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Both ethnic communities in Cyprus have maintained strong political and cultural ties with Greece and Turkey, respectively, and at some point of their twentieth century history, each has aspired to become part of either the former or the latter. Yet the way this relationship has been imagined has differed across time, space, and class. Both communities have adapted their identities to prevailing ideological waves as well as political opportunities, domestic alliances, and interests. The article evaluates different responses to ethnic nationalism, highlighting important intra-ethnic differentiations within each Cypriot community usually expressed in the positions of political parties, intellectuals, and the press. While the current literature identifies two major poles of identity in the island, “motherland nationalism” and “Cypriotism,” the article suggests that the major focus of identity of Cypriots is identification with their respective ethnic communities in the form of Greek Cypriotism or Turkish Cypriotism. In fact, contentious politics in Cyprus from the ENOSIS/TAKSIM struggle to the April 2004 referendums demonstrate the interplay of external constraints and collective self-identification processes leading to the formation of these identities. The article concludes by identifying the implications of identity shifts for deeply divided societies and conflict resolution in general.

Keywords: nationalism, identity, movements, Cyprus, EU enlargement, conflict resolution

I am Child of Anatolia. Everything on me is Turkish. My roots are in Central Asia. I am Turkish in my language, culture and history. My country is my motherland. Cyprus culture, Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, a common state, all these are nonsense. The Greek Cypriots are Byzantium, they are Greeks, we are Turks. They have their Greece and we have our Turkey. Why should we live under the same state? We declared once taksim (partition) or death. Now that we are so close to taksim why should we choose death? Some people talk about the so-called Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots. There are no Turkish Cypriots, no Greek

Author’s note: This article is based on a number of interviews the author conducted in December 1999. For his research, the author invited representatives from the major Greek Cypriot political parties, independent politicians as well as members of related NGOs. Specifically, the author would like to thank Giannakis Omirou, President of Socialist EDEK; Kaiti Cleridou, former MP for Democratic Rally; Kypros Chrysostomides, former government spokesperson and current MP for Lefist AKEL; George Iacovou, former candidate of DHKO and AKEL for the presidency of the Republic and former Minister of Foreign Affairs for Spyros Kyprianou, George Vasiliou, and Tassos Papadopoulos governments; Takis Hadjidemetriou, former MP and vice president of EDEK; Takis Hadjigeorgiou, AKEL MP and President of ASTRA radio; and George Hadjigeorgiou, former MP for AKEL. The author would also like to thank academics Ceasar Mavratsas and Niyazi Kızılıyrek, as well as the president of the New Cyprus Association, Josef Payatas, for providing insightful interviews on this topic. Elizabeth Doering, Elvan Kayral, Turgut Durduran, Barbara Karatsioli, Paul Magocsi, Elizabeth Thompson, and Antonis Ellinas as well as the anonymous reviewers of International Studies Perspectives offered helpful comments on an earlier version of the article.

Cypriots and no Cypriots. Do not dare to ask us, if we are Cypriots! We would take this as an insult. Why? Because in Cyprus the only thing that is Cypriot is the donkey. Rauf Denktaş, former Leader of the Turkish Cypriot community (Kızılyürek 1999a, 1999b: 36).

The [Cyprus] flag has its defenders. In the summer of 1990 . . . Glafkos Clerides, told the author [Monteagle Stearns] that the flag of Cyprus is “the best of the world”. When asked why, he replied, “Because no one would die for it.” Glafkos Clerides, former President of the Republic of Cyprus (Stearns 1992: 172).

Cyprus tells us an insightful story of how domestic and international factors can frequently transform the national orientation of ethnic communities. Historically, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots have experienced strong feelings of “motherland nationalism,” namely, a sense of primary loyalty to the “national centers” of Ankara and Athens, respectively.1 These feelings, however, have fluctuated across time and space. In the turbulent history of Cyprus, its labor and class strikes, bicomunal conflict, terror campaigns, the Junta Coup, the Turkish 1974 invasion, the democratization processes in Greece and Turkey, the nonviolent protests in the Turkish Cypriot community, and, more recently, the Annan plan mobilizations have all shaped the loyalty of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Although Cyprus has experienced these various manifestations of what scholars define as contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1997), the Cypriot case remains understudied in terms of the broader links between contentious politics and ethnicity or the interplay between domestic or international political factors and identity in formation (Laitin 1998; Beissinger 2002). Such analysis is important in understanding how identity politics interfere with conflict resolution in deeply divided societies.

Identity formation has been historically central to the intellectual thinking in the island, as demonstrated in studies by Nicos Peristianis (1995), Caesar Mavratsas (1998) and Niyazi Kızılyürek (1999). Influenced by constructivist approaches in the field (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990), these studies aimed to deconstruct the primordialist attachment to motherlands as well as highlight alternative paths of identification with Cyprus across civic or constitutional lines.2 Thus in most studies “attachment to the motherland” and “Cypriotism” appear to be in two opposing poles often de-emphasizing the various forms of adaptation and fusion.3 But presenting opposing poles is insufficient because it excludes a much more common route toward adaptation. More specifically, David Laitin’s work on

1Approximately less than a million people of Cyprus reside in a territory of 9,251 sq. km (about the size of Connecticut, U.S.A.), in the eastern corner of the Mediterranean. Until 1974, there were two largely segregated but territorially intermingled communities in Cyprus; the Greek Cypriot community comprised roughly four fifths of the population, while the Turkish Cypriots made up the rest. In their historical narratives, the Turkish Cypriots emphasize the 1963–1974 period when their community was excluded from the government and from safe access to some parts of the island, including traditionally Turkish Cypriot villages and neighborhoods. Meanwhile, Greek Cypriots emphasize the period following the 1974 Turkish invasion when the island was de facto divided between the Turkish army-controlled areas in the north and the government controlled areas in the south. In addition to the two communities, there are small indigenous communities of Maronites, Armenians, Latins and Roma as well as a growing number of immigrant groups and post-1974 Turkish settlers.

2Ernest Gellner paid special attention to the Greek case in defining the limits of constructivism. For him, the ancient Greeks possessed a vigorous awareness of their own shared culture, which distinguished them from the outsiders (Vārvara). However, their sense of unity had little political expression, in aspiration, let alone in achievement. Even “when a pan-Hellenic polity was established under Macedonian leadership, it very rapidly grew into an empire transcending by far the bounds of Hellenism. In ancient Greece, chauvinistic though the Greeks were in their own way, there appears to have been no slogan equivalent to Ein Reich, Ein Volk, Ein Fuehrer” (Gellner 1983:14).

3Zenon Stavrinides (1999:62–64) defines this dichotomy using the terms Hellenocentric and Cyprocentric. More specifically, various anthropological studies demonstrated the complexities of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot identification, the diverse ways that each individual distinguishes herself or himself from people in mainland Greece and Turkey or from members of the other community in the island as well as the way individuals often switch from one identity to another (Papadakis 2005).
identity in formation in the former U.S.S.R. or Marc Beissinger’s political opportunity perspective demonstrate the sensitivity of communal groups to domestic constraints, state policies, and external challenges when expressing identity (Laitin 1998; Beissinger 2002). Adaptation is particularly relevant for small ethnic/national communities (Hroch 1985; Magocsi 1997), and as it will be demonstrated in this article, it appears in Cyprus in the form of “ethnic community identification”: Greek Cypriotism and Turkish Cypriotism, respectively.

Devising a precise definition of attachment to ethnic communities or other types of identification is hard for a number of reasons. In daily language there is no sharp dichotomy between this identification and the other two forms mentioned above: attachment to the motherland and Cypriotism. For instance, on the Greek Cypriot side, concepts such as Greek Cypriot nationalism and Greek nationalism (i.e., of the Greek Cypriots in the island) are used interchangeably (Mavratsas 1999:37). More importantly, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots often use the term “Cypriot” to define their own ethnic communities, although the majority is also comfortable using the more precise terms Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot (Lacher and Kaymak 2005; Vural and Rustemli 2006). Further, a recent survey of Greek Cypriot students at a private university demonstrated that when they were asked to name negative and positive aspects of Turkey’s accession to the EU for their country, they concentrated primarily on aspects relevant to the Greek Cypriot community. This survey also demonstrated a stronger feeling of attachment to the republic of Cyprus among younger members of the Greek Cypriot community but one that is primarily defined within a Greek Cypriot context and interests (Üsküt et al., manuscript in preparation).

This article will build on a survey of the existing literature as well as primary accounts to explore the evolution of distinct as well as shared community loyalties among Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. To this end, it looks at attachment to the motherlands, island patriotism, and attachment to ethnic communities concluding with the relevant policy recommendations.

### Attachment to the Motherlands

Perceptions of common origin and history with Turkey or Greece have been instrumental in mobilizing each community in favor of competing nationalist projects. At one time or another, both communities in Cyprus have linked their destinies to those of their ethnic cousins outside the island.

Starting from the late nineteenth century, perceptions of the Greek nation as a perennial and organic entity across time captured the imagination of the Greek Cypriots (Kitromilides 1979; Papadakis 1999a, 1999b). They increasingly saw their destinies as linked to the ancient Hellenic past of Cyprus and their future to its revival through unification with Greece. Politicized forms of Greek nationalism resulted from resentment of British colonialism and signals of support from key political players in the Greek mainland, as well as the rejection by the British of a negotiated transfer of authority to Greece or an alternative compromise (Bitsios 1975:23; Crawshaw 1978:75–83; Stefanidis 1999:74–108).

In the case of Turkish Cypriots, nationalism has been driven by reaction to Greek Cypriot demands, insecurity, and fears of marginalization. At the symbolic level the Turkish Cypriots drew inspiration from “motherland nationalism themes” as well. For instance, Rauf Denktaş has repeatedly used historical analogies to argue how similar the history of Crete is to the history of Cyprus and to claim that Turkish Cypriots might face the same fate as their co-ethnics in Crete and the Balkans (Denktash 1982:19; Gazioglu 1996:85–97; Kızılıyrek 1999a, 1999b:64). Greek nationalism in Cyprus introduced symbols and practices that caused the immediate reaction of the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey itself. For example, the Greek words *Megali Idea* (the “Great Idea” of Greek expansionism, used earlier in
Asia Minor and the Balkans) and *Enosis* (the union of Cyprus with Greece) have appeared in most narratives written from a Turkish or Turkish Cypriot perspective on this issue.4

But what was the normative basis of the respective demands of the two nationalisms? The Greek Cypriots reacted strongly against British colonial rule, which was in decline after the end of World War II (WWII). Like other colonial peoples the Greek Cypriots fought in this war as allies of the British and suffered casualties. The Greek Cypriots sent about 30,000 volunteers to this war (Stamatakis 1991:68).5 Following WWII, they naturally felt eligible for freedom and self-government. Based on their numerical superiority, on the island, the Greek Cypriots supported *enosis* (union) with Greece. In a Church-run referendum held from January 15–22, 1950, no less than 95.73% of the entire Greek-Cypriot community recorded their votes in favor of this objective (Crawshaw 1978:34–56; Averoff-Tossizza 1986:8–9).

Turkish Cypriot mobilization developed almost simultaneously and emphasized geographic proximity to Turkey as well as previous ownership of the island. It reached its peak in a huge demonstration in December 1949, attended by 15,000 people, who demanded that Cyprus should be returned to Turkey, if Britain decided to leave the island (Gaziog˘lu 1996:455). Even though EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston) promised in 1955 not to target Turkish Cypriots, the latter objected *enosis*, and their leadership “expected that sooner or later the campaign of terror would be directed against the Turkish Cypriot community” (Necatigil 1998:7). Adding its voice to the argument, Turkey emphasized its own strategic interests and insisted that any change in the status quo would necessitate a revision of the Lausanne treaty of 1923 (Bahcheli 1972:71). Finally, the Turkish side pointed out to the treatment of the 100,000 Turks living in Western Thrace (Bahcheli 1972:57).

Toward the end of 1956, the Turkish Cypriots, with the backing of Turkey asked for *taksim* (partition) of Cyprus into two separate territories (Bahcheli 1972:60; Attalides 1977:78–86). Following the EOKA struggle they took measures for the segregation of the two communities and on June 6, 1958, Denktas then serving as Turkish Cypriot deputy-leader, delivered an inflammatory speech, leading to rioting and causing many Greek Cypriots living on the edge of Turkish Cypriot areas to flee their homes (Mallinson 2005:32). EOKA was also involved in the assassination of Turkish Cypriots allegedly collaborating with the British triggering Turkish Cypriot attacks and counterattacks (Bahcheli 1972:55). Thus, at the minimum, Turkish Cypriot positions aimed at preventing a “Greek”-dominated island and implied an understanding that no change to the status quo was possible without the community’s consent (Ertekin 1981:1–5; Necatigil 1998:7–8).

For the Greek Cypriot leadership, such consent was out of the question, and Turkish Cypriots were not included, even at a symbolic level, in what Greek Cypriots considered their own struggle for freedom. Politicized Greek nationalism drew symbols and inspiration from mainland Greece, and the symbols of Greek Cypriot armed struggle (1955–1959) were carefully selected to correspond to the Greek ones. EOKA initially planned to initiate its actions on the anniversary of Greek revolution on March 25, 1955, also a major Orthodox religious holiday (Papadakis 1999a, 1999b:25). Moreover, the leadership of EOKA not only excluded any references to Turkish Cypriots or Leftists but increasingly gave the impression that the organization was turning against them. Specifically, Georgios Grivas, EOKA’s military leader, transferred to Cyprus the prevailing form of Greek nationalism fol-

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4The author examined all Turkish language books in politics and recent history of Cyprus under the Cyprus section of the Robarts Library, University of Toronto, November 28, 2003. Out of 37 books in the University of Toronto library, 28 had the words *enosis* or *Megali Idea* in their first five pages.

5According to Mallinson (2005:11), however, among the 37,000 Cypriots who volunteered for the British Armed Forces at the time, one-third came from the Turkish Cypriot community.
lowing the Greek civil war, which saw Communists as being outside the national community and as obstacles to the attainment of nationalist goals (Crawshaw 1978:42–91; Mazower 1995; Holland 1998:29–30). Grivas found strong allies in the Church of Cyprus and in conservative forces in the society threatened by the rise of the Communist Left among the working classes and the peasantry (Markides 1977; Serva 1997).

In fact, the appearance of new ideologies such as Communism alarmed the Greek Cypriot clergy so much that in 1947 the Archbishop warned that Communism was in direct contrast to Christianity and Hellenism, and that no real Orthodox Greek could also be a Communist (Kızilyurek 1999a, 1999b:50). Critics of EOKA argued that “its struggle implied a triple goal which included the expulsion of the colonial rule, the subordination of the Turkish Cypriots and the weakening of the Communists” (Igoumenides 1999:31). Yet in politicizing the masses and recruiting participants in the struggle, Greek Cypriot elites emphasized primarily the “dream of the union,” rather than any of the latter.

In the Turkish Cypriot case, political opportunities were equally favorable to mobilizing communal sentiment. As elsewhere, colonial authorities welcomed ethnic divisions which enabled them to prolong their reign. More specifically, in their Divide and Rule strategies, the British offered strong incentives to the Turkish Cypriots to counter the Greek Cypriot demands. For one thing, the various institutional arrangements that were introduced by the colonial administration drew enough British and Turkish Cypriot votes to block the Greek Cypriot majority (Atalides 1979:41). For another, leading ethnic entrepreneurs in the Turkish Cypriot community served as trusted members in the British administration of the island (Crawshaw 1978:43), while others supported the British forces in fighting EOKA and manned auxiliary police forces. To oppose Greek Cypriot demands, British Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd even suggested a plebiscite for Turkish Cypriots, one which aimed only at the partition of the island (Hitchens 1984:46).

More important than British support was the presence of crucial allies within the Turkish political system. In the 1950s, the Turkish Cypriots living in Istanbul and Ankara mobilized public sentiment in the country, made Cyprus a focal point in Turkey’s strategic thinking, and recruited key allies in the domestic political system of the country (Crawshaw 1978:45; Kızilyurek 1999:62–63; Vryonis 2005:50–55). In the 1959–1960 London and Zürich Agreements, Turkey (as well as Greece) institutionalized their military presence in Cyprus as guarantor powers (Joseph 1997:21; Necatigil 1998:9–20).

Following the breakdown of the consociational arrangements in 1963, the Turkish Cypriot community experienced several shocks, however: many Turkish Cypriots became refugees and were forced into enclaves, living in conditions of misery (Patrick 1976). In addition, the community had to rely on Turkey for international representation, as Greek Cypriots gained the exclusive right to represent the Republic of Cyprus in the UN (Joseph 1997:100; Necatigil 1998:48–51). The presence of an immediate threat predisposed Turkish Cypriots to be obedient towards their “national leadership” and its commands (Vural and Rustemli 2006:338). Finally, right-wing terror campaigns, particularly those undertaken by the Turkish Cypriot TMT prevented intercommunal cooperation (Markides 1977:63). Thus, motherland nationalism remained the dominant perspective among the Turkish Cypriots, particularly immediately after the 1974 invasion and de facto partition of the island.

Certainly, authors are divided on the degree to which the British had a decisive influence on mobilizing the Turkish Cypriots. For instance, Kızilyurek (1999: 54–65) describes a British uneasiness with the growing nationalist feeling among the Turkish Cypriots.

While making an election speech in 1970, Nikos Sampson, then leader of a paramilitary militia, spoke of “cleansing the island of the stench of the Turks.” Peter Loizos uses this incident to provide a lucid account of how incendiary speeches contribute to an environment where societies become tolerant towards war crimes committed against ethnic others (Loizos 1988:647).
The levels and types of attachment to Turkey changed significantly in the 1980s, however. Initially, the Turkish Cypriot attachment to Turkey remained high, as Turkish “intervention” transformed Turkish Cypriots from a marginalized minority to a secured people within a “state,” and in 1985, the “nationalist” camp prevailed politically, as demonstrated in the May 5 constitutional referendum (Soysal 1992:39). At that time, the Turkish Cypriots saw the motherland troops as liberators. But these feelings waned in the following years, because of the resulting international isolation, Turkey’s interference in Turkish Cypriot community affairs, economic stagnation, and the colonization of Cyprus by Turkish settlers (Lacher and Kaymak 2005). Ultimately, the new conditions led many Turkish Cypriots to reconsider their unconditional loyalty to the policies of the national center (Sarıoğlu 1997; Bizden 1997). During the 1980s, the opposition started making several short-term electoral breakthroughs, thereby challenging the Denktaş/Eroğlu hold on power (Hatay 2005).

I ideological dependency on the national centers declined in the Greek Cypriot community, as well, after 1974. In fact, the events of 1974 filled most Greek Cypriots with strong feelings of anger and anxiety about their future. The coup against Makarios forced people to join opposing camps and fight against their co-ethnics. The feelings of betrayal reached a high when Turkey invaded Cyprus (Attalides 1979:57–79; Peristianis 1995:131). At this point, the hitherto nationalist junta returned the authority to politicians and abandoned Cyprus to Turkey. Soldiers returned from the battle, bitter from having to fight a superior enemy; some even had received orders from mainland Greek officers to retreat without engaging in battle with the Turkish troops. As a result, there was a general decline in the use of Greek national symbols and a stronger emphasis on the need to protect the integrity and the status of the Republic.

Since 1974, there has been no political party or major social institution that has talked about enosis or related goals, however, revived forms of motherland identification reappeared in various instances. One of the major post-war successes of the Greek Cypriot leadership was to bury the enosis discourse and for the most part to establish a new set of hegemonic beliefs that emphasized EU candidacy, international cooperation, and compromise on the basis of High Level Agreements signed in 1977 and 1979. In addition, George Vasiliou and Glafkos Clerides presidencies fostered a consensus on the need for close cooperation with moderate Greek governments while Greek Prime Ministers Constantine Mitsotakis and Costas Simitis offered support and political legitimacy to compromises made during intercommunal negotiations (Clerides 1992; Bahcheli and Rizopoulos 1996/1997; Loizides 2002).

During his first presidency Clerides added a military angle to this relationship and formed the weakly planned Joint Defense Doctrine that included stronger military ties with Greece and the purchase of S-300 missiles from Russia (Prodroomou 1998). Through militarization, Clerides aimed to invoke international attention to the Cyprus problem while at the same time appeasing the nationalist-minded fraction of the Democratic Rally and courting votes from DHKO and Greek Cypriot Socialists associated with the ruling PASOK in Greece (Hadjideimetriou 1999). The missiles gave Clerides a surprise victory in the 1998 presidential elections against George Iacovou, but his subsequent decision not to deploy the missiles in Cyprus but instead in Crete marked the end of the Joint Defense Doctrine (Iacovou 1999). Clerides subsequently attributed both the purchase and

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8An exception to this was the small weekly newspaper Enosis, which retained strong unionist views but entertained an audience whose actions were peaceful and positions marginalized.

9Although this marked a significant transformation, there were also major differences to be reached among all interested sides. For a detailed matrix and analysis of positions and priorities of the main actors see Yesilada and Sozen (2002).
cancellation to Greece. Even so, the “motherland card” proved to be increasingly weak in legitimizing domestic politics in the island (Achniotis 1999:11).

Island Patriotism

Unlike “motherland nationalists,” island or state patriots have argued that Cypriots should consider their Cypriot identity as the primary one. Island patriots have focused on strengthening the attachment of the citizens (regardless of ethnicity) to Cyprus, and to its common traditions and symbols. It has also urged reconciliation between the two communities on the basis of non-ethnic cleavages (Payatas 1999). Neşe Yaşın defined Cypriotism in the lyrics of the song yurdunu sevmeliyimis insan (Love your Homeland); the song was subsequently translated into Greek and became the unofficial anthem of those supporting the reunification of Cyprus. Speaking to a Greek Cypriot audience, the poet said, “Being a Cypriot for me is not a national identity but rather an association with the land, a geographical place, where I shared a history with a certain group of people with whom I have a lot of common traits” (Cyprus News Agency 1997).

Two decades earlier, Michael Attalides pointed out that the differentiation of Greece and Cyprus stemmed from the existence of a legal Communist party in Cyprus, the separate development of Cypriot institutions, British colonial legacies, and vested interests in independence among various groups in the Cypriot society (Attalides 1977:73). Comparable but not analogous variables were present in the Turkish Cypriot case, although the timing for the emergence of Cypriotism in the two communities differed.

Among the first supporters of this approach were politicians and intellectuals associated with the Communist/Leftist parties of Cyprus which normally represented about a third of the population. For instance, the first calls for cooperation between the two communities can be found in the newspapers of the Communist Party of Cyprus, Neos Anthropos, with a circulation of 1,000–1,500 copies (Serva 1997:77) and Neos Ergatis. As early as 1925, these papers claimed that the first duty of the Communist party was to eradicate all kinds of ethnic hatred among the people of the island and to teach the masses that people were not to be distinguished as Greeks or Turks but as rich and poor (Kakoullis 1990:9–19, Peristianis 1995:127). Ploutis Servas, an active politician in the Left and Secretary General of AKEL, presented the history of Cyprus as being one of peaceful coexistence between the two communities, with a “short parenthesis” of intercommunal strife, driven by the interests of the colonial powers (Serva 1997).

Cypriotism, however, failed to become a credible alternative to dominant nationalism in the first half of the twentieth century. For one thing, Leftists suffered repression from both the British colonial authorities and the dominant ethnocentric Church. To cite one example, the Leftist poet Tefkros Anthias was excommunicated during a short rebellion in 1931 (Serva 1999:27–28). Nor were the policies of the Greek Cypriot Left always sincere to the Turkish Cypriots, and the Communist party, AKEL, accepted the demand for enosis on several occasions throughout its history (Averoff-Tossizza 1986:7; Drousiotis 1988:40–46; Markides 1977:63). Finally, AKEL rarely sought alliances with other political forces sharing its anti-nationalist agenda; rather, it subordinated the ethnic problem to its own anti-class struggle, which has had limited appeal to non-Leftist circles in the two communities.

Beyond AKEL, an expression of island patriotism can be found in the work of Nicos C. Lanitis in his 1963 monograph Our Destiny earlier published as a series of articles in Cyprus Mail. Lanitis was one of the most successful entrepreneurs in Cyprus, and he represented the rising business class of the island. Lanitis criticized the monolithic attachment to enosis followed by Greek leaders during the period of the British rule, arguing that this policy was dictated by sentiment rather than
strategy. He was particularly concerned with the impracticality of this demand because of the distance between Greece and Cyprus: “Have a look at an atlas, look at the position of Cyprus; then look at the other Middle Eastern states; then look at Greece. It was obvious that union was not possible except by conquest; and this was not possible either” (Lanitis 1963:5). Lanitis argued in favor of a careful handling of the “Turkish factor,” a handling that necessitated the granting of certain guarantees acceptable to the Turks. He urged for restraint in the use of nationalistic rhetoric, for closer political cooperation, and for increasing financial concessions to the Turkish Cypriots (1963:5–16).

In the period following 1974, the general feeling of dissatisfaction with the two motherlands, Greece in particular, led to the formation of such organizations as the New Cyprus Association. The main goals of this association were to promote loyalty for Cyprus, to urge understanding between the communities, and to consolidate democracy. The members of the association did not deny their ethnic origins and cultural links, but asked the Cypriot people to consider themselves as Cypriots first and as Greeks, Turks, or others second (New Cyprus Association 1980). It made no effort to negate the ethnic origins of Cypriots; rather, these were unreservedly acknowledged and respected (Payatas 1999). It also considered diversity a positive factor, as long as attachment to ethnic origins did not detract from the devotion of Cypriots toward their own Common Country. One of the leading ideologues of the association was the Canadian-educated Josef Payatas, who returned to Cyprus from Canada where he was exposed to Canadian multicultural debates. Through the publication of the monthly journal *Ex Iparhis*, Payatas and other intellectuals emphasized common cultural elements uniting the two communities and suggested a form of civic nationalism that could potentially strengthen the Republic of Cyprus.

This association was influential during the first years after 1974. It is usually assumed that it attracted intellectuals or members of the bureaucracy in the capital Nicosia, however, according to Payatas the association also had impressive reception in Paphos and elsewhere (Payatas 1999). Furthermore, the association was successful in its demand for the use of Cypriot symbols, such as the hitherto neglected flag as a state symbol. It is reported that Makarios himself started to see the movement sympathetically (Peristianis 1995:134–135; Payatas 1999). Two other presidents, George Vassiliou and Glafkos Clerides, were influenced by the movement through their connection with Michael Attalides and Kaiti Cleridou, respectively. Kaiti Cleridou, daughter of the President Clerides, became a leading activist for the reunification of Cyprus in the 1990s and often supported ideas similar to those of the association (Cleridou 1999).

However, after 1982, the window of opportunity began to close for the Cypriotist camp. Democratization in Greece and the rise of the popular socialist, Andreas Papandreou, and the anti-junta PASOK coming to power led Greek Cypriots closer to Greece again. Papandreou not only granted unconditional support to the republic of Cyprus but also acknowledged Greek responsibilities of 1974. In a landmark speech in the Cypriot parliament, he stated clearly that these are not exclusively junta responsibilities but issues that affect every Greek person (Public Information Press House of Representatives 1982). Papandreou went on to issue a *casus belli* against further Turkish aggression in the island, a decision that he reportedly took without consulting Greek military planners and which ultimately had no tangible value (Iacovou 1999). Although democratization in Greece, improved relations and positive feelings in Cyprus were all unquestionably positive developments, they inadvertently weakened support for the island patriots (Payatas 1999).

At the same time, the New Cyprus Association became an easy and available target for the nationalists in the press. The association was accused of promoting the idea of a non-existent Cypriot (Phoenician) nation. The reference to Phoenicians caused a libel trial, which the association subsequently won (Payatas 1999). It failed, however, to save its reputation. In fact, the term “New Cypriot (*Neokyprios*)” is not a
term applied to devoted island patriots today; rather, it is used pejoratively to refer to the newly rich or to those who lack intellectual interests and culture. Finally, the timing after 1974 was not ideal for the emergence of a mass intercommunal movement, since communication with the Turkish Cypriots was limited and “motherland nationalism” was still dominant following the Turkish invasion.

Nonetheless, historically Cypriotism was present and in various forms in the Turkish Cypriot community as well. Dr. İhsan Ali, a Turkish Cypriot with a close connection to Makarios, was a passionate supporter of the integrity and independence of the Republic of Cyprus. He was opposed to the secessionist acts of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, and as a result, he was considered of questionable orientation in his own community (Özgür 2000:13). Interestingly, the most widely read newspaper in the North, Kıbrıs which in the past supported the Denktash/Eroğlu line, published an article expressing admiration on İhsan Ali. In the story a Turkish Cypriot who hitherto threatened to murder İhsan Ali for his political views expressed his desire to visit Ali’s grave to express his veneration of the man (Özgür 2000:268).

While the Turkish Cypriots felt closely attached to Turkey immediately after 1974, in the following years, Cypriotism was on the rise, taking a politicized form. Like most of their Greek Cypriot counterparts, the Turkish Cypriots did not try to introduce a new form of nationalism. Their major effort was based instead on cooperating with the Greek Cypriots to create a federal solution, which could secure the reunification of Cyprus and eventually its admission into the European Union. Even the most passionate Cypriotist politicians called for a synthesis of identities, arguing that being simply Turkish or Greek means denying one’s Cypriot homeland (Ex Iparhis 1999:16–20). Alpay Durduran has been one of the most popular politicians in the Left. He secured almost 30% of the Turkish Cypriot vote in the early 1980s, but his electoral power declined thereafter because of Ankara’s intervention in Turkish Cypriot affairs (Durduran 1999; Hatay 2005:26).

Another example is the Turkish Cypriot journalist Kutlu Adalı, who opposed Denktash on several occasions. In Adalı’s view the settlers have affected their social structure, their Cypriotism, the quality of life of the poor, their cultural level, and their ability to make decisions. Such views were widespread among Turkish Cypriots who felt to be “under siege by the large inflow of mainland Turks” (Güven-Lisaniler and Rodriguez 2002:187). Adalı who was among the most vocal critics of the regime, was assassinated in 1996, likely by Turkish ultra-nationalists or criminal groups associated with the deep state in Ankara. According to Sarıoğlu (1997:69), these organizations became increasingly involved in terrorist acts in the northern part of Cyprus and turned against Turkish Cypriot dissidents after the killings of two Greek Cypriot protestors in the Green Line in 1996. As for Adalı, there was no arrest for his murder, and according to a landmark ECHR decision, no “effective investigation into the killing” by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot authorities (ECHR 2005). Other journalists such as Sevgil Uludağ, Adalı’s sister-in-law, and Tema Irkad both of Yeniçağ as well as Şener Levent and other writers of Afrika faced death threats (Cyprus Alternative News 2003). In general, these journalists represented the Cypriotist camp in the Turkish Cypriot community; for instance, Uludağ uses a new term to define Turkish Cypriots, Kıbrıslı Türk (in one word), which in the Turkish language deemphasizes the Turkish component of the identity.

**Attachment to Ethnic Communities**

Although attachment to one’s ethnic community could be considered as a middle ground between “motherland nationalism” and “Cypriotism,” in reality, it serves a different function. While it appropriates themes, symbols, and rhetoric both from mainland nationalism and Cypriotism, thereby performing a middle-man role, it pays more attention to the aspirations of the ethnic community in the island than to
the interest of the “national centers” or Cyprus as a whole. Thus, Greek Cypriotism and Turkish Cypriotism take ascendancy in two respective frequently oppositional camps.

In a private interview, veteran Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Iacovou, argued that the Greek Cypriots have the direct responsibility for their future, and that “Cypriots” are in a better position to understand the Cyprus problem than their Greek counterparts:

Greece does not know Cyprus. Many Greek politicians have a shadow view of what is happening and don’t know many angles of Cyprus and the Cypriots. Therefore, we have a responsibility as a Greek Cypriot nationalism to defend our interest and not to take for granted that Greece could think of itself all these aspects, to project them and defend them. We should be in the first line (Iacovou 1999).

Turkish Cypriot nationalism lies in similar assumptions about the future and responsibilities of the Turkish Cypriot community and leadership. Historically, Greek Cypriotism is personified in the policies of Makarios and, currently, Cypriot President, Tassos Papadopoulos, while among the Turkish Cypriots, in the recently formed alliance between Serdar Denktaş and Mehmet Ali Talat.

In the fall of 1996, Serdar Denktaş, the son of veteran Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş, made a statement, which produced major reactions even within his own party. Traditionally, right-wing politicians have been represented by the conservative and nationalist UBP (Ulusal Birlik Partisi—National Unity Party) of Derviş Eroğlu and its smaller splinter DP (Demokrat Parti—Democratic Party) of Serdar Denktaş. These parties described opposition to the motherland as a blunder, since “motherland Turkey gave martyrs, paid a high price and faced great sacrifices for the Turkish Cypriots” (PIO 1996).

However, in 1996, Serdar Denktaş identified himself more openly as a Turkish Cypriot nationalist, in contrast to his father Rauf, who was exclusively a Turkish nationalist (Kızılyürek 1999a, 1999b:38). DP members reacted to this statement and issued a special declaration of what Turkish Cypriot means, making it sound like a bad copy of Turkish nationalism, squeezing Cypriot identity into the general Turkish one (Bizden 1997:86). Rauf Denktaş corrected his son, saying that Turkish nationalism incorporates “Turkish Cypriot nationalism” as well, adding that the one does not negate the other (Bayrak 1996).

Nevertheless, structural factors favored Turkish Cypriotism more than other forms of identification. First, domestically, the influence of the nationalist-minded UBP and DP reached its limits as they failed in both domestic administration and external affairs. Opposition grew as these parties could not rely anymore on political patronage through allocation of Greek Cypriot properties and new appointments in the post-1974 Turkish Cypriot administrative structures (Lacher and Kaymak 2005:156). Moreover, subsequent administrations failed to prevent the exodus of young Turkish Cypriots from the island or to stop the simultaneous influx of Turkish settlers. In addition, Rauf Denktaş and his form of nationalism had a very limited appeal, among the younger and often underemployed Turkish Cypriots who also did not experience past violence (Bizden 1997:87; Yashin 1999:223–237; Vural and Rustemli 2006). Finally, the Turkish Cypriots realized that the post-1983 goal for independence and international recognition was unattainable while at the same time they risked losing EU accession (Lacher and Kaymak 2005:156).

To legitimize new political alliances within the fragmented Turkish Cypriot political system, the smaller nationalist party DP and Serdar Denktaş had to create a common ground with the Left that would not alienate his own nationally minded Turkish Cypriot constituency. On their behalf, the Turkish Cypriot Left, specifically
Mehmet Ali Talat’s CTP\textsuperscript{10} saw an opportunity to gain power and crucial allies within the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish political systems. There were forces in Turkey that favored Talat’s pro-settlement policy but feared that a landslide victory of CTP could potentially alienate Turkish Cypriots from Turkey (Çarkoğlu and Sözen 2004:134–5). To appease these fears, Talat had to incorporate nationalist narratives, symbols, and crucial domestic allies in his political program.

This trend was intensified with Tayyip Erdoğan’s coming to power and his mixed signals initially favoring the Turkish Cypriot opposition (Castle 2003) and subsequently pointing to the status-quo nationalist parties. Erdoğan probably favored a draw between the two in order to maintain the final say for the future of the Annan plan negotiations. These policy considerations explain the remarkable growth of the nonviolent pro-peace movement among the Turkish Cypriots in 2002–2004 period against Rauf Denktas, its changing nature with the increasing use of Turkish flags (allegedly at Erdoğan’s request) as well as its final outcome—a coalition government between Mehmet Ali Talat and Serdar Denktas.

Turkish settlers were equally instrumental for this shift as they represented a new constituency where CTP could make significant electoral gains. While the policy of moving settlers to Cyprus is a crime from the point of view of international law (Chrysostomides 2000:434), in sociological terms the settlers fill the profile of an immigrant population interested primarily in welfare and daily survival issues and much less in politics. Although there is no official census on the settlers, Metin Hatay estimates the percentage of naturalized settlers to be around 16–18% of the electorate in the north (Hatay 2005:VIII) while more common estimates in the international press suggest a percentage of slightly more than 50% (Hope 2003). Moreover, settlers are largely heterogeneous in terms of ethnic and regional background (e.g., Kurds, Laz, and Arab speakers), time and conditions of arrival to Cyprus, degree of assimilation and political affiliation. While maintaining a balance between its own fears of colonization (Güven-Lisansiler and Rodriguez 2002:187) and the need to attract new voters, CTP portrayed an all inclusive identity combining the vision of joining the EU with equal citizenship for all (Lacher and Kaymak 2005:159). This attempt was marked by a short alliance with Nuri Çevikel, a young university lecturer of mainland Turkish background who founded an association to lobby for Turkish settlers’ rights within a unified Cyprus (Hatay 2005:56; Hope 2003).

Thus, on the Turkish Cypriot side we see fragments of “motherland nationalism” and “Cypriotism” merging as a result of a favorable political opportunity structure and political expediency. It is interesting to note that similar factors contributed to the emergence of Greek Cypriotism decades earlier with the presidency of Archbishop Makarios who typified this stream of thought and received the title of Ethnarch after his death.

During the first years of the republic, Makarios remained loyal to the idea of enosis, but he was not willing to make any compromises that could endanger the territorial unity of Cyprus. Roughly speaking, for the Greek governments, it was imaginable that a small part of the island could go to Turkey, if that meant that Greece could gain the rest. But for Makarios, the island of Cyprus was the homeland of Cypriot Hellenism, and its division could not be accepted, even if this meant the unification of the rest with Greece (Joseph 1997:65–67).

At the same time, the desire to fight for enosis began to wane in Cyprus, primarily because it was seen as unattainable and risky, but also because Cypriots enjoyed more liberties, and a better standard of living than mainland Greeks, not to mention full control of the state apparatus. This created a widespread suspicion in Greece that Makarios, his well-accommodated establishment, and part of the

\textsuperscript{10}This was not very difficult, as the party’s name Republican Turkish Party (CTP) implied commitment to Turkish Kemalism.
population, especially the Left, were losing their attachment to Greece itself. These feelings intensified during the rejection of the Acheson plan and other incidents that demonstrated the weakness of the “national center” in Athens to enforce policies among the Greek Cypriots (Heraclides 2002:109–125).

Successive Greek governments increasingly opposed Makarios and attempted to constrain his actions and foreign policy decisions. The rise of Junta (1967–1974) in Greece was catastrophic for Cyprus, because Greek military officers held key positions in Cyprus and could easily resort to propaganda against Makarios. Their effort to present Makarios as the only obstacle to enosis, however, had very limited appeal, with the exceptions of the Church, EOKA B, and the Far Right. In fact, Makarios’s international stature reinforced his legitimacy domestically and turned him into a symbol of statehood. His treatment by the Greek junta made him even more popular and his survival of a number of assassination attempts was considered a sign of divine providence. Markides describes the following scene:

> on one occasion George Papadopoulos, the Greek dictator whose regime was engineering Makarios’s demise, was photographed at the Athens airport greeting the archbishop with a deep bow and a hand kiss [NL: hand kiss of religious functionaries is very common in Greek culture]. The photograph, which was printed on the first page of most Cypriot newspapers, brought giggles and applause from the islanders (Markides 1977:39).

Greek Cypriotism presents a number of problems, however. First, Makarios’s legacy remains strong among Greek Cypriots, who have come to see him as a great world leader, in the league of Nehru, Nasser, and Tito. But since the 1950s, when Makarios allegedly even detested hearing about the Turkish Cypriots (Serva 1999:28), the latter have maintained an extremely negative view of his actions and intentions. In the following years, he tried to reverse his stand, but failed to gain any sympathy.

Makarios was disliked by the Turkish Cypriots not only for his view on the national issue (and for being a clergyman), but more importantly for failing to end the isolation of the community in the 1963–1974 period. It was clear that Makarios had as a priority the advancement of Cypriot Hellenism, rather than the national interests of all Cypriots. The same principle applied to the Greek interests; hence, Makarios enjoys little popularity in Greece itself. Decisions in Cyprus, for instance, never incorporated the needs and threats for the Greek community in Istanbul, which suffered the September 6–7, 1955, pogrom and a collective expulsion in 1963 (Alexandris 1983:319; Vathrolomeos 2001). Overall, Greek Cypriotism did not fit in the middle of the ideological or political spectrum, because the political forces of the Makarios and post-Makarios establishment failed to make credible openings to the Turkish Cypriots or the Greek moderates.

A second contemporary issue with Makarios’s version of Greek Cypriotism is that it relies on the close political alliance of three parties in the Greek Cypriot community: the social democrat EDEK of former auxiliary forces defending Makarios; the Communist pro-settlement AKEL which was deprived its true potential in bridging Greek and Turkish Cypriot perspectives in the settlement of the Cyprus problem; and finally, DHKO, representing the hard core of post-Makarios establishment, including former President Spyros Kyprianou and current President Tassos Papadopoulos. While the three parties together can form a comfortable majority within the Greek Cypriots, working together compromises other priorities, as illustrated in AKEL’s decision to rally behind the “NO” campaign in the April 2004 referendum.

AKEL’s decision to support Tassos Papadopoulos in the 2003 presidential elections appears puzzling outside the context of Greek Cypriotism. The author had a rare opportunity to conduct a series of interviews in 1999 with leading members of the opposition, and later, with Papadopoulos’ key political allies. The interviewees
expressed a frustration with Clerides’s use of nationalism and his capacity to win two surprise presidential elections for DISY in 1998, by his handling of the S-300 missiles and earlier in 1993 by criticizing the Butros Butros Ghali set of ideas. For the Leftist constituency, it was necessary to return to power after a decade in opposition, and many thought that DISY might internally weakened or even disintegrate after the end of the Clerides era (Hadjidemetriou 1999; Iacovou 1999). For even moderate Leftists, a “reformed” Papadopoulos posed little threat to the future of Cyprus, particularly as the horizons for a settlement seemed narrow with Denktas in the leadership of the Turkish Cypriots. AKEL, EDEK, and DHKO justified their alliance in historical terms and claimed themselves to be the political forces that defended democracy and Makarios in the difficult times of 1974: an argument that resonated well with their constituencies in the elections and which in material terms brought some delayed promotions for a suspiciously large number of police officers who had resented to the coup.

Cyprus accession to the European Union inadvertently contributed to the strengthening of Greek Cypriotism and the breakdown of hegemonic beliefs emphasizing cooperation with other parties for the settlement of the Cyprus problem. With the status of the republic now secured, international cooperation seemed less important and it became possible for some Greek Cypriot politicians to imagine Cyprus playing a power game with major European powers relying exclusively on its veto power against Turkey’s EU accession. Some even asserted that this could be possible without mainland Greek support or cooperation (Boland, Hadjipapas, and Hope 2004; Smith 2004; To Vima 2006). At least in the short-term, EU accession weakened the prevalent post-1974 consensus which emphasized cooperation with international organizations and the strengthening of the republic. Greek Cypriot interests became the dominant focus of political discourse and for the first time, a Cypriot president opened a direct confrontation with the UN and UNOPS accusing them of bribing Greek Cypriots to support a particular settlement in the island, an accusation that has yet to be documented (Cyprus Weekly 2004; Christou 2006).

Tassos Papadopoulos first revealed publicly his views on the Annan plan in an emotional and polemical plea in April 7, 2004, urging Greek Cypriots to vote NO in the Annan plan referendum. Papadopoulos addressed the public as “Greek Cypriot people” (Cyprus News Agency 2004), a term used exclusively in the past by Makarios and which it gradually disappeared in Greek Cypriot discourse as it implied a (sovereign) Turkish Cypriot people as well. Second, he played up Greek Cypriotism and Greek Cypriot attachment to the Republic of Cyprus with the commonly cited statement: “I was given an internationally recognized state. I am not going to give back ‘a Community’ without a say internationally and in search of a guardian” (Cyprus News Agency 2004). Finally, he argued that the plan’s provision to disband the National Guard would create conditions of insecurity for the Greek Cypriots, an argument that reminded the public of 1974 and mainland Greek inability to protect militarily the Greek Cypriots. Thus, while all other “glorious moments” in Greek Cypriot history were celebrated with Greek flags, at the end of Papadopoulos’s speech, individuals spontaneously rushed to the presidential palace, waving Cypriot flags, appropriating those as a symbol of Greek Cypriot identity and resistance to foreign plots or even “Turkish piracy” as Cartoon I below claimed for the Annan plan.

The referendum was a once in a lifetime event, with consequences that could span decades. Tassos Papadopoulos and his political circle won the battle of identity framing but established a form of Greek Cypriot nationalism driven by isolationism and lack of trust for the international community. In direct contrast, in the post-referendum elections CTP run media advertisements and campaign flyers featuring Talat with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Power, and EU Commission President José Manuel Baroso suggesting that the Turkish Cypriot leader speaks the language of international diplomacy thus serving his community affairs in the most beneficial manner (Sözen 2005:468).
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

The case of Cyprus supports scholarly perspectives that see identities as constructed and reconstructed as political factors and opportunities change (Laitin 1998:20). Apart from the theoretical implications, there are important public policy implications for conflict resolution that cannot be ignored. First, it has to be acknowledged that all forms of identification have, to varying degrees, certain propensities to conflict escalation or alternatively to reconciliation, and that, potentially, all forms of identification could serve peace or conflict, albeit in different ways. In Cyprus specifically, “motherland nationalism” cannot necessarily be wrong and it can serve as an important resource if Greece and Turkey worked together to convince the leaderships of the two communities to reach a settlement. However, like “Cypriotism,” motherland nationalism is in decline. Unfortunately in the case of the former, an important resource for the unification of the island seems to have remained unexploited.

Greek Cypriotism and Turkish Cypriotism are on the rise with favorable prospects for the future. Their formation appears to be driven by comparable processes, namely, majority alliances domestically and favorable opportunities externally. In the case of the Turkish Cypriots, an alliance between former motherland nationalists and the traditionally pro-deal Cypriotist camp has received positive signals from the democratizing and pro-EU forces in Turkey. On the other side of the Green Line, Greek Cypriotism, initially a basis of legitimizing an electoral alliance, received further advancement when Papadopoulos came to power, unfortunately at the expense of the settlement efforts. Regrettably, these forms of identification have already assumed an oppositional character as manifested in the “bitter exchange of words” by Papadopoulos and Talat officials.

While they are comparable, there is a noticeable difference between the experiences of the two communities. Mehmet Ali Talat and CTP initially faced more constraints and dangers than AKEL, yet they managed to broker an alliance that allowed them to make support of the Annan plan a majority decision among the Turkish Cypriots. At the same time, Tassos Papadopoulos used his position as a president to overshadow AKEL and prevent its leadership from supporting the Annan plan. Views on the plan itself might be insufficient in evaluating the two
sides; however, at the end of the day each of those identity formations and their political manifestations will be judged by their contribution to the purpose of peace and reunification.

Furthermore, mediators on Cyprus (and elsewhere) should become more aware of the complexities of each side specifically the loyalties to ethnic communities. They should also seek out policies that target key constituencies within each community or foster alliances among pro-deal forces. International and EU pressure to allow Greek Cypriot resettlement in Varosha and other parts of northern Cyprus, before a settlement, could potentially strengthen such constituencies and facilitate a grand alliance among moderate forces in the Greek Cypriot community. Likewise, international pressure on the Greek Cypriots to include Turkish Cypriots on the electoral rolls could transform the electoral map in the island and provide rational incentives for key players to reach a viable settlement. By the same token, Turkish Cypriot demands for direct trade and flights from the North could be met in advance of a settlement but such arrangements should be carefully designed and monitored to strengthen pro-deal camps in both communities.

Overall, practical solutions and incentives combined with creativity and ingenuity at the social identity construction level could offer alternative ways of imagining Cyprus and its genuine interest in reunification.

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Cartoons