Crisis Management in the Eastern Mediterranean: Implications for Policymakers

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RÉSUMÉ

Cet article examine le comportement de la Grèce et de la Turquie pendant les périodes de crise dans la Méditerranée Orientale durant les dernières deux décennies. Les crises sont définies et classifiées, et un nombre de fausses perceptions sont examinées à la lumière des expériences récentes. Trois larges catégories de crises de la politique étrangère sont analysées: Celles impliquant des minorités qui ont des liens ethniques à travers les frontières, celles avec des minorités « étrangères » à l’intérieur des frontières, et celles impliquant des tiers pays intéressés par leurs territoires et leurs ressources. L’auteur examine si les crises sont simplement provoquées par les élites, ou partiellement endossées et motivées par les masses dans les deux pays, et si le comportement greco-turc de crise reflète des rivalités ethniques de longue date, des intérêts de sécurité spécifiques, ou des besoins politiques et des normes domestiques. L’article s’inspire de l’expérience greco-turque durant les dernières deux décennies pour éclairer des dilemmes et des problèmes actuels auxquels font face les décideurs en matière de politique dans la région.

ABSTRACT

This article examines Greek-Turkish crisis behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean over the past two decades. Crises are first defined and classified, after which a number of common misperceptions are then addressed in light of recent experience. Three broad categories of foreign policy crises are analyzed: 1) those involving ethnically related minorities across the border; 2) those with ‘alien’ minorities within borders; and 3) those with third countries involving territories and resources. The article examines whether crises are simply elite-driven or partly endorsed and motivated by mass publics in both countries, and whether Greek-Turkish crisis behaviour reflects enduring ethnic rivalries, ‘genuine’ security interests, or domestic political needs and norms. The article draws upon the Greek-Turkish experience of the past two decades to illuminate contemporary dilemmas and issues which policymakers face in this region.

Introduction

The Eastern Mediterranean has a rich, diverse, and highly explosive history of crisis-making. In the period 1983-2003 only, there were around forty crises

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involving Greece and Turkey, either with each other or a third country. Three escalated close to war: twice between Greece and Turkey (1987 and 1996), and once between Turkey and Syria (1998). Within Greece and Turkey, crises are defined by a perceived threat to the basic values of a group, a limited time for response to the threat, and a heightened probability of military conflict. During this period, Greek and Turkish responses to crises have been varied: from nationwide protests over the Macedonian and Kurdish issues, to mild Greek and Turkish diplomatic responses to minority issues in Albania (1989-1994) and Bulgaria (1985-1989) respectively. Today, there is no real evidence that confrontational behaviour belongs to the past as many analysts recognize a high likelihood of future crises arising from the Cyprus-EU accession process, the future of Iraqi Kurdistan, and the possible refusal of the EU to grant an explicit accession negotiation date to Turkey.

**External National Homeland**

One can identify at least three broad categories of foreign policy issues in this area of the Eastern Mediterranean. The first contains the “external national homeland” crises, which erupt when a majority in one state tries to “rescue” an ethnically related minority across the border. The ethnic group is perceived to be threatened or severely repressed. In the period 1983-2003, there were several such episodes between Greece and Albania concerning the status of the Greek minority, as well as between Turkey and Bulgaria (or Greece) over the status of the Thracian-Turkish minorities. Despite some dire predictions, none of these crises led to interventions comparable to the events in the former Yugoslavia (Krajina and Bosnia) or in the former USSR (Nagorno-Karabakh or Transdniestrian region of Moldova). In fact, Greek and Turkish foreign policy adapted very quickly to the constraints of the new world order limiting the role of external homelands and emphasizing those of international bodies and non-governmental organizations. Despite these promising signs, however, Turkey’s continuing “external homeland behavior” over the Cyprus issue has led to a number of foreign policy crises and a general impasse in the negotiations with exclusive Turkish responsibility in the 1990s.
It is important to distinguish between the needs and desires of external minorities and the overall intentions of an ethnically related state. For example, the protection of ethnic kin across the border might be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for intervening or even invading a foreign territory, unless other strategic interests are present. Nobody has declared this more openly than Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, who in 2001 acknowledged that, regardless of Turkish-Cypriot preferences, Turkey will maintain the occupation of Northern Cyprus.6 Earlier, in 1992, Greek opinion-makers virtually invented a 300,000 strong minority in the Macedonian Republic as counterweight to ethnic Macedonian demands in Greece,7 while more recently, in 2003, Turkish commentators inflated the number of the tiny Turcoman community to three and a half million in order to justify Turkish strategic interests in post-Saddam Iraq.8

Nationalizing the State

The second type of issue relates to states crisis behaviour towards internal minorities. Here, the majority sees itself as the legitimate ‘owner’ of the state, which, in turn, is expected to become the embodiment and defender of its distinctive character.9 Preventing secessionism remains the cornerstone of majority nationalism, and where potentially secessionist minorities exist, majorities may mobilize to defend the integrity of the state. Yet an essential paradox here is repressionist or even eliminationist policies towards small minorities who lack any strategic importance. For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s, Turkish nationalism targeted the tiny urban minority of ethnic Greeks, leading to the virtual elimination of this historic Istanbul community.10 Likewise, until very recently, Greece has denied official recognition for the remaining ethnic Macedonians in northern Greece, not to mention repatriation rights for Civil war refugees of non-Greek descent, even though no evidence has ever been found to demonstrate that they pose a threat to Greek security.11

Unlike smaller minorities, the Kurds pose a potential threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. Since the mid-1980s, the PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party) has engaged in a violent struggle for the dismemberment of the country. Indeed, there were 35,000 casualties (mostly Kurds) in this struggle that ended only four years ago. In addition, the Kurds represent almost a fifth of the
Turkish population, with higher demographic growth than the rest of the country’s population. Turkish policymakers thus fear that a federated Kurdish entity in Iraq might become a model for the Kurds of Turkey in seeking their own autonomous status.

Yet several classic as well as recent studies in the study of secessionist movements have indicated that oppression resulting from majority nationalism does not offer a solution to this type of acute security problems. State repression not only legitimizes secessionist claims but often fuels popular demands and participation in secessionist movements. For these reasons, the current tendency worldwide is to proceed towards accommodation of national minority demands rather than confrontation.

Among Greek-Cypriots there is a similar debate concerning the status of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Those who support a settlement on the basis of the Annan plan argue that a rejectionist approach towards the plan will sooner or later lead to the recognition of the “TRNC” by third countries. The rest argue that the endorsement and application of the specific plan might lead to permanent deadlocks, and eventually collapse with the international recognition of two states in Cyprus.

The truth is that in neither scenario does the ‘TRNC’ have a reasonable chance of receiving international recognition. The current international system does not easily allow secessionist groups to establish their own internationally recognized states unless those groups face some serious eminent threat, like Croatia in 1991. The fact that only five internationally recognized states have been born from armed conflict during the past forty years speaks eloquently to this point. Among those five cases, there is no single instance of a country that has seceded violently from an inclusive democratic society and subsequently been by the international system.

There are, however, other more important reasons for the Greek-Cypriots to worry. Historical evidence illustrates that once a major population shift occurs in a ‘disputed’ area, groups weakened demographically are willing to make hitherto unthinkable compromises. According to Ian Lustick, both the British in Northern Ireland and the French in Algeria had to readjust or reconsider their plans once they realized that demography was not on their side. The author concludes that this was also the major obstacle for Israel in annexing the West Bank and Gaza to Israel. One should consider whether the continuous
flow of Anatolian settlers to northern Cyprus might force the Greek Cypriots to make compromises in the future for what is considered to be unthinkable today.

Inter-State Disputes

The third type of crisis relates to inter-state conflicts over territory, cultural property, and resources. Disputes over tiny inhabited islets or territorial waters fueled nationalist passions and even risked a war between Greece and Turkey in 1987 and again in 1996. Similar crises over islands have been recorded in the Western Mediterranean, between Spain and Morocco (2002), and in Southeast Asia among Malaysia, China, Taiwan, and the Philippines. In all cases, prestige and potential oil reserves affected policy priorities and subsequent crisis behavior. Specifically, in the case of the Aegean disputes, it is very unlikely that anticipated oil revenues would ever compensate for the defense budgets of Greece and Turkey, or lost income from tourism, not to mention trade between the two neighbours.

There are also numerous examples of crises related to territorial, water, and security threats. Syria and Turkey reached the brink of war in October 1998, after Turkey issued an ultimatum over Syria’s support of the PKK and protection of its leader Abdullah Öcalan. Among other factors, this support was seen to be motivated by disputes over Hatay and the water of Euphrates River. After the Turkish military sent a military ultimatum to the Syrian government in August 1988, Damascus gave in, and Öcalan left Syria for Russia; he was eventually arrested in Italy, which also refused to extradite him to Turkey, causing the outrage of hundreds of thousands of Turkish citizens and a boycott of Italian products in the country. Finally, the Kurdish PKK leader was captured in Kenya, arguably with Greek assistance. Given the overwhelming nationalist mobilizations that were taking place in Turkey at the time, it would have been possible for the Turkish leadership to issue military ultimatums to any of its neighbors hosting the PKK leader. If Greece or Cyprus had decided to host Öcalan in their own territory, after the latter’s request, this could have led to unprecedented consequences for peace in the region.
Another example is inter-state conflict over cultural property. The name ‘Macedonia’, ‘Macedonians’ plus the heritage and symbols of the ancient Macedonian Kingdom became issues of contention between Greece (and its northern province of Macedonia) and the Macedonian Republic (officially FYROM). In 1992, a wave of nationalist protest on the issue surprised many international observers as Greeks rallied in millions to prevent any use of the name by the neighbouring republic. In addition, to cultural property many Greeks feared that the Macedonian issue would be utilized by third countries such as Bulgaria and Turkey to advance territorial claims against Greece. Here one could witness the rise of a conspiratorial discourse in the country over the intentions of all its neighbours, including the Euro-Atlantic nexus. In fact, on many occasions, the disagreement was not whether the country was facing an international conspiracy, but what type of conspiracy it was.19

What was surprising is how quickly the relationship between the two countries has improved after the Interim Agreement of September 1995. This progress, especially in the area of economics, refutes many of the prophesies from the first half of the 1990s which saw the emergence of an independent Macedonian Republic as an inherent threat established and named just in order to deliberately harm Greeks and their interests.20 This case study implies important policy lessons for Turkey in its current quest for the right policy concerning the Kurds of Northern Iraq. Turkish policymakers should not take it for granted that the emergence of a federated Kurdish entity in northern Iraq will harm the country’s vital interest. Especially if Turkey succeeds in integrating northern Iraq in its own economic sphere while at the same time accommodating cultural rights for Kurds within its territory, the chances will be that Turkey will maximize its long-term security.

Civic Engagement in Ethnic Politics

The case studies above suggest that confrontational behavior is essentially dualistic, combining state policies with widespread public attitudes and actions. State policies such as the closure of ethnic Kurdish parties, the maintenance of the division in Cyprus, the enforcement of economic embargoes against neighboring countries, and the dangerous escalations in the Aegean have often been supplemented or accompanied by popular mobilizations — street rallies,
commercial boycotts, and voting for nationalist politicians or parties that promote these policies at the state level. There have also been “non-confrontational” cases, in which there was a mild civic or state response to a perceived provocation. As mentioned in the external minority crises above, Turkish policies have predominantly been non-confrontational in such cases as Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Kosovo, with the latter relying on its diplomatic and international leverage within the EuroAtlantic nexus rather than its military strength.\textsuperscript{21}

Mobilizing public opinion for foreign policy purposes can have multiple effects. On the one hand, a leader may make significant and credible public threats against ethnic antagonists. In mobilizing the public in this fashion, it becomes apparent that if a leader backs down, he/she will suffer what James Fearon describes as “audience costs.”\textsuperscript{22} Because these costs might affect their re-election prospects, leaders can more easily communicate a credible threat against ethnic antagonists. Moreover, a roused, nationalist-minded public could signal to ethnic antagonists a determination to fight a crisis until the end. Thus, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonis Samaras could use photographs from massive Greek Macedonian demonstrations in Thessaloniki in February 1992 to convince his European counterparts of the need to endorse the Greek position on the Macedonian issue.\textsuperscript{23}

On the other hand, mobilizing the public for foreign policy purposes might yield adverse effects. For one thing, ethnic antagonists and third parties could ‘frame’ the mobilizing public as inherently intransigent and abandon any efforts for reconciliation. For another thing, once an acceptable deal for crisis escalation is reached, this might be impossible to implement, due to unrealistic public expectations. The Greek mobilizations over the Macedonian issue in 1992-1994 demonstrated these two effects, as Greek public opinion prevented an acceptable compromise on the issue of the name Macedonia, while allies of Greece concluded that the Greek side was exclusively responsible for the lack of settlement.\textsuperscript{24} If these policy lessons are applied to the current debate in Cyprus, one should worry about the recent anti-Annan plan trend among Greek-Cypriots. Even if the political leadership manages to improve the plan, the public might fail to recognize these improvements and reject an otherwise promising deal.
Is Ethnic Antagonism Relevant?

Crises in the Eastern Mediterranean suggest that confrontational behaviour does not correspond to ethnic or religious differences, distant memories, or ancient hatreds. Confrontational policies can occur in an environment with little history of conflict, while they can be avoided in places with a long history of intergroup confrontation. In Greece, the ethnic antipathy theory would indicate that confrontational policies were more likely to occur over disputes with Albanians and Turks than with ethnic Macedonians. Nonetheless, in the Greek society of the early 1990s, the Macedonian issue gained prominence, even though ethnic Macedonians share similar religious traditions with the Greeks. Further to this, ethnic Macedonians were unfamiliar to most Greeks, especially in the South, and in fact, the majority of Greeks had simply no idea of the existence of this Yugoslavian nation. More surprisingly, the official Greek Church was in the forefront of this mobilization, which indirectly de-emphasized other issues involving “Muslim” Albania and Turkey. Finally, Greece managed to break the cycle of confrontation with the Turkish minority in Thrace while the country’s policy towards Albania proved to be beneficial for both the Greek economy and the newly arrived immigrants. All of the above occurred despite recent hostilities with Turkey in the Aegean and Cyprus or the fact that Greece and Albania were technically at war until 1987.

Evidence garnered from these various crises refutes the so-called “Sèvres syndrome” theory with respect to Turkey. This theory examines Turkish foreign policy through the lenses of Turkey’s ongoing fear of dismemberment, as agreed upon in the Sèvres Treaty of 1920. Proponents of this theory, such as Mümtaz Soysal, argue that in Turkey, there is a collective feeling of distrust, directed towards the European powers and towards its neighbors, and that this is a determining factor in Turkish foreign policy. As this theory is applicable to almost any country interacting with Turkey, it also provides a convenient, post-facto justification of Turkey’s confrontational policies with any of its neighbours and western allies. However, it says nothing about variation in Turkey’s crisis behaviour and particularly the large number of non-confrontational responses by Turkey in times of crises, particularly in the Balkans. For example, it explains neither the absence of confrontational nationalism in the wider Thrace in the 1990s, lost for Turkey around the time of the Sèvres treaty, nor the presence of contemporary, particularly post-1980 confrontational policies against the Kurdish populations, who largely supported the Young Turks against the implementation of Sèvres.
Yet what are the policy implications inherent in a refutation of the ancient/modern hatred hypothesis? In the case of the Kurds in Turkey, the fact that an uprising has taken place in the past two decades does not imply more conflict in the future, especially if the Turkish state comes to recognize the diverse nature of the country or to acknowledge the Kurdish reality in the greater Middle East. Moreover, past conflict in Cyprus does not necessarily imply new tensions if the Greek-Cypriot refugees resettle under a Turkish-Cypriot administration. Hence it is a waste of political capital for the Turkish side to focus primarily on this issue. Similarly, Greek-Cypriots should not take for granted the overwhelming popularity for a settlement among their Turkish counterparts. It might be the case that future generations of Turkish-Cypriots become unwilling to give up land and suffer major relocations of populations, especially if the Turkish north recovers from the current economic crisis. Finally, whether the Turkish settlers will be integrated into the social fabric of the Cypriot society or remain marginalized is a matter of long-term public policy rather than non-Cypriot ethnic origins. Provided that certain demographic balances in Cyprus are kept under control, it should be possible to accommodate the human rights needs of different groups on the island and create a positive human rights environment for all.29

**National Interest versus Domestic Politics**

While national interest should take precedence over domestic political concerns, there is no evidence that foreign policymaking in the Eastern Mediterranean follows precise and well-defined national goals. One of the most paradoxical aspects of confrontational behavior is the use of costly, ineffective, and self-damaging strategies by states and their dominant majorities. During the period in question, both Greek and Turkish governments have employed confrontational strategies, regardless of financial and political costs for their people: in fact, the two countries have been among the top six net importers of military equipment worldwide for the past five years.30 In Turkey, confrontational strategies have led to the radicalization of the Kurdish minority, and the slowdown in Turkey’s strategic objective of joining the EU. 31 As the
advantages of EU accession are so significant for the Turkish people, it seems odd that the country has not softened its stance on a number of foreign policy issues, as for example, human rights and Cyprus.

During the past few months there was an improvement particularly in lifting human rights prohibitions in Turkey and restrictions in free movement in Cyprus. Policymakers often rationalize Turkey’s crisis behaviour at these specific moments, occasionally post-facto, citing a set of plausible security or interest variables such as the positive role of the EU. However, these same variables are rarely present in subsequent crises and do not explain crisis behaviour in most cases. Overall, Turkey follows neither the lead of Eastern European countries that made significant concessions to minorities in exchange for peace and stability nor that of other developing countries such as Indonesia, which ended once and for all its occupation of East Timor.32

Likewise, such actions as Greece’s participation in dangerous escalations in the Aegean (1987, 1996) and its handling of the new Macedonian Republic (1992-1994) make little sense from the point of view of national interest. For instance, policies regarding the Macedonian issue weakened international and European support for Greece in its balancing of perceived or real threats from Turkey.33 In the case of Macedonia, Greek leadership ignored three key pieces of advice offered at the time. First, it failed to acknowledge that recognition of a small minority on its northern frontier would have no negative effect to Greek security and would, in fact, create a bridge with another Balkan nation.34 It subsequently dismissed evidence that the non-monopolization of the name Macedonia was the most feasible arrangement that could be made between the two countries.35 Lastly, it paid little attention to the fact that the new Republic was a “geopolitical” gift to Greece and, more specifically, a buffer zone with potential conflict areas in the Balkans such as Kosovo. This interpretation of national interests, along with the diplomat who presented it to the ministry, was rejected first by the government and then by the public, after the diplomat’s memo found its way into the daily press.36 As this example would seem to demonstrate, it is not national interest per se that defines foreign policy, but rather, the ability of élites to control, frame, and utilize concepts of national interest in the public eye.
Another interesting case is Rauf Denktash’s success in manipulating the Turkish political system during the past few decades. For instance, the unilateral declaration of the ‘TRNC’ in 1983 had nothing to do with the long-term imperialistic designs in Ankara presented at the time to explain this action. The decision to declare a new state was taken at the most unfortunate time for Turkey when there was absolutely no indication for international support and aimed to keep in power Rauf Denktash, who was facing increased opposition from the Turkish-Cypriots after the 1981 Turkish-Cypriot elections. This attempt was orchestrated by military circles in Turkey that favored his presence especially during the first years of democratization in Turkey. Over the past few decades, Rauf Denktash sustained Turkish support by appealing to the interests, emotions, and mentalities of special groups composed of Turkish Generals, ultranationalists Grey Wolves, and old-fashioned Ecevit-type Leftists. Although, he claims to do so, his policies in Cyprus do not serve the overall interest of the Turkish silent majority.

Theories on domestic politics have dominated international relations for decades, but only recently they have received serious attention from policymakers in the Eastern Mediterranean. The effects of domestic factors are particularly salient during periods of government instability. The absence of a strong government favors the selection of nationalist leaders, maximizes the influence of hitherto insignificant hyper-nationalist groups, or fosters nationalist coalitions. For instance, Tansu Ciller’s highly unstable coalitions, especially with the Islamists, led to a series of confrontational policies towards the Kurds, Cyprus, and Greece. Moreover, government instability caused leadership struggles, for instance, the two near-war situations between Greece and Turkey in 1987 and 1996 coincided with at least one main political protagonist in each episode being in the hospital.

The Macedonian controversy in Greece is another case in point which can partly be attributed to the inability of the Mitsotakis government in 1991-1993 to isolate domestic opposition within his New Democracy party. The Mitsotakis government had only a one-vote majority in a parliament of three hundred, and this allowed a single person to blackmail the government over difficult foreign policy dilemmas. The latest evidence suggests that the fear of domestic opposition forced Mitsotakis to follow the “wrong” policies over the Macedonian issue, despite his own personal reassessment of the issue in
Fortunately, the current ND government of Konstantinos Karamanlis does not face a similar challenge, due in large part to an electoral system introduced by Mitsotakis, which has guaranteed Greece strong governments and internal stability for over a decade after the Macedonian controversy.

In Turkey, the current internal situation is more complicated. On the one hand, current Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan, remains extremely popular. On the other, his Islamic proclivities do not create a good working environment with other influential groups in the country. For one thing, the military has its own agenda and interest in preserving unity among officers committed to secularism, the unitary state (Kurdish repression), and the division of Cyprus. For another, the secular bureaucracy of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers Cyprus its own domain of expertise, dismissing the influence of an elected government headed by a person who speaks no foreign languages. Finally, Erdogan faces a number of challenges within his own party, as was demonstrated in the refusal of a significant number of parliamentarians to pass the motion allowing US troops in the country in March 2003. Finally, opposition party CHP has adopted an uncompromising stand in almost every area of Turkish foreign policy. For the most part, in the settlement of difficult issues, such as the Kurdish issue or Cyprus, one spoiler might be enough to prevent progress.

Framing Confrontational and Cooperative Policies

Apart from spoilers, confrontational behaviour is being maintained by norms or rather adversarial framing of issues in the public discourse. Framing is an essential component of both confrontational and cooperative crisis behaviour. It reflects conscious strategic efforts by leaders to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate policy options. Generally speaking, frames determine what groups consider possible or impossible, natural or unnatural, problematic or inevitable. For instance, cooperative frames emphasize opportunities for reconciliation between Greek and Turks while confrontational ones mistrust and victimization.
Framing has multiple functions one of them protecting leaders from being exposed to the public for their own policy errors and miscalculations. For instance, policymakers in Greece or Turkey would not attribute their failures to their own policies but rather to intransigent policies taken by the other side, the ‘preferential’ position each enjoyed in ‘Western’ eyes, or its powerful lobbies in the US.47 When such interpretations are made on the basis of these three reasons, then policy change becomes very difficult. In Greece a major policy lesson was learnt when the country failed to prevail in its dispute over the young Macedonian Republic. Losing from a virtually unknown and unimportant country for the West, helped at the same time reassess the major parameters of Greek foreign policy. Greek policymakers, especially during the PM Simitis administration, attempted to delegitimize confrontational policies by pointing out to policy failures in such issues as the Macedonian and Öcalan crises.

In Turkey, a similar process of delegitimizing confrontational policies is possible even in the short-term. Erdogan seems willing and charismatic enough to reframe the Turkish foreign policy discourse. As an outsider non-Kemalist in the political system, he has no problem pointing out Ecevit’s policy failures that led to Cyprus joining the EU. At the same time, his challenging past policy choices is now less risky as reformists can clearly point out erroneous choices that delayed Turkey’s accession to the EU or minimized its role in post-Saddam Iraq. To project an alternative new path in Turkey’s foreign policy, however, the Erdogan government must be both convinced and convincing with the message that the US will not downplay Turkey’s interest in Iraq and that Europe will not renege on commitments and promises made to the country.

Conclusion

All the above constitute a complex mosaic of external, domestic, and ideational factors preventing the settlement of major issues in the Eastern Mediterranean. They also explain why issues such as Cyprus or Kurdish rights remain unresolved for decades even when incentives to reach an agreement are present for all sides in the conflict. The area surrounding Greece and Turkey is loaded with foreign policy issues and opportunities for escalation are always present. This article identified in detail various manifestations, potential causal
mechanisms and intellectual paradoxes of crisis management in the Eastern Mediterranean. Many otherwise popular theories of crisis behaviour based on the presence of minorities, resource disputes, ‘national interest’, ethnic antipathy, and EU influence have failed to offer sufficient explanations of the whys and wherefores in Greece and Turkey. It is precisely this failure to explain the region that makes the study of crises an important topic for further discussion. While emphasizing domestic politics and norms, the article suggests that the uncertainty created by these highly fluid and unpredictable variables should alert policymakers so that they make better use of time and opportunities for settlement and de-escalation in the region. Out of all the issues mentioned, a settlement in Cyprus within the next few months should be the major priority for all sides.

NOTES


2. For the definition of a foreign policy crisis, see Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2000), p.3.


6. Personal communication with former Minister Ilter Turkmen, July 26, 2003; see also his personal column in the Turkish daily Hurriyet, September 1, 2001.
7. Regarding how many Greeks lived in Yugoslav Macedonia, Eleftherotypia (Ios) cites the following figures: Christides (10,000); Zoulas in daily Kathimerini (250,000); Vakalopoulos (200,000); Minister Tsitsikostas (300,000); Tsathas in daily Ta Nea (250,000); Greek General Staff (239,000); Ambassador Dountas (0). See Trimis, Psarras, & Kostopoulos, “Ios tis Kyiakis,” Eleftherotypia, November 1, 1992, p.18.


11. For a detailed account of state repression of the (Slav) Macedonian minority in Greece, see Tasos Kostopoulos, The Banned Language [in Greek], second edition (Athens: Mavri Lista, 2000).


16. While many observers feared that contemporary self-determination movements continue the process of state breakdown signaled by the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, in fact, only four internationally recognized states were born out of armed conflicts during the last 40 years: Bangladesh (1971), Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991), and Eritrea (1993). *Ibid*, p.15.


33. It was only very recently that Greece received some support and even then, only after softening its policies towards Turkey and successfully demonstrating primary Turkish responsibility for the ongoing Greco-Turkish disputes, especially in Cyprus; see Neophytos Loizides, “Greek-Turkish Dilemmas and the Cyprus-EU Accession Process,” *Security Dialogue*, vol.33, no.4 (2002), p.429-42.

34. Personal communication with Alexis Heraclides, November 2001.

35. Kofos, the proponent of this solution was marginalized in the ministry of Foreign Affairs; see Alexis Heraclides, *I Ellada ke o Ex Anatolon Kindynos (Greece and the Eastern Threat)* [in Greek] (Athens: Polis, 2001), p.340; see also a document circulated among the ministers of foreign affairs of the European community dated August 8, 1991 and titled “Memorandum on Yugoslav Macedonia” in Thodoros Skylakakis, *Over the Name of Macedonia* [in Greek], (Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1995), p.257-60.


37. Personal communication with Ilter Turkmen, September 14, 2003.

39. Jack Levy describes numerous historical cases in which the public has appeared all too eager for war, from the American Civil War to the eve of World War I in Europe, to the contemporary “identity wars;” see Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol.92, no.1, (1998), p.139-65. In some cases, this enthusiasm for war may push political leaders into adopting more aggressive and risky policies than they would have preferred. In other cases, according to Mueller, leaders will undertake risky foreign ventures or hard line foreign policies because they anticipate popular support for a victorious war. See J.E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*, (New York: Wiley, 1973).


41. In 1987, Turgut Ozal, the Turkish PM was hospitalized in the US for a heart problem, while in 1996 the leader of the ruling PASOK, Andreas Papandreou was hospitalized in Athens for a similar problem. Even though their health problems were not a direct cause of crisis-escalation, succession games were extremely relevant.

42. Thodoros Skylakakis, *Over the Name of Macedonia* op. cit. [in Greek].


