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Article
Revenue Sharing and Within-team Payroll Inequality in Major League Baseball
Applied Economics Letters
  • Nicholas A. Jolly, Marquette University
Document Type
Article
Language
eng
Format of Original
6 p.
Publication Date
1-1-2015
Publisher
Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
Disciplines
Abstract

Using data from the 2000 to 2012 Major League Baseball seasons, this article investigates how changes to revenue sharing in the 2007 collective bargaining agreement altered within-team payroll inequality. Results indicate that inequality within teams decreased after the 2007 bargaining agreement. This reduced inequity is concentrated among those teams that were already experiencing relatively higher levels of inequality. This indicates that changes to revenue sharing should help increase competitive balance within the league. Additionally, the reduction in inequality occurs only among hitters and not pitchers. These results highlight how collective bargaining can have heterogeneous effects on groups of workers despite there being no requirement of differential treatment.

Comments

Accepted version. Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2015): 80-85. DOI. © 2015 Taylor & Francis (Routledge). Used with permission.

Citation Information
Nicholas A. Jolly. "Revenue Sharing and Within-team Payroll Inequality in Major League Baseball" Applied Economics Letters (2015) ISSN: 1350-4851
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/nicholas-jolly/7/