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THE ROLE OF STATE PROCESSES IN THE PRODUCTION OF ‘ETHNIC’ CONFLICT: THE NATION-STATE DIALECTIC, EUROPEANISATION AND GLOBALISATION

By Nicos Trimikliniotis

Abstract

This paper sets out to theorise the production of ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’ conflict via the complex inter-relation between ‘Nation’ and ‘State’, in what is termed as the nation-state dialectic. It considers the production of ‘ethnic conflict’ and the role of nationalism, the state and class politics. It theorises the State as a social relation and as a power structure and then proceeds in linking it to the emergence of the nation-state construct. In theorising ‘the State’, the attempt is to go beyond considering it merely as a juridical-legal apparatus of power in a given territory, but to explore it also as a process and social relation that penetrates all other relations through the different ways it operates. In this very wide conception, organisations such as the UN, EU and NATO are considered as ‘State processes’. The ‘nation-state’ dialectic refers to the complex interrelation between the two components, the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’, with the constant re-negotiation and tension between the two. It is essentially the study of the processes and material forces that create the tension, whilst at the same time ‘cementing’ the two components together. It explores how the dialectic of the ‘nation-state duplex’ produces a reserve or gap, which is the socio-political space within which the contest between the alternative political, including nationalistic, projects and visions takes place. This is where the contest for legitimacy occurs. The problem is then related to the recent debates over Europeanisation and how this affects the ‘nation-state’ and the ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’ conflict.
1 Paper Outline

The paper starts with Section A, which is the conceptual framework of the central subject of this paper that is the nature of conflict, not generally, but how it relates to state ‘processes’ and the ‘nation’. The tension between the core reference points ‘Nation’, ‘State’, and ideological projects based on them is analysed to understand the ‘nature of conflict’. The contradictions generated by the interrelation between the two are in many ways the key to understand conflict. Section B examines the European Integration challenges to the nation-state and how ‘ethnic conflicts’ are altered as a result of Europeanisation.

Section A: Conceptualising the Nation, State and the Nation-State

Dialectic

2 Preliminaries on the Nation-State Dialectic

Starting from the ‘nation’ it can be observed that this is an elusive concept with conflicting definitions, which remains a highly controversial and emotive subject. The question of ‘what is a nation’ and ‘when is a nation’ are crucial here. This paper places the understanding of these questions within the wider transformations of the world in the last few centuries. The term ‘nation’ cannot be understood outside the wider phenomenon of ‘nationalism’. Nationalism is in turn understood as an ideology, but also as a political strategy for hegemony or for contesting the hegemony of another group. Nationalism attempts to homogenise collectivities by using ‘the nation’ as its central focal point for rallying and mobilising popular support. It is also a prime actor in the process of centralisation, the unending process of ‘nationalisation of society’ to use Balibar’s expression (1991). All social relations are affected in this process and nationalism has a ‘social’ dimension. State processes, in the wider sense, play an important role (in an active or passive way), be it in the contest over who controls the state apparatus or over the shape of the State form. Furthermore, these social/political processes can act as background force activating political difference via discrimination or failing to redress imbalances or differentials in power and wealth; or even via the influence of ‘the state system’ in international relations and international politics, as manifestations of imperialism, post-colonialism or world system.

The ‘State’ assumes a number of different meanings, wider and narrower, that beg an explanation before proceeding any further. The ‘state form’ refers to the specific way of organisation of ‘a (recognised and legitimate) jurisdiction over a given territory’, which is a fairly standard minimalist definition of the State, especially in international law, politics and sociology textbooks. However, other formulations of ‘the State’ approach the ‘essence’ of the State in different ways, such as a ‘night-watchman’, ‘an arbitrator’; ‘a mechanism of oppression’ and so on. In theorising ‘the State’, the

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1 As will be explored in some detail the terms: ‘nation’ and ‘State’ are seen as interrelated concepts and their ideological justifications of nationalism and state-centred political ideologies as preceding what they claim to justify.

2 Other perceptions of the State include the following:
   - as a so-called ‘night-watchman’ (the minimalist prescription of the state mainly; confining its role to the maintenance of law and order)
attempt is to go beyond considering it merely as a juridical-legal apparatus of power in a given territory, but to explore it also as a process and social relation that penetrates all other relations through the different ways it operates. In this very wide conception, organisations such as the UN, EU and NATO are considered as ‘State processes’. However the danger of having an all-embracing and wide definition of the State is that it may become too vague and general and thus meaningless, as it may fail to provide any insight into the specific ways in which the State influences social phenomena.

The ‘nation-state’ dialectic refers to the complex interrelation between the two components, the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’, with the constant re-negotiation and tension between the two. It is essentially the study of the processes and material forces that create the tension, whilst at the same time ‘cementing’ the two components together.

2.2 The Concepts of Nation and Nationalism

The literature on the nation, nationalism and related topics is vast and this paper does not purport to review it exhaustively. It merely draws out those typologies that are considered useful for the analysis that will follow, particularly on the relation between Nation and State.

In some contexts nationalism may be seen as a system of hegemony, whilst in others it appears as a movement, with political, socio-economic and cultural dimensions, acting as a crucial ‘hegemonising/homogenising process’ and a ‘discipline mechanism’ over a particular community. The concept of the ‘nation’ is the core signifier of difference/ articulation and mobilisation of the specific political project involved. This ‘political project’ is the nationalist goal or utopia. This preliminary definition of nationalism does not in itself aim to capture the complexity of this political phenomenon, nor to reduce it to politics. Rather it aims to place the concept of the nation within the wider socio-political context.

2.1 What is the ‘nation’ and When is a ‘nation’?

Before examining nationalism a preliminary analysis on the concept of ‘the nation’ is attempted. A typology of definitions of the nation must involve the extent to which it is considered to be a ‘modern’ or a ‘pre-modern’ phenomenon; whether it takes cultural or political dimensions as its primary criteria; whether it is objective, subjective or ‘transubjective’.

Snyder, for the Encyclopaedia of Nationalism (1990: 230), prior to presenting a number of alternative definitions suggests that the definition of the concept of the nation is by no means an easy matter.

“At the root of nationality and nationalism is the word ‘nation’. There is much difficulty in arriving at a generally accepted definition of all three terms. Some scholars consider the meaning of nation to be too
complex a metaphysical fiction that they assume or explicitly state that it is not capable of scientific definition”.

Connor (1978: 379) suggests that it is so difficult to define and conceptualise the term because “the essence of the nation is intangible”.

The ‘primordialist case’ views nations as pre-modern, ‘primordial’ phenomena that survive social, political and economic transformations and that “nations emerged before nationalism” (Armstrong 1982). A more sophisticated attempt to retain some of the alleged pre-modern ‘essence’ of nations is that of Smith, who sees them as modern mutations of the primordial ‘Ethnie’, though not necessarily in the sense of ‘natural’ descent or blood’ (Smith 1986; 1991). For Smith (1991: 40) a nation is “a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and a common legal rights and duties for all members”.

This is the ‘ethnicist’ or ‘ethnic essentialist’ approach that maintains “the ethnic origins of nations” (Smith 1986). There is however considerably more powerful evidence that the ‘nation’ is in fact a modern phenomenon. The word ‘nation’ derives from Latin and when originally coined meant ‘common blood’. The word derived from the past participle of the verb ‘nasci’, which means ‘to be born’. By the 17th century the term ‘nation’ referred to “the people or the citizenry” (Connor 1978: 380). Hobsbawm’s rigorous research on the vocabulary of the subject illustrates the modernity of the term in different languages (Hobsbawm 1990: 14-45). The idea of the ‘nation’ as a novelty is shared by many writers on the subject. Hobsbawm (1990: 17-18) points out that “Whatever the ‘proper and original’ or any other meaning of ‘nation’, the term is clearly still quite different from its modern meaning. We may thus, without entering further into the matter, accept that in its modern and basically political sense the concept of the nation is very young”.

Hobsbawm is one of the proponents of the modernist thesis, together with Gellner (1983, 1997), Anderson (1991), Poulantzas (1980), Balibar (1990, 1991) and others. The modernist approach sees the emergence of nations and nationalism as a modern phenomenon, linked to the historical events of the last three centuries which are connected to do with social, economic and political transformations of the world.

In devising a typology of the nation Hobsbawm (1990: 18-22) distinguishes between the perceptions of the ‘revolutionary-democratic’ movements, which perceived this as a modern political-civil definition, from the later ‘nationalist’ perception, which was cultural, ethnic, and language based. For the purposes of the political-civil definition of the ‘nation’, individuals are inter-linked on the basis of citizenship, whereby they collectively exercise their sovereignty through their political participation, irrespective of their ethnic, cultural origin or affiliation. For Gellner the nation emerged after a certain stage of industrialisation and he therefore sees it primarily as an industrialisation-related phenomenon. Gellner (1983: 7) distinguishes between two types of nations: the culturalistic, where a group of people share the same culture; and the voluntaristic/subjective where “nations are artefacts of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities”.

The idea that the ‘nation’ is a social or historical construct has gained more credibility among social scientists and historians over the last twenty years. Hobsbawm’s ‘nation’ as an “invented tradition” is an influential dimension of this. He suggests that “invented traditions” are

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3 Smith cites the example of the Greeks to illustrate that the sense of continuity in the so called “3000 years of Greek identity” to quote Carras, to illustrate that in spite of the fact that in the blood sense there is much discontinuity, as a result of migration, conquering and wars the sense of continuity from the ancient ‘Hellenic spirit’ could still be claimed as a result of retaining the Greek language, the re-emphasis on Greek philosophy and literature etc. (Smith 1991: 28-30). “A sense of Greek identity and common sentiments of ethnicity can be said to have persisted beneath the many social and political changes in the last two thousand years” (Smith 1991: 30). This is a point that this thesis returns to when it considers the modernist versus primordialist stance. The ‘modernists’ may consider pre-modern points of reference as useful in links with the past, but they are not considered as being crucial in the shaping of modern nations and states. Ultimately it is modern social-political and economic and cultural transformations that shape ‘modernity’.
“highly relevant to that comparatively recent historical innovation, the ‘nation’, with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories and the rest. All rest on exercises of social engineering which have often been deliberate and always innovative, if only because historical novelty implies innovation” (Hobsbawm 1983: 13).

Balibar’s “fictive Ethnicity” and “ideal nation” express a similar notion (Balibar 1990). He suggests the ‘fiction’ in the sense used in this context does not mean “pure and simple illusion with no historical effects”, but rather the process and effect of an institutionalised personae, which itself generate a juridical-legal personality. It must “be understood by analogy with the persona ficta of the juridical tradition in the sense of an institutional effect, a ‘fabrication’” (Balibar 1991: 96). It is this “fictive ethnicity”, which is not identical to “Ideal Nation”, “which is the object of patriotism”, but a condition for its survival, for Balibar (1990). Without “fictive ethnicity” the “Ideal Nation” would be a distant and perhaps empty entity with no appeal to the masses: “the nation would appear as an idea or arbitrary abstraction” and patriotism would be left without an object to attach it to (Balibar 1991a: 96). It is Anderson’s influential “imagined communities” that is the most celebrated phrase used. However the ‘imaginary’ here is not necessarily equated with the ‘fictive’ of Balibar; or the ‘invented’ of Hobsbawm; or Gellner’s comment that at times nationalists ‘deliberately distort history’. For Anderson the imaginary is somehow more ‘benign’, as members of the nation do not actually communicate or know each other, and the community thus not real, but ‘imagined’4. The modern nation is a specific ‘imagined community’ that emerged after print capitalism made it possible to exist, replacing old dynastic regimes, religious orders and ‘real communities’. The antecedents of modern nations were the vast dynastic empires and the religious communities, which underwent a process of modern transformation and broke up as a result (Anderson 1991: 37-46).

Do ‘nations’ as such really exist? The idea of the existence of nations creates powerful forces worth investigating. They certainly exist as social forces that mobilise people5. The recognition of the fact that nationalism is a powerful force is not in itself evidence of the actual existence of the ‘nation’ as such, unless the ‘nation’ is collapsed into nationalism. The term ‘nation’ is used in different contexts and the meaning in each of these is not always the same. It may be used as an analytical category or as a mode of articulation/ rallying or reference point for collective solidarity, action and mobilisation. The ‘nation’ has commonalities with other terms and analytical categories of social division such as peoplehood, ethnicity, gender, and class. It is closely related to peoplehood and is sometimes equated to ‘the nation”; however in other contexts the two are juxtaposed as alternatives in political and legal discourses. With gender one is able to set the binary divide between masculine and feminine; with sex the divide is between male and female; something that is much more difficult with the concept of ‘the nation’6.

2.2 Who defines what is ‘a nation’ or ‘a people’: Objective or Subjective Definition?

What an analyst called “the problem of defining the national self” (Neuberger 1995: 302-303) has become an ‘existential angst’ in international politics and has opened up a crucial debate since the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw pact. International instruments leave fluid what the ‘national self’ is, or who determines whether self-determination is to be afforded. ‘Traditional norms’ developed

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4 Anderson (1991: 9) illustrates this by reference to tombs of Unknown Soldiers, “because they are either deliberately empty or no one knows who lies inside them, has no true precedents in earlier times”.

5 The nation is a political -social phenomenon, the existence of which as a fact is not necessary for the creation of a social force/movement for the attainment of a political project (nationalism), in the same way that the existence of God, as a matter of fact, is not a condition precedent for the existence of a religion/faith, which is based on the belief of God’s existence. As long that there is faith in a deity figure or a system of faith in general, religion is a force. The recognition of religion as a phenomenon, indeed a powerful one, does not necessarily imply the existence of God, objectively speaking, as impressed upon me by a Thomas Antoniou, to whom I would like to acknowledge the idea.

6 The difference between class and nation is that with class one can recognise class by looking at the their position in the mode of production or the social relations in production and society. With the nation matters are more complicated.
by international jurisprudence have always been ambiguous but have been questioned post 1989 (Koskenniemi 1994; Mayall 1994; Neuberger 1995: 302-303).

One needs to consider whether an objective definition would be more accurate, effective and useful or whether a subjective one would be more appropriate. Attempts to define ‘the nation’ have been made, usually using the various characteristics possessed by the construct. For Stalin (1913: 8) for a nation to exist, a set of rigid objective criteria had to be present if we are to have a nation; on the basis of history, language, culture, territory, economic life and psychological make-up. Stalin’s definition was:

“A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make up manifested in a common culture”.

A number of critiques of Stalin’s definition and overall approach exist within the Marxist tradition criticising his “rigid” and thus bureaucratic, “culturalist”, “psychological” stance and for being contrary to Lenin’s ‘political approach’ (see Lowy 1993: 66-72, Minnerup 1978).

Hobsbawm (1990: 5) wrestles with the question of definition in the search for a set of acceptable criteria to define the nation. However, he is pessimistic as to the success of such venture. He notes that “no satisfactory criterion can be discovered for deciding which human objectivities should be labelled in this way”. For Hobsbawm (1990: 5)

“the problem is that there is no way of telling the observer how to distinguish a nation from other entities a priori, as we can tell him or her how to recognise a bird or how to distinguish a mouse from a lizard”.

Objective definitions according to Hobsbawm have failed. This is because “only some members of the large class of entities” can fit these criteria and thus be described as nations, which means that “exceptions can always be found” (Hobsbawm 1990: 5-6). He then applies this to the question of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and illustrates cogently the difficulty in applying objective definitions in highly complex circumstances. The reference to a ‘separate historical past’, commonly invoked by nationalists in their claim to nationhood, is dismissed since it “almost certainly anachronistic, question begging or so vague as to be meaningless” (Hobsbawm 1990: 6).

Hobsbawm (1990) divides subjective definitions into two categories: collective ones such as Rennan’s, who saw the nation as “a daily plebiscite”; and individual ones such as the Austro-Marxist ones, which perceive nationality as being attached to persons wherever they live and whoever they live with and at any State they choose (Bauer 1996: 39-77; Nimni 1991: 162-165). A fairly standard subjective/culturalist definition is that provided by Seton-Watson (1977: 1),

“a community of people whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture a national consciousness”.

However, this doesn’t tell us much about the composition of this solidarity. Anderson’s “imagined communities”, is still rather vague and very little is added to the question of the criteria to be set in defining the ‘nation’. What are these criteria and who should define these criteria? Is it those set by the community or by reference to a set of objective or conventional (tran-subjective) criteria?

A number of problems can be identified with subjective definitions that define the nation on the basis of members’ consciousness. Hobsbawm (1990: 6-8) correctly cites three main problems. First, they are tautological; they are a posteriori guide as to what a nation is. Secondly, they may “lead the incautious into extremism or voluntarism”. Thirdly, they do not appreciate the complex ways and dimensions of defining and redefining identity. For Hobsbawm neither objective nor subjective definitions are satisfactory and both are misleading. He therefore takes what he calls an agnostic approach in his work and “assumes no a priori definition on what constitutes a nation”.
Taking an ‘agnostic approach’ may be convenient, given the difficulty in such a venture. However, we are still left with the original question set out: the ‘nation’ is left undefined. A number of guidelines must be attempted to defining and conceptualising the ‘nation’ before this thesis turns to theorising nationalism. First, the nation must be understood primarily as a political concept and some conventional criteria may well be set out. Secondly, the ‘nation’ is best understood as a signifier/reference point in the wider hegemonising process of one social group/class alliance over another in a given territory. In other words it must be related to class and ethnicity to see the operation of this political signifier of difference and rallying point. It may also be used as an analytical category, but any attempt to use it in this way must be approached with extreme caution, as the danger of essentialising a highly fluid and heterogeneous concept is apparent. Thirdly, the context is always within the inter-state system, it is therefore a state-related phenomenon. Any guidelines put forward are necessarily based on one certain theoretical underpinnings that must be properly scrutinised. One has to keep an open mind in considering what is and when is a ‘nation’ as the way it is perceived, defined, understood and expressed depends on the context and the particular structural and conjunctural factors involved. The ‘nation’ is by definition a political concept; it is politically orientated or motivated or at least potentially politically loaded. Whilst it would be misleading to deny that there are cultural, social and economic dimensions, in the modern world it is incomprehensible to consider the ‘nation’ as politically value-free. Irrespective of one’s attitude towards the nationalist phenomenon, the fact that international law and politics set out ‘the right to self-determination’ of peoples, in what was once called ‘the principle of nationality’ (Hobsbawm 1990) necessarily politicises ‘the nation’. By this, one cannot assume that it was international law that politicised it; in fact international law came to recognise a political principle. A ‘community’ or at least a group within a community is able to claim, whether legitimately or otherwise, the right to self-determination via an autonomous regime, such as devolution or even secession, by claiming to be a nation. A ‘cultural nation’, if geographically concentrated can be the basis for a ‘political’ nation. In any case where do the boundaries of culture stop and where do those of politics begin? They intersect as power-relations are everywhere.

2.3 Modern Nations: Continuity or Break from Past?

What are the origins of the nations? How did nations ‘emerge’, as we understand them today? These questions have a bearing on this thesis, as the myth of origin is a core discourse in nationalist claims, who attempt to legitimate their cause, actions and program invoking history and ancestral territories.

Attempts to trace the ‘origins of nations’ has led the ethnicists to argue that the modern nation “in practice incorporates several features of pre-modern ethnie and owes much to a general model of ethnicity which has survived in many areas until the dawn of the modern era” (Smith 1986).

Keeping equal distance and drawing from both the ‘modernist’ and ‘primordialist’ schools is not easy. The modernist approach which views the nation as a product of specific historical developments of the post eighteenth century Europe and in particular capitalism or industrial society (Althusser 1969; Hobsbawm 1990; Gellner 1983) bears witness to the influence of these processes. ‘Primordialists’ merely perceive the nations as “natural and universal an axiomatic extension of kinship relationship” (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992: 23).

The ‘ethnicist’ case relies on the premise that what is more important is the continuity between the pre-modern ‘ethnie’ (as Smith refers to them) than any change or rupture. Modern nations are in this view built on pre-modern ethnie. Smith divides into ‘lateral’ or ‘aristocratic’, those nations which are developed around a centralised State; and into ‘vertical’ or ‘demotic’, which are usually held together by religion and values that unify them, even when they subject other nations. For Smith these two ethnic structures interact with the state processes such as modernisation, economic and cultural transformations, which means that these communities are themselves transformed into political communities. The first type operated in Spain, England and France and the second in opposition to Empires for the State, as it were. A key role here is ascribed to secular interpretation by intellectuals who mediated in the transformation of a cultural-ethnic movements into political national ones.

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7 To be agnostic on the criteria that constitute a nation is not the same as being agnostic as to whether a nation as such exists. Of course if one adopts the later proposition one necessarily accepts the former, whereas if one adopts the former approach one may, though not necessarily accept the later.
mobilised against the State (Smith 1986: 129-152). Attempts to ‘invent’ nations, without what he called “clear ethnic core community” finding it difficult to build a cohesive social order (Smith, 1986: 1-18). This is a highly contentious point, more of a speculation than a true historical inquiry.

Smith is adamant that the national State form is resilient as a political unit due to “the mutual sustenance” of state and nation which according to Smith draws mainly on “the cohesive power and historic primacy of ethnic communities” and primarily relies upon “the dominant ethnie” around which it was formed and subsequently crystallised (Smith 1996: 114). For Smith, who sees nation and nationalism as “politically necessary, socially functional and historically embedded”, the suppression of the nation state in favour of a trans-national or supranational government or state is unlikely (Smith 1996: 152-153; see also the section on Europeanisation in this paper).

However, Smith’s analysis as to the resilience of the nation state form, is problematic and at times contradictory. This goes to the heart of his analysis in his works, as he supports the ‘ethnic core’ thesis, whereby all ‘authentic’ and thus ‘stable’ modern nations need to rely on primordial “ethnie”. Even a sophisticated approach, such as the one developed by Smith, cannot escape being subjected at least partly, to similar criticisms directed against the primordialist case. First, his ‘essentialist’ approach, which seeks to locate modern phenomena in what it perceives implicitly as primary collective identities cannot be substantiated empirically or even theoretically as necessarily interlinked. Secondly, there is clear evidence in any ethnic or national community that the State plays a powerful role in the shaping of nationalism. Even those sympathetic to the ethnicist approach, such as Hutchinson (1994: 11), recognise that “there is little or no evidence that the masses before the nineteenth century were aware of a national identity”.

A number of other modern processes have been put forward for the making of the contemporary nation, as we know it. Gellner (1983) sees the importance of the education systems and the socio-economic mobility produced by individual capitalism, which gradually destroyed localism. For Anderson (1983) the new imagined community differs from its precursors. This was only possible as a result of new cultural forms, such as printing popular newspapers and homogenous time. Print capitalism was crucial for creating this novel ‘imagined community’. Printing was invented and became popular only in the 15th century and allowed centralised states later on to ‘centralise’ time according to the Capital and thus ‘synchronise’ the ‘nation’. Zubaida, in his critique of Smith, suggests that it is specific political processes that facilitated centralisation; in other words it is the practice of centralised Government, which ethnically homogenises, nationalises societies, not the other way around (Zubaida 1989: 13).

2.4 But What is Nationalism?

Nationalism is primarily a political project or ideology. For Gellner (1983: 1) it is, “a theory of political legitimacy which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones”. Covering a wider spectrum, nationalism is a political project, “a claim for a separate political representation of a collectivity” (Anthias and Yuval-Davies 1983).

One may argue however, that there is always something unique in every nationalism. The context, time, content, leaders, class/gender relations are always varied in nationalistic projects. Nonetheless, different types of nationalistic projects or nationalism are distinguishable, as there are commonalities between them. Various typologies have been devised on the subject.

Elie Kedourie (1993: 104), who perceives nationalism as an ideology, considers it necessarily as illiberal and in constant tension with universalism: from the analyses of different nationalism he concludes that “nationalism and liberalism far from being twins are really antagonistic principles”. Other liberals however see two types of nationalism, liberal and illiberal (Griffin 1993). Hobshawn

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8 Kedourie’s published the first edition of his classic book, Nationalism in 1960, but here he is quoted in the fourth edition in 1993.
(1990; 1992) distinguishes the old unifying nationalism of the 19th century, linked with the national liberation anti-colonialist movements of the mid twentieth century, as opposed to the late 20th century nationalism, which aims at dividing in order to exercise power over ethnic/national collectivities. The former he calls “revolutionary democratic and liberal”, whilst the latter he sees as “divisive and conservative in essence” (Hobsbawm 1992). Anthony Smith’s typology (1971, 1986) divides them in “ethnic-genealogical” and “civic-territorial” or in Stolke’s typology (1987 quoted in Anthias and Yuval-Davies 1992: 23) “Kulturnations and Staatnation”. The typology can be expanded to include “Volknations”, constructed around the racial origin of the people (see Anthias and Yuval-Davies 1992:29). Examples of these types are American nationalism as “Staatnation”; French nationalism as “Kulturnation”; and German (classical) and white South Africanism as “Volknation”, since it is a classic example of construction around racial origins of the people.

Typologies are problematic in complex capturing social reality and are inherently limited, as they are ahistorical, static and not dynamic. Furthermore, some of the assumptions about the ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ of nationalism fail to properly account for the relation between nationalism and racism. An example of this is Michael Ignatieff’s distinction between “civic-nationalism” and “ethnic nationalism”. This corresponds to staatnation and Volknation respectively. The picture painted here is shared by many liberal perspectives, which assume that civic nationalism is not racist as it is open, liberal and democratic, whereas ethnic nationalism is illiberal and racially orientated. Even though there is inherent racism in Volknation constructions, this sort of analysis fails to contextualise for example how ethnic or culture-based nationalism during popular resistance to colonialist, imperialist or oppressive regimes can provide an effective source of inspiration for action. Civic nationalism may well operate in a racist way. Ahistorical approaches fail to consider the way British imperialism conquered and the conflict struggles in the creation of the imperial States. Nonetheless, the recognition that “imperialism was the form and expression of British nationalism” (Ignatieff 1993: 167) allows one to appreciate the processes by which a civic nationalism may solidify certain ethnic identities and shape the conflict that may emerge. As for the racism of a particular type of this civic nationalism to quote again the same writer:

“Bringing the lesser breeds within the law meant freeing them from lesser tribal fanaticisms and teaching them the civic temperament of the English race” (Ignatieff 1983: 167).

This ‘orientalist’ discourse’s ideology, inherent in colonialist and imperialist discourses is not only applied outside Britain but within it. It is this type of nationalism that is manifested by the British colonialists in Cyprus in the various policies, statements, and memoirs. This attitude is expressed vividly by the former governor of Cyprus, Sir Roland Storrs, who openly admitted that “Cyprus was occupied for imperial and strategic purposes” (cited in Attalides 1979: 3).

2.5 States-Induced Nations?

The extent to which State processes determine the formation of a nation ought not be conceived as a simple functional or mechanistic relationship, as if a particular State, acting in isolation, as a kind of ‘magical device’, necessarily ‘nationalises’ or ‘ethnifies’ society ex nihilo in a particular territory. The processes are or can be rather more complex. Therefore in trying to explain how it is possible that given the absence of a Kurdish State, for example, there is a Kurdish national ethnicity, instead of invoking pre modern ‘durable’ elements such as the Smithian “myth-symbol complexes”, we are better off looking at the role of the Turkish State. By oppression by a State regime and/or under the influence

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9 Although Ignatieff (1993: 135-61) is sympathetic towards the Kurdish nationalists, the superiority of civic over ethnic and the nativity, as to the luck of racism in the former, is apparent (Ignatieff 1993:3-11). The example of the UK (cited by Ignatieff) or of the USA illustrates how the supposed all-inclusiveness of civic staatnation is an idealised version of the practice of these states and societies. The example of Britain, which was “united...by shared attachment to certain institutions: the Crown; Parliament and the rule of law”, was has together four nations, according to Ignatieff (1993:4).

10 Edward Said’s Orientalism shows that perceptions, ‘knowledge’, literature about the ‘culture’ of the ‘orient’ (the east) is distorted and enmeshed in their own imperial projects (1978; 1993).
of a political/ideological movement, which pursues a State-oriented program (to conquer or destroy or reform or secede from a state formation) a national/ethnic identity is shaped\textsuperscript{11}.

In considering the ‘institutional materiality’ of the State, Poulantzas\textsuperscript{12} looks at the different aspects this entails, concentrating on three key areas: individualisation, law and the nation. As for the modern nation, Poulantzas considers that space and time are quite specific under capitalism and underlie the territoriality and historicity aspects respectively. In the “spatial matrix” territory and in the “temporal matrix”, tradition assumes both a novel meaning. He points out:

“By mapping out a new organisation of language and a new relationship of the state to territory and historicity, they bring into being the modern nation and the nation state.” (Poulantzas 1978: 97)

The production of the modern nation is always mediated by power relations, whereby the State(s) is/are central player(s). For Poulantzas (1978: 99) even the “social space and time” is being reserved by the capitalist State as it “intervenes in the erection of these matrices by tending to monopolise those procedures of space-time organisation, which are established throughout as the works of domination and power”. This observation on the role of the state is crucial in the homogenisation of the nation. The conclusion for Poulantzas is that

“the modern nation is the product of the State, since its constitutive elements (economic unity, territory, tradition) are modified through the state...the modern nation further tends to coincide with the State, since it is actually incorporated by the state and acquires flesh and blood in the state apparatuses: it becomes the anchorage of state power in society and maps out its contours. The capitalist state is functional to the nation” (Poulantzas 1978: 99).

The nation is more like an anchor of the modern capitalist state; the State is not an epiphenomenon of the nation, as Smith seems to imply (Poulantzas 1991; 1996). It is via or against state related apparatuses/mechanisms that nationalist projects articulated or implemented (Balibar 1990). This is because the main locus of power is the State or some supra-state apparatuses that have the capability of enforcing policy (Balibar 1990: 331), though these policies cannot guarantee results (Anthias and Yuval-Davies 1989: 22). Balibar articulates this effectively:

“the idea of nations without a state or nations ‘before’ the state is....a contradiction in terms, because the state is always implied in the...”

\textsuperscript{11} We can examine how the Turkish national operates on the Kurdish people on the one hand, and how political organisations as potential state-directors operate on the other. There is little doubt that there Turkish State oppression against ethnic groups such as the Kurds and others, liberation movements, parties and organisations (see Amnesty International Annual Reports 1980-1998). This oppression, together with the response of Kurdish organisations that resist this, such as the PKK and others, all acting within international politics and practice, are vital factors in the shaping of Kurdish nationalism and national/ethnic identity. The myths, symbols and ethnic resources (as defined in by Anthias and Yuval-Davis they themselves) do not in themselves necessarily create/generate a need for an autonomous political representation as a distinct nation. These “ethnic resources”, such as cultural, territorial, economic, linguistic, religious (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1993:8) are employed or are least activated by contact with and/or in opposition to State processes.

\textsuperscript{12} Poulantzas analyses on the nation are important in the theorisation of the nation-state construct. Surprisingly Poulantzas’s observations on the nation-state relation have received very little attention in the debates that followed his death in the 1980s.
historic framework of national formation (even if not necessarily within the limits of its territory” (Balibar 1990: 331).

Gellner is more provocative, as he goes even further to suggest that:

“Nationalism invents nations were they do not exist - but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, even if, as indicated, they are purely negative (Gellner in Smith 1971: 117).

The idea that the nation itself is a product of modernity incorporating ‘nationalism’ is not that nations necessarily pre-existed ‘nationalism’, but that nations are a product of nationalisms or at least of modern political phenomena. Gellner (1983: 55) is categorical: “it is nationalism which engenders nations, not the other way around”.

Nationalism is a product of modern social processes and practices, which is meaningless in the pre-modern era. The articulation of nationalism makes no sense outside this setting. It is the existence of the modern State as a notional possibility, given that other States exist in practice that generated the particular form of the ‘nation’. Balibar (1990, 1991) refers to a “state system” or “a system of states” to illustrate the above point. In order to gain ‘independence’, according to Wilsonian self-determination or liberal or Leninist theories, something also translatable in international Law and Politics, as a distinct ‘nation’, a priori ‘people’ is required. Even that will not suffice, but it is a condition precedent. Through political, economic, social and ideological processes the concept and mechanisms of States play a crucial role in the shaping modern ‘nations’. There is no causal link as such, between the old ‘ethnie’ and modern ‘nations’, other than a potential reference/rallying point of solidarity amongst a collectivity and point of difference with others. This is a point around which potential national boundaries may be inserted.

The fallacy of assuming a kind of primacy for the nation, and viewing the State as a mere epiphenomenon, in the guise attempting to examine how a particular State formation came into being, as if it was naturally created after a feeling of nationhood of particular community is apparent. To view the nation as necessarily the ‘base’ and the State as the ‘superstructure’ is an assumption, loaded by nationalism, as it perceives the nation as a ‘primary’ concept and the State subsidiary. As Lekkas (1996: 13) points out

“For the nationalist the State is like a shell and the sine qua non term for its political self-realization, especially in the modern world… In the national state, nationalism is ‘statefied’; it becomes ‘official’”.

The essential point here is not of course to deny the interconnection of historical antecedents to modern nations, nor to ignore the elements of continuity between pre-modern formations with modernity as an ‘abrupt modernist’ thesis, but to locate the particular material processes and forces that shape modern nations.

Before scrutinising the nation-state construct this paper examines more closely the concept of the State.

3 The Concept of the State

3.1 Defining the State

As with the nation, the State is difficult to define. The Penguin Dictionary of Politics points out:

“The state may be the most commonly-used and most opaque term in the whole political vocabulary. Even the derivation of the term is obscure, and in many cultures, (including earlier medieval European society, to take one example) it would be hard to specify what the word should be translated as ‘State’ ”(Robertson 1986: 307).

It seems paradoxical trying to define it in purely negative terms by saying “the State as opposed to ‘government’” but then not putting forward a positive theory. The same author complains that the term
“still creates a good deal of confusion and uncertainty”, but produces an unsatisfactory and confusing definition:

“The easiest way to think of it is as the set of fixed roles and institutions that makeup the generally legitimate political institutions within which partisan conflict is combined” (Robertson 1986: 308).

It is rather obscure to define the State as ‘a State of fixed roles’, unless he refers to the functions performed by the State and even then these derive from the State. The State is yet to be defined.

Theorising the State(s) or ‘political society’ has been a concern of thinkers for centuries. The word ‘politics’ itself is derived from the ancient Greek ‘politika’, «πολιτικά», which refers to the common concerns, «τα πολιτικά», of the ‘polis’, «πόλις», which is a city-state of ancient Greece. The classical Greek origins translation of the word ‘State’, «κράτος», is the noun of the verb «κρατέω», which means ‘power’. The State is a locus, a central locus of power, though not the exclusive locus of power; the State is part of society, but is also above it. The question of the origins of the State is an important consideration. A long time ago, Engels argued the State “is a product of society at a certain stage of its development” (Engels 1984: 103). The ‘State’ can be said to have emerged out of a historical process much harder to locate time-wise, or even by the specific methods of the State emergence though it has not been an eternal companion of human life. Stuart Hall (1984: 1) points out:

“The state is a historical phenomenon: it is a product of human association - of men and women living together in an organised way”.

Some alternative perspectives on the State have been briefly outlined in the introductory part of this paper (see also Held 1984). More recent perspectives are those from post-Marxist perspectives (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) and Foucaultian approaches (Sassoon 1988). But what is the State? Is it an accessible mediation mechanism, which balances power amongst competing groups or elites in society, as the pluralist model has it or is it a monolithic centralised power structure, the instrument of class rule as some Marxist approaches have it? Or is it a fragmented, diluted structure soaked and enmeshed in floating power in society as some Foucaultian approaches have it?

Max Weber’s influential definition is a common starting point for many. He defined the State as “the sole or monopoly legitimate user of violence in a given territory” (Weber 1983: 111). A broadly similar definition is that of the State as “a legal and political organisation with power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens” (Seton-Watson 1989: 1). Legitimacy and territory are two crucial elements in the understanding of the State, on which a theory must be built on. However it is possible to have an illegitimate State, which is therefore not a legitimate user of violence, despite being in practice a ‘State’. The State also is neither class-neutral, nor gender neutral (Anthias and Yuval-Davies 1989); according to Pateman (1983) the classic works on social contract, from which the State derives are deeply gender specific, within the patriarchal conceptions of society.

This paper tries to synthesise an overall Marxist-Poulantzian framework with a Foucaultian approach. It is thus necessary to consider some Marxist approaches, starting from Marx himself. Marx’s position on the State is rather ambiguous (Held 1984: 31; McLennan 1984: 84). There are according to Held at least two positions about the nature and role of the State in Marx’s writing. The first one is the instrumentalist position put forward with Engels in the Communist Manifesto. This is that “the executive of the State is nothing but a committee for the whole of the bourgeoisie”. Elsewhere this dependence on the ruling class is, in a more sophisticated way, founded as a ‘superstructure’ based on economic, political and social power of dominant class (Held 1984: 36). Related to the above formulations is Lenin’s influential pamphlet State and Revolution, which broadly follows and builds on this stance. The State machine is for Lenin a class instrument and must be smashed, if a new socialist order is to be built. This particular position has been branded as ‘reductionist’ because it reduces the state to be a capitalist essence also it is essentialist for the same reason (MacLennan 1984: 92). However, Jessop points out that in the same work Lenin has a second position which perceives the State as a system of political domination (Lenin 1917: 296 quoted by Jessop 1990).

13 Engels further suggests that there are a number of distinguishing features between the ‘old gentile order’ and the state. These include the following: the division of subjects according to territory; a new system of ‘institutions of coercion of all kinds of which gentile [clan] society knew nothing’ taxes; public debts and the appearance of officials “as organs of society, above society” (Engels: 1984: 103-104).
Marx’s second position developed in the eighteenth Brumaire perceives the State a parasitic bureaucracy that may mediate between classes in society. In other words it has the capacity to act as an autonomous social group in many circumstances (Held, 1989: 34) and derives from the ‘relative autonomist’ Marxism of such as Althusser (1972) and Poulantzas (1973) (see also McLennan 1984: 94). Also some of Gramsci’s concepts derive from this (such as ‘Caesarism’) and his concept of ‘hegemony’ and ‘historical block’ is close to this position. Jessop (1990: 26-26) locates at least six alternative Marxist positions\(^{14}\).

3.2 State and Class

Marx’s conception of the State must be examined the context of his overall approach to power relations in society, which are defined primarily on the basis of class. Marx died without completing his chapter on class, but left behind him a theoretical framework that entails class analysis, indeed it is the key to his work. Class struggle is the motto of social change and “all history is …history of class struggle”, Marx and Engels declare in the Communist Manifesto. Marx’s analysis of class is perceived as part of a dynamic process, whereby social change and revolution can be understood. A problem with Marx’s own writing, never mind Marxist analyses of Class at large, are the contradictions between the positions he took in different writings he undertook. Class assumes different meanings or dimensions, depending on what he was writing, the time, the purpose he was writing and audience he was addressing. For example he would take a different approach in the Communist Manifesto, which was a political pamphlet for agitation purposes, than in his Theories of Surplus Value or Das Kapital, which was a highly analytical-theoretical project\(^{15}\).

14 These are the following:

(i) As a parasitic organisation, whereby State officials “far from representing common interests, tend to exploit and oppress society on behalf of sectional groups”(1990:26) the view in early Marx.\(^{14}\)

(ii) As an epiphenomenon of property relations, in Marx’s Preface to the Critique of Political Economy. (1895).


(iv) Instrument of class rule (Marx and Engels in Communist Manifesto). (v) As set of institutions without a class character (See Jessop 1990:28).

(vi) “As a system political domination with specific effects on the class struggle” (Jessop 1990:28).

The reason the above are cited is not to deal with each one in some detail, as they may well express a dimension of State involvement or they could simply be rejected as inappropriate or anachronistic of the State today.

15 Avoiding too much schematising Marx’s approach, it must be noted that his theory is quite complex both with classes and between them. The two ‘main’ classes for Marx were capital (landed, financial and industrial) and labour (proletarian) and other transitional classes, middle classes, such as the petty bourgeoisie and the peasants. Marx in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte also mentions class fractions or factions and other classes. The middle classes, such as high dignitaries of the army, professionals and educationalists and small-scale capitalists will be ‘squeezed’ between the two main classes. Marx in the Theories of Surplus Value II predicted that there would be an increase in the number of the property-less middle class. This prediction seems to be disproved at least in the Western context, but if one is to view matters from a global or international perspective. The ‘ruling class’ exercises economic and political power via the State. Capitalists control not only the material production but also are able also to exercise power over “the means of mental production”, the production of ideas (Edgell 1995:9). This is crucial in the production of conflicts of national-ethnic phenomena. Ideological factors play a crucial role in ‘cementing’ class rule in society in the creation of the “hegemony of the spirit”, to use Marx and Engels phrase in the Communist Manifesto. This is because every ruling class through history

“is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to present its interests as a common interest of all the members of society …it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones” (Marx the German ideology 65-66 quoted in Edgell 1995:10).
Defining class, for the purposes of this paper, is only necessary in order to link class phenomena to ethnic-national phenomena, as well as placing class within the nation-state dialectic. In fact, ‘ethnicity’ when politicised is a dynamic process of political identification of the group in the wider economic, social and political and cultural context. Inequality and contest among ideas and the economic social divisions are intertwined. A sophisticated conception of class within this dynamic process and struggle must relate the ‘ethnic’ to class and visa versa. E. P. Thomson’s analysis contains such a conception, though prone to criticism of historicism:

“By class I understand a historical phenomenon, unifying a number of disparate and unconnected events, both in the now material of experience and in consciousness. I emphasise that it is an historical phenomenon. I do not see class as a ‘structure’, nor even as a ‘category’ but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships (Thompson 1963: 8).

However, ‘historical relationships’ can only be located and understood in their particular contexts as acting between real people in a dynamic way. Otherwise it becomes a distant abstraction, failing to capture the human element within it:

“The finest-meshed sociological net cannot give us one pure specimen of class, any more than it can give us a poor specimen of deference or of love. The relationship must always be embodied in real people and in a real context” (Thompson 1963: 8).

There are serious limitations in abstract structural analysis of class. It fails to capture the complexity and historicity of class, even if for analytical purposes, in the interest of theoretical rigour and clarity, ‘class’ is conceptualised as an analytical category. As Thompson points out:

“... the notion of class entails the notion of historical relationship. Like any other relationship, it is a fluency which evades analysis if we attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and anamolize its structure”.

The link between the ‘social’ ethnicities mentioned above, is illustrated by Thomson’s stress on the “struggle” in the making of class - as it does is the “making” of ethnicities:

“Class happens when some men [and women] as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), free and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs”.

Of course this is hardly the ‘last word’ on what is class and its importance vis-à-vis the State and Nation. The debates around these complex issues surrounding social divisions, class and class struggle can be found elsewhere (Giddens 1973; Poulantzas 1970; Parkin 1976; Gorz 1980; Hinders 1987; Edgell 1995; Anthias 1998). This thesis does not deal extensively with the question of class, as it is merely concerned with linking class to the nation and ethnicity. Nationalism has historically been part of the hegemonising process of ruling groups in their attempt to obtain or consolidate political power. Class must be related to the national question, national liberation and ethnic conflict in a theoretical-sociological manner. Furthermore, the State is a key link between class, nation and ethnic related phenomena. Class therefore like other social relations such as ‘ethnic’ group, ‘race’, gender and other analytical categories that define social relations/identification must be understood in their historical

Marx also refers to the pervasiveness resulting from “the fetishism of commodities” whereby commodities are perceived as human/social relations and social relations are reduced in the eyes of people to appear “in the fantastic form of a relation between things” (Marx Capital Vol.1, 1970:72). Lukacs’s concept of ‘reification’, whereby human relations, via commodification are reduced or ‘reified’ to things is similar (1974:83-271). Gramsci’s analysis of ‘the national-popular’ in the organisation of hegemony for the ruling class can be traced in Marx’s class analysis.
context. However, this thesis does not proceed any further in the analysis of these categories, as they are not the direct subject of this thesis.

3.3 Poulantzian and Foucaultian Perceptions of the State Class, Power and Social Relations

The later works of Poulantzas, which perceive the State as a complex system of political domination and intervention in society, are of particular relevance to this thesis. These works give an insightful framework, developing the Marxist analyses, which for a number of years were stagnant. The criticism was that they are ‘essentialist’, ‘reductionist’ and ‘economistic’. Poulantzas suggests that the State ought to be perceived as a relationship, rather than a quantifiable substance. ‘Power’, as such, is itself necessarily a social relation and cannot be reduced to a mere mechanism or apparatus. Held points out, for Poulantzas

“the concentrated modern state is both a necessary result of “the anarchic competition of civil society and a force in the reproduction of such competition and division. Its hierarchical-bureaucratic apparatus along with its electoral institutions simultaneously represent unity (the ‘people-nation’ and atomize and fragment the body politic” (Poulantzas 1980 quoted in Held 1989: 70)

For Poulantzas (1978: 53) the economic functions of the State “are articulated and grounded in the specifically capitalist relations of production”. The most innovative contribution of Poulantzas, however, is that of perceiving the State as a social relation. Poulantzas (1984: 147) was trying to counter what he considered to be an essentialist perception of the State and thus suggests as an alternative that the State is best understood as “a material condensation of a balance of power between classes and class fractions”. The State, and in particular the nationally organised State, is an instrument of the organisation and consolidation of the ‘national-popular’ hegemony. Within this, class cannot be obscured or overlooked, as it is a constitutive element in the hegemony. The creation of the State is related to the question of class. Moving away from the instrumentalist position, he criticises the monolithic perception to show that the whole process involving the State is far more complicated. But the apparatuses do not merely reflect “all power and not just class power” which is materialised there. He suggests that,

“these apparatuses are no mere appendices of power, but play a role in its constitution: the state is organically present in the generation of class power”. He goes further to set the bases for the construction of how to go about analysing the State, not any State but the specific State form under consideration. Poulantzas puts forward his relational theory of the State, perhaps one of the most fruitful analyses of the State, particularly when considering the nation-state dialectic. As for social change this is the product of wider struggles that occur in society, which are reflected (even if they are distorted) in the make-up of the State, at least in the longer term.

“Changes in the State themselves refer above all to the struggles of social classes. These constitute the framework of modifications in the role and economic activities of the state, each of which has particular effects upon the state” (Poulantzas 1980: 53).

These struggles are crucial in understanding the State. This thesis considers how these struggles, as well as the wider struggles for political hegemony in society, particularly those relating to ethnic-national conflicts, and how they transform the State and visa-versa. The examination of the ‘institutional materiality’ of the State in its different shapes, forms and phases it passed reflect these struggles/conflicts. When examining the particular way any State emerged and developed, particularly when it comes to post-colonial states, it is necessary to enquire into the role of its colonial predecessor has played in the ethnicity -class conflict and anti-colonialism. The constitutive role of the State is particularly relevant.

16 This is the central theme in all his works (Jessop 1985:14).
For Foucault (1980) it is the disciplinary discourses and techniques of domination that are more important for understanding power in society rather than the traditional concern with the institutional structure of the State. His attempt is beyond the “limited field of juridical sovereignty and state institutions” (Foucault 1984: 310). Foucault, using a Marxist terminology, reverses ‘the order of things’, to use euphemistically his celebrated phrase, to see the State as a superstructural of what he sees as the primary ‘shells’ of power which lie in society as a whole in what he calls ‘power networks’ (Foucault 1984: 312). Not only is the State perceived as being an epiphenomenon of other relations, but Foucault sees the State as heterogeneous and diverse set of institutions or at least can be interpreted as going in that direction. Each ‘department’ of the State is a ‘micro-State’ that is informed, constructed and shaped by its own ‘logic’, which is the basis for the operation and practices of the departments.

Foucault is critical of the distinction of the ‘State’ and civil society, “which traditional political theory belabor” (Foucault 1991: 164). He instead looks at the way power is exercised in society at large given that he refuses to view the State, as a locus of power par excellence or somehow above society, but only as part of power. However, he sometimes reduces the content of domination and discipline to mere mechanisms and techniques themselves, failing to trace properly the origins of power in society. In fact he sees power-relations everywhere. The difficulty is trying to conceptualise the effects of his ‘microphysics of power’ as a micro level of society beyond a mere aggregate of the ‘micros’. Furthermore, he underestimates the effects of the State in society and perhaps overstates the contradictions within the State structures. The importance of class seems to disappear in the mechanisms of power, hence he may fail to properly appreciate the role of the economic operation of capitalist society and the role of the State as a system of political domination and order.

The disappearance of the distinction of the State and civil society is not unique in Foucault; it is also present in Althusser but in the complete opposite way. For Althusser, society has been absorbed, structured by the State, which is why it is a ‘statist’ approach (Bocock 1986: 16), for Foucault however it is the State that has disappeared in society. The distinction between State and civil society must be maintained, but not in the mechanistic way the pluralist/liberals want. It must be seen as organically linked, but still able to distinguish, as this paper elaborates later. Gramsci’s use of this distinction, in his concept of hegemony, following Marx, is perhaps the most fruitful of perceiving this (Bocock 1986: 16-20). This distinction when linked with the concept of ‘hegemony’ provides a richer and complex theory of power in society, for both the State and civil society, which is divided in terms of classes, gender, race and other signifiers of social stratification/division.

This thesis does not examine Foucault’s insight into the State in any further detail. There is some correlation of direction in the works of Foucault and later works of Poulantzas. This does not underestimate the very differences between the two approaches, which go to the ‘heart’ of their writing. Poulantzas later views on the State as ‘a condensation of class relation’, within a relational model of the State, can be compared to Foucault’s ‘codification of relations of power’. A relational conception of State can be built on; this is the conception that this thesis is aiming to use, as a synthesis drawing from Marxist and Foucaultian works.17 Poulantzas himself has been critical of certain Foucaultian moments, when he underestimates the role of the State, perceiving it as a mere mechanism between power groups and that it collapses more or less into the old pluralist model.

### 3.4 The State as Juridical-political Apparatus and as a Social Relation

To perceive the State as a monolithic mechanism or set of institutions working necessary or always towards the calculated interest of a ruling class or fraction alone is problematic. The model of the State as a mere coercive or repressive apparatus centrally organised is an ideal type that must be transcended, if we are to have an understanding of the interactive, cross-section and diverse socio-political practices and policies involved. The processes involved are far more complex. For the ruling groups to be able the rule, maintain order and perpetuate their reign, they may well have to take into account their ‘opponents’ or potential opponents. The hegemony of one ‘group’ (social group or class) is many times maintained by building alliances and negotiating between groups. There may well be different elements in contradiction with one another, for instance the Defence ministry, with its connection with the army and the military establishment and the ‘social’ Departments, such as Health or Education may well have different or even conflicting priorities and policies. However, these departmental differences

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17 For further comparisons between Foucault and Poulantzas see Jessop 1990:220-247.
in ‘logic’ and make up; as far as civil servants are concerned for example, are not so sharp, unless the State is ready to disintegrate. The operation of parties, lobby groups and big business in particular sets limits to these contradictions. There are certainly tendencies within the different ‘arms’ of the State, but there is an overriding logic: order in society that is neither class-free, nor gender-free. There is also an ‘ethnic’ dimension to it. Althusser (1969) may well have overstated the order in capitalist society and the ‘calculated’ effects of the ‘ideological State apparatus’, but even in education for example the wider social and economic power relations are largely reflected in structure of education and training in society.

Rejecting the State all together due to the ‘heterogeneous’ practices, effects, policies or ‘logics’ of the various elements (departments, institutional settings) leaves theory ‘incapacitated’ from having a macro-performance and thus properly appreciate the macro-issues. Various groups do in fact compete for access, representation and resources of this kind, heterogeneous apparatus known as ‘the State’ precisely because it is the locus of power. This thesis rejects the view put forward by post- Marxists, like Laclau and Mouffe (1985) or Sassoon (1987), which dismiss the State altogether. Even if the practices or policies of the various institutions, assumed to be under the umbrella of the State do not have unitary effects or originate from the same primary source or always have a primary/essential aim, the panoply of the State is there. At times of war, crisis and when it comes to challenging the boundaries or order of the State and society force is used, the ultimate sign of weakness and simultaneously power. When the order is challenged, due to weakness in hegemony, the ‘repressive state apparatus’, to use Althusser’s celebrated term, comes into force.

There is another reason for retaining the State as an analytical/social category. Nationalism as an ideology has central to its program some action, policies towards or practised by ‘the State’ or it is used as “a legitimisation of claims” of the group in power (Wallestein 1991: 82). In fact nationalists in power usually aim to ‘homogenise’ the State from the point of view of their national-hegemonic project. Wallestein (1991: 82) suggests that “administrative uniformity... increases the efficacy of their policies” and that “nationalism is the expression, the promoter and consequence of such State-level uniformities”. If we rid ourselves of the notion of the State we will fail to understand the interrelation between the various institutions, practices, policies. Given that the results of State policies, practices and processes are by no means certain or always predictable, a definition around the intentionalities of the institution would be useful. Trying to avoid essentialism and reductionism, the State can be reformulated as a set of institutional structures and processes, as well as a socio-political system of practices. It is best understood as a social relation inter-crossing and mediating other institutions and social relations such as class, race, gender, family etc.. The State-in-society is a system of political hegemony and intervention in society. It is therefore understood at two levels: as a juridical-political set institutions/apparatuses at one level; but also as a social relationship that has a constitutive role in social processes. It cannot be located outside or above social life, although it may well act ‘from above’ as it were, either as an imposed dictatorial system or as a rule from a foreign force/State. As a social relation this system is neither always subordinated, nor can it be reduced to merely another mechanism of class/block rule, neither is it a homogeneous superimposing system. But it is certainly not a neutral agent; nor is it ‘autonomous’.

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3.5 The Nation-State Dialectic: Contradictions, Residue and ‘Ethnic Conflict’

One way of looking at the nation-state construct is to examine how stability and order and cohesion are maintained in the nation-state. However in cases of ethnic conflict it is best to look at matters from the

18 The questions of the relative autonomy of the state in the famous Poulantzas-Miliband debate remain open today (see Blackburn 1978; McLennan 1984:80-109; Jessop 1985; 1990).
opposite scenario: what are the contradictions between ‘nation’ and ‘state’? How is the disequilibrium between Nation and State generated and how is ‘order’ and hegemony possible, if there is a potential for disequilbria in the nation-state construct? How does one measure the contradictions and how do they affect the stability of the national formation?

Balibar interrogates the “Nation Form” as a historic formation that was produced by a set of transformations and practices in the modern epoch. He sets out to examine the constitution of the “Nation Form” and the “production of the people”. By examining this process of producing and reproducing the ‘national subject’ one is able to decipher the ways in which the nation-state construct is both successful in reproducing ‘carrier’ of its own ‘nationalising mission’ or where it is unsuccessful generating as an unintended consequence a dynamic process manifesting the ‘crack’ within the construct.

“A social formation only reproduces itself as a nation to the extent that, through a network of apparatuses and daily practices, the individual is instituted as a Homo nationalis from cradle to grave, at the same time as he or she is instituted as Homo economicus, politicus, religiosus...” (Balibar 1991: 93).

The crux of Balibar’s argument on the point is that it is communities that recognise themselves as a ‘people’ in a given territory, a priory, “in advance of the institution of the State, which recognises as a State of ‘its own’ in opposition to all other States” and all political struggles around the shape and policies of political groups are waged for that State. He informs us that without this we cannot have Weber’s ‘monopoly of organised violence’ nor Gramsci’s ‘national-popular will’ (Weber 1991: 93).

The problems arise out of a number of disjunctures. Firstly, as Balibar points out that no such a construction of ‘a people’ exists “naturally, and even when it is tendentiously constituted, it does not exist for all time.” This is because modern nations do not ‘possess a given ‘ethnic’ basis, even when it arises out of an independence struggle” (Balibar 1991: 93). In cases of ‘ethnic’ conflict, conflict, questions of ‘legitimacy’ arise: the break down of legitimacy is a central element in the melting down or the contested versions of a ‘national-popular will’, and violence is organised by the various ethnic/national poles in conflict in society. Secondly, the class struggle cannot be erased; no matter how ‘egalitarian’ the State is (Balibar 1991: 93), as societies are class divided, as they are gender divided. The production of a free, equal and homogeneous national subject is a fiction. Any project that involves a hegemonising and homogenising process on people, aiming to reproduce a collective identity via the endowing of each and every individual as a ‘carrier’ of this collective identity, is bound to be imperfect. Particularly when there are contested and antagonistic national projects, uneven, unequal, hierarchical and competitive social relations in society. The organisation of the ‘temporal’ and ‘territorial matrices’, to use Poulantzas terms, by the modern State are highly fluid and contested that makes the idea of balance or equilibrium impossible to sustain eternally.

The question of modernity or otherwise of a nation is a central field of nationalism, at least at the ideological level invests heavily, appropriating the past to serve current political goals. Modern nationalisms claim either to be the legitimate heirs of ancient ‘glorious people and regimes’, many times denying any ruptures in history, or if it suit their aim, nationalists claim to be totally detached from the past, the ‘ancien régime’. The contest over history is central to nationalism, but the kind of ‘history’ nationalists produce is highly distorted, projecting into the past, many times to legitimate the present and future projects.

‘Ethnic conflict’ may well arise out of the same process; specific factors must be located in order to understand the phenomenon. Ethnic conflict may be part of the contradictions generated by the ‘imperfect’ nationalisation process of society; this could take the form of struggles over territory by ethnic groups or the class based political projects, which compete in power struggles. Legitimacy crises are considered as expressions of contradictions in the nation-state dialectic, given the gap that exists between nation and state in the ‘nationalisation’ of society and the inherently antagonistic and domination based relations in capitalist State formations. The process of legitimisation primarily occurs as an ideological process, which also involves power and it is closely related to the Gramscian concept of hegemony (Gramsci 1971; Sassoon 1987; Bocock 1986). Legitimacy, in the context that it is used in this thesis, is distinct from hegemony. Hegemony relates to the particular ways State processes (constitutional, legal, social, economic and political) are organised to be accepted in society or to paraphrase Gramsci to organise consent, in the context used here, as it relates to the particular
national formations. In other words the conception of hegemony is seen by this thesis as a wider project, at a class, gender, ethnic, national, international level, of which legitimacy is only part of. For the purposes of this paper legitimacy is used as a State-related and ethno-national related process.

Theorising the question of legitimacy in context allows us to make the analytical leap between nation and State theoretically as it also serves as an ideological cohesion mechanism that unites nation and State. Hegel’s conception of ‘the State’ personifying ‘the Geist’ (‘the Idea’), is analogous in the mind of nationalists who see a particular State formation, as the personification of the Nation, ‘nation-state’, the ‘national state’, but at the same time an instrument of the Nation, however defined. It would be misleading however to see the justifications for particular State formations reduced to nationalism. Other political worldviews or ideologies see the importance of the State as an instrument or structure either for their own political program (liberals, communists in instrumentalist-practical purpose) or in their critique of the State (Marxists, anarchists). By this it is not suggested that these ideologies are necessarily mutually exclusive with nationalism, but to illustrate that the National State may well be also seen and indeed be used by other than nationalistic forces or ideologies.

At an ideological level and within nationalist policies, the ‘function’ of the ‘nation-State’ can be symbolic, symbolising the unity between body (the State) and soul (the nation). At the same time it is instrumental: to produce and reproduce the nationalist ideology and national subjects and to go its way, what in the national project is its destiny, its ‘legitimate’ national aspirations. Legitimacy involves both the particular projects and the organisation, internal and external of the allocation of resources, power and increasingly knowledge in society. Matters become more complicated with processes of ‘globalisation’ and ‘internationalisation’ as is shown further down in this thesis. The idea that nationalism is “a theory of political legitimacy” was first expounded by Gellner (1983: 1). In the first page of what has become a classic on Nations and Nationalism he writes:

In brief, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular ethnic boundaries within a given state - a general formulation - should not separate the power holders from the rest (Gellner 1983: 1).

Gellner suggests that his definition is “parasitic” to the two concepts, State and Nation. He starts the discussion of the State with Max Weber’s celebrated definition of the State as an “agency within society which possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence.” However, he goes on to point out that Weber’s principle is only valid in modernity, even if it appears “strangely ethnocentric... with its tacit assumption of a well-centralised Western state” (Gellner 1983: 3). He considers that the State is meaningful only in the modern sense, as there were institutions broadly defined as ‘States’ in the feudal and earlier time only when division of social labour, of which “the state constitutes one highly distinctive and important elaboration of”. Gellner (1983: 4) therefore specifies even further that

“the state is the specialisation and concentration of order maintenance... The state exists where specialised order-enforcing agencies, such as police forces and courts, have separated out from the rest of social life. They are the state”.

In considering the importance of legitimacy, Gellner’s thesis on nationalism has some bearing for this paper but the question of legitimacy is considered from a broader spectrum as it is shown later with regards to the State, in particular from a fusion of a broadly Marxist approaches. The framework is Gramscian-Poulantzian, which feeds on Foucault’s concepts on power and Habermas’s views on public

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19 Gramsci of course was using the term at least two levels and one did relate to the creation of the Italian national formation, where he looked the process of Italian unification, the Risogemento, to examine the roots of the weakness of the Italian state; this was a crisis in the Hegemony as a state process. At another level Hegemony was used as a class strategy to organise the consent of the ‘subaltern classes’, which of course related to the first level. He saw in this the way in which the Modern prince (i.e. The Communist party) could lead the working class and its allies in the counter-hegemonic struggle. Hegemony is an elusive and vague concept. It became a prime object of debate in the 1970-80’s. Hegemony may mean leadership, but in other times it may mean ideology ultimately backed by coercion and saw the

space, legitimisation crisis and communication. Furthermore it reads constitutional and legal principles from a political sociology point of view.

The question of legitimacy is closely related to the State and the question of power in society. This is the reason that an insight into the question of power in society and in particular the organisation of power at an inter-state and an intra-state level is considered later on. However, one should not lose sight of the subject of study here as the context of legitimacy is primarily concerned at two interrelated levels: firstly, on a theoretical plane in the context of the production, perpetuation and resolution of conflict in society (and especially ‘ethnic’ conflict\(^{21}\) and secondly, in the case study in the context of the Cypriot State formation and the Cyprus problem.

The ‘public sphere’ in the Habermasian sense can be employed as a mechanism for monitoring but also legitimating power via the public discussion. The bourgeois State emerged and so did the idea of “the rule of law” as a central element in the modern State in the transition to capitalism (Hostler 1992: 4-6). This meant the “societisation” of the State and the “statefication” of society, which in turn gradually destroyed the basis for the bourgeois public sphere: this was based on the separation of State from society (Habermas 1989: 142). The gap between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ did create a social space but this can no longer be usefully described as “public sphere”. The solution, according to Habermas, lies in “the rationalisation of the exercise of social and political authority” (Habermas quoted in Hostler 1992: 6). According to Hostler (1992: 7), Habermas throughout his works is “concerned with exposing the conditions that affect the possibility of understanding, as this understanding has been given to the human race to find solutions to the conflicts that arise from action”.

Precisely this concern is crucial to any attempt to consider the production, perpetuation and resolution of ‘ethnic/state conflict’\(^{22}\). But this is linked to Marx’s conception on the question of legitimacy.\(^{22}\) Marxist (and only Marx’s own) conceptions suggest that the State occupies a peculiar position in and above society. Having different capacities, including the production and reproduction of class subjects it also involves some form of mystification, as subjects are unable to see the exact role of the State. This is where legitimacy comes into it. As Connolly (1984: 7) observes: “the very wish to see the state as legitimate, to see it as a locus of the public will, obscures the true relation between state and society”.

What bearing does this have in the question of legitimacy in the nation-state dialectic? The legitimacy crisis in relation to the constructions of nation-states, as manifested in ethnic strife, arise partly because the State creates a mystification on its subjects, partly because of its capacity to be used in instrumentalist way for nationalist/class interests and intentionalities and because of the symbolic connection earlier on. The symbolic connection is in fact part of the ‘mystification’ referred to before.

A critique of the legitimacy connected to the nation-state construct can be mounted from the point of view of anticipating a State structure, without the mystification (i.e. the myth that unites supposedly in a predestined way a given territory as the national state space).\(^{23}\) Marx’s departure from the empiricist

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21 The Thesis later explores the notion of ‘ethnic conflict’ and replaces it with what is considers as a more accurate description of the conflict as “ethnic/state conflict”.

22 Although most theorists take as a starting point Max Weber’s celebrated lecture “Politics as Vocation” (see Weber 1984) as their starting point, Marx’s own contribution to the debate is extremely fruitful. It is however to draw out and reconstruct Marx’s position, a regular occurrence with Marx’s political contributions, something quite unnecessary when it comes to Weber.

23 In Marxist terms a question may be raised as to whether it is possible (or indeed desirable in a socialist program) for the capitalist system to transcend this mystification, as the system is based on
and formalist analysis of matters as they currently stand (i.e. the status quo) and his adoption of a political praxis-normative perspective gives his approach an obvious advantage: It is able to project into the future from a vantage point that is capable of theorising the potential for overcoming current contradictions, making use of the current contradiction and trends emerging and via his critique. Furthermore, Marx’s contribution to the question of legitimacy is that it links the political, social and economic in that legitimacy is rooted in the wider structures of society, the systemic logic of the way society is organised. This ‘logic’ is defined in line with the dimension one chooses to emphasise such as ‘totality’ or ‘the mode of production’ or class or other conflict. Also, there is a practical-political benefit in this analysis in that we are able to see the potential link between the political struggles related to State structures and constitutional arrangements to struggles for social-economic transformation. Anti-nationalist struggles can meet the struggles for social justice and equality. However, the resolution of ‘the national question’ and its relation to the State must take into account the world developments that affect not only the nature of the conflict but also the nation-state, as we know it. At this point the issue of European integration must be considered and how this affects the nation-state.

Section B: European Integration, Nation-State and ‘Ethnic’ Conflict

in Europe

4 The Europeanisation Debates

The debate on the way in which an emergent ‘United States of Europe’ would affect the shape of existing nation-States and alter the dynamics of ethnic/State conflict, seems to be more important today than it was ten or twenty years ago. The question is whether this ‘new Europe’ is a window of opportunity in the resolution of conflicts, such as the Cyprus problem via incorporation in the EU as the Euro-enthusiasts hold. The trend towards ‘unification’ and ‘integration’ is accompanied with an invigorated assertion of ethnic and national identity, the rise of phenomena such as nationalism, racism and xenophobia in the globe. If one is to accept the triumphal tone of the claims that today there is a ‘new era’ as ‘the end of ideology’, ‘the end of history’, ‘post-modern times’ and ‘era of global information and transnationalism’. These phenomena may seem puzzling. Today there is more than ever interdependency, free-floating capital and labour, massive growth of multinational corporations, explosive development of technology and information flow, media exposure and influence. How is it then possible, at the time of these developments, when ‘sovereignty’ may seem ever less important and relevant, that there is an acute problem of ethnic/State conflict? In terms of policy the question is how to respond to these challenges: is political, social and economic integration the answer? Does a transactional European union have the capacity/tendency to resolve ethnic/State conflicts and inter-State rivalries in Europe?

As far as the case study of Cyprus is concerned the questions are the following: What do we make of the past experiences on the way Europeanisation affected these conflicts? How do these processes affect conflicts such as that of Cyprus? What light can the attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem via joining the EU shed on Europeanisation as a general catalyst for conflict resolution?

Firstly it would be useful to locate theoretically the opportunities and problems that exist in Europeanisation as a method of resolving ethnic conflict, by the processes of integration, globalisation and transnationalism and considering how they affect the nation-state and ‘ethnic’ conflicts. This is done by considering whether the EU is becoming a transnational state and this process in relation to the nation-state; and by examining how Europeanisation may alter or has the potential to alter conflicts.
Secondly, this section examines the social processes and forces that may give rise to conflict in the region.

4.1 ‘Europeanism’ or ‘European Unionism’: a Transnational or Supra-national State?

The terms ‘transnationalism’ and ‘supranational’ are related in that they represent something ‘beyond’ the ‘national’. ‘Transnationalism’ “extends beyond the boundaries, interest of a single nation” (Collins Dictionary 1992: 1593); it refers to adjoining together of States and governments, whilst ‘supranational’ means “involving or relating to more than one nation” (Collins Dictionary 1992: 1508). In technical terms there may be a difference as the ‘supra’- may involve a ‘superimposing’ of an additional layer of government/state, whereas the ‘trans-’ is more akin to a fusion, a melting together. In practice the two may lead to the same eventuality since in the ‘transnational’ situation the old ‘national’ may well be an important ‘regional’ layer of Government or State. The difference may well be of significance in some contexts, but for the purposes of this thesis the difference is not significant.

Europeanisation is a regional variant of a worldwide phenomenon of internationalisation and globalisation, whereby trends towards political integration and the emergence of political-economic units or blocs are generated. In order to consider whether Europe is moving towards a ‘transnational or ‘supra-national’ State and if so what implications will this have on the national State as we know it we need to look at the theories of globalisation, integration and internationalisation. The term “Europeanisation” is taken from Marquard (1989: 206-209) whose title of an article is indicative “The Irresistible tide of Europeanisation”. Marquard locates European integration against the background of the growth of international trade and multinationals, with no national allegiance and by and large immune from national economic policy; increasing globalised capital markets and deregulation and accelerating technological change. He suggests that “the globalisation of economic forces requires the corresponding political institutions to cope with it.” Given the inability of the national State to deal with some economic matters of crucial importance, “it has to share some of its power with supranational bodies” (Marquard 1989: 207). Global political changes with the relative economic decline of the USA and the USSR, the two super-powers which suffer from “imperial over-stretch”, as well as defence considerations point to the same direction. Marquard (1989) wrote this before the collapse of the USSR, but his arguments apply even more today.

The traditional model of international relations seems ineffective in addressing today’s problems (see Fawn and Larkins 1996). The international relations perspectives have traditionally viewed the State as having its own integrity, as ‘a player’. The State is then related to other ‘integral’ States and other ‘players’. Then the policies of each State is considered as regards war and defence, security concerns

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24 Although the ‘decline’ of each of these cannot be simply considered that they necessarily derive from the same causes; the particular historical, social, political and economic context need to be examined.

25 He borrowed the term from Paul Kennedy (Marquard 1989: 208).
at large, and alliances and agreements of economic and political nature. This is also the model employed in international law, which assumes that States are ‘free and equal’, integral and sovereign units of international order (Mayall 1994). With the growth of globalisation these perspectives seem increasingly unrealistic. Globalisation theory is increasingly influential in addressing the newly emerging trends.

Globalisation theory (as distinct from term ‘internationalisation’) refers to the process and the form by which the world becoming more ‘united’, a more singular place; also as a result of the interdependency and the nation-State is increasingly eroded (Featherstone 1990: 6-7). In this context integration is part and parcel of the ‘global condition’. In the late 1980s, in particular, there was a new ‘celebration’ of ‘difference’, very much part of the ‘post-modern’, the subject and cultural identification and ‘identity politics’ (Brunt 1989). This ‘celebratory’ tone and sympathy extended to the newly emergent assertion of national and ethnic identity and (oppressed) nationalism’s such as the Scottish and Welsh nationalism’s against Thatcher’s “centralizing authoritarianism” (Manifesto of New Times 1989: 37; Williams 1989: 255). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider in any detail either the theories of globalisation, post-modernity and others related stories or their critiques and counter-theories. This thesis only presents the intellectual origins and some debates that provide an insight as to the processes of European integration, what is referred to as ‘Europeanisation’, to establish the state of affairs of the world today.

There are those writers who note that the extent of change with the ‘global condition’ is largely exaggerated (Hirst and Thompson 1996). Also there are continuities with earlier periods underestimated in globalisation theory; in any case earlier theories referred to these developments illustrate that these processes are not as novel as some times presented. Furthermore the direction of change and the ‘celebratory’ tone of the global theories cannot be justified in the light of developments such as wars and race related phenomena. The so-called ‘global condition’ is neither as novel nor is it a singular/ unitary process as the internationalisation debates illustrated. The debates started from the 19th century and carried on in different shapes, forms and under different headings ever since. Kuhn’s theory on the ‘Structure of scientific revolutions’ (Kuhn 1970) seems to apply to social sciences; and in particular over the ‘internationalisation’, ‘globalisation’ debates this is apparent. Paradigm shifts in this case occurred without necessarily discrediting or invalidating earlier, paradigms. By and large this depends on the criteria set out define what is ‘novel’, and thus marks a ‘new era’, and what is part of a continuing legacy from the past. For the purposes of this paper some of the insights provided by the debates of the late 60s and 70s and 80s, an attempt is made to synthesise them so as to see dimensions of the phenomena somehow obscured in the hype of ‘globalist’ perspectives. This paper now examines the implication of ‘globalisation’, ‘internationalisation’ and ‘integration’ to the nation-State form.

26 Even if it is rendered through a variety of trajectories the process produces global cultures, which are integrated but at the same time differentiated. This process, according to one theorist, passed through different phases: the “struggle-for-hegemony phase” (1920’s-60’s) was replaced by “the uncertainty phase”, a time of fluidity and relevant to this thesis in this phase “societies increasingly face problems of multiculturality and polyethnicity” (Robertson 1990: 27). Globalisation, as a process, is expressed through a number of phenomena, such as the massive increase in international organisations, agencies and organisations, the revolutionary transformation in global communication, international human rights and the increased conception of ‘humankind’ and global citizenship, even of the whole planet, the globe as a single ecological space.

27 These theories focus on the trends and processes that exist especially with regards to communication, economic processes and cultural aspects, occupational changes and spatial changes in line with the post-modern and post-industrial theory. Information flow seems to be a central element in the creation of the ‘new’ or ‘post-’ era that seems to be the dominant discourse or at least the ‘avante guard’ in social theory of the day. Daniel Bell’s ‘post-industrialism’ (in the 1950’s), the post modern of Lyotard and Baudrillard and the ‘New Times Theses’ as well as the ‘post-Fordists’, are all closely related to ‘globalisation theories’. They share between them the stressing of the novelty and change in the processes that shape today’s societies, and the emergence of a new ‘information society’. Three dimensions of globalisation can be noted, although inter-linked, it is useful to distinguish them: economic (movement of capital and labour, multinationals, international trade), social/cultural (e.g. media, information flow) political (e.g. the formation of new transnational organisations, NGOs etc.).
4.2 Integration and the Nation-State

The question of whether a new political formation is developing from the structures of the EU that goes beyond the nation-State, as we have known it, is central to those who place their faith in Europeanisation as a solution to ethnic/tate conflicts. Such a formation would also be the primary domain around which struggles over resources and autonomy are to be fought, in the future and would have the potential to become the main instrument for regulating, controlling and even resolving ethnic conflicts. For Cyprus this has particular bearing since the control of the State has been crucial in the conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

One needs to consider the meaning of ‘integration’ and interrogate the concept more closely. ‘Integration’ is a very troubled term as one of the problems in the debate over regional integration is precisely the absence of any consensus over the meaning and the precise subject matter under examination. O’Neill (1996: 11) refers here to “a lack of consensus over the intrinsic properties of the condition under review”. Therefore some see this as unfinished - indeed unending- process of transformation, “a process of becoming rather than it is a clear outcome or a definitive political end State”. Others try to be more systematic on regional integration by trying to grasp the “essentialist nettle” like Hughes and Schwartz (O’Neill 1996: 11). O’Neill (1996: 14) points out that

“Whatever the differences between the paradigms... they all address the same fundamental phenomenon... European integration theory examines the consequences of the increased interaction of long established nation States within their regional environment.”

It was assumed by the different paradigms (Neo-functionalists, federalists and realists and indeed other radical theorists) that “the exchanges and bargains were driven by a singular systemic logic; that a special dynamic was at work” (O’Neill 1996: 14). Others point to the fluidity of the whole project (Lodge 1992: 32). This fluidity is seen by some as the strengths, which provide the opportunity for working towards “a European Union genuinely democratic, open, transparent, responsive and legitimate” (Lodge 1992: 31). This seems to be an odd point since it is a consensus, almost, that these are precisely the qualities the EU lacks, unless the writer is referring to some EU of the future, Lodge (1992: 32) himself admits that “its locus of political authority is obscure and contested”.

How far however has the process of integration reached to date, both in the qualitative and quantitative sense of the question? Even as far back as 1989, it was considered that the EC’s significance “reaches further than any kind of international organisation due to its right to make laws that can be imposed on member States” (Held 1989b: 232-233). For Held (1989a: 191-204) the EC is a move to make policy more internationally and an instance of “the decline of the nation-State”. The EC however is seen as having a far more important role:

“It is seen as an anchor, as a bastion of stability and peace founded on liberal democracy and a broad commitment to maintaining a social market economy” (Lodge 1992: 31).

Whether we are dealing with some novel supra-national State or alternatively an intergovernmental form, it is for most scholars a new qualitative and/or quantitative phenomenon. It has been referred to as “totally unique historically or totally novel in interstate relations” (Pinder 1995: 1). Others point to the same direction viewing it “as a unique international organisation based on the Acquis Communautaire of the supranational EC” (Lodge 1992: 32). European integration, following the single European Act and Maastricht is supposed to be the realisation of the ‘European Ideal’ with the free movement of people and capital. The emergence of a pan-European project of integration is not as ‘new’ as it is usually presented.28 There is nonetheless a new momentum in the integration process that distinguishes this particular process from earlier attempts or phases of this particular one. The processes of integration are complex, as they are contradictory, but have so far led nation-states in the European Union closer than ever, measured politically or economically, if one considers the interdependency involved. However, at the same time with the social inequality, regional disparity and the problems of lack of cohesion are as wide as ever. Monroe (1987) saw the EC as “an embryonic Federation”, whilst Marquard (1989: 219) suggests that it must move from inter-governmentalism to “something reminiscent of federalism or at least pre-federalism”. Today a whole new vocabulary is developed, as it is anticipated that the political arrangement will be far more complex than a mere

28 The emergence of the ‘European ideal’ of a Europe with no boundaries is not something that came about this century.
federation of sovereign States; terms such as ‘consortio’, ‘condominio’ rather than the traditional State, federation, confederation (Schmitter 1995).

Ugur (1999) examines in detail the EU’s ‘anchoring and credibility dilemma’ in the context of Turkey’s accession aspirations. His basic argument is the ‘anchoring’ is not an ‘automatic’ process, but requires specific and credible policies to achieve this. Member States and the EU need to “undertake credible policy commitments” and these must “relate to transparent and divisible policy issues so that their consequences can be qualified and the adversely affected member states or societal groups can be compensated through issue linkage and package deals” (Ugur 1999: 14; 24-25). This is particularly relevant to context of Cyprus where accession is viewed as a means for resolving the Cyprus problem.

There is wide disagreement over the ultimate objectives of the Union since Maastricht (Lodge 1994: 269); the subsequent IGCs and treaties have so far only brought about marginal reforms to the Treaty of the European Union, with the Amsterdam Treaty integrating and renumbering the treaties together. Three options still seem possible: a federal Europe, the politically fragmented European Free Trade Area and the “Europe of the Treaties” (Kazakos 1996). The debate is set to continue until the next enlargement at 2004, when the eastern European countries and Cyprus are scheduled to accede. The stage and prospects of the integration process is of particular relevance to Cyprus (and other ethnic/state conflicts) if Europeanisation is to be a catalyst for solution. This paper considers the effects of Europeanisation to the nation-state and ethnic/state conflicts at a generic level.

4.3 The End of the Nation State in Europe?

Different approaches have been developed to explain the process of integration and their effect on the nation-state is by and large dependent on this. One has to move from describing the processes of integration to actually explaining why and how these processes are happening. O’Neill usefully divides the theoretical perspectives in four models: two “supranational paradigms”, which are the federal approach and the functionalist approach, the “State-centric model” and what he calls the “syncretic” model, which he favours. Marxist approaches present a different picture of the same process, but it is beyond the scope of this Paper to deal extensively with all the approaches to integration.

It would be misleading to assume that a rise of a ‘supra-national State’ formation necessarily means the erosion or doing away, at least at this stage, with the nation-state; even if new restraints may be superimposed on national states. This criticism of globalisation theory can be crucial in understanding how Europeanisation affects nation-states and ethnic conflict. The fact that the two most important areas of power are still in the hands of the nation-state illustrates that its powers are far from over: defence/security, and boundary control (immigration and territory guarding). There is a process of renegotiating this, as Schengen made boundary control an EU issue; this is set to continue. Max Weber’s classic definition of the State of “the sole legitimate user of force over a given territory” (Weber 1948: 77-128) still applies to the nation-State, at least for the time being; but is being ‘transferred’ also to the EU (see Kostakopoulou 1999). Held (1989a: 239) points out that although organisations such as the EEC (now EC/EU) “create new restraints on national states, they also create
new forms of political participation and intervention”. In fact for Held the creation of the EEC is a means by which the state is able to continue to exercise its sovereignty by taking part in “the creation of organisations more equipped to monitor and regulate trans-national forces and relations beyond their control” (Held 1989a: 239). What the creation and development of the EC has done is to alter significantly the conception of ‘sovereignty’ as an exclusive, perpetual and indivisible capacity of state power as traditionally considered by legal theory and international law (Held 1989a: 234).

The EC in this sense, faced with US dominance on the one hand and Japanese economic competition on the other, far from eroding the nation-state, “has actually helped the survival of the European nation state” (Held 1989a: 233). More recently the same writer (Held 1995) maintains that the theories that stress the transformations of the nation-state, as a result of globalisation, what he calls “the transformationalist literature”, are exaggerating the erosion of the nation state power. Held (1995: 26) suggests that this literature “fails to recognise the enduring relevance of the modern State, both as an idea and as an institutional complex, in determining the direction of domestic and international politics”. He argues convincingly for a more complex analysis that transcends the ‘exogenous’ versus endogenous paradigms. Other commentators suggest that it is not the case that the state is in retreat, as such but rather there is a reshaping taking place pointing out that “whilst the state may be in retreat in some respects, its activity may be increasing in others” (Muller and Wright 1994: 1). In spite of the difficulties of measuring the ‘retreat’ there has been an unquestionable “external ‘state’ retreat” which is “the erosion of state autonomy in the international and European arenas” but not an “internal ‘state retreat’ (the diminution of state authority at the domestic level” (Muller and Wright 1994: 7). For Muller and Wright there has been erosion of the western European state by “internationalisation, Europeanisation, multi-nationalisation and technological change”. As for the internal aspect the “redefinition”, this has been far more complex. In some areas, such as financial services, the role of the state has been reinforced. The law and order part of the state has also been reinforced. A trans-national institution is not simply displacing the nation-state; rather the changes over the state’s involvement in different spheres of life are very much depended on political, ideological and other factors. Muller and Wright cite different pressures on the State: ideological pressures (neo-liberalism and monetarism); political pressure by the Governments in power such as Thatcher, whose alleged ‘successes’ even forced other Governments into U-turns; changing perceptions of the State; the pressure from the internationalisation of industry; and the Europeanisation pressure. The debate the future of ‘global governance continue, with some scholars proposing a rethinking of democratic theory so as to take into account the global dimension (Held 1995).

Scholars writing from a Marxist perspective have been referring to the subject of internationalisation for many years. Marxists however, do not have a unified position on the question of the erosion of power of the nation state. How is it possible to speak of a “disintegration of the capitalist national unity” (Poulantzas 1975) and ‘crisis’ and simultaneously maintain that the nation-State remains a powerful tool in politics, as Marxists such as Poulantzas did? Poulantzas (1975: 84) himself in fact saw the emerging “authoritarian police states” throughout Europe as partly attributed to these same processes and the class struggle within these. The term “authoritarian statism”, a phrase he coined later, in fact describes the outcome of the ‘crisis’ in hegemony in a period where “inter-imperialist contradictions have been reactivated” (Poulantzas 1980: 212).

As regards to the question of the retreat or crisis of the national state, Smith, is adamant that the national state form is resilient as a political unit. This is due to what he calls “the mutual sustenance” of state and nation, which according to Smith, draws primarily on “the cohesive power and historic primacy of ethnic communities”, primarily relying upon “the dominant ethnie”, around which it was formed and subsequently crystallised (Smith 1995: 114). Smith’s overall ‘ethnic essentialism’ is here rejected; but his assessment that the days of the nation-state are not over, at least for the time being, in spite of the strain it faces from ‘internal’ and ‘external’ challenges is sound.

5. Europeanisation- Process for Resolving the ‘Ethnic conflict’?
5.1 ‘Ethnic’ Conflict in Europe: A Political Economy

The expectation or at least hope that the post-cold war era would essentially eradicate wars and ‘ethnic’ conflicts has proved too optimistic. The collapse of ‘communism’ in Eastern Europe and the so-called triumph of liberalism, did not bring about “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” or the celebrated “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992). History seems much more complex and such celebratory talk appears rather like wishful thinking. The new vigour of nationalism, ethnic conflict and racism is difficult to explain by employing some post-modernist and globalisation theories, without fundamentally rethinking the ‘post-modern’ or at least without erasing its initial celebratory tone.

When considering the question of whether we are actually dealing with ‘a Europe of nations’ or a ‘supranational government’, national loyalties have oddly enough not only been “an awkward opponent” to supranational projects, but also to the European nation-states as well (Hutchinson 1994). The perception of undivided and integrated European nation-states through equal citizenship was in fact erroneous. Research conducted in 1980 showed, 16 out of 29 nation-states in Europe contained significant proportion of minorities, which were settled in compact territories and might aspire to independence (Kjecki and Velinky 1981). Most European States are actually multicultural in composition and are certainly tensions with regards to how minorities are treated.

Certain considerations must be taken into account when dealing with the question of ethnic/state conflicts in Europe. Most western States are essentially products of conquest of one group by another as the ‘internal colonialism’ thesis suggests (Hecter 1975; Nairn 1979b), something that shows that the current boundaries are arbitrary. Miles (1993: 35-53) illustrates that an incomplete project of ‘nationalisation’ (involving cultural homogenisation, state centralisation and expansion and/or colonisation and reproduction of class division) was initiated in European nation-states whereby there is an articulation between nationalism and racism. This project meant that “certain modalities of racism were organised and expressed from the eighteenth century onwards a constituent element of the nationalisation process” (Miles 1993: 48). There are however many instances whereby these projects remain incomplete and indeed the resistance to these to these processes is a necessary contradiction involved. It is thus apparent that in these circumstances “there is considerable potential for a renewed articulation of nationalism and racism in the struggle about the criteria used to define who ‘belongs’ to the nation” (Miles 1993:49-50).

Hutchinson (1994) puts forward, at least as a partial explanation for the increase in minority nationalism the “institutional discrimination in resource allocation”. This however does not explain regional-based nationalisms in wealthy regions comparatively to the rest of the country such as Catalan and Basque nationalism’s and the ‘Northern League’ in Italy. Between 1945 and 1989 there was a decline in the power and importance of Europe vis-à-vis the USA and the USSR, but with the collapse of the Warsaw pact this is changing. Heraclides (1994) on the other hand points to the failure of the post 1989 regime, in international law, to cope with secessionist nationalism that he refers to as “one of the most daunting and intractable problems”. The question to be addressed for the purposes of this Chapter is how the processes of European integration are inter-linked to ethnic/state conflicts and nationalisms and more specifically how this process may affect the attempts to find a solution the Cyprus problem.

It is argued that “the EC as a pan-European unit, with budgetary powers and increased redistributive abilities” would in fact “engender centrifugal pressures on nation-states” (Hutchinson 1994: 152-153). It is far from clear that the EC is dismantling the nation-state as enhanced operations complicate and slow down the process of decision-making. However, if the net power surrendered by the States and the powers / competencies of the Community increase, this may well exacerbate national/ethnic conflict. The EC would increasingly become what has proved to be a trend in cases of minority nationalisms: “a lever of many minority nationalisms to free themselves from nation-state domination but with questionable success” (Hutchinson 1994: 154).

The various theoretical perspectives on international relations on the global and regional conditions approach the matter in a different way. Some theorists branded as “neo-liberal institutionalists” (Mayall and Miall 1994: 265) are optimistic about the ability of European institutions to hold together as they see them as having reasonably compatible interests and are capable of even limiting conflict (Van Ham 1994; Keohane 1994). Others are less convinced, stressing the fluidity and anarchy of
international relations today. Many Marxist theorists are not optimistic about the prospects of Europeanisation in ‘resolving’ conflict. They examine the contradictions generated and consider regional/inter-imperialist competition/rivalries, with disjunctures in the processes of restructuring. With the collapse of the USSR and the opening up of new markets there is a “global restructuring of [capitalist] accumulation” (Clarke 1992: 147). However the process of restructuring entails an unstable period and creates new conflicts:

“This global restructuring] is likely to unleash powerful national chauvinist and imperialist forces as it politicises the international competitive struggle, threatening to lead to the formation of competing international blocks” (Clarke 1992: 147).

It is precisely to avert such conflicts between blocks that the former US Foreign Secretary Kissinger refers to preserving “the equilibrium or balance of power” in the world in the post-cold war world (Kissinger 1995: 4-8). The USA have managed to elevate themselves to the status of “masters of the universe” (Walker 1996), but this somehow involves ‘sharing the USA hegemony’. This means sharing not only security concerns; it has led some, such as the former US Foreign Secretary Henry Kissinger, to conclude that what is required for security and stability is “some sort of North Atlantic Free trade association” (Kissinger 1995: 8).

From the mid-seventies, Poulantzas (1975: 81) saw co-ordination of economic policies at an international level as “a contemporary necessity”. As far as the EEC was concerned he thought that these institutions did not amount to “apparatuses supplanting the national States or superimposed on them”. He argued that “decisive institutional transformations in the State apparatuses” are required “to take charge of the international reproduction of capital under the domination of American capital, as well as the political and ideological conditions for its reproduction”. Some of these ‘transformations’ were well on the way in Europe since 1975, but his diagnosis then seems apt today, that “the present phase of internationalisation of capitalist relations, this crisis does not either automatically or inevitably put into question the hegemony of American imperialism over other metropolises, but rather affects the imperialist countries as a whole, and thus finds expression both at their head, and in the sharpening of inter-imperialist contradictions” (Poulantzas 1975: 86).

This process may lead to the intensification of the rivalries through the dis-articulation of the existing ‘national’ unity in the face instability and contradictions generated by the tendencies, as suggested by Clarke (1992). Poulantzas illustrated that the greater visibility of the strains between Nation and State in the West were the result of inter-imperialist rivalries and the internationalisation of capital that ruptures existing State formations. However, this tension may well lead less to the “supranationalisation of the State” via the creation of “a new State over and above the nations” but to ruptures appearing in the existing national State formations (Poulantzas 1975: 80). These take the form of nationalist regionalisms that appeared stronger in the 70s, but seem much more powerful in the 1980s and 90s.

A decade and a half later the same issues occupy commentators, albeit employing a different analytical framework and using a different ‘language’. Balibar (1996) analyses the rise of nationalism in Europe as interrelated to social, political and economic conjunctures in Europe that configuring a new European racism. Balibar (1996) explains these events as attempts to redefine and construct a new Europe following the collapse of the USSR and the eastern European regimes and the end of the cold war. Lutz et all (1995: 8) point out that “the new racist nationalism which is gathering force in contemporary Europe is much concerned with notions of defending ‘our’ home, space, territory”. Post-cold war Europe is facing challenges that were present during the cold war era but did not occupy the same position in the hierarchy of issues that needed dealing. Mayall and Miall suggest that the challenges to Europe come from two directions: ‘from above and below the State. Globalisation of capital markets, technologies and communications, “diminishes even the strongest and best administered States to deliver what their government promised” (Mayall and Miall 1994). Also the

30 Henry Kissinger is considered a ‘hawk’ of USA diplomacy, with regards to his views and practices in the past.

31 Marxism is no longer the dominant paradigm in sociology and has never been dominant in politics, international relations.
question of “international governance” is brought forward (Mayall and Miall 1994: 265). More importantly, for the purposes of this Chapter, according to Mayall and Miall, “globalisation also provided the setting for the challenge from below - to the legitimacy of the state from ethnic and / or religious minorities” (Mayall and Miall 1994: 266). The reasons for this are attributed to dramatic changes in the political map following the collapse of eastern European regimes on the one hand, and the debates over ‘subsidiarity’ on the other. Furthermore the question of the right to self-determination has been reopened as a result (Mayall and Miall 1994: 265). In the above context some of the current borders are considered as sustainable and some scholars argue for “a new normative basis for secession” (Heraclides 1994).

5.2 Europeanisation as a Method of Conflict Resolution?

In order to assess precisely how the European processes of integration could affect the dynamics of ethnic/state conflict two models/processes can be considered: the first is the EU as an active broker and the second is Europeanisation as a long-term process. The first involves EU institutions and structures having the political will, the credibility and ultimate military, strategic and economic might to ‘enforce’ decisions and agreements (or at least ‘twist some arms’ if necessary). This has a more short-term effect on conflict. The second is Europeanisation as an underlying and longer-term process that may weaken the centrality of identification with, or gradually orientate loyalty away from ones particular ethnic/national/cultural characteristics, towards Europe via the European citizenship and loyalty.

5.3 Europeanisation as an Active Broker

The issue in question here is whether Europeanisation can play a role, as an active broker, in resolving ethnic/state conflicts. However, on the basis of the record so far the prospects of such a role are rather bleak. Apart from the flourishing autonomist/secessionist nationalist movements within the EU, the two examples useful here are those of Yugoslavia crisis and the Greco-Turkish incidents at the Imia islet. In the case of former Yugoslavia the EU attempted to play the role of the broker and that of the Imia crisis between Greece, an EU member, and Turkey, a State with which has a Customs Union with the EU. Both cases have a bearing on the EU role on Cyprus.

It has been said that far from “extinguishing the bush-fires on its frontiers” the Yugoslavia crisis illustrated its limitations and failures (Hartley 1993). What was described as “the stern test” of Yugoslavia “has undermined the EC’s claim to act effectively in a crisis involving European Security and has eroded the credibility of the common foreign and security policies” (Hartley 1993: 202). The developments were such that left the USA/NATO as the only effective and credible broker in times of crisis. The recent crisis, with the bombing campaign by NATO of Yugoslavia in April and May 1999, the EU merely rallied behind NATO reaffirming the position that it is NATO and the USA who are the dominant players. According to the same author, a twofold ‘functional’ explanation can account for the EU/EC failures. First, member States may have different interests, objectives and priorities in these conflicts. Secondly, the laborious diplomatic negotiations required to bring about a carefully balanced formula to obscure disagreements means that it is too late to intervene if the reason for intervention is the deterrence of aggression in the first place (Hartley 1993: 202). The failure of the EU to provide for any diplomatic breakthrough in the Owen-Vans initiative, or indeed prevent or even halt the notorious policies of ‘ethnic cleansing’, left a mark of failure on the EU, especially when the US sponsored broker Mr Holbrook produced ‘results’ with the Dayton accord. The Europeans then had to ‘pick up the bill’ of implementing the agreement negotiated by the USA.

A few years earlier, in the summer of 1996, during the crisis over the rocky islet of Imia, which came close to a full-blown Greco-Turkish war, once again the EU failed to show any initiative. It was once more the US, via NATO, which ‘intervened’ to ‘diffuse’ the crisis. Of course this was not done out of

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140 This was nothing more than the carving up of Bosnia on the basis of ethnic cleansing, which does not offer much in terms of international law or justice, as a precedent, not to mention the human tragedy dimension which is beyond description.

33 The EU Commissioners were accused of ‘sleeping’ at the height of the crisis by the Greek press.
‘benevolence’ on behalf of the US or NATO, but because the stability in the eastern flank of the Atlantic Alliance was under threat. Moreover, this ‘mediation’ has not ‘resolved’ the problems as such, but ensured a permanent role for NATO in the region. The regional issues and the players in this conflict are simply in the US ambit of power, beyond the capacity of the EU, just like in the cold war times. Mayall and Miall (1994: 269) suggest that the failure of the EU as an international political actor is due to the fact that Europe remains “leaderless”, especially in strategic and military affairs where the US remains unchallenged. They point out, “although there is a strong tendency amongst non-Europeans and amongst some Europeans to see the EU as a major actor on the world stage, the divisions among European Union Members over foreign policies remain serious” (Mayall and Miall 1994: 269).

This sounds like a good warning to be directed to Cypriot policy-makers as to the limitations of the EU.

The processes of Europeanisation have not eradicated ‘ethnic’ conflicts or necessarily made them more ‘manageable’. The problem is nowhere near as acute as in Eastern Europe, yet nationalism (and racism) is becoming more and more serious in Europe (Puhle 1994; Woolf 1995). A related factor here is the overall failure of international law to provide an effective mechanism for the protection of the rights of the minorities. There is still little, if any scope for international ‘intervention’, in ‘domestic affairs’, and the fact remains that even within the EU there is no transnational regime to actually implement the stipulated norms and standards (Thornberry 1994) and intervention remains in some cases totally arbitrary. In the case of Yugoslavia NATO and US started a bombing campaign over Kosovo’s autonomy allegedly for the protection of the Albanian speaking population and to expel the Yugoslav army. The Yugoslav army had intervened in the autonomous region, which is part of the Yugoslav Federation, allegedly to deal with Kosovar Albanians separatists of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army). Amid widespread reports of oppression and persecution of many Albanian-speaking civilians, the USA and NATO decided to embark on the so-called ‘humanitarian bombing’ campaign allegedly to force the Milosevic regime to stop the extermination of these populations. However, NATO had no UN mandate and set out to achieve their own goals disregarding international law. However, form their point view, NATO insisted that it had to act decisively and quickly to avert genocide and that in any case the UN never condemned the NATO action. A few months later, after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav troops, with NATO being effectively in control of the region, it is the Kosovar Serbs, who felt persecuted whilst the future of the region remains uncertain.

It must be noted that even the European Courts (both Brussels and Strasbourg) rely on nation-states for implementation of their decision. Furthermore, within the European Union itself there is a hierarchy and power relations between member-states. Moreover, the semi-peripheral status and positioning in this hierarchy of southern European states are relevant considerations. The very concept of Eurocentrism, as a discourse of European superiority, may involve the attempts to legitimate domination over and perpetuate inequality in the south of the globe applies also within Europe and its regions.

The rise in nationalism, racism and xenophobia across Europe illustrates that Europeanism has not halted these phenomena. The proponents of the EU suggest that matters would have been much worse had the EU integration not been there. However a study of the various nationalist movements shows that there is wide scope for identification with Europe and at the same time particularist or regionalist identification. Basque, Catalan, Scottish, Welsh, Northern Italian nationalists are all pro-European. A survey of the various sub-State nationalist movements (secessionist, irredentist or autonomist) in Western Europe reveals that Europeanisation may actually intensify conflicts, in certain circumstances. This is because first, there is an additional platform to compete over, and challenge their nation-state; secondly, uneven development may widen the gap between regions, which is supposed to be addressed by the regional fund. Also, in the process of the shaping the emergent European order there is more scope for competition between groups, elites and classes. In addition there is the problem of oppression and power relation between social groups that has not been properly addressed nor is there the political will to do so. Moreover, there are contradictory trends and unintended consequences as a result of the process.
5.4 Longer-Term Processes: Radical Potential or the Limits of European Citizenship?

The question of European integration and its dynamics in the creation of a 'European identity' enhanced by the granting of European citizenship is part of a longer-term process of 'conflict resolution' as stated earlier. The examination of the question of European citizenship and how it relates to national identity may be useful for Cyprus.

Habermas considers the “complex relation between citizenship and national identity”, and locates this to historical movements in the eighties that contributed to the increasing importance of the link between the two concepts: first, what he calls “the liberation” of Eastern Europe and secondly the European integration process. He suggests that democracy is a problem for the EU as it somehow “lags behind” the economic integration (Habermas 1994: 20). It was the French revolution, which gave birth to both democracy as we know it today and nationalism. Republicanism and nationalism were for a short time striving for the same ends producing the same results and arousing the same kind of feelings: liberation. “Only briefly did the nation-state forge a close link between ‘ethnos’ and ‘demos’. Citizenship was never conceptually bound to national identity” (Habermas 1994: 23). This is crucial for Habermas in the way he views and conceptualises citizenship and the whole European project. He adopts part of the ‘communitarian’ agenda but locates the contradiction in the communitarian insistence that “the citizen must himself or herself ‘patriotically’ with his or her way of life”. The relationship between nationalism and republicanism is a historically contingent, not a conceptual one (Habermas 1994: 27). Habermas cites the USA and Switzerland as examples of multi-cultural societies and points out that the political culture underlying their constitutional principles “by no means need to be based on all citizens sharing the same language or the same ethnic and cultural origin”. It is here that Habermas develops his thesis on what he calls “constitutional patriotism”. His analysis must be contrasted to 'ethnistic' and ethno-essentialist misgivings about the European integration, such as Smith (1986). Habermas (1994: 27) argues that

“the political culture must serve as common denominator for a constitutional patriotism which simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which coexist in a multi-cultural society”.

He suggests that for European demos to emerge European policy makers must attempt to “anchor” the common traditions of Europe to particularistic identifications and symbols. For “a future Federal Republic of European States” to emerge he calls for “the same legal principles would also have to be interpreted from the vantage point of different traditions and histories.” One’s own national traditions need to be “appropriated in such a manner that is related and ‘relativised’ by the vantage points of other national cultures”. At the same time Habermas suggests that this must be then linked to and connected with “the overlapping consensus of a common, supra-nationally shared political culture of the EC”. It is this sort of “anchoring” that Habermas (1994: 28) views as not “impairing universal meaning of popular sovereignty and human rights”.

Habermas’s seminal observations on the European Union are worth considering when examining the problem of the European citizenship in the context of the integration process. The capitalist economy has developed “a systemic entelechy of its own” as it were, as “the markets for goods, capital and labour obey their own logic, independent of the persons involved”. The “System integration” of money competes with “social integration” (political integration being part of this) through values, norms and reaching understanding. There is a problem for liberal theory as it denies that “the relation between capitalism and democracy is fraught with tension.” Habermas points out that “the development of the European Community brings, in its own way, the tension between democracy and capitalism to the fore.” This is expressed in “the vertical divide between the systemic integration of

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34 Habermas quotes Crawert’s definition of citizenship as “the legal institution via which the individual member of a nation takes part as an active agent in the concrete nexus of State action” (1994:25). He then distinguishes the liberal tradition from the communitarian. In Lock’s natural law citizenship is individualist and instrumentalist and akin to a legal status and accordingly in this conception the individual is external to the State. The communitarian tradition is traced back to Aristotle who seeks communitarian and ethical understanding, as a self-determining ethical community. The individual is integrated into the political community as part of the whole. Citizenship can thus be only realised as a joint practice of self-determination (see Rousseau on “collective will”).
economy and administration at the supranational level - and political integration that thus far works at
the level of the nation-state."

The main difficulty is the fact that democracy at this supranational level is unprecedented. As
Habermas (1994: 29) points out:

“That nation-states constitute a problem along the thorny path to a
European Union is less due to their insurmountable claims to
sovereignty than to another fact: democratic processes have hitherto
only functioned within national borders”.

Trying therefore to draw on democratic traditions of existing experiences within culturally and socially
specific projects is no straightforward matter, but not impossible. Therefore,

“Unlike the American variant, a European constitutional patriotism
would have to grow from different interpretations, which the same
universalist rights and constitutional principles enjoy by receiving
their place in the context of different national histories.”

The ‘European demos’, in the Habermasian sense, is yet to emerge; there is however another Europe
that has already emerged in what is referred to as ‘Fortress Europe’. The long standing debates over
‘Fortress Europe’ with the rise of racist violence against migrants and asylum seekers, the re-
emerging nationalism and xenophobia have led many commentators to talk of a ‘new’ phenomena
referred as ‘European Racism’ and ‘Euro-nationalism’. These disturbing developments have been
conceptualised in terms of what Essed called “Europism” (Lutz et. all1995: 8), as an attempt to build a
‘pure Europe’ cleansed of alien and ‘uncivilised elements’ (Habermas 1995: 48-64), Balibar’s
European Racism (1996) and Habermas’s “welfare chauvinism” (1992)35 are closely related and
describe these practices. Bainbridge et all suggest a close correlation between the economic
consequences of Maastricht Treaty (deflation, unemployment, cuts in welfare provisions) and
exacerbation of racism and in particular support of extreme Right parties. This was supported by the
1994 elections of the European Parliament (Bainbridge et all 1995: 128-130), ‘Fortress Europe’ is not
merely an ideology but a structure resulting from this construction process, which extends to “a wide
range of laws and regulations, practices” that create a regime whereby “14 million non- nationals, non-
Europeans constitute second class citizens” (Lutz et all 1995: 8).

The prospect for a radical potential for a Europeanism, the kind of “Union citizenship which signals the
prospects of a post-national political arrangement based on a redefinition of community and re-
articulation of citizenship”, suggested by Kostakopoulou (1999: 181-197) seems quite remote from
today’s reality. Kostakopoulou’s arguments for a radical remodelling of European immigration and
asylum policy only shows how much “teasing out” is required before the EU is truly transformed, as
this policy “falls short of a principled response to immigration” Kostakopoulou (1999: 198) suggests:

“The ‘Communitarisation’ [following the treaty of Amsterdam] of
immigration and asylum policy needs to be accompanied by a radical
rethinking of the issues of immigration, citizenship and community in
the EU.”

Exactly how near we are to this ‘radical rethinking’ is a matter that only time
will tell.

5.5 Europeanism as Nationalist Ideology?

The concept of ‘Europeanism’ may be considered as a potential type of super-State nationalism that
could also be called ‘European Unionism’. It entails elements that allow one to classify it as a type of
nationalism, as defined by Gellner as “a theory of political legitimacy” or an Andersonian “imagined
community”. The notion of Europeanness involves a notion of “separate political representation” to
use Anthias and Yuval-Davies terms (1983) as it aims to create a separate political, economic, military
and cultural space. Europeanism is sometimes presented as an alternative to the particular nationalisms
(state or sub-state). However, this is not necessarily the case, as it may act as an additional layer of
nationalism, as European Unionism creating a boundary in this ‘new’ identity and politico-cultural

35 Quoted in Lutz et. all (1995: 8).
space vis-à-vis the non-European ‘other’. It is in this way that a ‘new’ racism may be considered to be operative as “Europism” to use Lutz’s term.

In some contexts European Unionism may in fact exacerbate the particular ideologies related to nation-states, as a part of the European nation/race vis-à-vis the ‘non-European other’. Furthermore, given that there is a hierarchy, uneven development and power relations within Europe, the question as to who is ‘more European’ may well collapse back into the component and particular ethnic identities. This is not to say that the role of the State has diminished; far from it. In the domain of controlling borders, regulating citizenship and immigration and law and order the role of the States has been enhanced. What Poulantzas called “authoritarian statism” is at its heyday when it comes to migration following agreements such as Schengen (Kourtovik 1995). Europeanism in some contexts may play a protagonistic role in creating new configurations where the non-Europeans (usually migrant or ethnic minorities with ‘questionable’ European credentials) may be excluded or inferiorised or subordinated. It therefore makes little sense to view Europeanisation necessarily as ‘conflict resolution’ given that it may well operate in practice as a mechanism for exclusion.

In other contexts however, Europeanism plays a direct and important role in endowing groups and individuals with rights, as with the ECJ and the ECHR, the developing Minority rights regime and the idea of creating a citizenship beyond the nation-state. What needs to be borne in mind is that national institutions have been more xenophobic than the EU and it is many times European institutions in spite of their weaknesses and inadequacies in upholding the rights of minorities. In assessing Europeanisation as a method for conflict resolution, at this level of generality, the answer remains ambiguous. The uncertainty about the eventual shape of European integration undermines the credibility of the EU in playing this role. Europeanisation has certainly affected the European nation-states, but not to the extent and direction that some commentators have suggested. Nation-states have not been eroded but reformulated and there is significant variation in State power in the EU, depending on the power, size, economic, military might of each member-state. International politics is of crucial importance. The processes of integration in the EU are complex and the dimensions (economic, political, social /cultural) may alter the dynamics of state/ethnic conflict in contradictory ways. Past experience illustrates that the EU as an active broker of ethnic conflict can hardly be described as a success. Furthermore, we may have not seen war amongst EU members so far, but there is little evidence of ‘conflict resolution’ as a result of membership. In many instances the role, policies and mere involvement of the EU may actually exacerbate conflict or leaves it unaffected. Europeanisation may contribute to resolving ethnic/state conflict, but it is best understood in the particular contexts examined. An analysis of the conjunctures and policies need to be scrutinised in detail.

6 Conclusion: The Nation-State Dialectic, the National Question and the Production of Conflict

The importance of state-related processes, in the generation of ethnic conflict and nationalist phenomena does not necessarily mean that the state ‘determines’ ethnic conflict, as a kind of base or infrastructure, which determines a superstructure, or vice versa. The relation between the two is far more complex. Since the 19th century, with the emergence of the modern nation-state, one can observe a complex inter-determinacy in the relationship between ‘nationalism’, and the state, at times leading to wars, liberation struggles and ethnic conflicts. These processes must be located within the processes of consolidation of political power by the bourgeoisie, the development of capitalism, gradually in certain instances, violently in others, displacing the old feudal order. Later in the late 19th and 20th century there were of course the questions of colonialism, imperialism, decolonisation and the cold war system, all of which were powerful forces in the generation of conflict and the shape of various ‘nation-states’ that emerged. Ingredients of these historical transformations were the complex interaction between the various forces, class struggles and the contradictory social processes of modernisation and ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’ conflicts.

The Europeanisation processes certainly create a new dimension in the generation of ‘ethnic conflicts’, as they alter the ‘nation-state dialectic’ and they redefine the boundaries and powers within and around the State. The processes are complex and contradictory and rather than considering that the nation-
state form would somehow be superseded by some ‘supra-national State’ and the ‘old allegiances’ and ‘ethnic particularisms’ would somehow be eradicated, it is best to approach matters in a cautious manner. The alterations and transformations that are happening are such that well accentuate, rather than erode ‘ethnic/state conflicts’, but they may, depending on the context, policies and other conjunctures facilitate a process for resolution of conflicts. There is no ‘automatic’ process and the eventualities are by no means certain. The analyses need to be contextual rather making broad generalisations.

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