COMMUNIST’S POST-MODERN POWER DILEMMA: ONE STEP BACK, TWO STEPS FORWARD, “SOFT NO” AND HARD CHOICES ...

Nicos Trimikliotis
A COMMUNIST’S POST-MODERN POWER
DILEMMA: ONE STEP BACK, TWO STEPS
FORWARD, “SOFT NO” AND HARD CHOICES ...
[The Cyprus Review, Spring 2006, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring 2006)]

Nicos Trimikliniotis*

Abstract
This paper considers the challenges ahead after having assessed what determined the outcome of the referendum in April 2004 and the balance of forces as they emerge in the Parliamentary elections of 2006. In spite of the generally sound claims that globalisation shifts decision-making away from nation-states, particularly weak and small states to networks beyond the nation-state, in the case of Cyprus what we have for the first time paradoxically is the “fate” of Cyprus primarily in the hands of Cypriots themselves. Although semi-occupied the two communities can make their decision as to the future of their country and state, providing they agree to share power in a federal state. This would mean addressing the obstacles they are facing, including the current polarisation of Greek-Cypriot opinion, which is divided amongst those who want to live together with the Turkish Cypriots and those who want to live apart. The Parliamentary elections of 2006 have not resolved matters. The key to the future of Cyprus is the contestation between the “hard no” and the “soft no”, which at the same time is the contestation between the “Right” and the “Left”: the paradox is that they are coalition partners in Government.

Introduction
An outburst of publications has appeared relating to the Annan plan, the referendum and the post-referendum conjunctures in Cyprus¹ which make it a separate task to review such material.² However, little work has been done in terms of a detailed analysis on the balance of political and social forces within Greek-Cypriot society.³ Very few works have managed to move beyond the eschatological, aphoristic and sweeping accusations of the “yes” and “no” camps, blaming each other for risking to make the partition permanent and for trying to bring a catastrophe to Cyprus. Irrespective of one’s stance during the period of referenda, it is now essential to move beyond that. A sober analysis is warranted, if we are to provide a reasoned sociological explanation of the tendencies in Cypriot society, not to mention the political necessity for such an analysis so that Greek-Cypriot politics can finally open the public space for a dialogue as to how to proceed from the current
impasse. This is not simply a matter to be decided by the political elite, but a matter to be debated and decided by citizens at a societal level. This paper attempts to examine the balance of forces within Greek-Cypriot society via an analysis of the discourses, ideologies and political practices in their evolution since the appearance of "Annan I" or thereabouts, as they are embedded within their distinct social base and their connection to questions of power, wealth and security.

During the period around the beginning of the millennium, in what we define as "the Euro-Cyprus conjuncture", a number of disparate international forces finally converged due to changes in priorities, strategies and long-term and short-term goals in the post-cold war era. The paper links the debates over the Annan plan and the way forward amongst various political parties and schools of thought to the resulting post-referenda political scene. This is defined by new kinds of polarisations, which may have certain elements of continuity with the past, but mark a qualitatively new era in Greek-Cypriot politics which corresponds to an equivalent rupture in society and defines new social cleavages.

That there is a polarisation of society between the "yes" and "no" supporters since April 2004 is to state the obvious to any informed observer. What is not often recognised is the extent to which there is an ongoing implicit but rather intense contest between the Greek-Cypriot "maximalists" on the one hand, who aim to "bury the Annan plan" (referred to as "hard no"), and on the other hand those who want to see "minimum changes to the plan to make it acceptable to the Greek-Cypriots" (referred to as the "soft no"). This paper, therefore, considers how President Papadopoulos managed to elevate himself into an unstable but nonetheless hegemonic position as long as he is in power. Papadopoulos has the full "state ammunition" of the powers vested in him as "President", inheriting the powers of the Colonial Governor, enjoying privileges and powers of an elected post-colonial monarch and legitimated by the enormous popularity and charisma of Archbishop Makarios: A colonial designed the regime's "checks and balances" on the basis of a communal consociation essentially via the Turkish-Cypriot Vice President. However, the constitution, as regards participation of the Turkish Cypriots, has been in abeyance since 1963. Through political manoeuvring, Tassos Papadopoulos has managed to retain the upper hand until 2008, but faces critical challenges: The stalemate is a major problem and the slick Erdogan-Talat duo has promised to remain "one step ahead". It is no easy task when the President is also facing criticism from the even "harder no" camp that he once nurtured himself in addition to the dilemmas of trying to "retain AKEL on board", the pressures from the USA, the EU and the UN, as well as the opposition of Anastasiades' "modernised" DISY. A "strong" President in a divided micro-state whose legitimacy is increasingly being questioned cannot hope to stay in that position too long. The "doctrine of necessity" seems to be running out of steam: The property question for both Turkish-Cypriots under
the control of the Republic and the Greek-Cypriots in the occupied territories is like a ticking bomb, as the current state of limbo cannot continue indefinitely without cost to the Government. The elections of 2008 will be the test. This will also be the test for AKEL.

AKEL, on the other hand is the largest political party in Cyprus and within the Government coalition, but it is in an extremely difficult situation, currently performing an impossible “balancing act” between two opposing tendencies, its traditionally pro-solution, pro-rapprochement support and being locked in a coalition with the “hard no”. Moreover, AKEL is forced to compromise between the popular social demands of the mass movement it represents and the disciplines of power in what it perceives as a neoliberal EU context. It will soon be forced to decide whether it will continue to be the major party but subordinated by President Papadopoulos, or whether it will decide to take the lead and put forward its own candidate, which will then open the way for a compromise solution to Cyprus.

This article considers the shifts of position as regards the notion of “solution” and the gradual erosion of the so-called “soft no” by the “hard no”, at least at the level of political discourse. AKEL is the soul of the “soft no”. However, the Left in Cyprus, dominated by AKEL, is faced with a broader set of dilemmas: How does it deal with the conflicting legacies of a rhetoric of anti-imperialism and a class-based rapprochement in the context of resolving a “national question”? How does it compromise a legacy of fostering “national unity” within the Greek-Cypriot community when there are such fundamental differences on the “national question” whilst trying to reach an understanding with the Turkish-Cypriot Left, which is in power in the north? Can AKEL’s typically “centrist” position move beyond a defensive strategy so that the “soft no” can at last become meaningful as a policy towards solution, or is it condemned to be eroded and eaten up by the “hard no”? AKEL could thus be forced to confront the question of power head on: Should there be a Left-wing candidate in the next election? The next few months can be telling as Ankara is facing two elections whilst being tested on its hard road to accession to the EU. The Cyprus Republic faces the tests of membership in the EU and the costs for the Greek-Cypriot “no” are gradually being felt as partition is being normalised, without a solution.

The basic position of this paper maintains that the contest between the “hard no” and the “soft no” holds the key to unlocking the Cyprus problem because it defines whether we will have a consolidation of the de facto partition via the prolonged continuation of the status quo, or whether there will be a meaningful but limited renegotiation of the Annan plan that will lead to an agreement.
At this point, the term “Left” is deliberately vague, although a three dimensional axis is provided to locate it more specifically in an increasingly complex and confusing world.

**The Euro-Cypriot Paradox: The Making of the Conjuncture**

It is accurately claimed that globalisation in general tends to shift decision-making away from nation-states, particularly weak and small states, to transnational networks and supranational powers beyond the nation-state. However, in the case of Cyprus, a small divided country, the specificities of the international and regional balance of forces and their current priorities in a chaotic post-cold war era dictates that the insecurity in the broader Middle Eastern region and the Balkans calls for more stability in Cyprus, where the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus triangle joins (see Anagnostopoulou, 2004; Trimikliniotis, 2004b). Thus in a world, hegemonised by the US, but facing constant challenges – due in part to the US policy that destabilises the Middle East and partially as a result of the “decline of American power” with its supremacy riddled with contradictions, – a solution to the Cyprus problem would serve as an important stabilising factor in the region and benefit all major forces in a number of ways. A re-united Cyprus within the EU could facilitate the smoothing of Turkey’s own accession orbit, given that Turkey faces a backlash by an increasingly insecure – many would say racist – European public opinion. Moreover, Turkey’s own internal and contradictory transformations resulting mostly from the accession process faces difficulties which make it increasingly difficult to meet the EU anchoring targets. There is internal opposition to economic reform liberalisation which creates turbulence amongst the poorer sections of the population, and there is opposition to political and human-rights reforms that may undermine the privileged position of the authoritarian Kemalist Army. The Kurdish question has been rekindled enhancing the political role of the military, whilst the NATO alliance with the West against “fellow Muslims” prompts unrest amongst those populations that form the social basis of AKP and the popular Erdogan leadership. The USA and the EU require Turkey’s accession route to remain on course in order to retain Ankara as a regional secular force of stability in this turbulent region: Even after the rejection of the UN plan it might in some ways be easier to deliver a solution on the Cyprus problem than to deliver internal political reform in connection with the Kurdish question or economic improvements.

In other words, with the advent of the new millennium a conjuncture emerged which gave Cypriots an opportunity to take their fate into their own hands: This conjuncture, the Euro-Cypriot paradox, has its limitations of course because the scope of this “free choice” is itself determined by powerful national, international and regional factors. Nonetheless it allows the two communities of a semi-occupied micro-state to take decisions on the future and the shape of a re-united state, providing they do agree to share power in a federal state. Perhaps, for the first time, it is not the “external factors”
alone that determine the future; at the moment the key for the solution to the Cyprus problem may well lie with the Cypriots themselves.\textsuperscript{11}

In this context, it is essential to discuss the internal factors, without wanting to undervalue the international factors and obstacles to resolution. After all, the so-called “Cyprus problem” consists at least of the internal and the international component – the dominant Greek-Cypriot discourses overplay the international over the internal, (i.e. it is fundamentally a problem of invasion and occupation by Turkey) and the dominant Turkish-Cypriot discourses overplay the internal over the international, (i.e. it is fundamentally a problem of ethnic conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots). As analysed elsewhere (Trimikliniotis, 2000a, 2005a, forthcoming), the Cyprus problem cannot be detached from the wider international issues surrounding it; these issues form \textit{an integral part of the problem itself}. It is precisely due to this that many sound analysts see the role of the international factor as crucial to the resolution of the problem (Attalides, 1979; Hitchens, 1997).\textsuperscript{12} Often the role of the “international political actors” is invoked in Greek-Cypriot political discourse in different forms such as “foreign powers”, “the powerful of this world”, or “imperialism”. It has been correctly pointed out that the conflict in Cyprus cannot merely be seen as externally imposed nor is it simply a “generic ethnic antagonism” (Anthias, 1987, pp. 187-188). The conflict is one of multiple levels.\textsuperscript{13} Understanding the Cyprus problem means examining some “internal” dynamics and processes like class, ethnicity, power, and nationalism together with factors “external” (or adjacent) to the Cypriot State, for example, international treaties and laws; other countries interventions, particularly Greece, Turkey, Britain and NATO, which is under US hegemony and regional and world politics.\textsuperscript{14} Moreover, there is a social and ideological dimension deriving from the “use and abuse” of the Cyprus problem within Greek-Cypriot society and as such we are obliged to examine the central role of the internal actors (see Trimikliniotis, 2000a, 2005a).

\textbf{The Post-referendum Greek-Cypriot Political Scenery}

\textit{The Annan Plan and Greek-Cypriot Politics in 2006: The “Yes”, the “Soft No” and the “Hard No”}

More than two years after the historic moment when Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were asked to vote in an unprecedented referendum to reunite the country, Cyprus is still caught in its aftermath. President Tassos Papadopoulos’ own dramatic address to the Greek-Cypriots on 7 April 2004, calling for a “resounding no” was based on the premise that the referendum was a \textit{crucial historic event}. All the political leaders concurred about the importance of the referendum, even those who strongly objected to the terms, style and tone of Papadopoulos’ address.

In his opening remarks to the specially convened Pancyprian Conference of AKEL on 14 April 2004, the General Secretary of the party, Demetris Chrisofias
was in no doubt that “the characterisation ‘historical moments’ is one of [the] few times that is fully justifiable.” In a book that aptly captures the spirit of the times and provides an analysis of the post-referendum climate, Takis Hadjidemetriou (2006) refers to 24 April as a “landmark date” when Cypriots had to face “the historic dilemmas”. The same viewpoint is taken by most known opponents of the plan. By any standard the referendum represents a decisive point in the recent history of Cyprus and it is still an active force in the divided Cypriot society, on both sides of the barbed wire.

The climate both during and following the referendum has been characterised by a hysteria on both sides of the camp, the “yes” and the “no” supporters, that has made informed dialogue extremely difficult. In fact ever since the introduction of Annan I it has not been possible to engage in a meaningful dialogue, in spite of efforts made at the time. Hadjidemetriou (2006) refers to the tense, polarised and intimidating mood during the referendum, in which the popular perceptions were more or less “conditioned” by a number of factors such as misinformation and use of the state machinery to influence people. Businessmen involved in construction and land development, particularly in the regions of Paphos and Limassol, were fearful that land prices would depreciate and affect their investments (p. 114); civil servants campaigned against the UN plan after being informed that posts and pensions may not be secure (p. 114); ambassadors and employees of the Foreign Ministry were on alert to demonise the plan (p. 115); police officers campaigned against it after being told by the Minister in charge and other high ranking Ministry officials that their employee rights were not safe under the plan; central bank officers were informed that their jobs were insecure because Turkish Cypriots would have to be employed, and the vast majority of the church leaders also campaigned against the plan (p. 116). For Hadjidemetriou, however, the most crucial role was played by the media's biased presentation and the terms by which President Papadopoulos rejected the plan. In such a climate, as the very terms of the Presidential rejection left no room for reasoned argument, we thus witnessed “the death of political dialogue” – it was a demonisation of the worst kind. Hence, new racisms were unleashed “derived from the nationalism, fanaticism and intolerance” against Turkish Cypriots for whom “we would have to pay”, as populist discourses expounded, or against Kofi Annan, Colin Powell and Condoleisa Rice, due to the colour of their skin (Hadjidemetriou, 2006, pp. 18-19). A number of grievances were lodged with the Cyprus anti-discrimination and anti-racist body over this racist issue. As a result some families were driven apart, friendships ceased, and political parties were sharply divided (some even split).

Post-referendum Greek-Cypriot politics may have “calmed down” a little since, but the essential elements of that climate are still in place. Different indicators of attitudes such as electoral results, opinion polls and research conducted from 2004 to 2006 show that there is polarisation, confusion and
uncertainty amongst the Greek-Cypriot population. The core issue is the inherent inability of the Greek-Cypriot political system and the party structure to engage in a meaningful dialogue over the content of the solution as proposed in the Annan plan. This can be interpreted as a “pathology” of the political system that tends to treat differences of opinion regarding a solution to the Cyprus issue as “national treachery”, as it symbolises “a wound in the national body”. Avoiding the danger of too much “pathologising” of a social formation, we may interpret this as a crisis of the political system when it approaches some notional “limits”: The Annan plan was for sure the end of an era of a mono-communal political system as we have known so far. The system closure can thus be understood as both a self-defence of the system to perpetuate its existence, as well as a malfunction of the democratic process itself derived from the inability of the Cyprus Republic to cope with a radical transformation of its historical “nation-state dialectic” inherent in all national states (see Trimikliniotis, 2000a; forthcoming).

Philippou (2005) attempts to penetrate and remedy this probably incurable tendency by conceptualising this state in Foucaultian terms as an “austere Cypriot enclosure”. He draws on Kitromilides who refers to the “sickliness of Greek-Cypriot political thought” that ideologically entraps politics in a conventional and cyclical perception of the political problem (Kitromilides, 1998-1999). If combined with Kitromilides’ celebrated “dialectic of intolerance” (Kitromilides, 1979), we have a powerful critique of the hegemonic system of political thought in Cyprus. Philippou illustrates that the Annan plan, posed “as a problem and as a question”, calls for an implicit challenge to the legitimacy of the claims made by the power mechanisms in Greek-Cypriot society. The system survives by suppressing questioning, concealing any potential for reflexivity, and by recycling clichés without reappraisal, dogmatic thinking and meaningless sound bites (Philippou, 2005, p. 70). The Annan plan, instead of being presented as the product of a long-lasting process of negotiation and compromise between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (and others), was presented as an “alien aborted product” or “an unworkable freak monster” for which no one was prepared to take responsibility (see Hadjidemetriou, 2006).

A number of intellectuals have lambasted the absence of critical thought before the appearance of the Annan plan: Kitromilides (1981, pp. 451-453) noted that the legacy of colonialism was the ideological framework of political life, which was characterised by an absence of serious dissent that would challenge the dominant social and political life of Cyprus which resulted in a weakening of social critique. Ierodiakonou (2003) wrote about the undemocratic elements and the deficiencies in observing the constitution, whilst Mavratsas (2003, pp. 119-157) attributes “the atrophy of civil society” and “clientelist corporatism” to be the key characteristics of Greek-Cypriot society. Similarly, Attalides (2006) in a recent review article makes similar observations.
Although this paper to a large extent shares the above critiques, it considers that they do not properly capture and fully assess the complexity of Cypriot society, as though it were a large homogeneous space which is somehow "weak" or "unable to produce critical thinking". Gramsci’s contribution to the study of civil society provides a different approach to the dominant western approaches (Gramsci, 1972). Andreas Panayiotou (1999) presents perhaps the most comprehensive study on the role of the Left within civil society, and sketches out an alternative view of understanding civil society, modernisation and development of Cypriot/Greek-Cypriot political culture. The Left played a crucial role in Cyprus’ own route to modernity in the twentieth century. Moreover, the sophisticated work of Constantinou (2002, 2003a) provides for a more complex and nuanced understanding of the state and civil society in the Cypriot context. To properly appreciate Cypriot civil society one has to grasp the process of the transformation of Cyprus from a colony to what Constantinou (2002, p. 20) refers to as a “post-colonial quasi-state”, given that “Cyprus was founded by Grossraum experiences which dictated its limited sovereignty”. It is this contest for hegemony between the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot elite that resulted in a distorted public sphere and shaped civil society accordingly. As aptly pointed out by Constantinou (2003a, p. 36), “civil society is not so much a sphere outside political power” and,

“it is not separate but influent on centres of power. This is particularly true in the case of Cyprus whereby the concept of government does not enjoy any significant margin of sectoral autonomy while the cohesiveness of civil society and party blocs largely compensates for the absence of a classical form of impersonal sovereign stateness capable of effect as well as affect.”

After the introduction of the Annan plan there was some debate over the complex nature of civil society and the social movements as inspired by the Swiss example and what we can learn for Cyprus (see Constantinou, 2003c and Trimikliniotis, 2003b).

To interpret the current lack of an open and democratic dialogue over the Annan plan is primarily the expression of the dilemmas of AKEL itself, which had been seen as a beacon for large sections of the population and functioned as the only alternative, even if it took a mild form, to the mainstream elites. It is the failure to properly appreciate the historic contribution of AKEL, with all its successes, failures and inadequacies that may lead to misunderstanding over the nature of civil society in Cyprus. The party, in spite of its historic democratic deficits, had been a major force in democratising society, channelling and expressing the views of the subaltern and “as a labour pillar substituted for the deficient legitimacy of the state” given that it pre-existed the Republic (Constantinou, 2003a, p. 36). AKEL and its allied organisation of the “popular movement” («λαϊκό κίνημα») organised as a “counter-hegemony”
since in practice it operated as a Gramscian party without a Gramsci-like theorist, to use Panayiotou’s insightful perspective (Panayiotou, 1999). AKEL’s vacillation over “Enosis” and its early reluctant support of irredentism resulted in failing to keep together a fragmented society and to consolidate and “freeze the ethnic cleavage and split political identification along communal lines” (Constantinou, 2003b, p. 37). Moreover, AKEL’s support of archbishop Makarios as President, and the subsequent leaders of the Greek Cypriots (with the exception of Clerides) was rightly criticised for being too closely identified with his policies. This was done at the expense of class unity and the building of a common front with the Turkish-Cypriot Leftists (see Anthias and Ayres, 1978, 1983). However, AKEL remained a popular movement outside the realms of power, and for decades was branded as “traitor” for daring to question EOKA’s military campaign in the 1950s. Moreover, the party remained a voice of calm and compromise, as it supported both rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots, as well as being a loyal supporter of the Cyprus Republic and its institutions. It was therefore a central pillar of civil society and a natural, but mild “functional opposition” of an almost “internal exile”: The party, its allied organisations and trade unions commanded massive support, controlled large portions of the cooperative movement, and had its own counter-hegemonic culture such as football teams, local meeting places in all neighbourhoods (“syllogoi”), entertainment events, and festivals within civil society (see Panayiotou, 1999). With the collapse of the so-called “actually existing socialism” and the internal split of 1989-1991, without abandoning its adherence to the communist ideology, AKEL made moves towards democratising its own centralist institutions and began to transform itself into a more open party allowing for more internal discussion, more questioning of the legacy of Stalinism and its confrontation with nationalism, the party’s relations with the Turkish Cypriots as well as voicing different opinions in public about social issues etc.

This, however, was brought to an abrupt halt due to two factors: Firstly, AKEL’s transition into a governmental force, the party is now in a different trajectory, and thus, after decades of “internal exile” AKEL has been “symbolically rehabilitated” and has accepted to uphold its role in the high echelons of state power. Secondly, AKEL’s adaptation coincided with the historic opportunity to reunite Cyprus thus bringing into direct collision the two potentially antagonistic traditions and strategies for the resolution of the Cyprus problem – “anti-imperialism” versus “rapprochement”. AKEL’s inability to cope with this ideological collision by setting out the rules of engagement/debate resulted in an historic failure to allow a free and open dialogue within and outside the party at all levels, which in turn spilled over and curbed freedom of speech throughout society. But then again the party has retained the prospect of a “solution” and its discourse of “reunification” and “rapprochement” are still central. Moreover, AKEL politicians who are known to have supported “yes” in the referendum are still prominent in the
party – perhaps more prominent than before, as the forthcoming municipal elections show.

There is no doubt that in post-referendum Greek-Cypriot politics there is a new taboo. References to the dreaded "Annan plan" itself are not acceptable; it has become the banned "A-word" of Greek-Cypriot politics and as a result, at least in the short term, this has squeezed out any possibility for debate over "softer" political alternatives to the current stalemate between the Greek-Cypriot's "no" and the Turkish-Cypriot's "yes". The political contest has continued and was tested in two national elections, i.e. the EU Parliament election shortly after the referendum in 2004 and the national Parliament election in May 2006. The election outcomes have not shown any massive overturning or reversal of old party structures, but the terms of the debate amongst the parties have shown a notable longer term shift away from a substantive politics to that of a politics of style and marketing.22

We can thus appreciate the hysterical exchanges at the time of the referendum and afterwards over the Annan plan as part of this pathology. The climax was rather bizarre when a tragic message was voiced by a high ranking DIKO MP calling to all those who were "bribed to vote Yes" to "commit suicide in public squares".23 Beyond the bizarre and the tragic, there is an internalisation of the "referendum trauma", which has meant that emerging ruptures and cleavages have been perpetuated and have even mutated into other forms of disagreements. The political differences, however, have merely turned into pathologies between the "yes" versus "no", and those who adopted a "soft no" during the referendum appear to have been caught "in between" political forces and have been attacked by all sides. There are some mild signs of recovery or "healing" but this is a rather slow and contradictory process.

The Contest between the "Hard No" and "Soft No"
The terms "hard no" and "soft no" are not used by the political actors themselves but are derived from the apparent disagreements between the two major partners of the current coalition Government, President Papadopoulos and AKEL. EDEK is less important; it serves a small buffer but often its discourse is much harder than any of the parties of "hard no". Papadopoulos, in his address to the Greek-Cypriot people on 7 April 2004 called on them to say a "resounding no"24 to the Annan plan, because it not only fails to "abolish the de facto partition but on the contrary it legalises and deepens it". AKEL's decision on 14 April, which was subsequently repeated in the political decision of the 20th Pancyprian Congress of the party,25 explicitly noted that

"AKEL did not share the evaluations made by the President of the Republic, as these had been expressed in his declaration, concerning the provisions of the Annan plan and especially concerning his evaluation. [...]"
If such an evaluation was supported then the plan should also not have been accepted not even as a basis for negotiation.”

The so-called “middle ground” that is somewhere “in between” the outright “yes” to the Annan plan and the “hard No” has been approved by the 20th Pancyprian Congress:

“AKEL quite rightly is working to continuously repel the two extreme trends which have been expressed on the domestic front. One trend, by exaggerating potential threats concerning the possible repercussions arising from the rejection of the plan, in essence comes out in favour of the reintroduction of the Annan plan in the form it was presented during the referenda, irrespective of the verdict of the people. The other trend, using the 76% “no” vote of the referendum result as a pretext and in the name of some vague so-called European solution, calls for the rejection of the plan but also of the bi-zonal bi-communal federal solution itself. The Congress assesses that both of these trends are catastrophic and calls on the new Central Committee to continue to repel and expose the dangers which these trends harbour.”

Furthermore, on many occasions during and after the referendum, the General Secretary of AKEL, Demetris Christofias was at pains to explain that “AKEL’s no” was different from the others, and “AKEL did not support a resounding no”. The often quoted extract from his statements by his critics, that “AKEL said no in order to cement a yes” [was presumably in the latter stages implying that there would be another referendum soon]. Christofias’ endeavour to steer AKEL into the “middle road” in an attempt to adopt a “centrist” position has made him a target of both the “yes” supporters for being “a stooge” or “tail of Papadopoulos” and “tailing nationalism” in order to “deceive AKEL supporters whilst benefiting from the privileges of being in power”, and coming under attack from the “hard no” supporters for being “the fifth column in the no camp” and for trying to retrieve the Annan plan with minor changes via “the back door”.

In order to follow the contest between the “hard no” and the “soft no”, one has to bear in mind the development of the policy regarding “managing the no vote” and the prospects for a solution in conjunction with the electoral results that followed.

In general, there has been little progress in terms of the efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem. Since the Greek-Cypriot rejection the UN Secretary General has asked the Greek Cypriots to state what changes to the UN plan are required to make it acceptable, but Papadopoulos was originally reluctant to state his concerns fearing that there would be another UN arbitration, “strict deadline for negotiations” and he would lose his “negotiating advantages”. The National Council convened several times and all parties
stated their “concerns” and Papadopoulos, after adding his own issues, “codified” the areas of concern. Finally, Papadopoulos sent a special envoy to state orally what he wanted as regards “areas of concern”. In the meantime, although he has repeatedly threatened to veto Ankara’s accession, this has proved impossible in practice since the initial go-ahead was given in December 2004 and again in October 2005. In terms of rhetoric there has been little debate and to date the Greek-Cypriot people have not officially been informed as to what these areas of concern are or what changes have been requested to the plan in order to make it acceptable, claiming that this information would “give away any negotiating advantages”.

The Report by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Kieran Prendergast, suggests that “the substantive points that the Greek-Cypriot side would like to pursue touched on most of the main issues dealt with in the plan, including governance, security, citizenship, residency, property, territory, economic and financial issues, transition periods and guarantees of implementation”. In other words the chapters that make up the entire UN plan; more importantly, what Papadopoulos proposes, via his all-out rejection of the plan is essentially an attack on the very political philosophy of the UN, in spite of his nominal reiteration of supporting “a bizonal bicommunal federation”. One would expect this criticism from Sir David Hannay (2005), however it is fully confirmed with Claire Palley’s critique of the plan, which is heralded as the most well-articulated argument of the official Greek-Cypriot side, voices precisely an attack on the very foundations of the UN plan (Palley, 2005), something that was never expressed by Tassos Papadopoulos during the negotiations.

The strategy of Papadopoulos has been to allow Ankara to proceed with its accession in December 2004 and thus avoid reintroducing the Annan plan to the negotiating table. His endeavour is to attempt small gains in the longer term and to gradually “eat away” concessions given to Turkey via the Annan plan each time that Turkey attempts to open a new harmonisation chapter. In practice this has meant a stalemate at local level, plus non-negotiation and marginalisation of the Turkish Cypriots and an EU stand-off before each chapter is opened. Moreover, it has resulted in a retraction from the substantive issues as regards the content of the solution to procedural side-issues and legalistic issues such as “direct trade”, “recognition” and other such matters.

There may be some glimmer of “progress” in the recent agreement brokered by the UN Under-Secretary General, Mr. Campari, which provides for “Technical Committees”. The secretive “technical talks” have stumbled even before they started because they are simply trying to put the carriage before the horse: it is highly improbable that they will yield results if one examines the positions of the two sides. Technocrats cannot provide answers when there is a fundamental disagreement of political philosophy; they need a clear
political mandate. The procedure may be ineffective but it gives the impression that something is being done. By the end of 2006 will be the time to evaluate results.

**Chronicle of the President’s Hegemony: A Tale of a Referendum**

The referendum results of 24 April 2004 came as a shock to many international observers. The resounding “no” by the Greek Cypriots – a massive 76 per cent, in contrast to the affirmative 64 per cent of the Turkish-Cypriot population – ought to have been expected given the internal balance of forces in Greek-Cypriot society. The taken-for-granted Greek-Cypriot “yes” proved to be a gross miscalculation: The possibility of failure in that great initiative was thought possible, as it had happened on numerous occasions in the past, but only as a result of Ankara’s misgivings or the intransigence of the hawkish Turkish-Cypriot veteran leader, Mr Denktash. The only alternative scenario of anticipated failure was the rather remote chance that such serious deviations from the original Annan Plan (mark 1) were to occur, and thus be considered of such magnitude that the Greek-Cypriot political leadership would not be able or willing to support it. The UN failed to realise that the Annan plan, the so-called “last chance” to resolve this intractable problem would be voted out by the Greek-Cypriot body politic, as this might endanger foregoing the occupied territories.

Mr. Papadopoulos, a lawyer by profession and close to Makarios for years, was well aware of the enormous power of the Presidential post: Once elected, the parties who elected him (or her in that unlikely possibility) would have little leverage, until the run up to re-election five years later. The pact with AKEL was made; Demetris Christofias became the President of the House of Representative, the “number 2” post as he would replace the President whenever he was absent from office. In the case of AKEL, this was of great “symbolic” value as it signalled a time when AKEL, a Communist party, would be “rehabilitated” and accepted as “normal” and “equal” to all other political forces after years of exclusion, discrimination and isolation. Beyond that, however, it is the President who calls the shots.

The institution of the Presidency in Cyprus is extremely powerful. It is referred to in Article 1 of the Cyprus Constitution (together with the Vice-President) which states that “the State of Cyprus shall be an independent and sovereign Republic with a presidential regime”. It is a prestigious post given the symbolic role of “head of the state”; it is connected to the very notion of “independence and sovereignty”; it has all the executive powers and powers of patronage; it is the head of the army and the state and, it is the post which for seventeen years was headed by archbishop Makarios between 1960 and 1977. Makarios bestowed legitimacy on the institution as he personified the sovereignty/independence of Cyprus against a hostile international environment in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, since 1963, with the Turkish Cypriots “abandoning” or “pushed from” their Governmental posts and
in particular the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President, who also held reciprocal powers for the Turkish-Cypriot community including power to veto any of the President’s decisions, the institution of the Presidency has had no effective “checks and balances”. Parliament has no effective means of controlling the President – even if the budget is rejected; the previous year’s budget is re-activated. The strict separation of powers prevent Parliament from performing any “checks and balances” on the executive.

Prior to the referendum, when Papadopoulos was newly elected President in February 2003, he was very cautious. After all, the mandate he received hinged on the premise that he would work to resolve the Cyprus problem on the basis of the Annan plan. Following the referendum he changed his style of leadership, taking the 76 per cent vote as endorsement of full backing that gave him strength irrespective of AKEL. His supporters claimed that it was the only time a Cyprus President had been given a mandate mid-term. Whilst retaining his Presidency, once accession to the EU had been secured, the “compromise” with AKEL became less important. Given the prestige that the Presidential institution carries, Papadopoulos ensured that he made use of this to further his political goals: Critics argue that he would make compromises to internal policies and appointments in various quangos and communities (i.e. share out some of the powers and privileges of patronage), but he made no real compromises to his Cyprus policy except to reiterate his support for a "bizonal, bicommunal federation" that would serve as a "fig leaf" for AKEL and shield him from international and Turkish-Cypriot criticisms. Moreover, the terms upon which he rejected the plan were so extreme that he may have damaged the institution of the Presidency itself by relegating the State function of the President, which he holds, into that of a mere “communal leader”, which he simultaneously holds. The constitution declares that the Greek-Cypriot President and the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-president represent the unity of the country. Given the “deviations” from the constitution since 1964, the fact the Turkish-Cypriots are living in the occupied north and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership is questioning whether they can be represented by a Greek-Cypriot-run Republic internationally, one would expect some caution by the President – but there was none. Hadjidedemetriou’s critique of the speech illustrates that it was not only the content of the speech that was damaging but it was his expression, terminology and extremity that created what he calls “a dynamic of rejection” that has mobilised and unleashed forces of regress in Greek-Cypriot society (see Hadjidedemetriou, 2006). However, as the Presidential elections of 2008 are approaching, Mr Papadopoulos is perhaps becoming more willing to compromise with AKEL. For the forthcoming municipal elections he has backed the former Interior Minister Andreas Christou and Eleni Mavrou MP in Cyprus’ most important cities, Limassol and Nicosia, in spite of disagreement by many DIKO cadres that both these politicians were reputed to be amongst the most prominent “yes” supporters of AKEL. It remains to be seen whether such “domestic” concessions will find
a wider application when dealing with the Cyprus problem; at this point it seems unlikely.

The “political autonomy” of the Greek-Cypriot-controlled Cyprus Republic is derived from authoritarian statist tradition, as articulated within legal fiction branded as “the doctrine of necessity” since 1964 (see Papaphilippou, 1995; Trimikliniotis, 2005d). The “no” campaign effectively appealed to capture the hearts and minds and become the chief representative of a regime poised to protect its privileges and exclude the Turkish Cypriots who, according to the 1960 constitution, ought to enjoy equal footing power-sharing in the consociational Cyprus Republic, in the same way that the hegemony of the Denktash regime had done years before. Class factions, as Poulantzas (1975) pointed out, appear as “natural” and are interconnected to such interests, but they become powerful enemies of a compromise in practice.

The President’s “Propaganda Machine”: Brief Encounter with Media Power

The literature on the Annan plan formed an important part of the contest with regard to the interpretation of the UN plan. Of course this section cannot review the “popular debate” that took place in the media (the press, radio and TV), even though it would be an interesting exercise to undertake to assess the kind of issues that dominated the political agenda prior to the referenda and afterwards. Nevertheless, the issues that circulate in a small society such as Cyprus are not dissimilar, whereby “experts”, academics and politicians “interact” and regularly present their views in the media. In fact many of the publications that appeared in haste were directly or indirectly aimed at influencing public opinion or articulating specific views in order to make a political statement rather than enriching the debate and enhancing the chances of reaching a settlement in Cyprus. The following types of literature were published on the subject of the solution, post Annan; legal, economic and other expert opinions, polemical texts (books and articles in journals and newspapers, reviews in journals and “popular guides” to the Annan Plan, i.e. the PRI0, 2003 guide and the anti-Annan leaflets of the newspaper Simerini).

Presidential “Propaganda Machines” II: A Tale of “Turkey Taking it All”

Contrary to Greek-Cypriot media claims, the plan was far from a Turkish triumph – even if the pro-European and pro-Erdogan Turkish press took such a celebratory stance – partly due to the fact that powerful social forces in Turkey wanted to “close”, once and for all, the Cyprus problem, so that Ankara could “move on”. In order to do so, they secured strong media support for Prime-Minister Erdogan against the hardliners of the powerful military establishment. Nevertheless, this jubilation combined with the triumphant spirit showed by Mr. Erdogan himself, in sharp contrast to a lukewarm Karamanlis – not to mention the solemn-faced Papadopoulos – set the scene. Straight after the Swiss talks the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot press
celebrated a “solution a-la-Turka”, whilst a stunned Greek and Greek-Cypriot press shouted “foul”. This of course is far from true.

The Greek-Cypriot media, which had already been negatively predisposed, if not all out hostile to the UN deal, drafted in its final form only a few days before accession to the EU. The hysterical “no” campaign had already been underway, whilst the “yes” campaign had not even begun. Overall, the plan itself was made out to be “evil”, “unjust”, “unworkable”: The process, the context, the climate, the timing and the “balance of forces” within the Greek-Cypriot community (and Greece) has not allowed for any transparent and sober debate to take place for over a year now.

The climate has not moderated to allow for open democratic dialogue throughout the post referenda period. The island has been subjected to the mass production of magazines, journals, books demonising the Annan plan as an “Anglo-American and Turkish conspiracy”; a classic is the best-seller of Ignatiou, Venizelos and Meletis,36 with the telling title *The Secret Bazaar*. The book repeats all the myths, exaggerations, even fabrications about “the Turks taking all they asked for in the final stages of peace talks”.37 Moreover, the demonisation as “US-funded agents” of those people who campaigned for a “yes” vote reached a pinnacle straight after the referendum. Despite the fact that there was no evidence of this, Mr. Papadopoulos informed us that the very absence of it is evidence which requires that one examines “the surrounding atmosphere” from which one can deduce that money was offered and accepted. The investigation by Makarios Drousiotis (2005), illustrated the way in which Tassos Papadopoulos used the state machinery and the media to obliterate his critics and political opponents by defamation. He accused them, without any evidence, of being financed by the USA.38 These methods have not yet ceased.39

**A Presidential Address that Stirred Up the Fears**

On his return from Switzerland, President Papadopoulos set the mood with a tearful address to the nation, presenting a tone and content that no-one had anticipated.40 Following a memorandum by the Education Minister to all primary and secondary schools, pupils and most of their teachers poured out into the streets with Greek and Cypriot flags shouting “no”.41 The polarisation of society climaxed and the “No campaign” continued at fever pitch to maintain the upper hand. That there would be partition and no way out this time was the reaction of the “yes” supporters who pointed to the warnings of the USA, the UN and EU officials. An electrified atmosphere prevailed and the hysterical mood did not permit any sober dialogue.42

The President’s address to the nation consolidated what had been carefully and masterfully planted by the “no” campaign. The intonation and context of the Presidential address was solemn and hammered home the most “basic” instincts and key ideas: The Greek-Cypriot people, he said, would be devoid of
the most important vehicle of their political existence. Their sovereignty and democracy – the Republic of Cyprus – would be "destroyed only a few days before accession", in return for "empty promises from an occupying force", which had been violating international law and human rights for the past thirty years. The key word here was "security", a security that would be based on the alleged, but clearly untrustworthy "goodwill" of Ankara.

The second key word to be hammered in was "dignity": The Greek Cypriots would be robbed of their "dignity," because they would be "forced to sign away their rights to justice" and "give away their independence", which was part and parcel of the new constitution – the Protocol relating to the Treaty of Guarantee. What Mr. Papadopoulos failed to mention was the fact that the Treaty of Guarantee has been in place since 1960 and the comparison is not between the said Treaty with alleged intervention rights or no treaty at all, but between the 1960 Treaty, which is part of the constitution and the amended treaty, which is introduced as a protocol.

The third key word was "fairness": For the previous eighteen months Mr. Papadopoulos had made a big issue out of the fact that he has dropped references from his speeches to a "fair solution" in favour of a "functional" and "viable solution", to illustrate his willingness to negotiate. He argued that since the UN did not even entertain his basic concerns, he was no longer bound: This solution is neither fair, nor even-handed.

The fourth element was "prosperity": Amid fears over the alleged economic viability of the Annan solution, Mr. Papadopoulos claimed that the Greek Cypriots would be forced to subsidise an ineffective system, and the economic security and prosperity that the Greek Cypriots had worked so hard for, would be jeopardised. The scent of "welfare-chauvinism", a kind of common sense economic racism, which seemed to have pervaded Greek-Cypriot society and penetrated the media was taken advantage of.

Underneath these references lay a basic point: A strong body of Greek-Cypriot opinion are neither willing to share equally, with the Turkish Cypriots, the State that they have exclusively monopolised since 1964 nor the prosperity they have accrued – majoritarian nationalism may have become the hegemonic force (see Trimikliniotis, forthcoming). The logic of the “no camp” has re-emerged like a phoenix from the ashes to declare "the Cyprus Republic as a second Greek-controlled state" and is thus unwilling to transform itself into a "federal bizonal bi-communal state to put the Turkish Cypriots on an equal footing". Of course, this has never been explicitly said directly, nevertheless, throughout society such discourses were circulating widely amongst different sections of the population from the nationalist camp. Moreover, it exaggerated fears and suspicions that via the Turkish-Cypriot population and the 60,000 settlers that would stay under the plan, Turkey
would become “a partner” in Cyprus and might interfere by manipulating the Turkish settlers.

Papadopoulos also had an ingenious second line of defence – assuming that the supporters of the plan are correct and he is wrong. He said that *Cyprus would have nothing to lose if Greek-Cypriots said “no” as Cyprus would have acceded to the EU and Turkey would still be knocking on Brussels’ door to accede.* If, however, he was correct about the plan and the Greek-Cypriots had voted “yes” it would be catastrophic for Cyprus, whereas a “no” vote would achieve the second best of the “national goals”, i.e. accession to the EU and an opportunity to achieve a solution with the security of accession, improved odds and additional bargaining power.

The Greek Cypriots returned a resounding “no”.

**The National Hegemony and the Political Forces of the Greek-Cypriot Community**

The analysis of the political forces on the Greek-Cypriot community requires close scrutiny if we are to understand *what* actually happened. To this effect we ought to examine the Greek-Cypriot party system. The fact that AKEL did not carry the burden of the campaign by unequivocally adopting the Annan plan certainly left the “yes” campaign soul-less. Shortly after the referendum there was a contest to determine *the exact meaning of the massive 76 per cent.* It was a contest between the “hard no” of Papadopoulos and his allies and the “soft no” of AKEL. The result remains blurred, as the two sides are still locked in a Governmental alliance and the issue is simply not being pushed, leaving the situation with little public dialogue as to the future of Cyprus. The so-called “codification” regarding the positions of the political parties on the Annan plan is merely a fig leaf in the absence of any real “common position” as to the future, and leaves Cyprus in the ambiguous position of “wait and see”.

**The Break-up of the No Vote: Class and Nationalism**

The question of class is rarely discussed in research on Cyprus. Moreover, it is rarely touched upon when discussing the national question and nationalism. However, class and national elements intersect in ways whereby the social cleavages emerging do not correspond to a “pure” class conflict (see Anthias and Ayres, 1978, 1983). We can deduce that class and socio-economic interests are articulated *within* the policies and strategies from the vantage point of the “yes” and “no” (“hard” and “soft” camps). In fact their “fractional interests” are strong determinants of the position articulated by political and economic actors in Greek-Cypriot society. Political power appears to reflect two crucial dimensions of Greek-Cypriot politics; the *role of class* in the broad sense (economic, socio-political and power relation) and the *autonomy* of nationalism matters that is closely connected to international politics of the
post-cold war order (Trimikliniotis, 2004b). The central locus of power is the
Cyprus state, via which the various interests are articulated by competing
groups (see Kattos, 1999; Trimikliniotis, 2000a).

Initially the Greek-Cypriot powerful economic forces, or the bourgeoisie in
Marxian terms, appeared to be divided over the Annan plan; however, the
“divide” may not be as deep a rift. It appears rational to expect that the
“maximalist” strategy may not have long to run, but the major financial forces
in the construction and tourism industry prefer to retain the divided status quo
rather than risk sharing the position they currently enjoy. Annan 4/5 had
provisions which were not beneficial for Greek-Cypriot firms and large land
owners who, since 1974, have become economically active in the south. The
property provisions of Annan 5 were designed to win over the poorer and
middle-income earners, leaving the large ones out. In view of this it appears
reasonable to assume that major hoteliers, land-owners and developers would
prefer the status quo and in the meantime continue to enjoy their power and
privileges via the state, the media, the economic might, the relations with the
powerful financial factors, as well as personal and business networks. Of
course, there are other powerful factions orientated towards a solution, and
thus positively predisposed to the Annan plan (and a revised Annan plan).
A re-unified Cyprus would provide major opportunities for economic expansion,
investment and establish new markets and “raw materials” for the tourist
industry, which is currently nearing saturation point. It could also provide
stability in the region; essential elements for growth and long-term prosperity
(see Trimikliniotis and Ioakimoglou, 2005). In addition, the tourist sector is
deeply divided over a solution.44 The “no campaign” convinced those
connected with the tourist sector that they stand to lose from an Annan-based
solution as it might result in stiff competition and job-losses for workers45 –
this posture, however, evades the issue. In fact, partition would be a much
more “negative” development for the Greek Cypriots in the longer-term than
an Annan-based solution.

Social Transformations, Party and Power
It would be misguided to present the formation of opinion as somehow
unmediated via political and other institutions of society. We have already
spoken of the role of the State, as expressed via the powerful institution of
the President. The other institutions that are important are political parties,
which will be referred to briefly before we look at their fortunes as interpreted
in the post-referendum elections. Cypriot society has been undergoing
significant transformation that affects the social base of political parties (see

The “modernist” section of DISY represented by the party leader, Mr.
Anastasiades, decided to support the Annan plan fully, making a strategic
choice to forego short-term political costs in favour of long-term gains. The
party, which has traditionally consisted of two antagonistic poles, the
“modernising” section (swinging betwixt neo-liberal tendencies and more socially-orientated policies) and the nationalistic-chauvinistic section (with corporatist but right-wing tendencies) had always been riddled with contradictions making co-existence under the same political formation tense. Anastasiades, however, having decided to let go of the national-chauvinist section, came into conflict with the majority of ordinary DISY voters, who did not follow the leadership (merely 38 per cent did).

The leading figures of the most vociferous “no” within DISY, eventually split the party and set up a new block to contest the Euro-elections, as EVRODI. They then merged with “Neoi Orizontes” and subsequently contested the Parliamentary elections of 2006, as EVROKO, although a small group around Prodromos Prodromou, who refused to merge and retained the party as EVRODI. Another initiative was an attempt to combine all the smaller parties together to consolidate the “no” vote, but such efforts were in vein. The parties DIKO and EDEK, who in the past had formed an old “national-patriotic front” in the early 1990s, agreed to unite as a single party. The smaller parties from the “hard no” camps tried to combine forces (e.g. Neoi Orizontes, EVROKO and ADYK), but some “one man” bands disappeared (e.g. EVRODI). Others, however, such as the Cypriot Greens only just survived as Parliamentary parties. The “hard no” followers remain dependent on Tassos Papadopoulos, even though some of these parties appear further to the right than he does.

Messages From a Bottle: What Can We Learn From the Election Results?
The results of the Euro-elections that followed soon after the referendum (13 June 2004), did not strengthen the DIKO party’s stance for Mr. Papadopoulos, and AKEL lost approximately 6 per cent of its votes. DISY lost 5 per cent but finished first with its splinter groups of right-wing extremists winning 11 per cent of the vote and EDEK receiving almost 11 per cent. The results did not “resolve” matters in any way. The 2004 European Parliament elections were the first that Cyprus had ever participated in. However, the Lilliputian parties of the “hard no” trailed behind Tassos Papadopoulos, failing in their attempt to capitalise on it in the European Parliament and subsequent national Parliamentary elections. Following their failure to gain a single advantage in the polls they competed over claims as to which party was the most consistently anti-Annan, whilst attempting to appear as “European” as possible. Hence, the adjective “European” featured in every electoral campaign. Nevertheless, DIKO and its “hard no” allies also failed to capitalise on its “success” in the referendum. The party joined forces with the ex-DIKO groupings such as ADYK, but only managed to gain 17 per cent and secure one MEP despite up to the last minute rigorous campaigning, calling on the electorate to “back and empower the president.” The tiny party “Neoi Orizontes” – preferring to vote for the “hard no” splinter group of DISY, “Coalition for Europe” in the euro-elections – lost half of its votes and dropped
to 1.6 per cent. This group was led by veteran leader, Mr. Matsis, who won one seat (11 per cent), but later made a pact with his old party, DISY. Only EDEK regained what it once held – just under 11 per cent – failing, however, to win a Euro-Parliament seat by 35 votes. EDEK may have attracted a "sympathy vote" from old EDEK voters who defected to AKEL supporters in order "to help them out" and succeed in "sending a Socialist" to Europe. The (nationalistic) Greens more or less disappeared from the political map, whilst the pro-Annan EDY-based "European Cyprus" gained only 1.9 per cent. The irony is that the Left-wing AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People), although apparently so concerned with party unity and the referendum – deciding "No, to cement the Yes" – lost heavily in the Euro-elections. DISY, however, in spite of carrying only 38 per cent of its electoral support in the referendum and losing four MPs who split away, still managed to obtain the largest number of votes and secure two MEPs, even though 5 per cent of its vote was lost.

Beneath the surface however, lies a much more serious problem for the political parties: Abstention. AKEL dominated the abstention vote with 35 per cent of its traditional voters staying home (or voting for other parties). This has been interpreted by critics as a clear warning to the Party as well as a protest vote against their various policies: The party’s participation in a "rejectionist unholy alliance", and above all, as punishment for AKEL’s "hermaphrodite" decision on the referendum. AKEL’s evaluation of the situation tried to downplay the role of the referendum and the reason why AKEL voters failed to turn up at the ballot box (for more see Christoforou, 2005).

The Parliamentary elections in May 2006 illustrated the tendency of the Greek-Cypriot political system to largely absorb the "shock" it received from the referendum outcome, with some gains for the "no" camp, but without managing to "capitalise" on the massive 76 per cent "no" vote. Hence, AKEL received 31 per cent (losing 3.6 per cent since 2001), DISY 30.6 per cent (losing 3.5 per cent), DIKO (increased by 3 per cent), EDEK (increased by 2.5 per cent), the new anti-federation party EVROKO, received 5.7 per cent and the other anti-federation party, the Ecologists, 1.9 per cent. The small pro-solution party EDY, was borderline and ousted from Parliament and other "one-man-bands" failed to gain a seat. Some "consolidation" of the referendum results has been achieved by the two major parties, which were split over the UN plan, but remain in control of the situation even though they face new challenges. The 2006 election showed that abstention is seriously on the increase when compared to elections held in 2001 (but still less than in the 2004 elections).

The last Parliamentary election provided interesting reading as regards the shifts of opinion, whilst the next municipal elections are likely to be a precursor for the Presidential elections in 2008. In any case, what will be
revealing about the prospects of a solution in this rather odd post-referenda era, is the way in which political forces position themselves in the light of the 2008 Presidential elections: Will there be a serious challenger to Tassos Papadopoulos from the Left and/or Right?

But let us reflect on how matters have evolved since then in an effort to analyse what happened.

**The Greek-Cypriot Party Cleavages: The Cyprus Problem and the Annan Plan**

The political divide amongst parties in Cyprus is a political cleavage that goes back some years (see Attalides, 1986, Christophorou, 2003, 2005). Stein Rokkan’s work on political cleavages has defined the territory of understanding modern party politics (see Rokkan, 1970; Flora, 1999; also Bartolini, 1996 for the class cleavage). The post-referendum era of party and political opinion needs to be located within the historical divides of Greek-Cypriot politics.

The political party system is sharply divided along the Left-Right ideological lines but betwixt it there are matters that complicate and distort the traditional “Left-Right divide”. In the context of Cyprus there are factors that seem to crosscut the split, therefore, the different dimensions of the political divide between Greek-Cypriot political parties ought to be examined. They can be viewed as “axes of the political divide” in Greek-Cypriot politics.

(a) One Axis is “Radical” versus “Conservative” as Regards the Socio-economic Order

This more or less reflects the international ideological divide between the ideologies of Left (communism/socialism, social democracy, libertarianism, collective/class action), Centre-Left (social democracy, Keynesianism/welfare state, liberalism, libertarianism), Centre-Right (mixed economy, capitalism, Keynesianism/welfare state, plus also stress on private initiative and enterprise), and Right (capitalism, mixed economy, private initiative, individualism and enterprise, privatisation, “less state”). In practice, consensus politics means that 95 per cent of legislation is passed unanimously and the “tripartite” system of industrial relations and advanced social dialogue between the social partners keeps some of the rhetoric alive but not much of the actual conflict in terms of industrial disputes and direct action by workers.

(b) The Cyprus Issue Dimension

It may be assumed generally that Left-wing inclined parties, due to their proclaimed internationalism, are likely to be more conciliatory towards the Turkish Cypriots and are willing to live in peace with them. Historically, this has generally been the case: Left and liberals tended to be pro-peace, pro-compromise and rapprochement. Matters are, however, distorted as the question of nationalism cuts across the ideological and party cleavages: Apart from the nationalist camp and the far Right there has always been a social
democratic and centrist hard line of nationalism attached to the Greek-Cypriot controlled State. It is well established from other contexts that nationalism is a complex phenomenon and takes different forms, affecting even those who are on the Left of the political spectrum, particularly in anti-colonial and post-colonial contexts where national-liberation and patriotism are motivating forces (see Balibar, 1991). Furthermore, strands of the Left who are anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist, often see nationalism as a “tactical ally” in order to achieve their goal or they may even adopt nationalism as part of their programme of “self-determination of the nation” and “national liberations”. The situation has become even more confusing since 1990 with the collapse of the USSR and their allies because some pro-Soviet Left-wing parties have taken up nationalism as their ideology to replace their dogmatic persuasion. In any case the relationship between socialism and nationalism has never been easy or straightforward (Davis, 1978; Nairn, 1979; Hobsbawm, 1989, pp. 119-143; Anderson, 1991, pp. 1-4; Nimni, 1991).

At least three sub-categories or sub-issues can be identified in the case of Cyprus:

Firstly, during the historical past, the position adopted in the major turning points that have defined modern Cyprus still operate as an important point of reference, i.e. the position as regards the anti-colonial struggle; or the position taken during 1960-1974 when the Greek-Cypriot political divide was between “pro-Makarios versus anti-Makarios forces”; later it was the position taken by the political forces over the 1974 coup. This divide appears to be fading as current politics on the Cyprus issue become more important for the immediate future, particularly after the 2004 referendum and the accession to the EU.

Secondly, the model employed by some researchers is that of dividing Greek-Cypriot political actors into “Cypro-centrists” versus “Helleno-centrists” (Papadakis, 1993, Peristianis, 1994; Mavratsas, 1998), with the two axes as the two extremes and the two main political parties nearer the edges, while others take intermediary positions – AKEL and DISY respectively. Although these models explain some variations in the behaviour of parties in the past, such binary logics fail to capture the more sophisticated positionality shifts and changes on the ideological level. Zenon Stavrinides model (1999, p. 76) has a “Helleno-centric versus Cypro-centric” axis and a “moderate versus maximalist” axis which places the parties in position in this line accordingly. This model, however, grossly simplifies complex political positions and logics; it is not dynamic, it ignores the time factor and does not take into account where each party is coming from ideologically. In any case the location of political parties is debatable in his map.

Thirdly, the distinction “pro-federation/pro-solution” versus anti-federation” is important in assessing “the vision for the nation” as it materialises in the solution of the Cyprus problem: Irredentist nationalists are “anti-federation”,
whilst accommodating/conciliatory and pragmatists, both nationalists and anti-nationalists, are “pro-federation”. The two camps could either be “Hellenocentric” or “Cypro-centric” as the cultural identity is not automatically translated into a direct political position; after all, both so-called “mother countries” gave their blessing to the Annan plan and old “nationalists” and “anti-nationalists” found their place in both camps, even if there was a hegemonic “no” based on nationalist rhetoric and discourse. AKEL, the most consistent anti-nationalist, Cypro-centric and moderate party (see Attalides, 1979; Papadakis, 1993) eventually aligned with the “no” camp on procedural grounds and for reasons of security.

With the Annan plan, however, we can go one step further. It is possible to distinguish between those who want _minimalist changes_ that would not alter the philosophy of the bargain (i.e. the “soft no” together with those who see the problem in a more conciliatory manner) and those who are _essentially opposed_ to a federal solution based on political equality between the two communities (i.e. the “hard no”). The referendum has defined a new dimension in Greek-Cypriot party politics, which is apparent in different contexts. Even when there is no connection whatsoever, politicians are keen to present themselves as “victims” due to the stance they took in the referendum, even in the most bizarre situations.

(c) Social Issues
On these subjects the distinction is between “conservative” versus “liberal/libertarian”. Cypriot society is generally conservative, thus on issues such as homosexuality, abortion, freedom of religion, immigration, the divide is not one of strict Left-Right partition.

Let us now turn to AKEL, the “soft no” of the Left.

**AKEL’s “Soft No”: A Prisoner’s Dilemma?**

_The AKEL Enigma and the Crisis of Anti-imperialist Rhetoric_
The stand of AKEL was the most striking upset in the referendum issue. It failed to support the Annan plan, despite the recognised prospect of being perhaps the greatest beneficiary from a reunified Cyprus under the plan. In fact, the party considered the plan’s positive element:

“in spite of the dangers constituted a hopeful basis for the reunification of Cyprus”.

The alliance with Mr. Papadopoulos seemed to have worked well up to the Swiss talks with the President appearing generally reserved and in-check by AKEL. It all changed, however, on the President’s return to Cyprus and his address to the Greek-Cypriot people. AKEL called for a postponement of the referenda in order to obtain “necessary guarantees” for the implementation of
a solution and security and to fill in certain “gaps”, thus to “entertain” the fears and insecurities of the people.\textsuperscript{51} Having realised that a deep divide was in sight and a “yes” by AKEL might have shifted the party over to the losing side, hence forfeiting its role in the Government, AKEL did \textit{not} support the plan and called for a “no” vote at the last minute. Most of the party’s voters followed the leadership, but a large section voted “yes”. It distinguished its own “procedural no” to “cement a massive and substantial yes” for the plan “next time”. In the process, however, it may well have injured its ties with Turkish Cypriots and intellectual sympathisers. Nevertheless, AKEL remains the key to the solution in the future. It insists that it supports a revised Annan plan; the formula of the party is the federal solution based on the Annan plan which should make amendments, as such, that would satisfy the Greek-Cypriot concerns, but \textit{will not alter the philosophy of the plan or take away any Turkish-Cypriot rights}. Be that as it may, its position appears more blurred as the prospects for a solution fade away.

AKEL cannot be perceived as merely a political party like any other. The party organisation is only one part, admittedly the centre or the “nucleus” of a wider movement involving mass-based organisations (trade unions, youth organisations, women’s groups, football teams, the cooperative movement etc.), in every neighbourhood and village across the country (see Adams, 1971; Panayiotou, 1999). It is the only party that has a following on the “other side of the island”. It is a party that has internalised what one researcher called Cyprus’ unique “boundary experience” (Panayiotou, 2005). The party was born out of the labour movement (see Lefkis, 1984; Servas, 1997, 2005; Leventis, 1997; Kalodoukas, 2003), and from its inception was a trans-ethnic movement as it transcended ethnic-communal barriers fighting originally for a “united anti-colonial and anti-imperialist front of Greeks and Turks.”\textsuperscript{52} “National liberation” in the original formulation of KKK (Communist Party of Cyprus), which was formed in 1926 uniting the nucleus into a clandestine party formation that would lead the working class, took a strong anti-nationalistic stance: “Enosis” or unification with Greece was viewed as a “chauvinistic diversion” from the real revolutionary stance, which demanded the transformation of society there and then (see AKEL, 1977; Servas, 1997, 2005; Katsiaounis, 2000; Leventis, 1997, 2002). Since that time the Left in Cyprus has been dominated by AKEL.\textsuperscript{53} Contantinou’s (2003a) observation that AKEL is the second most ancient political institution after the church is pertinent and crucial. Due to its history, structure and praxis, AKEL has certain “special” characteristics as a communist party with a mass base and remains the only party with inter-ethnic support from the two large communities of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{54} AKEL’s tactical retreat, which forced it into “rearguard action”, rather than going on the offensive – a practice that has disappointed many – may under certain conditions finally prove to be useful if we move towards a solution in the immediate future. Alternatively, if there is no solution in sight and there is no resumption of negotiations, it may become a tragic historic mistake.
We now turn to the root of AKEL’s ambivalence toward the Annan plan, to examine the ideological, social and political considerations that have shaped this ambivalence.

**AKEL’s Ambivalence on the Annan Plan: Imperial(istic) Trojan Horse or an Historic Opportunity for Reunification?**

As stated earlier, AKEL’s dilemmas and vacillations between the “yes” and “no” reflect the tension within its twin tradition of, on the one hand, being the “rapprochement party par excellence” (labour movement, “common front of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriots workers” etc.), and on the other, being an “anti-imperialist party”. This very dilemma between “anti-nationalism” versus “anti-imperialism” also dominated the Greek Left, which was equally split into two camps that were unable to exchange views without accusing one another of “selling out the class enemies”, either “local bourgeoisie” or “imperialism and its comprador classes and lackeys”.

One of the major points of contestation was the role of the US, the UK and the other imperial powers in shaping the Annan plan and the way in which its content and particularly the potential implementation of it might be constructed as “serving the interests of these powers” contra to the “interests of the people of Cyprus”. This point requires specific attention, amid confusion and gross misunderstanding both at regional (Cyprus, Greece, Turkey) level as well as at international level concerning the “imperialism of our time”, to use Aijaz Ahmad’s title (Ahmad, 2004, pp. 156-181). In fact this is an issue that crosscuts the Left-Right boundaries and is constantly under debate in the Cypriot media. Moreover, the problem seems to be a wide-ranging conceptual conundrum facing the “Left” (in all its shapes, shades and forms). In a timely volume of *Socialist Register 2004*, aptly titled “The New Imperial Challenge”, Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (2004, p. 13) note:

“It seems to us that an increasingly serious limitation of contemporary socialist thought it was its lack of conceptual tools capable of analysing the nature of imperialism today rather than recycling theories developed in a much earlier era.”

The theoretical lacuna in analysing the “US-led globalisation and a new and more overt form of US imperialism” (Panitch and Leys, 2004, p. 13) is very much at the heart of the failure of the Left in Cyprus, including both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as well as the Left in Greece and Turkey, to devise a common and insightful strategy that might properly influence the outcome of events as regards the Cyprus issue. In the three countries the political forces of the Left were deeply divided over the Annan plan at all points in the diametrically oppositional axis in a “debate” more akin to a hysterical outcry than a reasoned dialectical argumentation. Inter and intra-party and grouping rivalries were so intense, it was reminiscent of the collapse
of the Second International over the First World War. The Left could no longer speak with anything resembling a common voice, not even in common language, and in the same vein the Right and Centre had also split itself. The Annan plan opened “Pandora’s Box” and the crisis of the Left was so blatant, even in a country like Cyprus where AKEL, the local Communist party, attracts about 31-35 per cent of the vote and is a principal player in local politics.

In Greece, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) entered into a strange alliance – Neo-Marxist, Stalinist, Maoist, and Trotskyite groupings with various nationalistic and Right-wing forces and took an utterly hostile stance to the UN plan. They called it an “imperialistic Trojan horse” which aimed to impose the US dominated “New World Order” designs on the fragile Turkey-Greece-Cyprus triangle. They alleged that the plan would impose Ankara, a USA ally, onto the EU and thus reduce the Cyprus Republic into an “ineffectual Anglo-American protectorate” with NATO (British, Turkish and Greek) troops at variance with the principles of national sovereignty and independence. On the polar opposite, the dominant forces of Synaspismos (the evolution of the Euro-communists) took the view that AKEL’s position ought to be a major consideration. However, they eventually decided, by majority, that the Annan plan was a great opportunity for rapprochement, not only between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, but also between Greece and Turkey. Within Synaspismos there were strong descending voices which echoed more or less the KKE position with a more Europhile twist. They viewed the Annan plan as an Anglo-American recipe to incapacitate the emerging European “third polar” that would threaten US hegemony.

The contrasts between Left-wing groups illustrate the disarray in the state of theory and anti-imperialist strategy in the specific context of Cyprus. The KKE was overwhelmed by the resounding “no” as it was viewed as another nail in the coffin of imperialism; another attack on the “imperialist chain” similar to the way in which resistance in Iraq and Palestine is developing. For Synaspismos the result was a regrettable slide into new irrational nationalism, which injures the opportunity for rapprochement, and which might lead to a permanent partition of Cyprus.

The case of Cyprus essentially exemplifies the complex current conjuncture and illustrates the poverty of their theoretical framework and the absence of a long-term strategy that would have a practical effect. The Cyprus problem consists of multiple sets of conflicts and is riddled with local, regional and international contradictions and only via a multi-layer and complex theory of “imperialism” today, the role of nationalism, class and other social conflicts, inter and intra-regional state projects and rivalries, can we gain the insight to appreciate it and devise the necessary strategies and tactics.

There is a delicate balance to be observed. The most important element in this “equation” is the “internal” versus “external” component of the Cyprus
problem – both of which are of equal importance and priority. Whilst one has to be aware of the constant interplay between the “internal” and “external”, it is vital that this analytical distinction between the two is retained so that the analysis is not one-sided, which is tantamount to distortion of the real world we live in and is thus detrimental to the development of an effective strategy.55

"Soft No" and Hard Choices: A Communist’s Post-modern Power Dilemma?

AKEL’s drift away from its initial “soft no” is apparent from a mere glance at the position it took at its Extraordinary Conference on 14 April 2004 and the subsequent position taken in its 20th Pancyprian Congress. The party did not formally abandon its previous position but the wording illustrates the shift of position to a “harder no” but not quite a “hard no”. AKEL holds a vague position somewhere in between its original “soft no” (mostly procedural) and the “hard no” of the Papadopoulos line, but the 20th Pancyprian Congress did not specify the party’s areas of concern over the Annan plan. This gives enormous scope for discretion to the central committee, which in practice can be interpreted as discretion to the party leadership.

More recently, the AKEL spokesperson Andros Kyprianou56 stated AKEL’s areas of concern, indicating a shift of position from being largely concerned with procedural and implementation issues to more substantive areas, although he acknowledged that AKEL had “no illusions” and did “realise that the historical compromise also entails the acceptance of unpleasant aspects”. He said that,

“the Annan Plan contains a whole number of serious negative elements, some of which are a source of extreme concern for the Greek Cypriots.”

He added that AKEL always stressed that its policy does “not aim to take away rights, even privileges, which the Annan plan conceded to our Turkish-Cypriot compatriots” and notes that “the disproportionate participation of the Turkish Cypriots, bearing in mind the demographic balances, in all the bodies and decisions of the federal state do not constitute an essential obstacle”. He suggests, however, that “the Annan plan leaves a huge number of settlers in Cyprus, greater than the number of Turkish Cypriots”,57 and represents “a drastic change in the demographic balance on the island and it would of course bring an unfair advantage to the content of the solution itself”. The issue of the settlers itself, he argues, “gives an adequate explanation as to why the Greek Cypriots voted the way they did”. Secondly, he raised the issue of “the rights of intervention”, which is he says “another great source of concern of the Greek Cypriots”. What is unclear in AKEL’s papers is whether the party’s immediate objective in future negotiations is to denounce and abandon the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, something never decided at the congress. Although the removal of such imperial or neo-colonial elements are
certainly important long-term goals of the party, such a drastic call for an immediate denouncing would require all other elements to be dropped and herald a radical change of policy. Thirdly, “an extremely lengthy timetable is set out for the withdrawal of the troops, whilst not all of the troops will be withdrawn in the end”. And fourthly, as far as the property issue is concerned, he refers to the provision that will give back “just one-third of what belongs to refugees”, as being problematic. In reality, many refugees will never be able to return because “so many new construction works have been built on existing buildings and exemptions that have been made that in fact they constitute the rule rather than the exception”. Overall he suggests that,

“there are also other issues that may be addressed such as the presence of foreign troops, the right to intervene, the number of settlers, some property issues and timetable and safeguards for implementation are issues that warrant renegotiation and can certainly be improved for the benefit of both communities. Solutions to such problems are possible and within sight as long there is goodwill by all sides.”

Kyprianou’s references are the latest issues raised; AKEL’s position remains vague – perhaps deliberately so – and at times contradictory.

AKEL’s dilemmas extend beyond the “soft no”, the “hard no” and the “yes”. We have already referred to the competing legacies of the Left between “anti-imperialism” versus “anti-nationalism.” The socio-historical and political context within which the Cypriot Left was born and from which it derives its popular legitimacy is such that it can threaten its very base. This instability is accentuated by tensions over the lack of progress in the search for a post-referendum solution between its traditionally pro-solution, pro-rapprochement support, to the “disciplines” of being locked in a coalition with the “hard no” element as the party is forced into political acrobatics analogous to a “balance on tight rope” and simultaneously behaving within the coalition to play a guerrilla-like “quasi oppositional” role. This balancing act has two dimensions that are played together in an unsynchronised manner:

- Firstly, AKEL’s ambivalent stance and dilemmas during/after the referenda puts the party in “a permanent exceptional state”, to modify and apply Agamben’s terms (2005a, 2005b): The “soft no” was a temporary safety board that allowed Christofias an opportunity to avoid confronting the responsibility of the party’s self-declared “historic mission” as the “vanguard of the working class and its allies” in front of its dual constituency, the Greek-Cypriot Left and the Turkish-Cypriot Left. So far, however, this policy has failed to place any real pressure on the dominant “hard no” of the official Greek-Cypriot side. The situation is comparable to a time-bomb ticking away while time is running out.
Secondly, the party’s flexible, practical and pragmatic policies, which were both criticised and praised for “deviating” from its ideological doctrines, may have reached a climax: Theory and praxis appear to be so divergent that the party’s ideology appears to be in flux. It is, of course, remarkable that the party has not only survived successfully the collapse of the so-called “really existing socialism”, but it has gained and stabilised its support. Nonetheless, the party has more or less ceased to produce any new “ideological lessons” for cadres since 1995. It has not really produced a theory of the world beyond the usual condemnation of the “new world order” and the occasional recycling of a largely formalistic rhetoric. AKEL’s adherence to a broad Communist ideology, which may in the past have appeared to its critics as “illiberal, austere and non-renewable rhetoric,” has nevertheless proved to be much more adaptable, flexible and reflexive in practice (see Panayiotou, 2005). For example, it attempts to stir its own “concept of socialism” in an interesting document after the fall of the eastern European regimes and intervened rather creatively in the debate over the modernisation of Cypriot society, even though the documents produced arouse some criticism for being eclectic, not very detailed and for containing incoherent elements.

The party’s mass following and strong organisation since its early days in the 1950s to the 1960s is undoubtedly a source of its strength (see Adams, 1971; Panayiotou, 1999); but this, might also impede flexible decision-making that requires quick responses to changing events. Furthermore, it may prove to become a serious problem when the party is in coalition with partners sporting a different ideological outlook and priorities. It may also result in failing to meet the expectations of the mass constituency due to its inability to properly “serve” its members as it wishes due to the inadequacy in the pace or the quality of delivery of Government policies. AKEL’s seemingly impossible position is defined by trying to provide both at the same time within the Government coalition, AND also lead the mass movement outside of the Government. It is a dilemma which has been similarly faced by other Communist parties throughout the globe. To some extent the party’s presence in the current Government has managed to check any drift towards a more adventurous neoliberal agenda, i.e. policies on the privatisation of public utilities, reductions in benefits, trade liberalisation, flexibilisation, curbing trade union power, or the abolition of COLA, however, it has not been able to realise any major socio-economic reforms and the process of flexibilisation of the markets, including the labour markets continue (see Kattos, 1999; INEK, 2005). Also the disciplines of power with more conservative forces and the insistence that Cyprus achieves the Maastricht criteria and adopts the Euro by 2007 has generated further economic difficulties, insecurity and uncertainty for the lower strata and poorer sections of the population. The reforms derived from EU accession have brought high petrol prices, “tight spending” policies, reductions in earnings from tourism,
sometimes ill-designed reform packages as well as the employer’s invigorated post accession agenda. They have also produced a period of accentuated strike activity, popular mobilisations and frustration by farmers, lorry drivers, small shop owners, pensioners, students, Cyprus airways employees, teachers and temporary public employees, construction and hotel workers as well as migrants and asylum-seekers. The party has thus been forced to act as a “broker” with the Government in this unusual popular activism in the Republic. The only “success story” in terms of pushing forward AKEL’s agenda has been the adoption of the comprehensive proposal for education reform by the Ministry of education, but even this has been stalled because the reform has not been implemented.63

AKEL’s so-called “enclosure” to take Philippou’s formulation may turn out to be a serious stumbling block. The party decided that retention of its “unity” is much more important than “clarity” of position or even “dialogue”. This has created a particularly problematic issue since there is no release mechanism for the accumulating pressures derived from daily conflict and contestation. The more the party becomes integrated within the power/state structures the more the contradictions between theory and praxis will become evident and more pressure will be imposed on the leadership to “contain” debate. The core issue is the explosive character of the “lost words”, the unarticulated social and political demands that are denied or banned from becoming legitimate political discourses and platforms in contestation. The search for the lost words of Kavazoglou, the Turkish-Cypriot martyr of the party,64 allows for a theorisation of the historic success of Cypriot Left patriotism as the unconsciously Gramscian party that derived an outlook primarily from its praxis (Panayiotou, 2005, pp. 43-74); it may however account for the limitations and the party’s historic failure to “speak for the subaltern”, to apply Spivak’s original post-colonial formulation (Spivak, 1988), in this case the Turkish-Cypriot Leftists (see Panayiotou, 2005). The fact that the politics of AKEL were shaped by the process of the “boundary experience” (Panayiotou, 1999) compelled to deal with “new boundaries” but not necessarily successfully. The erection of new borderlines and frontiers by “fortress Europe” (see Trimikliniotis, 2001) will in fact actuate the tensions and press the party’s delicate balances to its limits. Thousands of new challenges promoting fresh scope for resistance will appear before the party and the social movements of Cyprus: Hardt’s and Negri’s search of “a thousand plateaus” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) of resistance in the struggle against Empire may at last find expression within the Cyprus of the new millennium (Hardt and Negri, 2001). AKEL is perhaps the most receptive microcosm of the dilemmas and challenges ahead: It will be compelled sooner or later to open up the process of dialogue, as transfigured following the collapse of the USSR and its allies, if it does not wish to be misfigured.

AKEL would be forced to open up the processes for democratic dialogue in order to aid the next phase of the democratisation of the party structure – its’
own “unfinished revolution” occurred after the collapse of the so-called “actually existing socialism” and the internal split of the party. The process was brought to a halt for pragmatic reasons as the party turned its attention to the governance of the country. As younger party cadres became more established and the internal party’s bureaucratisation processes established their own “new order” sadly confirming Michels’ pessimistic account of the drift to oligarchy in social democratic parties (Michels, 1997). For the time being the fear of division has imposed an “exceptional state of emergency” banning the questioning of the leadership’s choices. However, the formulae of “putting the lid on the opposition” have been tested in the past and proved to be disastrous. More centralisation is likely to create more disillusionment, whilst the lack of democratic dialogue is likely to lead to a dead end, strangling and suffocating whatever is live and vibrant in the party.

Exit Routes: A Sociologist’s Explanations, Interpretations, Praxis?

This section merely attempts to round up the concerns and extract some final questions for debate, rather than close the issues. It will start by returning to the referendum and what determined the outcome and then tackle the post-referendum politics: What determined the 76 per cent?

As far as the readily available explanations of the Greek-Cypriot “no” are concerned we have three types of reasons provided:

- The first explanation is the favourite one of the “official” Greek-Cypriot side: It was simply a “bad” plan for the Greek-Cypriots, who justifiably rejected it as “manifestly unjust”, “unfair”, “one-sided”, favouring Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots and “unworkable”. In other words it was the content of the plan that produced the appropriate outcome according to the vast majority of the population.
- The second is a structural explanation: Greek-Cypriot institutions as such (schooling, media, the army, the state functions, the church etc.), tend to perpetuate and freeze the situation. Old style Greek-Cypriot irredentism is out of fashion now and has been transformed into something “novel” or “mutated into an irredentism lite” (Constantinou, 2003b) to find expression in an implicit rejection of federal-based settlement that requires political equality at a communal level into a majoritarianism. According to the majoritarian doctrine “Turkish Cypriots are merely a minority and thus cannot be politically equal as a community”.
- The third explanation offers a conjunctural or symptomatic character. According to this view, the developments have been determined by specific positions taken by actors, such as the political parties. It is essentially a problem of “political leadership”: The vast majority of political forces supported “no”.

32
Although there is an extensive range of anti-Annan literature (Palley, 2005; Papasavvas, 2003 Theophanous, 2003, 2004; Emilianides, 2003; Kentas, 2003; Kontos, 2003; Mavromatis, 2003; Fokaides, 2003 etc.), there is also literature that provides an equally, if not more convincing case for the Annan plan (Vassiliou, 2004; Markides, 2004; Tsielepis, 2004; Hadjidemetriou, 2006). A number of prestigious international legal experts suggested that the plan was viable and acceptable such as Crawford (2002), Alivizatos (2003), Drosos, (2003) etc., whilst others said otherwise (e.g. Chrysogonos, 2003). Recently a more balanced presentation of the Annan plan puts matters in a more sober perspective – the overall schema of the plan is sound; the main faults are the legacies of the past, but that there can certainly be some improvements to the plan (see Syrigos, 2005).

The assumption that the plan was “bad” and “one-sided” cannot stand closer scrutiny of the constitutional, political and economic dimensions of it, in spite of the substantial literature that reproduces the same linear thinking on the subject. Such perspectives assume an automatic, autonomous and unmediated behaviour by all voters without due examination – the reasons why individuals, groups and institutions in society vote for something for completely different reasons. In order to understand why Greek Cypriots voted the way they did in the referendum we must consider also a number of circumstantial, symptomatic or conjunctural reasons that were important in determining the outcome. All the same the sheer magnitude of the result is illustrative of more deeply rooted and long-term factors in operation – as well as dissatisfaction with the process itself. Starting with the latter, it is crucial to appreciate how we ended up with the Annan plan and gain some idea about its content – a subject of gross misunderstanding and misinformation. Structural factors are equally as crucial as conjunctural. None of the above explanations alone can, therefore, really explain why Greek Cypriots voted the way they did. There are different reasons which motivate each individual’s decision and there is an interesting debate amongst politicians, opinion survey analysts and researchers on the subject. Indeed it is a matter of ongoing research and interpretation. The content of the plan in conjunction with the context (local and international) and the way internal political forces competed, making use of structural (i.e. deep rooted institutional, power, social, economic, and cultural factors in society) as well as conjunctural or symptomatic factors (short-term issues relating to timing, campaign tactics and leadership), determined the outcome of the referenda. In other words it comes down to the way in which the interpretation of what the plan signifies is understood, together with the meaning of the compromise and the way it was to be implemented that determined the outcome. It was a contest for which interpretation was to become dominant but not necessarily the merits, strengths and weaknesses of the UN plan. In effect it is by studying the combination of all three explanations together that we are able to reach a conclusion on the subject.
Cypriot Society at the Crossroads: Can the “Soft No” Create the Conditions for a “Post-Annan Plan” to Overcome the Cyprus Impasse?

This is the challenge for the “soft no”, and the challenge for AKEL. How does it act to open up and facilitate the transformation of a system that is unable to even discuss the issues, never mind find solutions? The Cyprus issue is not only a problem in its own right; it is a major obstacle to the modernisation and democratisation of Cypriot society, north and south of the barbed wire. AKEL’s fate is common with that of Cyprus. It is a boundary party by its very nature. To push Panayiotou’s (1999, 2005) argument further, it is the class, ethnic, national, gender boundary party, and the boundary. Its defensive strategy has prolonged suspense so far, but this seems to have reached a ceiling. The question however is, how can the party activate a debate on the issues? And what headings should be discussed?

In the first instance, AKEL must review how the “soft no” policy is working in terms of bringing about the desired results. Even if the party leaves the question of “anti-imperialism versus anti-nationalism” unresolved as an existential angst, it can and indeed is forced to proceed to clarify where it stands with regard to developing its long-declared goal of “a common front of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots” that might serve as a basis for the resolution of the problem. AKEL has little choice but to the party activate a debate on the issues? And what headings should be discussed?

The opening of the closed militarily imposed border allows thousands of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots to cross over on a daily basis; there are over 5000 Turkish-Cypriots working in the south and others who interact on a daily basis. In July 2006 the first multi-ethnic or trans-ethnic strike took place consisting of Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Pontians and other migrant construction workers, which was organised by Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot trade unions (about 25,000 workers in the sector – the strike was
successful as far as mobilising support). The political climate is not the best, but things seem to be moving (see Trimikliniotis, 2006). Having said this, it is essential to appreciate that the mass party of the Turkish-Cypriot Left (CTP), is following more less the same dilemmas as AKEL. It seems comfortable with being in power north of the barbed wire and it is also responsible for the bad relations between the two major parties of the Left. Saying “yes” in 2004 is simply not enough; it is the aftermath of the referendum that shall determine whether we can overcome the de facto partition.

The second issue is closely connected to the first: AKEL’s connection to the governance of the Republic. It will soon be forced to decide how to confront Tassos Papadopoulos whose Presidential term in office expires shortly. The post-referendum period has been marked by a regress and closure of the democratic debate of the Republic, a stalemate in the efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem, and social discontent due to many reasons. Sooner rather than later AKEL must decide where it stands on the various issues; moreover it will be pressed to decide who to champion in the 2008 Presidential elections.

Thirdly, on the subject of ideology the issue is a longer-term one: What sort of thinking processes will AKEL establish to rekindle a stalemate in political thinking and theorising that could guide its praxis? How will it respond to the challenges of globalised knowledge and the social movements? How does it handle the rise of nationalism, racism and xenophobia?

Finally, it seems that it is still impossible to have an informed dialogue over the Cyprus issue amongst citizens because there is no political space – a kind of “neutral zone for engagement in dialogue”— or “a third space”, as Sitas (2005) calls it, to engage in a way forward on the kind of changes to the UN plan that is acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots. We have witnessed a “freezing” of the debate, in what can be thought of as a negative “structure transformation of the public sphere” that has been denied the possibility for critical thinking and the social action of citizens. Kitromilides’ reference (1979) to the post-colonial syndrome, called the “dialectic of intolerance”, seems to have survived into the new millennium. The “austere Cypriot enclosure” and the “absence of critical thinking” can be brought to an end thus allowing the Greek-Cypriot body politic to introduce reflexivity into their policies on the Cyprus question and a new politics of intercommunal, transethnic and transnational citizenship. The current climate is neither stable, nor permanent; it marks rather a non-sustainable transitional point of hegemony. Greek-Cypriot society remains deeply polarised, confused and uncertain; democratic and open dialogue is the only feasible way out, and the only way to introduce reflexivity and contrive to “move on” with the Cyprus impasse.

This article has concentrated on the contested relations between the policy of the “hard no” as represented by President Papadopoulos and the “soft no”
personified by AKEL. The Government coalition has resulted in the obfuscation of the two alternative strategies for exit of the post-referenda impasse. They also each represent an alternative social and ideological trajectory for the future of the country. This is essentially the new Left-Right divide that allows for a new social imaginary of Cyprus. Will there be a divided Cyprus searching for a new “geopolitical partnership in Europe” to essentially absorb the Turkish Cypriots should the opportunities arise in the future, or alternatively, can the Greek-Cypriot official side come to an understanding with the new Turkish-Cypriot leadership in a limited renegotiation of the Annan plan to reunite the country and share on an equal footing the wealth, power and the future? The protracted contest between the “hard no” and the “soft no” is the key to unlocking the Cyprus problem. At last, after all these years, “the prospects for the reunification of their country now rest primarily in their hands” [the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots], as the UN Secretary General reminded us straight after the Referenda.

* I would like to thank Andreas Panayiotou for the useful comments to this paper. Also I would like to thank Christina McRoy and the anonymous reviewers of earlier drafts to this paper for their comments.

Notes

1. *The Cyprus Review* covered extensively some of these debates. It even published a special issue on the subject ‘Cyprus, the EU and the Referenda on the Annan Plan’, Vol. 16, No. 2. See papers by Heraklides, 2004; Camp, 2004; Bahcheli, 2004; Coufoudakis, 2004; Veremis and Savvides, 2004. Similar discussions took place in the Greek-Cypriot press and Turkish-Cypriot press and in Greek and Turkish journals.


3. The only exceptions are: Hadjidemetriou, 2006 and various papers in journals (see Trimikliniotis, 2004a, 2005a and 2005b).

4. These issues are elaborated further whereby I set out ways in which there has been a transformation of the political, social and economic priorities that created the momentum for a settlement in Cyprus and thus created the conditions for the UN plan to “emerge” (see Trimikliniotis, 2005a, pp. 168-204).

5. Most opinion polls on political issues have added an “independent variable” in their question list based on how people voted during the referendum.

6. These ideas were amplified in detail elsewhere (see Trimikliniotis, 2005a and forthcoming).


8. Even the generally pro-Western *Economist* speaks about the USA at least in part – “paying for self-inflicted mistakes” such as invading Iraq for no reason, picking a fight
with Iran and Syria, being indifferent to the plight of the Palestinians and not guiding Israel towards peace (see the Leader’s column *Economist*, 12-18 August 2006, pp. 9-10).


11. In fact this is what the UN Secretary General said in his Report on Cyprus shortly after the referenda in 2004 and repeated again in 2005 and 2006.

12. The Cold War has been a prime determining force in the fortunes of the people of Cyprus, as is the re-configured “order” since. The involvement of the UN goes back to 1964 with the setting up of UNFICYP (United Nations Force in Cyprus): The problem did not start in 1963, as the Turkish-Cypriot official view dictates, nor did it start in 1974, as prescribed by the Greek-Cypriot official view – it was present in 1960 with the emergence of the Cyprus Republic and it has since passed through various phases and escalations.

13. Hitchens, 1997, p. 158 refers to the following four main but related questions which the Cyprus problem consists of: (a) The relationship between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; (b) The long-standing differences between the states of Greece and Turkey; (c) The time factor – Hitchens was writing during the Cold War period; (today this would mean the politics of the "New World Order"); (d) The place factor (the regional strategic importance of the island).

14. The division between “internal” and “external” should never be viewed as rigid or in reality as neatly demarcating these processes. Attalides’ study of Cyprus from the point of view of “nationalism and international politics” provides a complex approach to the study of the problem(s) of Cyprus (Attalides, 1979), indeed “... the Cyprus problem represents a classic example of the interplay of domestic and international politics” (Coufoudakis, 1993, p. 41).

15. If the works of the opponents of the Annan plan are read, i.e. Papasavvas (2003); the collective book by Emilianides, A., Kentas, G., Kontos, M., Mavromatis, M. and Fokaides, P. (2004); Ioannides, (2004); Theophanous (2004); Angelidou, K., Alavanos, A., Mihailides, A., Stoforopoulos, Th., Chrysogons, K. (2004); Chrysogons (2003); Kostantakopoulos (2004); Palley (2005), the journalistic style book based on “anecdotal data” (i.e. with little, if any references) by Venizelos, Ignatiou and Meletiou, 2005 (see endnote 33), it is apparent that they all consider the referendum date to be a crucial historic moment.

16. An extensive effort was made as can be traced in a selected number of newspaper publications at the time. Another example was a poorly attended discussion at Intercollege in late 2002, chaired by Sia Anagnostopoulou when the prospects of the Swiss model of governance with reference to Cyprus were examined, which resulted in publications in the Cypriot journal *Ex Yparhis* and the Greek journal *Theseis* (see Constantinou, 2003c and Trimikliniotis, 2003a). For other journal publication see Constantinou, 2002, 2003a and 2003b and Trimikliniotis, 2003a, 2004a, 2004b, 2005b.

17. And they are of male gender as a rule.

18. From the survey of the Cyprus School of Tourism, as analysed by Webster (2005) to the research surveys of Lordos (2004) and Faiz (2006) as well as other research (Stavrinides et al., 2006; and opinion polls by CyBC.

19. Any anti-Annan book or article is likely to contain such references.

20. The concept “Grossraum” is a principle in geopolitics, which means “Great Area” formulated by the German Jurist Carl Schmitt. Grossraum is an area dominated by a
power representing a distinct political idea. For the application of this idea to Cyprus see Constantinou (2002)]

21. Antonio Gramsci (22 January, 1891 – 27 April, 1937) was an Italian writer, politician and political theorist; a founding member and one-time leader of the Communist Party of Italy. He was imprisoned by Mussolini’s fascist regime. At his trial, Gramsci’s prosecutor famously stated, "For twenty years we must stop this brain from functioning". Ironically, there he wrote 30 notebooks and 3000 pages of history and analysis, his celebrated “Prison notebooks” that would make him famous and influential internationally. Gramsci is viewed by many as one of the most important Marxist thinkers of the twentieth century, in particular as a key thinker in the development of Western Marxism. His writings are heavily concerned with the themes of culture and leadership and he is notable as a highly original thinker within the Marxist tradition. He opposed a "philosophy of praxis" to materialist dialectics and is renowned for his concept of hegemony as a means of maintaining the state in a capitalist society. As a theorist of the party he developed ideas about the need to master the "science and art of politics", so that the party acts like “the modern Prince” (adapting this from Machiavelli) in order to build the “counter-hegemony” of the subaltern classes (see Gramsci, 1972).]

22. For an extensive discussion the political debate of the Greek-Cypriot elections of 21 May 2006, see the journal Peripeties Ideon, Issue No.1, Politis, 21 May 2006; see also Christophorou (2005).

23. This is the Vice President of DIKO, MP Nicos Pittokopitis (see Drousiotis, 2005). He was voted out in the May 2006 elections.

24. In Greek he called it «ηπηρο όχι».


26. In Greek he stated: «εμείς δεν θέλουμε ηπηρο όχι».

27. A glut of articles of this sort has been written in the newspaper Altheia and some from “yes” supporters in Politis. Their style of criticism is many times characterised with bitterness and frustration due to the fact that they are not able to understand why AKEL behaved the way it has.

28. The newspaper Simerini is articulating these sorts of arguments on an almost daily basis.

29. Circles close to the Presidential palace referred to "36 small vetoes”, i.e. a veto for each of Turkey’s chapters.


32. Hadjidemetriou quotes David Hannay.

33. According to Kibris newspaper the Turkish-Cypriot side proposes eight areas (administration, territorial issues, foreign relations, EU related affairs, international conventions, procedures implemented, foreign debts, security/guarantees); the Greek-Cypriot side proposes that the following issues be discussed: administration, EU relations, property, economic unification, the continental shelf, shipping, aviation, sources of energy, citizenship/nationality, immigration and asylum, education and cultural heritage. On everyday issues the UN proposes that the committees discuss ten issues: health, environment, water management, waste management, money laundering, crime prevention, road safety, migration and illegal immigration, crisis resolution and humanitarian issues. The Turkish-Cypriot side proposed five everyday issues: the creation of a Reconciliation Commission, Commission for Education and History, Radio-television frequencies, economic and trade cooperation and protection of cultural heritage.
34 For a critical analysis of charismatic power in Cyprus, see Constantinoú, 2006.
35 See Poulantzas (1980) for the dangers of “authoritarian statism”. This concept requires substantial adaptation and application to the Cypriot context before it can be appreciated properly.
37 For a critique of the book see Trímkilíniotís, N. “Η Συνομιλιολογία στην Υπηρεσία της Διχοτόμησης: Το Παρασκήνια των Μεγάλων και των Μικρών”, θέσεις τ. 96.
38 The study was also presented as a documentary.
39 Only one day before the elections, on 20 May 2006, the most popular “serious” newspaper Phíleleftherós carried a half page article with the massive headline ‘Dance of Millions for the Plan’, blaming UNOPS for distributing millions of dollars for the “yes” campaign.
40 The “loyal” Ministers played their part in serving their President: Trade Minister Lillykas, a close associate of the President, and owner of an advertising and marketing company is said to have been the “marketing brain” in the “no” campaign.
41 There have been media reports that some pupils even shouted, “A good Turk, is a dead Turk”. Others called those who supported “yes” traitors.
42 Various statements by church officials, whilst the Bishop of Paphos said that he had the champagne ready as a “No vote equals union with Greece”.
43 The argument that the policy of the Greek-Cypriot leadership was to create a “second Hellenic state” («δεύτερο Ελληνικό κράτος») or “a small Hellas” («μικρή Ελλάς») has been made based on quotes by President Makarios himself. An analysis from this perspective is found in Milíc, G. and Kyprianides, T. (1988a, 1988b, 1988c) and Kyprianides, T. and Milios, Y. (1988a and 1988b).
44 One faction, orientated and attached to the state, is sceptical, if not outright hostile to a reunified Cyprus, fearing the possible stiff competition from the unspoilt and beautiful northern coastal tourism.
45 Paphos, for example, was solidly against the solution, and so was Limassol.
46 The Ecologists/Greens are unique as they are the only modern Green party which supports the buying of missiles and armaments.
47 In Greek: «να βιωσόκουν τον Πρόεδρο».
48 The fact that the AKEL Minister of Interior, Andreas Christou, repeated in 2005 that he would still “support”, if there were to be a referendum again, has made him the target of tabloid and right-wing papers. He is often presented in Simerini and Mahi as “unpatriotic” and for being “too soft on Turkish-Cypriots”. Also, the stance at the referendum is often invoked to decide who would be supported in the next Municipal elections: DIKO proposed Ouranios Ioannidis of DISY (a well-known “hard no” supporter) as a common candidate for Mayor of Nicosia but this proposal was rejected by AKEL. Moreover, Eleni Mavrou, MP, who has been proposed by AKEL to stand as Mayor of Nicosia is said to be opposed by some “hard no” DIKO executives members for being a well-known “yes” supporter.
49 Yiorgos Lillykas makes extensive use of the fact that he was such an ardent supporter of “no” and is “suffering” as a result, however, what we see is in fact the complete opposite: He has climbed up the political and Governmental ladder from an MP to Trade Minister and Government spokesperson, to be elevated to Foreign Minister (ousting the experienced George Iakovou). Doros Christodoulides, AKEL MP, complained that he suffered for being a “hard no” supporter, contrary to the party line. The DISY MP, Eleni Theocharous, claimed that when she stood in the European Parliament elections in 2004, the party machinery worked against her because she is a well known “no” supporter.
50 During the debate over the decriminalising of homosexuality, the archbishop threatened ex-communication to those politicians who voted in favour of the law.
51. The relevant section of the Party decision reads: “Today our Party is before a plan, the positive elements of which, with its possible acceptance, could have, despite the dangers, created a promising perspective for a peaceful living-together of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. We do not share evaluations of the President of the Republic regarding provisions of the Annan Plan and particularly the evaluation that this “does not do away with the de facto partition, but on the contrary legitimises and deepens it.” The Party leadership will open a dialogue on these issues with the President in the framework of our cooperation”. See Website of AKEL [http://www.akel.org.cy/English/akel.html].

52. The labour movement became a mass movement in the 1940s when the first trade unions managed to mobilise workers for both socio-economic demands, as well as national liberation; the most important mobilisation being the mass strikes in the mines (asbestos) of 1947. The colonialists arrested the leadership of the miner’s union, which organised at a national level as the Pancyprian Labour Confederation (Πανκύπρια Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών – ΠΣΕ (PSE). In the CIA commissioned study on AKEL (Adams, 1971), the problematising of Western imperial forces about the growth of the Left and the Labour Movement can be examined.

53. For a discussion on the Left in the interwar period see George Leventis (1997) and Fifis Ioannou (2005) and the introduction by Nicos Peristianis (2005).

54. (a) Internationally it was a stable supporter of the non-aligned movement, but ideologically pro-soviet and Marxist-Leninist; (b) Internally it subscribed to a “stagist” approach to national liberation and Cyprus was considered to be chasing independence at a “national liberation phase”. Therefore, AKEL would not contest the Presidential elections but would seek political alliances within “centrist” supporters, what is branded as “democratic-patriotic forces”. AKEL supported Archbishop Makarios and would act in a “responsible” manner in the class struggle, i.e. subordinating ways, demands and labour militancy in general to the “national question”; (c) it promoted “national unity” of “democratic patriotic forces” in the Greek-Cypriot community (as political representation was essentially ethnic-communally based) whilst at the same time it promoted close collaboration with Turkish-Cypriot “democratic political forces”. In the labour struggles, despite the ethnic split of the trade union movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the PEO always had strong backing by Turkish-Cypriot workers. AKEL was formed in 1941 following the banning of KKK (which was set up in 1924). The KKK continued to work as a faction within AKEL until it decided to dissolve itself having completed its historic mission, leaving AKEL as its successor to “carry the torch”. AKEL’s historic vacillation about “Enosis”, “self-government” and “independence” continued up to 1974, although it followed, without hesitation, Makarios’ pragmatic shift from the “politics of the desirable” (“Enosis”) to the “politics of the feasible” (Independence) in 1967.

55. I have expanded on this view elsewhere (Trimikliniotis, 2005a).


57. He clarifies: “We are not talking about immigrants, or even about illegal immigrants. We are talking about colonisation being carried out by the occupying force, something which according to conventional International Law is considered as a crime of war. We accept that humanitarian cases exist and as such we do not insist on the strict implementation of the relative rules of International Law. We are ready to accept that a reasonable number of settlers remain after the achievement of a solution. However, we are not ready to accept a number of settlers that would surpass the number of Turkish Cypriots.”
58. This is what Herbert Marcuse called “Soviet Marxism”. Yiannis Milios (1996) referred to the distinction between “Marxism as a theory” versus “Marxism as an ideology of the masses”.

59. See the document “Our Concept of Socialism” at: [http://www.akel.org.cy/English/kathodighsh.html].

60. See AKEL’s proposal on modernisation of society as approved by the 19th Congress in 2000, at: [http://www.akel.org.cy/English/synedrio19eksynchronism.html].

61. This is a dilemma faced by many western Communist and radical socialist parties in Western Europe, but it is of particular interest to these parties in the third world (see Trimikliniotis, 2005e).


63. See Trimikliniotis, forthcoming.

64. He was a Central Committee member of AKEL who was killed together with a Greek-Cypriot comrade by Turkish-Cypriot fascists in 1965.

65. A number of constitutional provisions are in dire need of reform. Freedom of speech ought to be guaranteed and not punished. Electoral rules are problematic. It is, for example, at least anachronistic that candidates for the Central Committee are vetted and placed in a hierarchical order by a ranking committee; they could be placed in alphabetical order to make the elections genuinely democratic etc.

66. Lenin’s banning of “all fractions” was meant to be an “exceptional” action that was kept secret from the membership outside of the central committee. However, when Stalin took over he created a monstrous system of formalistic and ossified “democratic centralism” which was, in fact, a “bureaucratic centralism”, suppressing any dissent or difference of opinion: see Gramsci’s critique of “bureaucratic centralism” in (Gramsci, 1972).

67. Most of the books and papers on the subject are listed in the bibliography.

68. For more on this potential that has not been realised (see Trimikliniotis 2003a, 2000b).

69. He defined this as a “third space” which allowed for what I termed an “ethic of reconciliation” to emerge (Sitas, 2005).


Bibliography


Association of Sociologists of Cyprus, Intercollege, Nicosia, Cyprus, 14-16 April 2000.


----- (2003a) 'Freedom of Movement as Radical Potential' in IKME (ed.), *Cyprus After A Solution – Left Policies*


**Greek Bibliography**


AKEL (1977) «Ο Δρόμος προς τη Λευτερία: Για ένα μίνιμο πρόγραμμα του ΑΚΕΛ για τη συγκρότηση του ενιαίου απελευθερωτικού μετώπου πάλης», *Τρία Κέιμενα για την Κύπρο*. Αθήνα, Εκδοτική Όμοδα Εργασία.


Kitromilides, P. (1981) Ριο ηδενινγή πιλάζη προ Πνημηνθά δήο ζηελ Θύην».


Lordos, A. (2004), Oι Ελληνοκύπριοι μπροστά στη Λύση του Κυπριακού, μία έρευνα σε συνεργασία με την CYMAR MARKET RESEARCH LTD.


------. (2005) «Το Κίνημα της Αριστεράς και η Δεκαετία της Βαθιάς Διαίρεσης των Ε/K», Peristianis, N. (επιμ.) Ο Φιλής Ιωάννου, η Αριστερά και το Κυπριακό. Λευκωσία, εκδ. Intercollege, pp. ΧΙΓ-ΧΗΠΙΙ.
------. (2003c) «Η ελεύθερη διακίνηση ως πολιτική πρόκληση για τους κυπρίους», Θέσεις, τ. 84 στο [http://www.thesesis.com/76-thesESIS/t84/t84.htm].
------. (2004b) «Η Κυπριακή Κοινωνία αντιμέτωπη με την Λύση: Πατρiotικοί Λόγοι ή Ταξικά Συμφέροντα;» ['Cypriot Society confronted with the solution: Patriotic or Class Reasons?'], Θέσεις 88.


------. (2005b) «Το Εθνικό Ζήτημα, η Αριστερά και το Κυπριακό: Αντι-ιμπεριαλισμός ή Αντι-Εθνικισμός?» ('The National Question, the Left and the Cyprus problem: Anti-imperialism or Anti-nationalism?'), Θέσεις 92.


