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Quality bargaining and intermediate goods protection
Bulletin of Economic Research (2001)
  • Neil Campbell, Massey University

This paper offers an explanation for the proposition that removing protection from a firm can induce an improvement in product quality. In a vertically separated industry the quality of the final good is dependent on the quality of the intermediate goods used in its production. This model is used to consider removal of protection from the upstream firm (the supplier) which gives the downstream firm (the assembler) greater bargaining power since the option of turning to a foreign supplier becomes more attractive.

Publication Date
April 1, 2001
Publisher Statement
Citation only

Campbell, N. (2001). Quality bargaining and intermediate goods protection. Bulletin of Economic Research, 53(2), 135-142

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© Copyright Blackwell Publishers & Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research, 2001

Citation Information
Neil Campbell. "Quality bargaining and intermediate goods protection" Bulletin of Economic Research Vol. 53 Iss. 2 (2001)
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