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Article
Aristotle on the Metaphysics of Emotions
Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science
  • Myrna Gabbe, University of Dayton
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2016
Abstract

This article explores the nature of Aristotelian emotions and the body-soul metaphysics required to undergird them. The point of departure is an oft-cited argument that appeals to our experience of fear and anger to show the inseparability of the soul. My claim is that this argument is commonly misunderstood: that the intended target is not a separable soul, but an embodied soul.

Reinterpreted, we find that Aristotle is driven by an interest to integrate the sentient body with the intellect. And while, on this interpretation, the argument does not support a functionalist reading of Aristotle on the soul, it does suggest that Aristotle shares key intuitions with embodied cognition theorists and neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, in particular, who demonstrates the dependence of reason on the body.

Inclusive pages
33–56
ISBN/ISSN
0003-6390
Document Version
Published Version
Comments

This document is provided for download in compliance with the publisher's policy on self-archiving. Permission documentation is on file.

Publisher
Walter de Gruyter
Peer Reviewed
Yes
Keywords
  • pathê (or affections); logoi enuloi; body; functionalism; embodied cognition
Disciplines
Citation Information
Myrna Gabbe. "Aristotle on the Metaphysics of Emotions" Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science Vol. 49 Iss. 1 (2016)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/myrna-gabbe/4/