Symfiliosi, Cyprus

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When I started reading this book, Sartre’s novel, The Reprieve, the sequel to the Age of Reason in his Roads to Freedom trilogy came to my mind. Sartre recounts the story of his protagonists who are constantly reminded of the double game; the global and the local: the story takes place in France of 1938 as the fictional characters await news from the Munich conference where ‘high politics’ – the global chess-players – decide the fate of the world. Even though The Reprieve is not an easy narrative as it slips swiftly between characters in different situations at the same moment, it is a gripping read from the outset with keen perspective and leaves one with a sense of actually being there. The book by Fouskas and Dimoulas is, of course, not fiction, but by analogy, it too constantly shifts the story from the micro to the macro, from geopolitics to the economy, and from class to political protagonists. Overall, this greatly adds to the book’s depth of analysis and the shifting is successful as the authors integrate and synthesise their text by presenting the whole book as a constant shifting game. On reading it, I felt that the book unfolded like a novel with a vast amount of empirical data – economic and sociological. The crisis in Greece, or better, the crisis of Europeanism and global financialization as experienced in Greece, it unfolds before us.

The crisis in Greece has become a major subject in academic as well as political debates. It has resulted in a number of scholarly texts in English; tens, if not hundreds of books are produced in Greek. Paradoxically, and despite the pain and suffering caused, the crisis is proving to be immensely ‘creative’, and well beyond what Joseph Schumpeter had imagined, when he underlined how capitalism is riddled with ‘creative destruction’. The crisis in the Eurozone and the crisis in Greece more specifically, have generated serious critical thinking. The troubled Eurozone is more violently felt in the periphery Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece (see Lapavitsas et al., 2012), as the old structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) imposed by the IMF in the poorer countries of the South are now enforced on the debt-suffering periphery of the Eurozone (see Arestis and Sawyer, 2013; Milios and Sotiropoulos, 2009, 2010, Milios et al., 2013), resulting in the drastic collapse of the late European welfarism and triggering poverty, homelessness, mass unemployment, disintegration of the middle class, closure of small businesses and the destruction
of the social security safety net. Greece is particularly and severely hit by the crisis as it enters its sixth consecutive year of economic recession; this is a country in a state of ‘bankruptocracy’ (Varoufakis, 2011) or ‘debtocracy’ (Kitidi and Hadjistefanou, 2012). It is a country where the crisis is ‘a state of emergency’ (Athanasiou, 2012).

Fouskas and Dimoulas guide us through a fascinating journey of Greece’s route into a distorted and dependent modernity. This absorbing excursion entails a post-ottoman capitalism riddled by imperial machinations besides being combined with the inherent contradictions of comprador capitalism of a state in shambles. We are narrated a story of political and economic dependency, crisis and indebtedness in perpetuity. Greece is depicted as the ‘vassal state’ par excellence: from its establishment in 1828 it was dependent on the ‘Lord’, that is to say the major powers at that time on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. This sounds very much like the Troika in Greece today.

**Structure:** Chapter 2 is the theoretical and global reading of the Greek crisis whereby financialization is placed at the heart of the European integration process; it delivers the current crisis in the Eurozone as ‘a manifestation of deeper disintegrative tendencies embedded in the hub-and-spoke system of neo-imperial governance built by the USA in Western Europe, the Middle/Near East and East Asia in the aftermath of World War II’. The authors illustrate the links between capital, security, ideational issues, geopolitics and social struggles, which are often tackled by different disciplines. The remainder of the book undertakes an historical enquiry on Greece. Chapter 3 examines the first 100 years of the subaltern position in the international capitalist system. Chapter 4 looks at post-war Greece, characterised by political and economic dependency on the United States of America (USA), in what was a model of authoritarian development and undemocratic rule. Chapter 5 studies the late arrival of Keynesian/corporatist economic management mostly by the socialist PASOK in the 1980s and the bi-partisan consensus in the 1980s and up to the mid-1990s, as power alternated between PASOK and the conservative Nea Demokratia, which resisted neoliberal globalisation up until the 1990s. This was due to three reasons: First, there was strong popular pressure for the long-overdue democratic reforms and claims for popular participation after the fall of the dictatorship which was met with a mixture of populist politics, clientelism and state co-option. The second derived directly from issues of security and geopolitics in Cyprus, the Aegean and the relations with Turkey. And the third related to Greece’s weak industrial base. Although this allowed the reproduction of a large middle class, there was a simultaneous expansion of the working class. In the end the peripheral position of Greece and its ‘fault-lines’ which had delayed the neoliberal onslaught, converted to violent accelerators that imposed the most severe austerity programme in the European Union (EU) and five years of continuing decline. This is taken up in chapter 6, which is essentially the empirical core that engages with the theoretical issues of chapter 2. And this is where the key arguments of the book are to be found.
The relation between foreign loans and bankruptcy in Greece is aptly illustrated in the table 3.1 (p. 62), with the following periodisation: 1826 (first bankruptcy), then 1828–1843 (second bankruptcy), 1844–1893 (third bankruptcy), and 1894–1932 (fourth bankruptcy). Evidently matters hardly stop there: the dictatorship of Metaxas (1936–1940) and then the Nazi occupation (1940–1945), the civil war and post-World War Two (WWII) regimes integrated the fault-lines – Greece was the fault-line between East and West. This resonates with the current ‘vassal state’ which has enforced an unprecedented Troika-imposed austerity package that has turned the clock back 150 years in terms of employment rights and labour relations; it has resulted in the shedding of one-quarter of its GDP, the mass unemployment of one-quarter of the population and left 60% of its youth in impoverishment and debt. It is no wonder that the sub-title to the book is designated as ‘the political economy of debt and destruction’.

This volume sets ambitious tasks. It is an effort to grasp the debt and destruction in Greece by revisiting and revising many classical Marxian, Neomarxist and post-Marxist analytical frameworks to sharpen them in order to enable a holistic reading of crisis-ridden Greece. Hence, we have features from Peter Gowan’s ‘global gamble’ (1999), the late Arrighi’s last work (2008) to gauge the power-shift towards the east (with Chinas and India’s rise) in combination with a USA in long-term, if not terminal demise. The paradox, however, is that the economic decline and debt of the USA is inversely related to its military might. We can locate David Harvey’s ‘new imperialism’ (2003), as ‘accumulation by dispossession’ featuring in the collapsing economies. This is repackaging Marx’s primitive accumulation and the Marxist notions of combined/uneven development. Moreover, in the book we find explanatory theorisation drawn from Antonio Gramsci and from Nicos Poulantzas ‘authoritarian statism’, not forgetting Constantine Tsoukalas, to whom the book is dedicated.

The book succeeds in the most important tasks, namely, it asks key questions, it sets the framework and proceeds in a bold historical analysis on the Greek crisis in an original and insightful manner. How can such an analysis assist in understanding the crisis in Greece as both an instance, even if this is the acute instance of a Eurozone crisis and not as an exceptional case? The authors certainly do not shy away from critically engaging the corruption, nepotism and clientelism within the Greek social formation and state. A possible weakness of the book is keeping the delicate equilibrium between the geopolitical angle and the political economy angle.

A major strength of the book is the fact that it structurally links and integrates the global fault-lines approach to the economic and political crisis in Greece. This places the Greek crisis in its proper context, that is to say, regionally and historically. Innovative also is the renewal of Neomarxist political economy in southern and peripheral Europe. The authors successfully adapt the debates over the Global south to the European South and periphery. Populism, nepotism and

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2 Kyriakos Varvaressos (2002) was commissioned to write a Report on the Greek economic problem in 1952. Εκθέσεις επί του Οικονομικού Προβλήματος της Ελλάδος see Varvaressos (2002[1952]).
political clientelism are seen by the authors as political strategies organised and maintained by the comprador bourgeoisie (i.e. the fraction of the ruling class in peripheral state who act as ‘go between’ betwixt the country and the imperial metropolis). They do not constitute an absence of modernity but particular modernising strategies that ‘are geared to block the labour movement from assuming power which may entail breaking away of a peripheral state from the imperial state’ (p. 49). The authors consider deeply flawed the view that populism and clientelism are products of an ‘under-development of civil society’. They argue that the danger of a state of emergency is more likely in the peripheral state than the core because of the ease via which ‘capitalistic crises in capitalism spread vertically across the state/civil society axis and horizontally across the regions and various segments of social economy’. This is because these cannot be ‘absorbed due to lack of a robust institutional framework’. It is here where geopolitics returns with a vengeance: Greece is a classic case of such a global fault-line, for example, ‘the discursive articulation of economic, political and ideological and geo-political instance in a social formation divided into classes and determined by social struggle’ (p. 44). The basic underdevelopment thesis was in vogue in the 1960s and 1970s, holding that the countries of less developed regions – now also called the Global South – are underdeveloped because of the neo-colonial relations.

**Greece the Eurozone and Cyprus: Facing the New Social Question**

A fascinating but painful social theme in chapter 6 is the disintegration of the middle classes, comparing the ‘PIGS’ (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain) after the section on the concluding points. An expansion of this comparative section would have been welcome rather than leaving the subject to the end. This is acutely relevant to Cyprus.

This issue links austerity politics to the re-opened ‘social question’3 (Troika imposed *Memoranda of Understandings*, IMF recommendations together with particular class factions which make up the ‘comprador bourgeoisie’). Fouskas and Dimoulas take us through the dramatic collapse of the welfare state in Greece and in PIGS, but it must be noted that welfarism has been in decline since the late 1970s and early 1980s (Esping-Andersen, 1996). The ‘new social question’ (Rosanvallon, 2002) is re-surfacing violently and with new terms in countries such as PIGS as well as Cyprus. References to ‘social crisis’ feature regularly in the local media and the term ‘new social question’ is hardly uncommon; it is over a century since ‘the social question’ was first introduced to Greece by the pioneer socialist G.A. Skliros (1907). Cyprus, like Greece, has often been the headline in major newspapers since the Euro Group imposed an unprecedented bail-in that led to a massive haircut on bank deposits, bank melt-down and stringent financial controls on banking and financial markets.

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The story of PIGS (and Cyprus) are not ‘exceptions’ in an otherwise well-functioning normality; they are a new authoritarian ‘normality’. Yet, there is wild social and economic experimentation in a systemic crisis where the manifestation of the logic of a system seems to have gone astray. The systemic features of Cyprus with an overblown banking-and-finance sector that benefitted on speculation and ‘hot money’ are well-known (see Trimikliniotis et al., 2012). However, the treatment of Cyprus in March 2013 was truly incredible. One year after the first ever bail-in, which forced depositors to pay for bank losses in Cyprus, we have a better picture of this extraordinary event that made the so-called ‘Cyprus template’ and the ‘Cyprus treatment’, feature in international news headlines (see Kitromilides, 2013; Trimikliniotis, 2013). At the time there was an interesting debate as to whether the template could be used in the future, despite the desperate efforts to claim that the situation in Cyprus was ‘unique’. As pointed out by Arestis and Sawyer (2013), the €17.5 billion requested by Cyprus was a comparatively trivial sum in absolute terms when compared to the previous Southern European bailouts. Cyprus makes up only 0.2% of the Eurozone economy and once it was sealed off by cutting the Cypriot banks off from Greece, this small economy was suitable for experimentation in regard to ideas about bail-in procedures. In the words of the Economist (2014):

‘Of the 147 banking crises since 1970 tracked by the IMF, none inflicted losses on all depositors, irrespective of the amounts they held and the banks they were with. Now depositors in weak banks in weak countries have every reason to worry about sudden raids on their savings. Depositors in places like Italy have not panicked yet. But they will if the euro zone tries to “rescue” them too.’

The initial Euro Group proposal violated the EU acquis. It premised its banking rescue on the imposition of an unprecedented confiscation of 6.75% on guaranteed deposits (i.e. under €100,000) and 99% for those with over. It is at least odd that the proposal came from the Cypriot President himself, but it was endorsed by the Euro Group. The legacy of the mass Cypriot mobilisation against the decision of the Euro Group and the newly-elected Cypriot President averted the imposition of a hair-cut on guaranteed deposits; this legacy is one that extends beyond Cyprus saving the principle of guaranteed deposits for low-income earners across Europe and beyond. After being tested in Cyprus, the ‘bail-in’ system has become EU law: the directive is to enter into force on 1 January 2015 and the bail-in system is to take effect on 1 January 2016.  

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4 This was a shock therapy-type of liquidation of the banking and financial services of a small island state economy with a Banking sector that was (and is no more) 8 times larger than the country’s GDP. See Trimikliniotis (2013) and Kitromilides (2013).


Exit Route(s): Austerity Policies, Exit the Euro or Global Seisachtheia?  

Chapter 6 nicely sums up three key approaches to the crisis, which also contain recipes for solution:

1. The peripheral state is to blame for its lack of fiscal discipline and corruption. This is the position of the EU Commission, IMF and ECB, as well as the mainstream parties in Greece such as Nea Demokratia/PASOK. Remedy: austerity; if that fails then more austerity.

2. The European Monetary Union (EMU) has caused a split in the core and periphery creating permanent discrimination and structural hierarchy between the core (Germany) and the periphery (PIGS). This requires radical remedies in the Eurozone as a whole, but also for those in the periphery to break away (Lapavitsas et al., 2012; Krugman, 2012, 2014); even influential commentators such as Martin Wolf in the Financial Times support this.

3. The Eurozone function is the problem, and austerity is essentially a process of ‘internal devaluation’ that socialises the crisis and imposes it on the subaltern classes. However, the countries in the Eurozone are now structurally connected which exacerbates the problem but breaking away is not a solution as the peripheral state will (a) have to negotiate and eventually accept a severe exit deal, and (b) will still be subject to the same kind of pressures from outside. The only solution is to force a structural transformation on the Eurozone. This is the Syriza line and is articulatred by Milios and Sotiropoulos (2009, 2010) and Varoufakis (2011).

The authors then present three other structural subjects that should be addressed: first the legacy of the Stock-exchange bonanza which Cyprus also experienced in 1999–2000; second, what Krugman called ‘run away banks’ – in Cyprus we have much work to do; third the comprador-military complex which has imposed extortionate military spending and the corruption that goes hand in hand with it, i.e. μίζες or backhanders – again, sadly, Cyprus also excels in this.

The key argument of Fouskas and Dimoulas is that ‘the fusion of comprador and financial/rentier capital with the state apparatuses and political economy’ (p. 45) is the leitmotiv of their empirical analysis. Peripheral/subaltern states such as Greece and Cyprus in the Eurozone are inherently ‘deeply dependent on decision-making processes that take place in the core’, hence their recommendation to the way out is to ‘break away from the imperial chain’ as Cuba did or as Salvatore Allende tried to do. Yet, they recognise that there is no quick fix or magic recipe; there are

Wikipedia has the definition of Seisachtheia as: ‘a set of laws instituted by the Athenian lawmaker Solon in order to rectify widespread serfdom and slaves (...)’. Serfdom and slaves, used as debt relief/payment, was ‘rampant in Athens in the 6th Century BC. (...). The seisachtheia laws immediately cancelled all outstanding debts, retroactively emancipated all previously enslaved debtors, reinstated all confiscated serf property to the serfs [hektemoroi], and forbade the use of personal freedom as collateral in all future debts. The laws instituted a ceiling to maximum property size - regardless of the legality of its acquisition (i.e. by marriage), meant to prevent excessive accumulation of land by powerful families’.

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massive difficulties with leaving the Eurozone or breaking away from the imperial chain. They, therefore, propose a multilateral policy of ‘international and socialist seisachtheia’ (p. 189) and develop these ideas in the ultimate chapter of the book.

My final words on this book by Fouskas and Dimoulas is that overall it is a fine read with a very clear line of thinking, in spite of the fact that it contains extraordinary information, sources and theory; it is probably one of the best advocates of re-vamped, well-argued and smart Neo-Marxist accounts on Greece I have come across. It is a well-thought synthesis of economics, politics and international relations that attempts not only to theorise but apply the theoretical insights to the Greek situation. More to the point it is highly relevant to what is happening today in the Eurozone at large and in Cyprus in particular. In terms of the research agenda, we would certainly benefit from a book like this on Cyprus.

Nicos Trimikliniotis

References
With increased interest in cooperation beyond the nation-state and the proliferation of International Organisations (IOs) and regimes in the post Second World War period, International Relations (IR) research has tended to focus mostly on bigger rather than smaller players in these groups. Hence the significance for the wider discipline of the role of small member states in EU negotiations. Small states have an incentive to exhibit strong commitment to institutions for collective action, as they seek to protect and promote their interests. Although Diana Panke’s book comes to complement an already rich literature on EU negotiations, it does so in a most insightful way in relation to the negotiation activities of small member states and their success prospects, which are ultimately dependent upon the powers of persuasion, mediation and lobbying.

Panke’s main theme is captured in the book title. She undertakes a comparative analysis by investigating the day-to-day negotiations within the EU in which 19 small member states can gain influence over EU policies through the Council of Ministers (both at the level of working groups and the COREPER). The 19 EU member states examined are namely Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. In the Introduction of the book, Panke defines small states as those with less than average votes in the Council of Ministers. As Panke explains, these states also have smaller economies (and therefore less bargaining power to advocate their interests), leaner administrations and fewer policy experts. It is in this context that Panke addresses the two main research questions of the book: (1) Why do some small states participate in EU negotiations more actively than others? (2) How and under which conditions do negotiation strategies of small states influence their prospects of negotiation success?

Taking this as her point of departure, Panke implicitly divides the book into two main thematic parts. Chapters 2–5 deal exclusively with the first research question, investigating why some small states are more active than others when engaging in EU negotiations, despite the fact that they all face very similar structural disadvantages. These disadvantages may take the form of constraints in the process of uploading national policies to the EU level, in influencing policy outcomes through bargaining vis-à-vis other member states in the Council (individual strategies), as well as in argument-based lobbying on EU institutions or coalition formation to increase their
bargaining leverage (compound strategies). The second thematic part of the book comprises chapters 6–9, which focus on the second research question, thus attempting to shed light on the reasons why some small states are more successful than others in influencing negotiation outcomes, as well as the possible scope conditions under which different strategies can be effective.

Methodologically the author combines a mixture of quantitative and qualitative techniques in order to investigate the extent and frequency with which small states apply a variety of persuasion-based and bargaining-based shaping strategies. Before embarking on this examination however, Panke first determines the types of size-related disadvantages that small states face and how they affect policy-making. She determines this, both theoretically and empirically by recording the results of more than 100 interviews conducted with national officials charged with representing their national governments at the supranational forum. While the theoretical framework of the analysis and the results of the quantitative research are discussed in the main text, the author also gives lengthy interview quotes at the bottom of the pages as footnotes. This makes the book much easier to read, as it can in fact be read in two different contexts: that of the theoretical framework and that of the empirical findings.

Panke then uses a multivariate OLS regression analysis in order to examine the effect of the negotiation strategies used by the small EU member states and define their degree of success. She concludes that, the more frequently states use these negotiation strategies, the more successful they are likely to be. She recognises, however, that a significant limitation of this approach is that not all hypotheses can be quantified. She addresses this constraint by conducting two qualitative case studies on EU negotiations: spirit drinks and specifically vodka (a highly politicised case) and pesticides (a very technical case). Panke argues that concentrating on niche policies can help small states in negotiations; hence the detailed case studies in the aforementioned areas, which are lesser known and, arguably, more insignificant. Although both cases belong to the wider sphere of agricultural policy, they demonstrate distinctions between this, rather heterogeneous group of small EU states. The group in fact involves those states that are more and those that are less actively engaged in the EU negotiation process. The author concludes that the more actively engaged a state is and the more it concentrates its rather limited resources on a specific set of policy priorities, the more likely it is to cope with its inherent structural disadvantages and the more successful it will be in EU negotiations.

All in all, Diana Panke’s intervention is indeed a welcome addition to the IR and Europeanist literature in state negotiations in International/Regional Organisations. More specifically, it makes a significant contribution to the literature on small states’ negotiation, especially from an empirical perspective, while it also comes to enhance the bodies of literature on IR, Europeanization (from the perspective of how states’ administrations adapt to EU pressure), Intergovernmentalism, comparative policy analysis, as well as the literature on domestic coordination.

While the EU itself strengthens the position of small states through the establishment of institutions in which member states participate and have formal equality with bigger states, most
bargaining chips are not in their hands. Through a most comprehensive approach, Panke demonstrates empirically how small EU member states can follow negotiating, bargaining, mediating and persuasion strategies that will help them to punch above their weight and not merely be bystanders. The author succeeds in advancing the reader’s collective understanding of the role of small players in the EU forum in particular and in supranational governance structures in general.

CHRISTINA IOANNOU
The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States

JAMES KER-LINDSAY

In this book, James Ker-Lindsay describes how states seek to prevent the recognition of regions that are trying to secede unilaterally from the states in question. He focuses on three countries: Cyprus, Serbia and Georgia; and four secessionist regions: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In each case, the region has established de facto control over its territory, but wants de jure recognition. As Ker-Lindsay notes, the relevance of this subject matter extends far beyond the covered cases. There are several states that are faced with very similar situations, including Azerbaijan, Moldova and Somalia. There are many other states that face popular secessionist movements, including Spain, Canada, the United Kingdom, and India, and there are yet other states that are nationally heterogeneous and may come to face secessionist movements in the future. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the issue of counter-recognition is of relevance to a significant proportion of the world’s states. It is also relevant, of course, for the secessionist regions in question, or any would-be secessionist region. As will become clear to anyone who reads this book, non-recognition matters profoundly. Without it, ‘contested states’ are unable to trade (legally) with the outside world; unable to establish transportation links; unable to take part in international sporting competitions; and unable to do a good deal more.

It is somewhat surprising, given the importance of the subject matter, that Ker-Lindsay’s book is the first to show in detail how states work to prevent the recognition of breakaway regions. There is a large literature, written by international lawyers, on how statehood is acquired. There is also a significant political science literature on secession, and a growing political philosophy literature on the right to secession (‘just cause’ and ‘choice’ theories of secession). But hitherto no-one has examined the myriad of ways in which states seek to ensure that their breakaway regions do not get recognised within the international system.

Ker-Lindsay’s account is rich, and ranges from tactics that are interesting and meaningful to some that will seem to many readers to be trivial, or even ridiculous. In the former category is the

1 Although the northern part of the island is referred to as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in this book review, it is acknowledged that the TRNC is not recognised by any country except Turkey. The TRNC is treated in the review as it is treated in Ker-Lindsay’s book, as a secessionist region or entity rather than a (recognised) state.
insistence by the Republic of Cyprus, currently controlled by Greek Cypriots, that it is faced with an issue of ‘invasion and occupation’ rather than a campaign for ‘self-determination’ by Turkish Cypriots, and far less an attempt to escape historic oppression. This matters profoundly because ‘invasion and occupation’ suggests two important conclusions: first, that the secessionist entity was created by a clear breach of international law, and should therefore be opposed by all states; second, that the entity in question is a ‘puppet’ state that does not control its own territory, a criterion that is sometimes used to define statehood. The trivial tactics include the insistence on putting all references to secessionist entities or their officers in inverted commas, or prefacing them with ‘so-called’ (e.g. the ‘so-called foreign minister’). Ker-Lindsay also provides an interesting and unusual example of a state engaging in what was a massive error: Serbia asking the ICJ to rule on whether Kosovo’s declaration of independence was illegal, rather than asking it to rule on whether Kosovo could become independent from Serbia. The former allowed the ICJ to sit on the fence by stating that the ‘declaration’ was legal, without having to pronounce on the substantive issue regarding whether regions can secede – an issue that would have been much more difficult to answer in the affirmative.

Ker-Lindsay makes clear that states enjoy an enormous structural advantage over regionalist movements attempting to secede unilaterally. Other states and, if I may, ‘so-called’ international organisations (in fact they are based on ‘states’, some of which are pluri-national) are understandably not inclined to support unilateral secession. This is because they see unilateral secession as a threat to international stability and possibly as posing a threat to their own territorial integrity or to that of their allies. Bilateral secession, by contrast, poses no such risks, and can be accepted unproblematically, as we saw in 2011 with the secession, and universal recognition, of South Sudan. This structural advantage explains why there have been very few, if any, successful cases of unilateral secession. Ker-Lindsay explains that even Bangladesh, arguably the only case since 1900, was given a seat in the United Nations only after Pakistan recognised it. Somaliland has failed to achieve recognition from anyone, in spite of the fact that it is reasonably stable, while Somalia is a failed state that has had no functioning central government for more than a decade. Kosovo is the only other arguable exception, but it remains unrecognised by many states and is still not in the UN. The only factor that can significantly offset the structural bias in favour of states, in Ker-Lindsay’s account, is the support of a great power, with the United States clearly the most important. It is the United States’ support for Kosovo which explains its relative success vis-à-vis the other regions covered, although Kosovo’s success is still only partial. Great powers, however, tend to be as conservative with respect to recognition as other states, with China being particularly cautious. Some powers, meanwhile, appear hypocritical: Russia backs the territorial integrity of Serbia, but not Georgia or Ukraine, while the United States takes the opposite position.

The strength of the international bias against recognition is such that it begs a key question: why do states bother expending considerable resources on counter-recognition policies when there is very little chance of recognition occurring? The answer, Ker-Lindsay explains, is that
'recognition' is not dichotomous (a secessionist region is recognised or it isn't), but involves an extensive continuum. At one end there is formal recognition as an independent state, but there are many steps before this, some of them minute, that can lead to 'legitimation and acknowledgement'. Secessionist regions and the states from which they are seeking to extricate themselves are usually aware that formal recognition is out of the question. Instead the secessionist regions aspire to a degree of interaction with the rest of the global community that, while falling short of statehood, delivers virtually all of the practical benefits associated with statehood, including trading and sporting links etc. This is sometimes called 'Taiwan status', with Taiwan an entity that prospers in worldwide trade and takes part in the Olympic Games etc., but is not a recognised state. It is 'Taiwanization', rather than formal recognition, that constitutes the real danger for most states with secessionist regions (p. 175). In addition, one must recognise that even formal recognition of statehood is not itself a dichotomous matter, as a region can be recognised by one state (e.g. the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by Turkey); by a sufficient number of states to be entitled to membership of the UN (the gold standard); or by all states in the UN (Israel is in the middle but not the last category). This means that states with secessionist regions have to be wary of any state, or any additional state, recognising their secessionist region, which requires a considerable diplomatic outlay and means the state in question can never relax its guard.

Another reason why states put so much energy into counter-recognition policies, Ker-Lindsay explains, is that they are less concerned about formal recognition than with keeping military options open for re-capturing the territory (Georgia prior to 2008), or with securing re-integration on better terms in negotiations. On the latter score, the state will want to limit 'legitimization and acknowledgement', while the secessionist region will want to maximise them, as this strengthens their respective hands at the negotiating table. The Greek Cypriots, to use one example, can expect to get more territory, more property, and perhaps even a better deal on Turkey's intervention rights under the Treaty of Guarantee, if there is little or no legitimisation or acknowledgement of the TRNC. The Turkish Cypriots can aspire to more of a confederal status the more recognition they can win. In a few exceptional cases, if the secessionist entity looks set to win, the state can hope through its counter-recognition policies to secure better terms for protecting its interests in the about to become independent entity. This is the course that Serbia looks to be currently set on, with respect to protecting Serbs within Kosovo, and the Serbian religious sites.

Ker-Lindsay has written a very strong text. He could have done a little more to bring out the comparative dimension of his subject: e.g. why have some states, or secessionist regions done better or worse than others? Even on this point, the answers can be found in his book, but they are not brought together as an orthodox comparativist might have done. One point that emerges throughout the book, for example, is that Cyprus is the 'Rolls-Royce' of counter-secessionist states, while Serbia looks like a 'loser' by comparison, with Georgia located somewhere in between. But why is this? It can hardly be because of size, or vast diplomatic resources. It can also not be because
Cyprus has more experience than the rest, although it does. Cyprus, after all, has been successful in countering recognition from the very start: in 1983, on the TRNC’s UDI, the UN Security Council expressly prohibited other states from recognising it. The answer appears to lie instead in the fact that the international community has accepted that the TRNC is a result of ‘invasion and occupation’ and not, as the Turkish Cypriots or Ankara would have it, an exercise in self-determination or a case of ‘just cause’ secession. Also, though perhaps less important, the 1960 Cyprus constitution expressly prohibited secession or partition. The Yugoslav and Soviet constitutions, by contrast, acknowledged rights to self-determination and secession respectively, and while Kosovo and Abkhazia and South Ossetia were not full members of their respective federations, they, particularly Kosovo, have derived indirect benefits from this constitutional permissiveness. This, in turn, explains why Greek Cypriot negotiators want to prevent anything in the constitution of a united Cyprus that might facilitate the future recognition of a Turkish Cypriot state.

An important and related issue that is not touched on in the book is why some states are more interested in countering secession than others. Ker-Lindsay acknowledges not just that Sudan let South Sudan go – perhaps not difficult to understand, as it happened after massive and protracted violence – but that the UK and Canada do not seem as interested as Cyprus and other states in preventing secession. No explanation is given. The UK is liberal on secession primarily because it is a union-state: Scotland and Northern Ireland have always been treated differently, and the loss of either or both would pose no serious problem for England, which pre-existed the UK as a separate state with stable borders and a strong national identity. Canada is not quite as liberal as the UK (because there is no historic identity or region in Canada outside Quebec), but it is a democratic and liberal federation with an independent judiciary. It was the judiciary that decided that the federal government would have to negotiate the terms of secession if any province clearly wanted it.

In places, the book reads like a handbook for states that want to prevent secession, and it will certainly make essential reading for the policymakers of such states (and their counterparts in the contested states). This does not mean that Ker-Lindsay wants to promote counter-recognition policies at the expense of seeking agreement. On the contrary, he points out that if the real goal of states is to set the terms for re-integration, they should be more cognisant of the damage that counter-recognition policies can have on prospects for reconciliation or reunification. This part of the book is brief, but it is meaningful.

Ker-Lindsay’s book is original, demonstrates a deep knowledge of the subject matter, is ultra-accessible, and is possible to read from cover to cover. It makes a solid, eminently worthwhile, contribution to the broad literature on secession.

**John McGarry**
As we approach the centennial of the Armenian genocide, denialist scholars still attempt to obfuscate and distort the historical facts of one of the classical cases of genocide in the twentieth century. The volume under review provides the reader with one of the most indisputable proofs on the veracity of the Armenian genocide and specifically the intent to commit such a crime. In the past four decades, the scholarship on the Armenian genocide has been developing in tandem with literature in the field of comparative genocides. Since then numerous volumes from different disciplines have contributed substantially to our understanding of this genocide. Despite these promising developments, studies of the Armenian genocide from a legal-criminal perspective have been scarce. Only a handful of works have addressed the subject and even those have done so partially.1 The volume under review is the most comprehensive and analytical work to address the Armenian genocide from legal-criminal perspective to date. Major portions of the book Judgment at Istanbul: The Armenian Genocide Trials written by Vahakn N. Dadrian and Taner Akçam, appeared first in Turkish.2 In Judgment at Istanbul Dadrian and Akçam examine the Armenian genocide as documented by the Ottoman Special Military Tribunal’s criminal persecution of the perpetrators who were involved in the genocide. They analyse the genocide from a legal-criminal perspective in order to inquire the specific context and conditions in which the prosecutorial initiatives took place, the huge obstacles that the courts had to overcome, and the series of verdicts


that ensued (p. 3). With this aim in mind the book analyses these courts-martial in a meticulous way from both legal and historical perspectives.

After the armistice of Mudros in the aftermath of World War I, the defeated Ottoman government of Istanbul, under the pressure of the allies especially the British, established Courts-Martial to try members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), government officials, and military leaders, as well as other functionaries, with charges of committing crimes against the Armenians and subverting the constitution by leading the Empire into the War. The Courts-Martial, which began in 1919 and ended in 1922, demonstrated the undeniable role that the Young Turk Party, the CUP, played in the organisation and implementation of the Armenian genocide. The importance of these military tribunals does not only lie in their verdicts and Key Indictment, rather in the process that culminated in these decisions. This process involved the gathering and classification of mass documentary evidence about the centrally organised plan to annihilate the Armenians of the Empire. In the course of these Tribunals new documents surfaced which were authenticated in the pre-trial investigation by officials from the Ministry of Justice and Interior. The authentication of these documents was carried out by affixing to the bottom of the documents the phrase ‘it confirms with the original’ (aslı muafıkdir).

The book Judgment at Istanbul is divided into two parts: Part I entitled the ‘Conditions Surrounding the Trials’ which constitutes the major section of the book (9 chapters) is written by Dadrian whereas Part II entitled ‘The Trials and Beyond’ (3 chapters) is written by Akçam. The final chapter of the book provides verbatim translation into English of the full texts of the Indictments and Verdicts from the original Ottoman. In Part I, Dadrian provides an overview about the political and military conditions of the time, a detailed analysis of the trial preparation, and an analysis of the court procedures. Towards the end of Part I he provides a summary of the series of verdicts. Akçam on the other hand examines closely the Ottoman Turkish press in Istanbul during the period of the courts-martial and provides the reader with a detailed list of the trials in question. What is unique in these courts-martial is that for the first time in the history of the Ottoman Empire all three branches of the Ottoman government (executive, legal, and judicial) were resolved to prosecute and punish the perpetrators.

After providing a brief historical background about the Armeno-Turkish conflict, Dadrian concentrates in chapter two on the Ottoman Parliamentary debates about the Armenian genocide and the inception of the Mazhar Inquiry Commission appointed by the Cabinet which was tasked with the ‘investigation of misdeeds’ (tetkiki şeyyati) of officials only. Assigned to conduct large-scale pre-trial criminal investigation, the Commission began gathering eyewitness accounts and official and quasi-official documents. The latter proved to be instrumental in the trial process and a testament to the complicity of parliamentary deputies and provincial governors in the Genocide (p. 60). Before its termination, the Commission collected some 200 dossiers and handed them over to the courts-martial authorities (p. 64). In chapter three Dadrian discusses the preparations for the courts-martial and the array of impediments that it had to overcome in order
to provide its verdict. The most important of which was the existence of CUP sympathisers within these administrations who intentionally obstructed the process of the trials. Afterwards Dadrian concentrates on the importance of the Key Indictment whose trial began on 28 April 1919 and which constituted a singular phenomenon in Ottoman-Turkish history as a whole. This is because for the first time in Ottoman history ‘high-ranking Turkish officials, including two wartime prime ministers and [a] host of cabinet ministers were being criminally prosecuted for crimes’ (p. 83).

The collection of documents in the hands of the courts-martial was crucial in incriminating the chiefs of the Special Organisation (SO), the most prominent of which were Drs Mehmet Nazim and Bahaeddin Şakir. Through analysing the Indictment, Dadrian demonstrates how Talat Paşa, the chief architect of the genocide, was ‘singled out as being in secret communication with Şakir, the director of the SO operating in the Eastern provinces’ (p. 86). Furthermore, he demonstrates that two groups organised and supervised the killings in the eastern provinces: the CUP leaders who were in charge of the SO units and a coterie of ex-officers who had resigned from the military and were sent by the CUP to deliver special orders to the provinces. In chapter four Dadrian discusses the initiation of the courts-martial and demonstrates the challenges that they endured in this process. The most important of these obstacles were the instability of post-war Turkish governments, local political resistance, and the rising tide of Kemalism in Anatolia, all of which created problems for the operating military tribunals. It is interesting to note in this chapter that Dadrian provides the list of the defendants and the names of their lawyers (pp. 96–97). If the documents of these defence lawyers exist today it will provide a new aspect of understanding the arguments they made in defending their clients (read perpetrators). Chapter five of the book deals with the emergence of Kemalism and the rise of Turkish nationalism, both of which had a huge impact on aborting justice in the case of the courts-martial. This was because Kemalism became more and more entwined with the remaining CUP leaders many of whom played leading roles in the Armenian genocide. Chapter six of the book deals with the series of major trials and the related verdicts. In this chapter Dadrian concentrates on the courts-martial proceedings that took place in the cities of Yozgat, Bayburt, Erzincan, and the provinces of Harput and Trabzon (pp. 110–116). In addition, he concentrates on the trials of the responsible secretaries and delegates of the CUP (pp. 116–119) and on cabinet ministers’ and CUP chieftains’ trial series (pp. 120–121). The central theme of the Key Verdict with regard to the cabinet ministers and CUP chieftains was that ‘crime of mass murder’ against the Armenians was ‘organized and carried out by the top leaders (erkân) of CUP’ (p. 120). Dadrian notes that the significance of all these major trial series was that the verdicts were solely based on Muslim testimony, which supported the majority of the existing documentary evidence (p. 109). Chapter seven should be regarded as the most important chapter of the book. Here Dadrian analyses the pre-trial parliamentary initiatives ‘in terms of examining and ascertaining the principal determinants of the crime of the World War I Armenian Genocide’ (p. 127). For Dadrian these determinants are: 1) Premeditation and special intent (pp. 133–337); 2) The Special Organisation (pp. 137–144); 3) Responsible secretaries (pp. 144–146); and 4) The
central authorities especially the Central Committee of the CUP (pp. 147–148). The most important of these determinants is the premeditation and special intent (dolus specialis) which is considered to be the critical component in qualifying a mass crime as genocide by the UN definition. Another important point that Dadrian raises is the way in which the CUP leaders sidelined the cabinet and the parliament and war was declared without the requisite cabinet approval. In chapter eight Dadrian provides a summary of the conditions surrounding the trials. The last chapter of Part I deals with the judicial liquidation of some of the arch perpetrators of the genocide by both CUP and Kemalist authorities. Dadrian argues that in liquidating these perpetrators the Kemalist regime ‘ended up administering punitive justice against some of the most prominent authors of the Armenian Genocide’ (p. 182).

The second part of the book, written by Akçam, surveys the press during the period of the courts-martial and provides important details that do not appear in the official gazette of the government, Takvim-i Vekayi. Akçam confirms that there existed sixty-three different court cases directly involved in crimes against the Armenians. He briefly discusses each case (pp. 202–242). Of these sixty-three only twelve appeared in Takvim-i Vekayi. Akçam divides the documentation of these trials into four categories: the first consists of complete accounts of the trials, the second of partial accounts, the third includes those trials that were documented only by their verdicts, and the fourth includes those sentences that were decreed officially by the Sultan (p. 202). In his last chapter Akçam discusses the formation and operation of the Ottoman Military Tribunals. Though the information in this chapter appears in the first section of the book written by Dadrian, it nevertheless provides a useful overview of the political situations in both Istanbul and Ankara during the formation and operation of the Military Tribunals and their demise in 1922 when the Ankara Nationalist movement took Istanbul. It would have been much better if this chapter had been placed in the beginning of Part I of the book. The final chapter of the book provides English translations of the full texts of the Indictments and Verdicts (pp. 271–332).

The book Judgment at Istanbul should be regarded as an important contribution to the field of Armenian genocide studies, Ottoman legal history, and the history of War Tribunals. It provides readers with a compelling argument about the historical veracity of the Armenian genocide. It also demonstrates that the post-war government in Istanbul was willing to try the culprits of the Armenian genocide and deliver justice to the victims. However, for reasons discussed in the book these attempts failed to attain their goal. Judgment at Istanbul is a valuable contribution to the field of legal aspects of genocides. The book would be useful to students in genocide studies, late Ottoman history, legal experts on mass crimes, and comparative genocide scholars.

Bedross Der Matossian

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A Russian proverb says: 'The past is less predictable than the future.' Today, the task of re-visiting and re-working the past is, more than ever, a major theme of the present. In his book *Present Pasts* Huyssen (2003, p. 3) argues that we currently suffer from a 'hypertrophy of memory', not history. Commenting on the explosion of memory discourses he points out that whereas nineteenth-century nation-states were concerned with recording history and tradition in order to legitimise a utopian future of progress, contemporary debates centre not only on the relationship between history (official, public) and memory (unofficial, personal) but also on the nature and premises of history writing itself. In this new memory market, Cyprus is well positioned to offer the perfect case study, given the conflict, the trauma and the almost experimental design of collective memory with the arbitrary and abrupt closing and partial opening of the Green Line. *Cyprus and the Politics of Memory: History, Community and Conflict* (edited by Rebecca Bryant and Yiannis Papadakis, I.B. Tauris, 2012) is an example of this trend that aims at exploring how 'history becomes a site for struggle, as well as a weapon used in the struggle' (p. 3). Even though not all the chapters engage theoretically the dynamic between memory and history, it is obvious that the main concern of the book revolves around what and how people remember the past – whether it is the past they personally experienced or the past handed down to them through history books.

Thus, the first theme one detects is related to how history in Cyprus is constantly re-visited and revised. Hatay and Papadakis start off in chapter 1 by arguing that a comparative look on the evolution of history writing in Cyprus on both sites can be illuminating, not because it will settle the issue of what really happened but because the question of historiography (vs. history) seems to be a much more interesting site for examining the struggle over the past. In the same vein, Bryant (chapter 7) explains how the battle of Erenköy evolved from a historical footnote that simply added on the idea of helpless Turkish Cypriots awaiting salvation from Turkey, into a myth of Turkish Cypriot heroism. Current commemorations of the battle are a sign of shifting loyalties and an indication that Turkish Cypriots are ready to move on to a history that does not present them as pure victims.

Both chapters allude to the idea of history as a palimpsest: a palimpsest is a manuscript (papyrus or parchment) that contains text underneath which another text from an earlier era is still visible. Reasons for the creation of palimpsests were both economic as well as political (for
example, the case of Christian sermons written over pagan texts in order to destroy them) but they are considered important documents because they are material manifestations of the memory/amnesia dynamic relationship. Two other chapters take on similar perspectives by peeling away layers of memory in people’s narratives. In chapter 3, Goker examines how memory is subject to revision once we cross a spatial or temporal threshold: a nationalist visits her home on the other side and cannot deny that she has memories of peaceful coexistence; a migrant Cypriot rewrites the chapter of ‘home’ when he is unable to find his childhood home after crossing the Green Line. Even though the conceptual focus of the chapter is on home, belonging and alienation, it represents an excellent case of the workings of memory, especially as they relate to issues of space. In another interesting chapter, Loizos (chapter 8) begins to strip off not only the layers of his informants’ memory but, more importantly, the layers of his own ability as an anthropologist to collect, collate and present legitimate information. The main focus of the chapter is the question of oral evidence related to the burning of the Argaki Turkish Cypriot coffee shop and the originality of it stems from the fact that it is posed in relation to memory, not history. Loizos argues, however, that neither the historian nor the social anthropologist can avoid the fact that all types of evidence must be interpreted as admissible and valid.

Two other chapters engage the pedagogical side of history by examining its multiple public performances that infuse everyday life. In chapter 6, Pattie provides a critical overview of the Armenian genocide commemoration through poetry and song, supporting the idea that history revolves around narratives of pain and suffering. In one of the most poignant questions of the book she asks: ‘What might it mean for children to recite a poem about war and death that involves young people, even children? ’ (p. 151). While the question is left unanswered, it is a reminder that the issue of how trauma is transferred remains understudied in the case of Cyprus, with only a few exceptions (see Zembylas, 2008). In chapter 2, Philippou analyses Greek Cypriot geography and civics textbooks in order to point out that dominant identity claims and moral teachings of history are not confined to history textbooks. Indeed, this argument is important for anyone interested in the politics of collective memory in Cyprus which continue to fuel furious public debates any time educational reforms are proposed.

In most of the book’s chapters a close affinity between memory (or collective memory) and history is implicitly assumed – after all, in ancient Greek mythology, Mnemosyne was the mother of the muse of History. More recent interpretations of their relationship, however, point to a memory/history split. Nora (1989), for example, argues that modern, national history has abducted people’s memory and turned it into a monolithic interpretation of the past. The starting point for Panayiotou in chapter 3 is exactly this issue: the silencing of the Left’s role in forging class consciousness, contrary to what people experienced or remembered. The chapter argues that (official) history systematically suppressed the voices of people from the Left in order to provide a nationalist version of the EOKA struggle that did not differ much from the modernising British vision. Similarly, Chatzipanagiotidou (chapter 4) engages the ‘unofficial’ and marginalised history
of the Left (through the eyes of Cypriot migrants in London) even though her work offers a more nuanced analysis: first, in pointing out the dangers of assuming that any alternative or silenced history is automatically authentic and second, in presenting splits between official and unofficial accounts even within the unofficial version.

In both chapters, (official) history is presented as an overpowering, controlling force that provides a singular lens for understanding the world. This is what Ratip aims to deconstruct in chapter 9 by arguing that it would be more useful if we could see the history of Cyprus from the perspective of those who are excluded by it; those who belong to a non-Cypriot history. We would, therefore, recognise how this limited perspective has robbed us of the ability to focus on other narratives beyond the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot conflict — such as the cases of violence and ‘purification’ within each community. The main argument of the chapter is a call to incorporate Cypriot history in the larger, international context of capitalism, militarism and globalised violence and, in that sense, to free it from the shackles of exceptionalism.

Ratip’s chapter along with chapter 10 by Galatariotou is where the volume ventures into unanticipated areas in order to resolve the history/memory split of the Cyprus conflict. I was initially highly suspicious — should I say, resistant? — of Galatariotou’s attempt to bring psychoanalytic methods to the study of history and collective memory but by the end of the chapter I was a Greek Cypriot patient on the couch, enlightened by the seamless connections between private, psychic reactions and public, ideological positions. The chapter initiates us into the basics of psychoanalytic thought (that the objectivity of external reality is compromised by the subjectivity of the conscious or unconscious mind; that there are collective psychic positions; and how we are fixated at the trauma and cannot move past it) before presenting Cypriots’ six major difficulties in revisiting the past. From resistance to change to collective obsession with ‘the truth’ yet fierce rejection of irrefutable facts, and from deceptive memories to de-signified memories (knowing without feeling), the analysis of how the Cypriot society suffers from ‘paranoid-schizoid and depressive states of mind in its inter-communal relating’ (p. 246) points to a collective denial that maintains false beliefs. These are the beliefs that can and have justified violence.

The problem is that people firmly believe in what they remember as real — as Galatariotou explains: ‘Memory is an unreliable witness of external reality but an unfailing recorder of psychic reality’ (p. 252). Such diagnosis, of course, is based on the idea that there is an external reality that is separate and, to some extent, independent of our psychic reality. And this is really the bottom line: can this external reality (about what happened in Cyprus) ever be established by those whose psyches have been traumatised by it? Or, more importantly, how do we know that we are in danger of privileging psychic realities at the expense of recognising an external reality? These questions that pitch positivism against relativism may sound simplistic and outdated but they are at the crux of the matter when we are investigating violence, pain and human rights, and I wish that more of the chapters in this book engaged them directly. The Russian proverb implies that memory is productive, not reproductive. If we are experiencing an era of memory saturation that favours the
trauma, the survivor and the witness, then we need to recognise when we are in danger of moving from the fetishisation of history to the fetishisation of the victim. Overall, this book is itself productive in the multiple ways in which it interrogates the tension between reality, truth and memory and, thus, raises more questions than it answers.

Miranda Christou

References


Stan Draenos’ book Andreas Papandreou: The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick has come at a time when Greece is facing tremendous economic, political and social problems. The role played by PASOK and Andreas Papandreou’s son George Papandreou also brings to the limelight the heritage left by the founder of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement.

Writing about Andreas Papandreou is no easy task when considering his complex and controversial persona in addition to contemplating the active part he played and his influence on modern Greek politics. Andreas Papandreou had such an avid personality that could not leave anyone indifferent: people either admired and followed him or came to strongly oppose him.

Stan Draenos has taken a number of years to carry out his research into the life of Andreas Papandreou. The book in its 340 pages covers very interesting aspects of Papandreou’s life. The early part of the book (the first four chapters) deals with Andreas’ successful academic career as well as his personal life; it also analyses in a thorough and meticulous way the transformation of an excellent academic into a politician slowly but surely being attracted to Greek politics. The persistent efforts of his father George Papandreou are described in a detailed and lively manner and the author leads us gradually to understand this transformation.

The magnetism of the personality of Andreas Papandreou as well as his passionate temperament comes out vividly through his early life in America. The incident with the authorities described on pages 5 and 6 indicates that Andreas was not the kind of person who easily conformed to restrictions. It also marked the beginning of a new life. The meeting with Margaret Chant and what was to follow, throw light on the passionate aspect of Andreas’ character which he was to exhibit later in his political career.

The author describes very skillfully the efforts of George Papandreou to draw his son into Greek politics. The involvement was slow but steady and after some years Greece was to acquire its ‘Messiah’. The maverick of Greek politics decided to stay in Greece and subsequently was to be a key player in Greek politics for the next thirty years or so.

A book on Andreas Papandreou could not be complete without reference to Cyprus and the Cyprus problem. Andreas Papandreou came onto the Greek political scene at a time when Cyprus
was facing serious internal political problems and the threat from Turkey was looming in the background. Andreas Papandreou is seen in the role of a modern Greek politician trying to steer a middle path between American politics, Greek interests and internal politics. This was to change in later years as Papandreou moved away from the United States and became more deeply involved in Greek politics and the Cyprus problem. Progressively, the Greek Cypriots were to see a strong supporter of their cause; a leader who was at times even prepared to go to war for the sake of Cyprus. The later years however, are beyond the scope of this book.

The book ends with the tragic events of April 1967: the coup by the Greek colonels, his confinement and his departure from Greece in January 1968.

As Draenos states in his concluding statement ‘... Andreas Papandreou’s transformation into a political maverick had reached its fulfillment at the level of analysis and understanding. The consequences for his politics were to follow’ (p. 307).

This is a well-researched and well-written book. It covers the early years of Andreas Papandreou’s life in academia, his personal life and his gradual pull and involvement in Greek politics. The coverage is balanced and dispassionate and brings to life the man who was to be a leading figure in modern Greek politics.

Draenos writes in a style that is attractive, smooth and easy to follow. Reading the book was both interesting and easy. As the flyer to the book states ‘it will appeal to general readers as well as to scholars and students of international affairs’.

The bibliography is not so extensive but it covers important works on the period. In addition the book has been published in Greek by «Ψυχογιός» in a translation by the writer and journalist Christos Economou.

It has been described by Andreas’ son Nicos Papandreou, as one of the best books written on his father. It probably contains the best coverage to date of the early years of Andreas Papandreou.

Emilios Solomou