, were characterized by a sense of the Swedes as morally impeccable, which also manifest within the country in relation to gender, sexuality, and class. While the emergence of a xeno-racist, right-wing party in Sweden threatens this self-image, it is dealt with by constructing the racism evident in the party as exceptional to Swedishness, even though social indicators point to acute marginalization of racial others within the society. The current melancholia, then, reflects how the affective attachment to being a model white nation, though having these divergent historical expressions, has been constant. The attachment to the feeling of moral impeccability is the referent for the current sense of loss. Unwilling to let go of this feeling, the white Swedish nation projects their discomfort onto the “others” now present in the country who are the cause of their letting themselves down, of making them be less than their true selves. Effectively, this preserves the sense of an essential white goodness, even as the boundaries of white solidarity are firmed up across class and gender. The analysis shows that feeling both Swedish and racially generous is more difficult with a “present other” (Steyn 1997), who places a moral burden on whiteness to reconfigure a sense of self within a dialogical relationship.

These thought-provoking chapters illustrate how the field of whiteness studies presents a moral challenge to those to racialized as white to confront racially produced dys-relationality, wherever they live.

REFERENCES

move from a place of naiveté about racial issues to greater awareness (see Hardiman 1982 and Helms 1990).

We organize this chapter on the emotions of white racism and antiracism in three parts. First, we draw from the existing literature in psychology, sociology, and education (primarily in the US context) to introduce a preliminary taxonomy of the emotions of white racism. Second, we draw from emerging research to discuss the emotions of white antiracism. In closing, we discuss the implications of the emotions of white racism and antiracism for praxis and research. When appropriate, we discuss manifestations of the emotions of racism on individual and collective levels. We acknowledge the interrelatedness among individual and collective emotions of racism, such that individual expressions take place in a collective context; and, we note that collective manifestations carry more cultural, political, and social power than individual emotional reactions.

**WHITE APATHY**

Drawing from nearly twenty years of qualitative research on white individuals’ racial attitudes, Counselor Education scholars Michael D’Andrea and Judy Daniels (2001, 306) identified “generalized apathy and disinterest” as the most common response to inquiries about racism. When white apathy was prevalent among their participants, race was framed as unimportant to white individuals and therefore only a problem for people of color. Moreover, white apathy often is linked to notions of racism as individual behaviors; thus, an absence of overt racial tension is seen as evidence that racism is relatively unimportant. Linked to color-blind racial ideology, or a set of beliefs that race does not and should not matter (Bonilla-Silva 2006, Neville et al. 2013), white apathy is contingent upon the maintenance of white space where whiteness is normalized in discourse and practice (Harper and Hurtado 2007). Thus, individuals in living and learning spaces that are largely white often are enmeshed in color-blind racial ideology, which reinforces the idea that racism is not an issue (Picca and Feagin 2007). For example, as Amanda Lewis (2001) uncovered in ethnographic research at a predominantly white elementary school, “there is no race in the schoolyard.” She found that white teachers, parents, and administrators grossly minimized the importance of race in their mostly white school, even when they reported negative effects of racism on students of color. Similarly, in a university context, Nolan Cabrera (2014a) found that white male students at a predominantly white institution tended to be racially apathetic. Importantly, his research indicated that racial apathy did not mean that race was “unimportant” to them individually, but rather that it was not an issue universally. Thus, when race was an issue, it was primarily because a person of color “played the race card.”

White apathy, in some respects, is the most insidious of the emotions of white racism. One might think that white rage or white fear, described below, might hold that distinction because they may lead to immediate, violent action. While dramatic displays may garner headlines, they do little to explain the persistence of systemic racial inequality. Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2006) argues that the privileges of whiteness are so engrained in US society that white people need only maintain the status quo to retain dominance. He further asserts that racial color-blindness is integral to the perpetuation of contemporary white supremacy, what he designates “racism without racists” (1). Philosopher Charles Mills (1997, 18) described whiteness as an “epistemology of ignorance” that reproduces and sustains racial dominance and white privilege. Thus, white apathy functions as an emotional equivalent to its cognitive counterpart, color-blind racial ideology. Representing a lack of feeling or concern, white apathy communicates that race and racism do not matter. It also serves to deny, distort, and minimize race and racism in society, because if one does not have any feelings about racism, then racism must not be important. This enables white individuals to declare that people of color “play the race card” when they draw attention to racial inequality, allowing the underlying system of racial stratification to remain unchallenged.

White apathy is related strongly to two systemic issues. First, white people tend to individualize issues of race, whereby racism is considered an inner hatred of the racial other (Bonilla-Silva 2006). This limited understanding of racism places responsibility for racism on extremists such as neo-Nazis, or on individual racist outbursts such as the widely disseminated rant of former LA Clippers owner Donald Sterling. Within relatively homogeneous white environments, especially when white individuals do not feel a hatred for people of color, they arrive at the mistaken conclusion that racism is unimportant. Second, these homogeneous environments generally prevent white people from seeing the effects of racism on people of color. When white individuals are challenged in new social and academic environments, the more dramatic emotions such as fear, rage, and guilt frequently emerge.

**WHITE FEAR**

Fear and anxiety are among the most common feelings that white students experience when learning about racism (Reason, Roosa Millar, and Scales 2005). We refer to this fear and anxiety as white fear, which may emerge when white people finally confront issues of race. It comprises a range of
responses, such as anxiety about appearing racist and irrational fear of people of color, particularly Black and Latino men in the United States (Frankenberg 1993; Spanierman and Heppner 2004). Spanierman’s psychosocial research has been concerned with this latter aspect of white fear, which is associated with lower levels of racial awareness, cultural sensitivity, and diversity appreciation. Several investigations have linked irrational fear and mistrust of people of color to a lack of cross-racial contact or friendships. High levels of racial color-blindness and prejudice also are prevalent among white individuals who score high on a measure of white fear. This research has implications for white educators in classrooms with racially diverse students, which we address later in this chapter.

Other aspects of white fear involve anxiety about appearing racist, offending others, or fear of facing one’s own racism (Derman-Sparks and Phillips 1997; McKinney 2005). Beverly Tatum (1997, 194), clinical psychologist and President of Spelman College, captures the intensity of this aspect of white fear, “Fear is a powerful emotion, one that immobilizes, traps words in our throats, and stills our tongues . . . when we are afraid it seems that we cannot think, we cannot speak, we cannot move.” This racial “analysis paralysis,” as Cabrera terms it, has impacts on interracial interactions as well. When white people interact across race, they may suffer cognitive depletion from spending so much psychic energy trying not to appear racist (Richeson and Shelton 2007). Relatedly, scholars of racism described a dimension of white fear that includes fear of facing the reality that white privilege is unearned and learning that their achievements are not entirely merit-based (Feagin and O’Brien 2004; Jensen 2005). Considering the various aspects of white fear, scholars thus have identified it as a major impediment to racial awareness and racial justice, and urge for research investigation to attain a deeper understanding of this constellation of emotions (Levine-Rasky 2000; Spanierman, Poteat et al. 2008).

In addition to an individual-level white fear, we identify manifestations of collective white fear. Ghassan Hage’s (2003, 4) “colonial white paranoia,” for instance, exemplifies collective white fear in settler colonies such as Australia, and seems relevant for other settler colonies such as Canada and the United States. Hage (2003, 49) defines paranoia as a “pathological form of fear based on an excessively fragile conception of the self as constantly threatened” even when no threat exists. He links white paranoia to fear of “losing its ‘civilized’ [white] identity that propelled the colonial project and gave rise to the nation in the first place.” Pamela Perry (2002) identified white fear of a revolution by people of color, or fear of Black retribution through violence against whites, in a study of white high school students in the United States (see also Jensen 2005; Spanierman, Oh et al. 2008). Commercial media capitalizes on this form of white fear. For example, unfounded reports of potential violent riots stemming from the George Zimmerman verdict in 2013 exemplify collective white fear of a Black revolution. A related set of xenophobic responses occurred in Arizona surrounding the elimination of the Tucson Unified School District’s Mexican American Studies program, as opponents of the program framed a culturally relevant curriculum as “promoting the overthrow of the U.S. government” (O’Leary et al. 2012, 104; see also Clark and Reed 2010).

Chapters in this collection also provide examples of white fear as it manifests in Sweden and Romania. Tobias Hubinette and Catrin Lundström, in chapter 13 for example, highlight an “ever increasing crisis mentality . . . feelings of fear and anxiety concerning everything that is regarded as foreign, alien, non-white and non-Christian,” which leads to white Swedish melancholia or mourning for a white Sweden overrun by racialized others. Also linked to collective white fear, Adela Fofiu in chapter 2 offers an account of collective white fear in Romania, which she argues is linked to a fear of a white apocalypse (i.e., the total destruction of the white race by Romani peoples, a process referred to as the Gypsification of Romania). Importantly, it is this hegemonic, collective white fear that allows individual manifestations to appear rational.

**WHITE MELANCHOLIA**

White melancholia may be an international phenomenon that reflects an extreme and collective response to white fear. Drawing from Freud’s (1968) psychoanalytic theory of unresolved grief and more recent literature on racial melancholia (Cheng 2001; Eng and Han 2000), Hubinette and Lundström delineated the concept of white melancholia to describe the contemporary racial formation in Sweden (see chapter 3, this volume). The longing of white melancholia in Sweden takes two forms: a longing for the “old Sweden,” a racially homogenous, white nation, and a longing for “good Sweden,” a politically progressive (i.e., antiracist and egalitarian) nation that did not have a racist party in Parliament. In Freud’s theory, the mourner clings to the lost love object, because part of one’s self (i.e., white privilege) is threatened by loss of the lost object (i.e., homogenous white spaces with white man as master). In other words, the loss of the love object (e.g., “old Sweden”) is linked to loss of a core aspect of one’s identity. Although not referred to explicitly, several additional chapters in this collection also discuss forms of white melancholia in Romania (see Fofiu, chapter 2) and Australia (see Howard-Wagner, chapter 4).

White melancholia also is evident in the United States. Diverging from Freud’s theory of unresolved grief in response to an actual loss, white mel-
ancholia, as we understand it, involves grieving for a time that never existed to deal with feelings of slipping racial dominance. As historian Jill Lepore (2010) reported in The Whites of Their Eyes, for example, Tea Party-identified whites yearn for a past that did not exist in order to take back a country that never actually was. Minnesota Republican congresswoman and Tea Party favorite Michele Bachmann, for example, seriously alleged in 2011 that the Founding Fathers “worked tirelessly” to end slavery. These sentiments deny that the United States was founded on the enslavement of Africans and the forced relocation and genocide of American Indians (Feagin 2014). After the election of Barack Obama as the first Black US president, white Americans like Bachman generated fantastic notions of the US founding moment, unconsciously grieving a perceived loss of racial dominance. Grounded in these gross misrepresentations, white melancholia could lead to white rage.

WHITE RAGE

Antiracist scholar and educator Diane Goodman (2011; see also Cabrera 2014a) explained that fear sometimes manifests in expressions of hostility and rage, especially among white men. We refer to these emotions of white racism as white rage. This category of emotions comprises racial resentment, frustration about a perceived climate of political correctness, and annoyance with what is perceived to be people of color whining about racial injustice (Bonilla-Silva, Lewis, and Embrick 2004; D’Andrea and Daniels 2001). As sociologist Michael Kimmel (2013, 18) documents in Angry White Men, white rage also includes anger and “aggrieved entitlement” among middle- and working-class white people who believe that white men are losing power and privilege. Drawing from sociologist Joe Feagin’s (2010) white racial frame (i.e., a hegemonic lens through which whites view themselves as normal and superior), white rage also involves intense negative feelings toward people of color, such as racial hatred, arrogance, sense of superiority, and desire for dominance.

University courses that critique power, white privilege, and oppression likely activate white rage. bell hooks (1995), for instance, described the shock and rage that erupted among white students when they learned that Black people gaze upon their whiteness and frequently see it as terrorizing. Because white male students tend to regulate their affective responses to race and express them in more “manly” ways, white rage may be expressed more frequently among white men than women (Cabrera 2014a). On campus, white rage may lead to actions such as hanging a noose, which students perpetrated at the University of California San Diego, the University of Maryland, and University of Mississippi, to name a few. In addition to understanding students’ rageful responses, scholars have identified examples of white faculty emotions that reflect white rage. In a case study at the University of Connecticut, for example, researchers documented the ways in which white male faculty members intensely opposed a course on white racism (Cazenave and Maddern 1999). The authors identified nine themes that characterized their opposition, including: the title is racially offensive and divisive, the professor has a political agenda, and white people are not the only racists. In this example, white rage may influence decisions about university curricula.

Expressions of white rage sometimes hide behind anonymity in weblogs and find their way into popular media. For example, Fofii in chapter 3 features provocative expressions of white rage on right-wing extremist Romanian websites, which she argues reflect perceptions of the broader society in Romania. In another example, when the University of Illinois discontinued “Chief Illiniwek,” a racist mascot representing a fictional American Indian chief who performed dances at sporting events, white rage ran rampant in online discussion board posts (Clark et al. 2011). In the latter example, and others (see also Feagin 2010), white rage appeared in conjunction with stereotyping (i.e., American Indians were misrepresented as alcoholics, casino gamers, and primitives).

Scholars have linked white rage to racial resentment and the notion of white individuals as victims of racism (Kincheloe and Steinberg 1998; see also Cabrera 2014b). This mistaken idea of “reverse racism” begins with denial. For example, white university students may absolve themselves from any responsibility in statements such as, “I didn’t own slaves . . . my parents didn’t own slaves . . . my grandparents didn’t own slaves,” or they may blame contemporary racial inequality on pathologies unique to minority communities or on some sort of cultural deficit (e.g., “They don’t value education”). American Studies scholar Jennifer Pierce (2003) refers to this as “racing for innocence,” a discursive way to place blame for racial inequality on communities of color. Sociologist Ruth Frankenberg (1993) refers to this phenomenon among white individuals as power evasion. Within this context, modest race-conscious programs such as affirmative action, race-based scholarships, or race-based student organizations, are framed as being oppressive to white people (Cabrera 2014a).

To borrow from education scholar Richard Orozco (2014), white innocence (i.e., blaming people of color for racial inequality) cannot exist without minority aggression, or “reverse racism.” Bill O’Reilly, host of the highly rated “The O’Reilly Factor” on the Fox News Channel, provides an example of white innocence. He took issue with the Harvard Kennedy School’s deci-
sion to require a course on privilege for all students. Because of his modest upbringing O’Reilly claimed, “I’m going to have to exempt myself under that White privilege.” Within a two-minute span, Mr. O’Reilly argued that he was not a recipient of white privilege, twisting the meaning of the concept in the process. He then derided the course stating, “You can’t have a course based on skin color, white privilege. That in itself is inherently racist.” This is a consistent theme when Mr. O’Reilly’s programming focuses on race. White people are innocent and people of color are the perpetrators (e.g., see his coverage of the New Black Panthers, Ricci v. DeStefano, or any affirmative action case, among many other examples).

While there is no empirical basis for white people experiencing “reverse racism,” this view is held by a large number of Americans. According to the 2014 MTV David Binder research project, for instance, nearly half of white millennials between the ages of 18–24 believed that discrimination against people of color is as bad as discrimination toward people of color.⁵ In another investigation, Norton and Sommers (2011) found that in the 2000’s white people believe that anti-white racial bias occurs more frequently than anti-black racial bias. This was not the case prior to the new millennium and is in response to perceptions of decreased bias against Black Americans since the civil rights era. The authors refer to this phenomenon as white Americans’ “a zero-sum game that they now are losing.” We contend that the increased prevalence of racial resentment and the notion of whites as victims of racism is a discursive manifestation of white rage in a society that now frowns upon overt expressions of racial superiority and hatred.

**WHITE GUILT AND SHAME**

We define white guilt as remorse, self-reproach, or sense of responsibility for individual or collective wrongdoing with regard to racism. This differs from popular notions, which equate white guilt with self-serving, self-flagellation that is counterproductive in terms of addressing systemic racism. Receiving much empirical attention in recent years, white guilt represents a crucial emotion of racism that emerges among white individuals who are aware of systemic racism and white privilege. In the psychological literature on emotions in general, guilt motivates some people to take self-correcting action to alleviate negative feelings (Tangney and Fischer 1995). With regard to race-related guilt, or white guilt, conceptual writings and empirical research both have suggested that white guilt indeed can be linked to cultural competence and social action (Iyer, Leach, and Crosby 2003; Segrest 1994; Spanierman, Poteat et al. 2008). For example, Spanier-

man and her colleagues (2008) found that higher scores on a measure of white guilt were linked to counselors’ ability to consider racial and cultural factors (e.g., racism and isolation) as the cause of a client’s problems. Relatedly, social psychologists Iyer, Leach, and Pederson (2004) explained that racial guilt could predict particular actions, such as promoting an apology or material compensatory efforts. However, they cautioned that white guilt is infrequent and self-focused (i.e., the compensatory action serves the purpose of making the white person feel better), and does not predict non-compensatory policies such as equal opportunity programs.

Additionally, research indicates that the nature of white guilt depends on the context. One of Spanierman’s current projects involves teasing apart the various dimensions of white guilt to determine whether some aspects are productive (i.e., linked to accountability) and others are maladaptive (i.e., impede racial awareness and social action). On the basis of our empirical research and teaching courses such as Whiteness and the University and Whiteness and Education, we agree with Helms (1990) and McKinney (2005) that engaging and channeling guilt may be an important part of the process for whites to become racially conscious and an area that deserves further attention.

Notably, scholars have critiqued the construct of white guilt. Some, for instance, have observed that white guilt is a middle-class emotion and seen much less often among working-class whites (Preston 2007). Furthermore, educators argue that white guilt recenters whiteness in the classroom, thus shifting the focus away from the experiences of students of color. This recentering of whiteness may prevent white students from learning about racism and white privilege, may serve to maintain the status quo, and can leave white students in a state of racial arrested development (i.e., being stuck in a place of racial naiveté and obliviousness) (Yamato 1998, Cabrera, Watson, and Franklin, at press). Others have critiqued researchers for conflating white guilt and shame, and suggest that some of the maladaptive elements of white guilt might in fact be white shame (Grzanka 2010; Tangney 1999; Thandeka 1999).

Thandeka (1999), a theologian and Unitarian Universalist minister, defined white shame as a longstanding internal conflict that lowers an individual’s self-esteem. The conflict pertains to one’s sense of self as good and moral on the one hand, and a feeling that one’s being is inherently flawed. In the general psychological literature (not necessarily pertaining to race), shame has been differentiated from guilt in several important ways: (a) shame involves a negative appraisal of one’s self, whereas guilt is linked to a negative evaluation of a particular behavior; (b) shame is linked to feeling worthless, powerless, and unlovable, whereas guilt is not; and (c) guilt may motivate reparative action, whereas shame does not appear to do so. Thandeka further
explained that with white shame nothing can be done for retribution, because nobody did anything wrong.

White guilt also manifests in collective forms. Social psychologist Nyla Branscombe and her colleagues (2004) identified various antecedents and consequences of collective white guilt. For Branscombe and colleagues, collective guilt is a nation’s experience of guilt for either causing harm within (e.g., displacement and genocide of American Indians) or outside (e.g., genocide of Jewish people in the Holocaust) the nation. Their research findings suggest that under the right conditions the distress of collective guilt may motivate reparative, pro-social action, such as a national apology.

**WHITE EMPATHY**

White empathy refers to understanding the dehumanization and pain that people of color experience as a result of racial oppression. It is an emotion that educators suggest fostering among white students, because it can disrupt white racism and propel white individuals toward antiracism (Cabrera 2012). Operationalized as anger and sadness about the existence of racism in Spanierman’s quantitative research, white empathy has been associated with higher levels of racial awareness, cultural sensitivity, an appreciation of diversity, prior multicultural education, and more racially diverse friends (Spanierman and Hepner 2004; Spanierman, Poteat et al. 2008). In Cabrera’s (2012) qualitative work, he conceptualizes racial empathy as a concurrent critique of white supremacy and humanization of people of color that can lead to antiracist actions. Some students may feel bad that racism exists and even agree that it is harmful to people of color, but they lack any sense of accountability and are not moved to take action. This is reflected by the number of white student research participants who made statements such as, “Racism is bad… I feel terrible about it… but it’s not my fault [or my problem]!” (Spanierman, Oh et al. 2008). The above-mentioned research suggests that white empathy is necessary but not sufficient for inspiring pro-racial justice behaviors.

Feagin and Vera (1995) posit three stages of white empathy, which include sympathy, empathy, and autopathy. Sympathy refers to the most limited stage in which white individuals develop a passive interest in the lives of racialized people; it is largely expressed as pity or feeling sorry for someone else. Empathy, the second stage, is a more consistent and developed ability to understand racialized individuals’ feelings. Here, white people are better able to identify with someone else’s pain and suffering. In the third stage, autopathy, white individuals deliberately place themselves in situations to approximate feelings of marginalization and oppression. In a qualitative study by Spanierman and her colleagues (Spanierman, Oh et al. 2008, 858), a young white racial ally described “discrimination by association” whereby the police harassed her when she was on the streets with her Black friends. Living in a predominately Black community, she and her family deliberately sought meaningful relationships with people of color, and therefore she understood her Black peers’ experiences differently than most white individuals do. Of all the emotions of white racism that we have discussed thus far, autopathy seems most closely aligned with the emotions of white antiracism, which we discuss below.

**EMOTIONS OF WHITE ANTIRACISM**

In addition to the deep sense of empathy (or autopathy) described above, the emotions of white antiracism also include moral outrage or indignant antiracism, compassion, joy, and hope, which lead to antiracist action. Moral outrage may arise in response to learning about the realities of structural racism. It refers to feelings of anger and frustration about the existence of racial injustice, and may be considered the “flip side” to white rage described above. Jensen (2005) argues that more moral outrage is needed among whites, that whites should be as outraged about racism as people of color. Spanierman and her colleagues examined the perspectives of white students at the University of Illinois who exhibited some antiracist characteristics (Kordesh, Spanierman, and Neville 2013). These students, high in white empathy and productive forms of guilt, expressed moral outrage about a number of campus diversity issues. For example, these white students noted they were extremely dissatisfied with the lack of administrative response to racial-themed parties (e.g., “Tacos and Tequila” in which white fraternity and sorority members dressed up as stereotypes of Mexicans for their own selfish enjoyment). They also expressed outrage at dress codes at the local bars that discriminate against young Black men. Although not directly related to race, research on a general form of moral outrage suggests it is a stronger predictor than guilt of support for social justice efforts (Montada and Schneider 1989).

When white people become aware of racial oppression, they frequently want to dedicate their racial privileges toward actions designed to eliminate racism (Edwards 2006; Reason, Roosa Millar, and Scales 2005). However, this form of white outrage can be destructive if not properly channeled. In the absence of praxis (theory/critique + action), moral outrage can transform into
nihilism (Peet 2006). An absence of self-reflection in moral outrage, blaming racist whites as opposed to “good” whites, can be a method white individuals use to feel better about themselves. More specifically, within antiracist circles, this moral outrage frequently trumps a concurrent analysis of one’s own racial privileges. In a Freirian sense, many white people who aspire to ally with people of color begin this journey working for as opposed to working with communities of color (see Freire 2000). As director of campus life, Keith Edwards (2006, 39) explained, “some who genuinely aspire to act as social justice allies are harmful, ultimately, despite their best intentions, perpetuating the system of oppression they seek to change.” Consistent with our earlier discussion of white empathy, this type of harm occurs when white people confuse sympathy for empathy and take a patronizing view of people of color when combating racism. At the same time, white individuals who become aware of racial oppression may lack empathy for other white people who have not yet come to such awareness. Thus, rage directed exclusively as a social critique but with no self-interrogation may have little effect on dismantling racism and may inadvertently perpetuate racial oppression by alienating people of color and other white individuals. Although the journey from white racism to white antiracism (e.g., learning the truth about historical and contemporary social inequality) is painful, scholars have documented the feelings of joy on the other side (Siegel 2010). In a qualitative study among eighteen white antiracists, for instance, Smith and Redington (2010) found that participants felt “a sense of integrity,” “peace of mind,” “joyful feeling of connection to humanity,” and sense of “moral fulfillment” as a result of their journey toward antiracism. Furthermore, white antiracists in this study reported experiencing a sense of authenticity, pleasure, and relief, so much so that they wanted to advertise the good feeling to other whites. Finally, they reported feeling hope for future generations, for a better world with less racism, and greater humanity for all. Hope is a critically important component of white antiracist emotions, and it should not be confused with optimism. Optimism is the belief that conditions will improve. Hope, on the other hand, is the eternal possibility that conditions can improve (West 2008). Duncan-Andrade (2009) argues that not all forms of hope are equally effective at addressing oppressive circumstances. For example, “mythical hope” is a view that conditions can improve, but it relies on faith in the American system to correct inequality, overlooking structural oppression embedded within this system. Instead, Duncan-Andrade argues that “critical hope” is necessary. This form of hope requires analysis of systemic oppression, intentional action to disrupt oppression, and consistent self-reflection. It stands directly in opposition to nihilism, and intentionally integrates affect, cognition, and action.

**IMPLICATIONS**

Now that we have shared our taxonomy of the emotions of white racism and antiracism, we turn our attention to its implications, in particular, for pedagogical practice. Because the emotions of white racism and antiracism are many, varied, and linked to behaviors, educators must learn to recognize and respond to them effectively in the classroom (Goodman 2011; Reason, Roosa Millar, and Scales 2005). Our naming and categorizing these varied emotions may assist educators, who in many fields are not trained to deal with white students’ emotional intensity and may feel overwhelmed, incompetent, and misunderstood (Tatum 1992). Those of us who teach about racism and whiteness will not succeed if we are not prepared to engage with white students’ deep-seated, socially sanctioned fear and hostility. And we will be far less successful in unsupportive, racially color-blind university environments if we do not recognize the systemic support for white racism and denial. An unfortunate, but pragmatic, consideration is that white students are more likely to be receptive to learning about power, privilege, and oppression from white educators. White students dismiss educators of color frequently when they discuss issues of race in their classes (Smith and Lander 2012; Tuitt et al. 2009). Individual educators alone cannot shoulder the responsibility for addressing the emotions of white racism, which are recreated systemically. With these various systemic matters in mind, some recommendations include:

1. Educators must prepare white students for experiencing a range of emotions as they learn about racism and white privilege; we can normalize and validate the process.
2. Educators must be aware that strong emotional responses among students interfere with their ability to process cognitive information.
3. White educators, in particular, must take responsibility for teaching white students about racism. We know that white role models are important in the development of white racial allies. And, it is not reasonable to put the onus on racialized faculty. White educators can become powerful mentors to white students as they begin their antiracism journey.
4. Educators need to challenge white students to be accountable for educating themselves about racism. Much like it is the duty of white professors to teach about racism, white students concurrently bear responsibility for learning about race and racism instead of relying on their peers of color to be their racial educators.
5. To address white fear and reliance on stereotypes, educators and administrators should create settings that foster meaningful friendships across differences. This might be accomplished in the classroom, and should also
be addressed in the larger university setting such as in the residence halls and intergroup dialogues.

6. We must acknowledge that not all white individuals experience the emotions of racism and antiracism in the same way. Intersecting identities (e.g., gender and social class status) likely influence such emotions. For instance, white men may be more likely to suppress emotional responses or channel them into an acceptable “manly” emotion: anger. In this example, educators must dig deeper for other white male racial emotions.

7. Educators, especially white educators, need to be willing to make themselves emotionally vulnerable, make mistakes, and challenge the notion that to have a racist inclination makes you a racist and therefore a bad person. We need to be prepared to model the same types of behaviors and emotional vulnerability we seek from our students. This is an incredible risk, and requires a great deal of courage. To borrow from the recently passed Maya Angelou, “Courage is the most important of all the virtues because without it, you cannot practice the others consistently.”

8. Finally, we need research to identify effective interventions in fostering change among white students. For example, how do we disrupt white fear and at the same time foster white empathy and moral outrage, which are appropriate responses to domination and dehumanization of racialized peoples? How might we help white students to experience and express emotions such as productive forms of guilt (which may be a necessary part of the process of becoming antiracist)? And, finally, how do we best support educators who are on the front lines teaching volatile, emotion-laden content such as racism and white privilege to white students?

We make these recommendations with a cautionary note. As the cultural norms of many educational institutions are white, white people only minimally have to address issues of race. As such, we encourage educators to engage white racial emotions as part of a larger antiracist project. However, educators need to strike a balance in their approach. Education scholar Diane Gusa (2010) argues that predominantly white institutions are culturally and structurally normed around whiteness in what she labels a white institutional presence. Sara Ahmed (2012) refers to this as institutional whiteness. This concurrently means white students are frequently in states of racial arrested development (Cabrera, Watson, and Franklin, at press) and require a disproportionate amount of time and energy from educators to help them work through their whiteness. To what extent does this attention take away educational opportunities from students of color? Our concern is that engaging white racial emotions devolves into a type of racial group therapy where the learning needs of students of color are ignored because they are assumed to be ahead of the curve in terms of the racial identity development (Lensmire et al. 2013). We obviously do not argue for ignoring the needs of white students as these emotions arise. Rather, educators need to strike a balance between constructive racial engagement with white students and tending to the needs of students of color.

Also linked to white institutional presence, university administrators have a responsibility to educate themselves and create systemic change. Diversity educators likely will be more effective in institutional environments that support diversity and equity from the top. In a world in which color-blind racial ideology is pervasive among white individuals who are socialized to deny or minimize racism, we must be prepared to deal with the variety and depth of feelings that we may unearth when the truth wakes them up. The overall goal in this pedagogical approach is to move white individuals away from melancholia, anger, apathy, and fear, toward the more productive racial emotions such as productive guilt and empathy, and ultimately toward a stance of pro-racial justice.

NOTES

1. A version of this chapter originally appeared in On Whiteness (Falkof and Cashman-Brown 2012).
2. Used with Permission of the National Constitution Center.
6. Our use of the term “white rage” extends beyond that of Martin Durham, White Rage: The Extreme Right and American Politics (New York: Routledge, 2007), which applies solely to extreme right-wing groups in the United States.
7. For the full discussion, please see: http://mediamatters.org/blog/2014/05/14/fox-s-bill-oreilly-falsely-claims-harvard-requir/199326
9. For example, when white guilt is coupled with irrational white fear of people of color it is less productive than when it is coupled with white empathy.


REFERENCES


Interethnic relations in Romania suffered a blow in 2010. The representative of the Liberal-Democrat Party in the Romanian Parliament, Silviu Prigoana, drafted a bill in which persons of Romani ethnic origin should officially be called tiganii (Gypsy) rather than romi (Romani). One of Prigoana’s arguments in support of this proposal, which did not pass, was that Europeans frequently confuse Romanians and Romani due to the similar sound of the names. This bill was proposed in a country that is comprised of 2.5 percent (approximately 500,000) Romani according to the 2002 national census, although demographers speculate that as many as two million Romani may actually live in Romania without declaring their ethnic identity (Fofiu 2013). The social implications of such an initiative were and are deep. It put an official stamp on a longstanding tension in Eastern European interethnic relations; Romani were verbally herded into a separate group with seemingly little connection to the official national identity. The re-naming of this ethnicity in Romania expressed the political power (Vinceze 2011) of a white majority over a non-white minority, and denied the minority group the right to self-definition.

Given the historical multiculturalism of the Balkans and Eastern Europe, such a public and political debate is not surprising. Intercultural relations in these regions have historically been the powder keg of Europe, and the de/reterritorialization of cultures brought about by globalization flows (Inda and Rosaldo 2002) add to the conflicual character of majority-minority relations in the area. In this chapter I consider the Internet as a high-fidelity mirror of off-line social dynamics. This is the position Lisa Nakamura (2009) takes in Digitizing Race: Visual Cultures of the Internet. She finds race and racism on the Internet are relevant because they are culturally produced by social actors who are already shaped by the ways in which race and racism exist.