Internally Displaced Persons and the Cyprus Peace Process

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Available at: https://works.bepress.com/neophytos_loizides/40/
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Abstract
The article focuses on Greek Cypriot internally displaced persons and their attitudes towards the island’s reunification talks. We utilize quantitative data from two representative sample surveys, conducted in 2016–2017, which probed respondents on their views on territorial readjustments, property provisions and power-sharing. Contrary to the current findings in the literature, internally displaced persons status is associated with higher levels of support for a negotiated peace settlement. The article examines the impact of anticipated threats and economic opportunities accompanying a settlement and suggests a set of institutionalized mechanisms to incorporate the views of internally displaced persons and other disadvantaged groups in future reunification talks.

Keywords
Peace agreements, federalism, internally displaced persons (IDPs), consociationalism, political attitudes

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Introduction

Peace processes rarely facilitate institutionalized internally displaced person (IDP) participation nor do they encourage information gathering through public opinion surveys on their preferences.1 Cyprus provides a paradigmatic case where the right of return has been a key priority, especially for Greek Cypriots, yet IDPs are not represented at negotiations, and there is no related research on the potential advantages of their inclusion. This article addresses this gap in peace studies and public opinion research using two public opinion surveys focusing on Greek Cypriot displaced persons and their attitudes to the prospective political institutions of a reunited Cyprus. Our data, collected before and after the 2017 United Nations (UN) peace talks, probes respondents’ possible alternatives to the ‘Guterres package’, named after the UN Secretary General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres.

The article’s main objectives are threefold. First, we focus on Greek Cypriot displaced persons as the primary stakeholders in the Cyprus peace process. Although it is assumed the Greek Cypriot IDPs could be potential beneficiaries of a settlement in the form of a bizonal bicommunal federation (BBF), little attention has been paid to their attitudes; a fundamental difference between the two sides is that Greek Cypriots maintain ‘the right of return’ while Turkish Cypriots prioritize the current status quo. We ask how this thinking affects their responses to a possible settlement. Second, we highlight a broader question concerning the role of IDP-specific research in conflict resolution studies. As Cyprus is now enjoying stability and increased communication between the two main communities, we suggest lessons from the island could be applicable elsewhere. Third, we incorporate in our analysis the social psychological antecedents of support for a prospective solution or its lack thereof. By doing so, we locate a practical real-life political phenomenon of the Cyprus peace process in everyday intergroup behaviour, past and present.

Intergroup relations and internally displaced persons

Existing research has demonstrated how perceived threats elicit behaviour to reduce exposure to risk at both personal and group levels (Huddy et al., 2002). As a group-level process, perceived threats from outgroup(s) are prevalent among those previously exposed to political violence and conflict (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009a, 2009b). It is important to consider how this experience, in the case of Greek Cypriots’ displacement experience, affects present perceptions of threat and attitudes to a political process designed to address it. An often-unchallenged view in the literature is that protracted refugee situations produce radicalized populations (Adelman, 1998; Lischer 2015; Sude et al., 2015). As refugees and IDPs suffer disproportionately during displacement campaigns, they may be more likely to want revenge when opportunities arise (Achvarina and Reich, 2006; Bohnet et al., 2018; Choi and Piazza, 2016). These tendencies could be aggravated if the right of return is either restricted or difficult to implement after the passage of time, as in Cyprus. Thus far, the evidence on return in post-conflict communities is mixed, with some finding it feasible under specific conditions (Stefanovic and Loizides, 2017) and others, unrealistic (Adelman and Barkan, 2011; Zolberg et al., 1986). Even though the literature identifies the pitfalls of securitizing displacement crises and their victims (Greenhill, 2010; Jacobsen, 2002), few public opinion studies challenge these claims or point to potential pro-peace attitudes among IDPs. To address this gap, our article highlights the exclusion-amid-inclusion (EAI) dilemma (Agarin and McCulloch, this issue), probing the potential role of IDPs as peace agents (rather than as unconditional or occasional spoilers). We argue that what is missing in the Cyprus talks is not only designated IDP representation at the official level but also other inclusive procedures involving, for instance, the inclusion of IDP representatives (including those in the
diaspora) in specialized technical committees on implementing the right of return and individual consultation with property owners through new census technologies as to their preferences on return, restitution, and overall settlement provisions.

Cyprus is a critical case study for the role of the IDPs in peace processes: in the Greek Cypriot community, rights are prominent in official discourses, but nonetheless, IDPs and their associations have no formal role in the peace negotiations. Designated representation is missing at the official level, as are other inclusive procedures, for instance, individual or group consultation with displaced property owners. Cyprus is not alone in this: IDPs and refugees are generally underrepresented in peace processes. While Cyprus arguably constitutes a case of refugee–citizens with some degree of inclusivity through national or local elections (Demetriou, 2018), marginalization is much wider in those cases where IDPs have either lost their voting rights within their home states (e.g. in Georgia or Turkey/Kurds) or have been deprived citizenship in third countries (e.g. Syrians in the Middle East). Even in Cyprus, under-representation of IDPs is evident: the Republic’s 2018 cabinet, according to official online bios, lacked any IDP members, even though the latter constitute one-third of the population. This lack of representation has been a serious impediment to the peace process. As this article demonstrates, IDP respondents are more likely to vote for a peace settlement in Cyprus, while IDP status is a statistically significant predictor of acceptance of power-sharing arrangements across different models.

**Cypriot displacement context**

Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have suffered from forced displacement in their recent past but have reacted differently to their suffering. For the most part, Greek Cypriots have emphasized the right of return while Turkish Cypriots want to preserve the island’s new political realities and ensure a ‘demographically secure’ Turkish Cypriot entity (Necatigil, 1989; Yesilada and Sozen, 2002: 275). In their narratives, Turkish Cypriots focus on their position as a numerical minority during the 1963–1964 bi-communal clashes when they were forced to settle in enclaves scattered across a Greek Cypriot-dominated island, while Greek Cypriots emphasize the events of 1974 when Turkish troops partitioned Cyprus, forcing approximately 160,000 Greek Cypriots to flee their cities and villages (Bryant, 2011; Dikomitis, 2012; Georgiades, 2009; Loizos, 2008). During the same period, around 40,000 Turkish Cypriots living in the south were coerced or chose to move to the north which, since 1983, has functioned as a non-recognized state (Bertrand, 2004). Turkish Cypriots prioritize maintaining a federally autonomous and demographically secure entity in the northern part of Cyprus. Return to pre-1974 homes has been an issue primarily in the context of compensations and mutual exchange of properties, and so far no Turkish Cypriot political party has championed the return of their own displaced, although moderate parties have been more open to multiculturalism and accommodating the Greek Cypriot right of return to the north, a priority for Greek Cypriots.

In a nutshell, the Cyprus problem reflects many of the contradictions of consociationalism noted in the introduction of this special issue. On the one hand, the proposed BBF may lead to the inclusion of Turkish Cypriots and provide the basis for political equality between the two communities (Lijphart, 2004). On the other hand, it may restrict rights among the displaced, particularly among the numerically larger Greek Cypriot community, to promote the autonomy of the numerically smaller Turkish Cypriot community. This is a fundamental but not necessarily unresolvable challenge for Lijphart’s consociational reasoning: while his fourth pillar of consociationalism, segmental autonomy, might appear unproblematic in most occasions, in Cyprus the challenge is to balance the needs of two sides in the same territorial space.
Until 2003, the two communities had few opportunities for contact, as only limited interactions were permitted across the dividing line. The opening of checkpoints in 2003 created opportunities for contact and improved intergroup relations. Since then, an estimated 40 million crossings have taken place. There is now regular unstructured contact: people cross to shop, trade, attend school, sightsee, and visit friends. The beneficial effects of contacts that entail talking to each other either directly (McKeown and Psaltis, 2017), indirectly through extended cross-group friendships (Yucel & Psaltis, under review), or social media friendships (Žeželj et al., 2017) on improving attitudes and reducing prejudice are well documented. One of the most encouraging findings is that cross-group friendships between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots multiplied between 2007 and 2017. Nevertheless, a significant portion of both communities do not cross the divide regularly: to date only, about one-third of the Greek Cypriot community and 40 to 50% of the Turkish Cypriot community have regular contact with members of the other community by crossing the checkpoints frequently (Žeželj et al., 2017) while until today, 16 years since the opening of the checkpoints, about one-third of Greek Cypriots have never crossed to the north.

Understanding antecedents of support for a peace settlement is important, but to the best of our knowledge no research has focused on IDPs. This is surprising, as IDPs are the primary stakeholders: they are the most affected by the conflict and will be the most affected by a solution. However, efforts to reach a settlement in Cyprus have repeatedly failed, leaving IDPs and their rights in limbo. In 2004, the efforts to reach a settlement almost came to fruition but even then IDP status played a minor, albeit positive, role, and ‘only fractionally more refugees voted “Yes” than did the general population’ (Loizos, 2008: 94). At the time, IDPs were promised either a quick return to the talks, i.e., a ‘new better deal, or material compensations that never materialized.

In this article, we present new findings on Greek Cypriot IDPs and their attitudes toward the Turkish Cypriots, and how these relate to their position on the Cyprus peace process and power-sharing in particular. In the first study of February–March 2016, we investigate IDPs’ support or lack of support thereof for the specific aspects of the proposed settlement to the Cyprus problem. In the second study, which was conducted shortly after the collapse of the final UN round of talks at Crans Montana in July 2017, we delve into a set of social psychological antecedents of IDPs’ current position: perceived threats to Greek Cypriot values and beliefs; perceptions of Greek Cypriot unreadiness for a solution and perceptions of the dysfunctionality of a prospective settlement of the issue; anticipation of meddling by Turkey in the internal affairs of the new state; benefits (economic opportunities and free movement) to a possible solution; trust towards Turkish Cypriots; and Greek Cypriot attitudes towards the opening of the checkpoints.

Study 1: Pre-Guterres survey

Research methods

Sample: The first survey was conducted by the University Centre for Field Studies of the University of Cyprus in Nicosia, Cyprus, through telephone interviews in Greek using the NIPO/CATI program. The phone survey used both land lines and mobile phone numbers and ran from 29 February 2016 to 22 March 2016. Participants came from both urban and rural areas in each district of the Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot community). Eligible participants were over 18 and had voting rights. The total sample included 1605 participants. The cooperation rate was 24.8%.

Questionnaire: The questionnaire was developed in English and then translated into and back translated from Greek to ensure conceptual and semantic equivalence (Brislin, 1970). It took a mean of 13 minutes to complete and consisted of five parts, one of which was a special part completed only by IDPs. The five parts included: demographic questions (gender, age, IDP status,
place of residence in terms of district and area [rural or urban], and educational level); stance in a future referendum and so forth. The special part for IDPs included questions in binary form asking about their relationship to their lost properties and their intention to return in the event of a solution. They were also asked about their stance on bicomunal relations and the Cyprus issue, especially their return intentions under Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot administration in the event of a solution.

Results

Study 1 yielded useful statistical information about IDPs. In particular, in 2016, first generation IDPs were estimated to be 19.8% of the whole population of Greek Cypriots. The survey had a margin of error of 2% and 95% level of confidence. The second generation IDPs whose fathers were displaced represented 30.1% of all IDPs; those whose mothers were displaced totalled 29.1%. Over a third, 37.7%, said they owned property in the north. Once these three categories (first generation, second generation, property owner) were amalgamated into a binary variable, 43.4% of the sample satisfied one or more of the above criteria.

About a third of the IDPs said they never thought of returning if there were a solution, another third said they rarely or sometimes thought about it, and another third said they were always thinking about it. When they were specifically asked ‘If there is a settlement in 2016, how likely is it for you to return and live in your pre-1974 home under Greek Cypriot administration in the next 3 years?’, 59.5% said they would likely or very likely return. When the same question was asked in the same way but ‘under Turkish Cypriot administration’, numbers dropped significantly, to 22.5%.

All participants (IDPs and non-IDPs) with voting rights in the Greek Cypriot community were also asked about their stance if there was a referendum and their political party supported a Yes vote. About 40% said they tended towards voting Yes or were sure to vote Yes, about 26% tended towards or were sure to vote No, and about 34% were equally likely to vote Yes or No. The results are shown in Table 1.

When we compared the answers of IDPs and non-IDPs we discovered significant differences. Notably, the percentage of non-IDPs determined to reject a plan was almost double the percentage of IDPs challenging the refugee radicalization thesis (Adelman, 1998).

At this point, we filtered out the Sure Yes and Sure No and asked the rest of the participants the following question: ‘If you are unsure, would you vote for the settlement, if it includes provisions to replace Ankara’s for EU guarantees?’ This resulted in about one-third of the undecided changing their vote to a definite Yes and only 17% changing their vote to a definite No. IDP status was unrelated to the distribution of these answers. The responses suggested that under this scenario, a Sure

Table 1. Stance on possible referendum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Non-IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would vote yes for sure</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would most likely vote for yes</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes and no are equally likely</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would most likely vote for no</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would vote no for sure</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Yes could go up to 43% and a Most Likely Yes to 13.2%, leaving us with 56.2% of Greek Cypriots who would definitely or probably vote Yes.

An additional scenario with an IDP-specific focus asked both IDPs and non-IDPs ‘If you are unsure, would you vote for the settlement, if it includes provisions to secure that the overwhelming majority of refugees have the first say as to their properties?’ In this scenario, two-thirds of the undecideds shifted to a definite Yes (Table 2). In this case, there was a tendency for the IDPs, as expected, to support Yes in greater numbers than non-IDPs, but the difference did not reach statistical significance.

As these findings show, Greek Cypriots (both IDPs and non-IDPs) are concerned about property issues and want IDPs to be able to choose how to deal with their property. This comes as no surprise, of course, given the widely shared representation of the Cyprus issue in the Greek Cypriot community as a problem of Turkish territorial occupation. However, it is also clear that in areas that will fall under Turkish Cypriot administration, only a small minority of IDPs will request restitution for their properties. This point is vital for Turkish Cypriots, as they fear losing the demographic majority in the north after a solution.

Although this has been a very difficult impediment in the negotiations, as we argue elsewhere, new information and communication technologies might create opportunities for the two sides to collect data ahead of the negotiations, meeting the objectives of all sides (see also Andrade and Doolin, 2016). Those hailing from areas in the future Turkish Cypriot constituent state are more likely to be accommodating if their preferences on restitution and compensation, or a combination of these and other options, are known in advance to the mediators. One reason for limiting the role of IDP-specific representation in the negotiations is the fear that IDPs might act as spoilers, but our research suggests the opposite: IDPs have a promising profile. These data must be made accessible to all stakeholders in the peace process.

The undecided were also asked: ‘Under what conditions would you accept a system of rotating presidency (select all that applies)?’ The majority selected option five in Table 3 (‘I would never accept a rotating presidency’) and did not choose any of the other options, even though they could pick more than one.

The fact that 54.3% of undecided voters said they would never support a rotational presidency in any guise is worrying from the perspective of getting a Yes vote in a referendum, since if we assume about half of undecided voters would vote No on a peace plan with a rotating presidency, then the No vote presented in Table 1 rises to 47% of voters. Even though a presidential form of power-sharing has dominated the mediations in Cyprus so far, such an arrangement would not have been the preferred institutional choice of most consociational theorists (Lijphart, 2004; Linz 1990; McGarry 2011). Thus, in future surveys, it is worth examining the impact of non-presidential systems and whether these alternative models could increase support for a settlement.

### Table 2. Repositioning of undecided under the following scenario: ‘If you are unsure, would you vote for the settlement, if it includes provisions to secure that the overwhelming majority of refugees would have the first say as to their properties?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I would vote yes for sure</td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would most likely vote for yes</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes and no are equally likely</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would most likely vote for no</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would vote for no for sure</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yes could go up to 43% and a Most Likely Yes to 13.2%, leaving us with 56.2% of Greek Cypriots who would definitely or probably vote Yes.

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Another interesting dimension of the finding on the rotating presidency is that political preferences differ significantly when comparing IDPs with non-IDPs. Overall, non-IDPs are less willing to share power with Turkish Cypriots than IDPs (see Table 4).

Study 1 discussion

Given the findings, particularly the fact that IDPs take a significantly different stance on power-sharing than non-IDPs, it is worth further exploring a host of other factors publicly discussed as reasons for Greek Cypriots’ rejection of power-sharing, such as security concerns, territorial concerns and trust. We explored one of these factors in the second survey. A crucial element of the six-point Guterres framework was for Greek Cypriots to offer Turkish Cypriots participation in power-sharing in exchange for the return of the town of Morphou. Morphou was an almost entirely Greek Cypriot town in 1974 (home to 6480) and since then has been included in each of the five versions of territorial adjustment in the Annan plan and in previous UN proposals, such as the Ghali Set of Ideas of 1992 (Michael, 2009). In the second survey, we explored factors that increase or decrease the possibility of acceptance of this element of the Guterres framework in the Greek Cypriot community. We were specifically interested in whether IDPs had different preferences than non-IDPs, controlling for a number of demographic variables. We also tested the predictive strength of various social psychological variables openly discussed as hopes and fears in the Greek Cypriot press just before the collapse of the Crans Montana negotiations (UNDP, 2015).

Table 3. Acceptance of rotating presidency under varying conditions among undecided voters (support for each condition in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If the rotating presidents have limited duties and dedicated to resolving</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deadlocks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the cabinet includes only one-third Turkish Cypriot ministers</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If rotating presidents took decisions together for all matters</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Cypriots also vote for the Turkish Cypriot co-president constituting</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% of total voters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would never accept a system of rotational presidency even if 1–4 are</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>included</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total exceeds 100%, as participants could select more than one option.

Table 4. Acceptance of rotating presidency under varying conditions by undecided IDP and non-IDP voters (support for each condition in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>IDP</th>
<th>Non-IDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If the rotating presidents have limited duties and dedicated to resolving</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deadlocks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the cabinet includes only one-third Turkish Cypriot ministers</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If rotating presidents took decisions together for all matters</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Cypriots also vote for the Turkish Cypriot co-president constituting</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% of total voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would never accept a system of rotational presidency even if 1–4 are</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>included</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Totals exceed 100%, as participants could select more than one option.*
Study 2: Post-Guterres survey

Research methods

Sample: This survey was conducted by the University Centre for Field Studies of the University of Cyprus using a representative sample survey of 811 participants and with face-to-face interviews. Participants were over 18 years with voting rights. The fieldwork took place from 23 November 2017 to 28 December 2017. The margin of error was 3% with a level of confidence of 95%. Participants were drawn from both urban and rural areas using multistage stratified sampling.

Questionnaire: The questionnaire took about 45 minutes to complete and had eight parts: demographic information, displacement experience, acceptance of solution based on Guterres framework, specific trade-off elements relating to rotating presidency, hopes and fears of a federal solution, symbolic threats, and attitudes towards opening of checkpoints and intergroup trust (see supplementary material). In addition, participants were asked to position themselves on whether they accepted the following possibilities as a satisfactory solution, accepted them as a solution of necessity/if necessary, or rejected them: bizonal bicommunal federation (BBF), two states, unitary state, keeping the status quo. We did this to decipher the post-Crans Montana attitudes of Greek Cypriots towards these options.

Results

For a more focused analysis of predictors of power-sharing, it is important to establish the general attitudes of Greek Cypriots to various solutions in the post-Crans Montana period, as such an analysis makes sense only if a BBF is still an option. The Crans Montana failure increased the number of Greek Cypriots who were sceptical of a BBF: the percentage of our participants who rejected a BBF in various gradations reached 41.7%, one of highest registered in the Greek Cypriot community in recent years. Crucially, however, it was far from becoming a majority view. We found that 36.3% accepted it as a compromise solution and an additional 21.9% found it a satisfactory solution. In other words, a majority (58.2%) was committed to BBF as the solution of the Cyprus problem.4

Since 2018, there has been public discussion of a two-state solution as a ‘Plan B’ in case the BBF model becomes unacceptable to the two communities. However, our data suggest the majority of Greek Cypriots reject this option. In particular, the majority (70.8%) of Greek Cypriots, even after the Crans Montana failure, reject the two-state solution. On the particular question of whether the participants would accept a plan based on the Guterres framework as a solution, the majority of Greek Cypriots (57.2%) said they were undecided whilst 23.8% rejected it and 19.6% accepted it as a satisfactory solution. When we compared the level of support for a solution on the basis of the Guterres framework among IDPs and non-IDPs, we found the IDPs (M = 4.02, SD = 1.57) were significantly more likely to accept the Guterres framework than non-IDPs (M = 3.66, SD = 1.74) (t(800) = −3.03, p < 0.01) on a 7-point Likert scale where 4 was the midpoint.

Two additional questions in Study 2 concerned whether IDPs thought the burden of displacement was equally distributed between all Greek Cypriot citizens of the Republic of Cyprus and, if not, whether they were ready to take a more assertive stance on the need for a fairer redistribution. In both questions, a clear majority of IDPs felt unjustly treated, with 73.4% choosing the extreme end of a 7-point Likert scale; they also stated their readiness to take a more assertive stance in claiming a more equal redistribution, with 68.4% again choosing the extreme end of the scale (7).

About 55% of IDPs felt the place they left behind was part of their identity. About 26.4% felt that their real home was their occupied home in the north, not their home in the south, whereas 24.5% felt their home was both. In a question on their wishes in handling their property, about 40%
wanted only restitution for their property and, when asked to give in percentage the portion of the valuation of their property that they would be willing to accept as compensation in cash, would not accept any compensation.

Focusing on the power-sharing provisions of the framework, we tested a model predicting support for a trade-off between a rotating presidency and the return of Morphou to Greek Cypriots in a model based on the variables of Appendix I in the online supplementary material. Table 5 shows the means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations of the variables. At first glance, the results suggest the majority of Greek Cypriots are worried about Turkey interfering in the federal state, about getting a dysfunctional solution, and about Greek Cypriots being unready for a possible solution. An exception is symbolic threats to Greek Cypriot way of life where the mean is very close to the midpoint (4) of the seven-point Likert scale. More participants show intergroup distrust than trust, and the majority is unable to recognize the positive effects of social interaction between the two communities that have grown exponentially since the opening of the checkpoints in 2003, even though such interactions, namely intergroup contact, are empirically known to have positive effects on intergroup relations in a variety of contexts (e.g. McKeown and Psaltis, 2017). On the positive side, the majority of participants recognize the opportunities offered by a solution for economic development and free movement around Cyprus.

The bivariate correlations indicate that IDPs and non-IDPs share the same level of fears and hopes for a solution. They also have the same level of trust, mention the same symbolic threats and express the same attitudes to the opening of the checkpoints. However, IDPs are more likely to support a rotating presidency with the return of Morphou, and, as noted above, significantly more likely to support a solution based on the Guterres framework.

We conducted additional analyses to determine levels of support for a rotating presidency using hierarchical binary logistic regression. We divided the predictor variables into three sets: respondents’ structural location (age, gender, education, income and IDP status; Model 1), hopes and fears of a federal arrangement (Model 2), the variable of symbolic threat (Model 3) and variables related to confidence-building measures (attitudes to the opening of the checkpoints and intergroup trust; Model 4). Table 6 reports the cumulative results for all four models.

Model 1 suggests men are more accepting of a rotating presidency than women, and the difference is statistically significant. IDPs are also more likely than non-IDPs to accept a rotating presidency. Age, education and income play no role.

We then entered hopes and fears in the form of expecting positive or negative outcomes from a federal settlement in Model 2. This block of variables proved to be a very important predictor, as the Cox and Snell R² indicates an increase from 2.5% to 19.9% when the second block of variables was entered. Interference by Turkey and the possible dysfunctionality of the reunited federal state are the major worries for Greek Cypriots. Hope for economic development and free movement across Cyprus both increase the chance of accepting the rotating presidency in exchange for Morphou.

Model 3 explores symbolic threat (Stephan and Stephan, 1996). The findings suggest it explains some additional variance. Both real and symbolic threats are well known in the social psychological literature as leading to reduced levels of trust, so we decided to add two variables as potentially more proximal predictors of acceptance of a rotating presidency in the last block of the equation. Thus, Model 4 includes a set of variables relating to the social psychological element of trust and stance on one of the admittedly more successful confidence-building measures, the opening of the checkpoints in 2003. The findings of Model 4 suggest the stance on the opening of checkpoints and trust mediate the effect of hopes and fears on accepting or rejecting a rotating presidency; in this model, both variables of the new block are significant, and four out of five of the second block of variables (hopes and realistic threats) become non-significant.
Table 5. Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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<th>9</th>
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<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
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<td>.50</td>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>13**</td>
<td>-.12**</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>-.13**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>-.02</td>
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<td>.04</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>-.16**</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
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<td>.07</td>
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<td>Interference by Turkey</td>
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<td>.37**</td>
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<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.04</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.47**</td>
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<td>-.52**</td>
<td>-.37**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hope (economic opportunities)</td>
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<td>.44**</td>
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<td>Hope (free movement)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Positive attitude toward opening of checkpoints</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>1.03</td>
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<td>Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rotating presidency</td>
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<td>.39</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; **p < .001

IDP: internally displaced person
Table 6. Odds ratios for logistic regression of Greek Cypriot acceptance of rotating presidency with the return of Morphou.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Structural factors</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1.940*** (.204)</td>
<td>1.724* (.234)</td>
<td>1.664* (.239)</td>
<td>1.567† (.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 = male; 0 = female)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.001 (.007)</td>
<td>1.000 (.008)</td>
<td>.996 (.009)</td>
<td>.993 (.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.998 (.053)</td>
<td>.922 (.081)</td>
<td>.928 (.062)</td>
<td>.927 (.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>1.030 (.083)</td>
<td>1.031 (.098)</td>
<td>1.030 (.083)</td>
<td>.945 (.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>1.495* (.200)</td>
<td>1.656* (.231)</td>
<td>1.599* (.234)</td>
<td>1.621* (.240)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hopes and realistic threats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interference by Turkey</td>
<td>0.679** (.149)</td>
<td>0.712* (.153)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.784 (.180)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greek Cypriots unready for solution</td>
<td>1.381* (.113)</td>
<td>1.391** (.112)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.214† (.106)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dysfunctionality of federation</td>
<td>0.548*** (.130)</td>
<td>0.588*** (.143)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.658** (.147)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hope for economic opportunities</td>
<td>1.317** (.095)</td>
<td>1.289** (.096)</td>
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<td>1.180† (.112)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hope for free movement</td>
<td>1.322** (.095)</td>
<td>1.281** (.097)</td>
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<td>1.197† (.097)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Symbolic threat</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBM related</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive attitude to opening of checkpoints</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.495** (.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergroup trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.349* (.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cox and Snell R^2</strong></td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance: = not significant; †p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
IDP: internally displaced person, CBM: Confidence Building Measures
Note:
1. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
2. For exact wording of questions and coding of variables, see Appendix 1 in online supplementary material.
3. In this table and all following tables, we report odds ratios and standard errors (in parentheses), statistical significance of each coefficient and overall model fit. Odds ratios less than 1 indicate the given independent variables reduce the odds of the outcome. For example, in Model 1, the odds of males accepting power-sharing in exchange for the return of Morphou are almost twice (1.94) the odds of females. Odds ratios less than 1 mean the given independent variable decreases the odds of the outcome. For example, an increase of one standard deviation in the belief in the dysfunctionality of the federation almost halves the odds of accepting a rotating presidency in Model 1.
Study 2 discussion

Even after the Crans Montana failure, 70.8% of Greek Cypriots rejected a two-state solution, and 58.2% were still committed to a BBF. In this post-Crans Montana period, the Guterres framework remains a viable option, as the majority is undecided on whether to accept or reject it. IDPs are readier than non-IDPs to accept a settlement along the Guterres framework, and the findings suggest this is partly explained by their greater readiness to accept the rotating presidency with the return of Morphou. However, this specific trade-off is not acceptable to the majority of Greek Cypriots. As the majority is still undecided on the Guterres framework, however, there is clearly space for renegotiating ways of power-sharing beyond a rotating presidency – a give and take between aspects of the Gutteres framework that are of equal importance to the two communities (endorsing power-sharing in return for security guarantees for example). One possibility is the exploration of a cross-community parliamentary system similar to that in Belgium or Switzerland (Cochrane et al., 2018) safeguarding the participation of Turkish Cypriots in power-sharing but without giving Turkey the power to block or influence decision-making.

If there is a renewed effort to resolve the Cyprus problem, confidence-building measures should be taken to improve the low levels of trust, as these play a significant role in reducing the acceptance of a compromise solution. The role of information and framing will be decisive, particularly among undecided Greek Cypriots, as demonstrated in comparable public opinion survey experiment settings elsewhere (see, for instance, Morgan-Jones et al., 2019; Tanaka et al., 2017).

Conclusions

In Cyprus and across divided societies, peace mediations are often ill-equipped to account for IDP views while existing political institutions (if they exist at all) explicitly marginalize displaced persons. The challenge of broad IDP inclusion in peace processes is not unique to Cyprus; as suggested elsewhere in the special issue, despite differences in regions and conflicts, most post-conflict peace settlements are brokered by those involved in the ongoing conflict and not so much by those with real stakes in tangible outcomes.

IDP exclusion in cases such as Cyprus is puzzling given the prevailing narratives and runs counter to all efforts to settle the Cyprus issue. As our findings show, displaced persons could positively influence the outcome of a future mediation in Cyprus. IDPs are a key electoral constituency likely to switch sides in elections or a referendum vote for a settlement largely depending on the degree they are consulted on property issues and the negative or positive provisions on the right of return. For a successful mediation process, then, their distinctive features and preferences must be identified early in the process through, for instance, designated participation in technical committees on properties, the right of return and even diaspora returnees.

Our most surprising finding was the positive change of attitude towards a future peace settlement, particularly among undecideds, if IDPs have the first say on their properties. This provision covers IDPs who wish to return to their pre-1974 homes and others who might choose compensation or to exchange their properties for Turkish Cypriot land in the south. Although the percentage of IDPs varies, depending on our criteria, the number affected represent over half of the Greek Cypriot voters if we consider mixed-marriages between IDPs and the rest of the Greek Cypriot population (plus their descendants who might inherit these claims). Equally, a segment of the non-IDP Greek Cypriot population favours this arrangement, likely because of its own understanding of a fair settlement. Interestingly, we found no evidence of the effect of demographic variables of age, level of education, and socio-economic status on the rotating presidency in any direction whatsoever.
We began our discussion with the assumption that IDPs’ viewpoints are neglected in the peace process. Yet we demonstrate that their status as the primary stakeholders will determine support for a prospective agreement. Our findings provide conclusive evidence that IDP status, along with social psychological processes (i.e. threats, hopes and trust), are the primary predictors of this support, while demographics have little explanatory power. Similarly, previous research argues that, when models are firmly grounded in theory, demographics should only serve as a useful summary not as a causal variable. We suggest the acceptance or rejection of this particular element of give and take, beyond IDP status, is largely dependent on the hopes and fears of the wider public, irrespective of their age and educational level.

Our findings demonstrate the critical role of IDP-specific research in conflict resolution studies, particularly power-sharing settlements. Contrary to much of the literature on the radicalization of displaced persons (Achvarina and Reich, 2006; Bohnet et al., 2018; Choi and Piazza, 2016), IDP status among Greek Cypriots appears to be associated with higher levels of support for peace processes. While conclusions and recommendations cannot be generalized beyond our specific case and survey results, our questionnaire and methodology offer a useful tool for comparable situations where return options constitute a critical priority among displaced communities. Comparable research by Khalil Shikaki and Dahlia Scheindlin among Palestinians suggests that refugees are more likely to accept a peace plan than non-displaced Palestinians (39% compared with 35% for non-refugees) indicating similar trends even in more polarized environments.

Our surveys of IDPs and non-IDPs demonstrate critical limitations of public support for specific provisions of the current peace processes. In terms of power-sharing, we find that rotating the presidency between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots could potentially lead to a No vote in the Greek Cypriot community. Additional incentives and a more nuanced discourse on issues of governance might be needed in justifying these options. Alternatively, leaders might switch towards parliamentary options. Although the argument that a presidential form of power-sharing would not be optimal for Cyprus is not new (see McGarry, 2017), our evidence should caution all sides in Cyprus to reconsider alternatives that match the interests of the two main communities in Cyprus, including victim groups, women and the island’s smaller communities.

Finally, our findings suggest how IDP-specific research could facilitate peace mediations. Rather than advocating partition that would force sides to accept previous ethnic cleansing as a given and remain permanently hostile, a better approach would be to create credible incentives for all sides. A significant first step is to investigate what victims and other individuals to be affected by the settlement actually want. As our findings suggest, examining in advance the views of displaced persons – those who lost their homes and those who ended up occupying another person’s property – is extremely important. In Cyprus, years of peace talks have been wasted, with sides discussing technical and top-down criteria on the allocation of disputed properties rather than engaging directly with property owners/occupants. To avoid this problem, bottom-up solutions should be sought involving owners and users themselves. For instance, a census-style approach would largely avoid current unresolvable dilemmas while coming to win-win, generous, and acceptable terms with the majority of individual owners and users. A comprehensive census survey of preferences among all displaced persons would address the insecurities of Turkish Cypriots about how many Greek Cypriots want to have their properties reinstated. As the current evidence suggests, the Turkish Cypriot position for majority ownership in its constituent state could be fairly easily addressed without contradicting the rights of legal owners. If Greek Cypriot IDPs are asked about their intentions first, this could be the most important factor in determining a Yes vote in a referendum.

IDPs constitute a category of citizens in peace processes with both higher stakes and different preferences. Contrary to the current literature that identifies the dangers of securitizing refugees
and IDPs (Greenhill, 2010; Jaconsen, 2002; Jaskulowski, 2019), our study is the first to highlight, through survey data, the positive impact IDPs could have on peace processes. We therefore advocate broader IDP participation in power-sharing settlements to ensure the longevity of peace arrangements. As in Cyprus, related research elsewhere across conflict-ridden societies could guide decisions on peace processes. For instance, future IDP-specific surveys could be relevant in Sri Lanka, Colombia or Nagorno-Karabakh, where the ratification of peace settlements and IDP rights are unambiguously interlinked, and local peace referendums have been central in the mediators’ agendas.

Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Dr Djordje Stefanovic for his contribution to the design of the two surveys cited in this article, and our anonymous reviewers, as well as Dr Elizabeth Thompson for editing the manuscript. The authors state that they have no potential conflict of interest.

Funding
The article benefited from funding from the Leverhulme Trust RF-2014-401, the US Institute of Peace G-1703-172, the British Academy AF16002 and the A.G. Leventis Foundation.

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Supplementary material
Supplementary material for this article is available online.

Notes
2. After Crans Montana, the Turkish Cypriot leader and representatives of the Turkish government made statements suggesting the main reason for the collapse of negotiations was the failure of Greek Cypriot leadership to accept power-sharing.
3. The net sample of households visited was 2252; contact rate was 83%, co-operation rate 43.8% and response rate 36%.
4. It is important to note however that later research undertaken after 2018 suggested that supporters of BBF in the Greek Cypriot community increased by at least 10%.
5. Special attention should be given to how the Greek Cypriot press presents the negotiations; a significant number of the media exacerbate fears (see [name omitted] under review), a major factor in the rejection of power-sharing arrangements.
6. For a discussion of the rights and identity formation of IDP descendants see Hadjiyanni (2002)
8. For a related proposal and its specific advantages in terms of IDP inclusion, see http://ucy.ac.cy/dir/documents/dir/cpsaltis/Proposal_for_Property_Census_2017.pdf

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