The Postmodern Empire: The United States' New Foreign Policy and its Global Challenges

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In the aftermath of the attacks on 11 September 2001, the United States was faced with a critical choice: either to respond with a strategy limited in scope and means, or with a grand strategy that marshaled all its military, economic and diplomatic powers to precipitate transformative changes of global and structural impact. Initially the United States opted for a limited response but later it found itself resorting to a more comprehensive, global strategy—the Bush doctrine. As a result of this choice the United States has changed considerably since 11 September 2001. Policy making has become increasingly secretive; the White House is reluctant to share intelligence and policy rationale with the people, the media, its allies and even with other branches of government. There is also a prevailing intolerance for dissent; some sections of the media and the administration have been quick to accuse anyone who disagreed with the new policies as unpatriotic. The consequences of stifling debate have made it difficult to acquire information on policies now being formulated in the White House and the Pentagon, and to fully explore their domestic and global implications. In this environment of limited freedom and knowledge, the U.S. response to its vulnerability has evolved into a new grand strategy to (re)imagine the republic as a postmodern empire.

The details of U.S. foreign policy remain amorphous and the consequences unanticipated. Yet the trajectory has been towards enlarging both the cultural and military scope of the doctrine. Thus, as the pillars of the Bush strategy became evident, the response to its manifestation remained hidden and the common pathology of anti-American sentiment in the Middle East lie as (un)intended consequences of a
postmodern approach to foreign policy. To consider the postmodern moments of the Bush doctrine is to note an ahistorical approach towards policy making, the adamant attempt to inscribe U.S. power, and the masking of a meta-narrative towards foreign policy as commonsensical and sometimes inconsistent in its attempt to achieve invincibility. The reactions to this the doctrine have been varied across states and peoples, yet the engendering of negativity towards the United States is an empirical matter of considerable import. Turning to three of the most pressing foreign policy challenges to the United States—Iraq, Saudi-Arabia, and Pakistan—provides the necessary material to understand the United States’ new global relationships and foreign policy.

THE POSTMODERN TURN

Early responses from Washington to 11 September indicated that the Bush administration was determined to employ a limited strategy. President Bush articulated this bounded approach in his metaphorical ‘twin goals’ of post-11 September—eliminate immediate threats to U.S. security and win the hearts and minds of Arabs and Muslims. Rooted in absences, the nascent Bush foreign policy suggested that the lack of democracy in the Arab world was one cause for the radicalization of Islamic groups and the increase in political violence in the Muslim world. Focusing on the democratic deficit logically led the United States to promote democracy and freedom everywhere, especially in the Muslim World. Yet, the idea that the United States would actively pursue regime change and partake in national/democratic building in the Arab World only recently became an articulated component of the Bush doctrine.

As the Bush doctrine began to be implemented, both its scope and horizons found necessary room for expansion as the list of measures needed to secure the United States and the world grew ever longer. For example, protecting U.S. national security was explained as bringing justice to Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, permanently ending Al Qaeda’s capacity to wage terrorist attacks against the United States—within U.S. sovereignty or overseas—eliminating sleeper cells, putting a stop to the flow of terrorists finances, and destroying their bases and other infrastructure. The removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and the promise to rebuild Afghanistan as a prosperous democracy free from Islamic extremism became an additional, albeit unforeseen, goal of the new Bush doctrine. Thus, immediately after the easy capitulation of Afghanistan it became apparent that Bush was looking further.

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By early 2002 it became clear that the policy makers in Washington were looking far
beyond Al Qaeda and Afghanistan. The talk of regime change in Iraq, the disarming and taming of rogue states and the systematic transformation indeed the reconstitution of the Middle East itself, became open for discussion and the Department of Defense was ordered to develop a new plan. The Bush administration, which had demonstrated both prudence and fortitude in the face of the 11 September attacks, now began to explore the possibilities and opportunities that 11 September had opened for a new U.S. foreign policy.4

For a long time the United States has been the world's only super-power, but it has had a population that was far less inclined than some of its elite towards pursuing imperial politics overseas. The United States has historically been reluctant to wage unprovoked wars and appreciate European-style imperial and colonial policies. The elite in the United States could never convince their peers to embark on empire building purely because the present distribution of power permits such action. Governments needed a more compelling moral, as well as a national security argument to use the United States' overwhelming power to dominate, control and use other nations and societies to ensure that U.S. advantages are perpetuated and U.S. interests served.5

A group of policy entrepreneurs, generally known as neoconservatives, found themselves in the position to reshape U.S. policy right as the U.S. population was deeply moved, extremely insecure, and demanded revenge after 11 September. For neoconservatives the key to stability and security is the preponderance of U.S. power and the globalization of democracy. They believe that a United States with overwhelming military might, backed by a strong and dominant economy and culture, can easily defeat the challenge of anti-Americanism in the Muslim world.6 The prospect of deploying U.S. power unilaterally and unconstrained by international law and international institutions will create an U.S. empire. The neocons aspire to build this empire and are willing to pay the price in terms of dollars and lives. Thus, the neocons see 11 September as providing the opportunity to align the American people behind the quest for security through the imperial expansion of the United States and the reshaping of the Muslim World.7

The first and foremost consequence of the domestic victory of the neoconservative thinkers was the unveiling of the Bush National Security Doctrine, which explicitly advocates the use of force unilaterally, preemptively and in the selective pursuit of U.S. security as well as structural transformations overseas to protect U.S. interests. The neocons are widely known for their unyielding support for Israel and their discomfort with an independent Palestinian state. Some of them advocate a military solution rather than a peace process to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus the plan to transform the Middle East by undermining regimes designated as rogue regimes and promoting democracy, starting with Iraq, would serve both U.S. and Israeli interests. The war
against Iraq was the first step as well as the test case in realizing this grand strategy to make the United States a postmodern empire. By declaring a war against terror everywhere, the Bush administration has given itself the opportunity to intervene anywhere militarily and positioned itself to realize this postmodern imperial vision.

The neoconservative aspiration and vision for the United States is a new kind of empire, one that enjoys imperial privileges, but is unwilling to fulfill imperial obligations. Empires in the past, such as the Roman, the Islamic, and the British had a civilizing and modernizing impact, whereas the neocon empire is designed merely to ensure U.S. primacy with no redeeming objectives. There is no doubt that they claim an empire shall advance the cause of democracy, but in actuality it will advance regimes that act as proxies and clients to the United States. The neoconservative vision of the United States has initiated a postmodern empire. In an age when territorial control is being replaced by a network of global governance institutions, multilateral regimes, international norms and laws, the neocons aspire to control through a unilateral use of military force. Under neocon influence the U.S. empire has abandoned the pursuit of hegemony and instead opted for the cruder form of domination through occupation. In an ironic way, the neoconservative imperial agenda also expresses a lack of confidence in U.S. culture, U.S. norms, the appeal of liberty and freedom, U.S. international leadership and diplomacy—all the ingredients that constitute U.S. soft power.

Today we live in a postmodern era. Nation states, the constitutive institution of modernity, are transforming either by collapsing in places like Somalia and Afghanistan, or reconstituting into conglomerates such as the European Union. Today, wars are fought between non-state actors: the United States and its coalition of the willing and Al Qaeda and its cohort of the willing. Both sides have armies which are multicultural, diverse and consisting of multiple nationalities. The main struggle today is between nation states and non-state actors in a battle that is geopolitical (the war on terror) or geo-economical (anti-globalization). The modern world system, built around the principle of sovereignty and with nation states as the sole agency is transforming into a post-Westphalian system with multiple agencies and many sources of legitimacy besides the principle of state sovereignty. In this era, to desire a territorial empire would be to move against the direction of history itself. If United States’ desire for an empire were to be realized, it must be recast in the form of a postmodern empire, a non-traditional spatial behemoth.
Today Iraqis are without water, without electricity, without gas, without government, without democracy and without security. The United States is without Saddam, without WMDs, without a link between Saddam and Al Qaeda and without international support, without the UN's umbrella of legitimacy and without credibility. The Baghdad adventure has revealed many fundamental flaws in the assumptions on which the Bush security doctrine is based. The most fundamental assumption, that in many areas the United States can go it alone, has been exposed as an erroneous and extremely dangerous for the United States and others.

Before the war, President Bush advanced two reasons for attacking Iraq. The first reason was that Iraq was on the verge of developing nuclear weapons and already had an ominous stockpile of biological and chemical weapons. Secondly Iraq was supposedly linked with those who attacked the United States on 11 September 2001. If Iraq was not immediately disarmed and its regime changed, then the United States and the world were in grave danger of becoming victims of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction. Post-war revelations have exposed the fallacy of these claims. Careless remarks by key members of the Bush administration, Paul Wolfowitz in particular, have revealed that the argument that Iraq was an immediate threat was hyped by the administration in order to gain domestic public support for an imperial war that was necessary for other perceived interests of the United States.

A number of reasons can be cited as the real purpose for the invasion of Iraq. First of all, for many of the neoconservatives, Iraq was unfinished business and the new mood in the country post 11 September was an opportunity too good to miss. Secondly, many of the neocons are deeply committed to the security of Israel and consider Iraq, Iran and Syria as festering threats to Israel. Regime changes followed by disarmament of the trio are, in their minds, the only way to safeguard Israel and hence the invasions of Iraq is the first step towards a less threatening Middle East. Once Iraq was secured non-military means backed by coercive diplomacy could be adopted to precipitate regime changes, probably in the following order: Iran, Syria, and then Saudi Arabia. A transformed Middle East would welcome democracy and U.S. influence, keep Israel safe with minimum concession to Palestinians and reduce the threat of terrorism from Muslim militias such as Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas.

If this was indeed the neocons’ grand design, then why not execute it in a fashion that would ensure its success? Their first mistake was to wage a war against the entire international community, barring the U.K., through a misguided attempt to threaten the UN to join the war or lose legitimacy. Post-war Iraq is a testimony to how badly the Bush administration needs the rest of the world to help maintain its hegemony. The
Bush administration has acknowledged this, albeit half-heartedly by appealing to the UN for more financial and military support for the occupation of Iraq. The second mistake was to ignore the advice of the military generals and not put enough boots on the ground in Iraq. Most of the problems in Iraq are a result of a shortage of troops. U.S. requests to Turkey, India, and others to send troops to help occupy Iraq have been rejected. There aren't enough soldiers to safeguard either the pipelines or power plants, or provide security to potential targets (such as the UN office) against the guerrillas. Saboteurs are having a field day in Iraq. One tactical error made immediately after the war was the failure to consolidate control over Iraqi territory by sealing its borders. Open borders have allowed foreign fighters to join the locals in mounting a guerilla war that has been more devastating to U.S. forces than the war itself. At the time of writing this article the number of U.S. casualties after victory in the war exceeds the number of casualties in the war.  

U.S. failures in Iraq are understandable. After all, the United States is an empire with hardly any imperial experience. U.S. imperial ambitions are best served through multilateral institutions and the cover of international legitimacy that the Security Council provides. In Iraq, without the umbrella of the UN, the United States is exposed to the searing heat of raw geopolitics.

The Bush administration's over-zealous foreign policy and its tactical incompetence, both in post-war Iraq and in the diplomatic arena, continues to put the United States at ever increasing risks to terrorism, instability, and war. The war on Iraq was supposed to reduce terrorism. One only has to look at this week's newspapers in Israel, India, and Iraq to realize that terror reigns globally. There is no sign of the WMD and as the prospects of finding them diminish daily, as does, the international legitimacy of U.S. actions. As Iraq suffers from chaos U.S. capabilities and intentions will come into question. At this rate the United States may soon become like Israel; it will continue to be the target of terror, but in the eyes of the world will be seen as an occupier and an oppressor.

**U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS: BALANCING NEW AND OLD RELATIONSHIPS**

Saudi Arabia has been a close ally and business partner of the United States for more than 60 years. It is also at the heart of all the key elements that contributed to the attacks on the United States. Fifteen of the 19 Arabs involved in the 11 September attacks were Saudi nationals. Osama bin Laden is from Saudi Arabia. The intelligence community is convinced that much of Al Qaeda’s finances come from private Saudi sources. The outstanding question is whether Al Qaeda has penetrated the Saudi ruling elite and question whether it has received any support from official Saudi sources, which may well prove to be the case.
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What motivates the Saudis in this double-dealing is the overriding desire for the continuity of the present regime. That has meant cooperating with the West, especially the United States, on some issues, while using Islam as a legitimizing tool. This is done first within their domestic constituency by building a strategic alliance with Wahhabi Islam, and then within the global Muslim community, through the expansion and lavish redecoration of the holy mosques in Mecca and Medina and through financing “Islamic projects” worldwide. The Saudi ambition to sustain a medieval-style Islamic society and government has resulted in a policy of uniquely Saudi Islamic imperialism. To protect Wahhabi Islam from the influence of Islamic revivalism taking place in other parts of the Muslim world, especially Egypt, the Saudis adopted a policy of exporting Wahhabism. The effort to reconstruct the rest of the Islamic world in its own image has contributed to the growth of hatred of the West among Muslims.

Yet, even as the Saudi regime sought to Wahhabize the Muslim world, it continued to maintain good relations with the United States by becoming its most important ally in moderating the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The Saudis have often helped Western economies by manipulating oil prices and keeping them within limits acceptable to U.S. consumers. By becoming useful to the United States they gained its support and protection, even as they promoted an Islam hostile to everything the United States represents.

The fervor of the Islamic resurgence led to a widespread call for regime changes in most of the Muslim world. Islamists succeeded in taking power in Iran and Sudan, but failed everywhere else, notably in Egypt and Algeria. Meanwhile, the United States, in collaboration with Pakistan and the Saudis, produced the modern Mujahideen to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan from which Osama bin Laden was born. After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan this new breed of Islamic fighters was neither disbanded nor rehabilitated, rather it turned to new battlefields fighting for new Muslim causes. Some chose Kashmir. Others chose Bosnia and Chechnya. Bin Laden decided to go home to try and make Saudi Arabia a more Islamic state.

The presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, considered by many Muslims as “off limits” for non-Muslims, infuriated bin Laden and exacerbated the conflict between him and his followers and the Saudi regime. In this Saudi civil war, the United States took sides and has since worked to protect the regime from terrorists as well as other Arab threats, such as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Bin Laden knew Saudi Arabia could not be transformed into a more Islamic state as long as the regime had U.S. protection. Al Qaeda decided to drive the United States out of the region through a sustained terrorist campaign. Thus in many ways the United States suffered the attacks of 11 September because of its support of a Wahhabi monarchy that has sown seeds of rage among Muslims against its greatest ally.
Today the United States faces the challenge of protecting as well as reforming Saudi Arabia. It needs the present regime to stabilize geopolitics and the oil economy. Regime change in Saudi Arabia could bring pro-bin Laden forces to power. Maintaining the status quo is also unacceptable because of the classified linkages to terrorism. Even though the administration has repeatedly proclaimed that it will go after all those who harbor and support terrorists, and that it hopes to democratize the entire Middle East, it has generally exempted Saudi Arabia. But the United States cannot continue to keep the Saudi Arabian issue on the back burner. If democracy will reduce terrorism, then we must talk about democracy in Saudi Arabia. If liberal Islam promotes dialogue and co-existence, then we must support liberal Muslims in the kingdom and make their voices heard over the cacophony of the fatwa regime. The Saudis have been dependent on two pillars for their security—the United States and Wahhabi Islam. Perhaps it is time to choose one. The administration's deliberate ambiguity over Saudi Arabia will not advance U.S. interests. On the contrary it could seriously undermine U.S. security.

**Pakistan: A Shifting Foreign Policy**

Pakistan has taken more risks than any other nation to aid the U.S. war on terror, yet its relations with Washington are still insecure. In fact, Pakistan's extensive, risky cooperation with the United States has done little to alleviate its own security dilemmas. Today, Pakistan remains exposed to the danger of preemptive strikes from the United States' other close allies in the war on terror, India and Israel. Pakistan is not even fully safe from U.S. preemption. Washington seems to maintain a complex strategy towards Pakistan that combines coercive diplomacy and economic assistance, rewarding Islamabad economically for its cooperation but failing to assuage its security concerns. In this strange way, Pakistan, in spite of being a close ally of the world's most dominant power, continues to live in a Hobbesian world.

Insecurity can lead nations to irrational behavior. Note that a heightened sense of vulnerability after 11 September has led U.S. foreign policy from one monumental blunder to another. As the Pakistani public, especially Islamists, feels that its nation is being bullied into working against its own interests, as well as, its own people and faith, anger, resentment and fear is increasing. At seminar after seminar on South Asian security in the war on terror, Pakistanis can be heard expressing deep concern, confusion and suspicion about Washington's policies; in particular the emergence of a new anti-Pakistan axis—the United States, Israel and India.

Pakistan has three main security concerns: First, a conventional strike by India from the Kashmir border or a strategic strike by India against Pakistan's nuclear facili-
ties. Second, Pakistan fears a preemptive strike by Israel at Pakistani nuclear facilities with direct Indian assistance or using India as a base. Finally, it fears a preemptive strike by the U.S. against Pakistani nuclear facilities to prevent them from becoming available to those Islamists who could easily come to power. Every Pakistani nightmare scenario involves a threat to nuclear capabilities from either one or all of the three closely tied states—the United States, India and Israel. All three of these nations now identify “Islamic terrorism” as the main threat to their own security, and share the ultimate nightmare of attacks by nuclear armed Jihadis. Pakistan's nuclear weapons, secured primarily for defense against a conventionally superior India, have instead increased the possibility of Pakistan becoming a victim of attacks from more powerful nations far and near, rather than making it more secure.

The United States needs to address a more complex question requiring some geopolitical analysis that is more subtle than Washington has been willing to indulge in of late. Can the world in general, and India, Israel and the United States in particular, afford to make a nuclear armed nation feel confused and insecure about its relations with them? Pakistan's defense strategy is based on a first strike policy. Very simply this means that when in grave danger, Pakistanis will trigger the nukes. Keep in mind that this is the policy of secular, rational generals and not crazy Mullahs.

Pakistani nukes need not fall in to the hands of Taliban types before we see them lighting up the sky. All we need to do is scare the present administration sufficiently. Nothing could be scarier for the present Pakistani military establishment than a threat to their nuclear weapons. Washington is scaring Islamabad, and although things have not reached dangerous levels, who knows what Pakistan's threshold level is? How much pressure can it handle? Washington continues to insinuate that Pakistan has been sharing its nuclear secrets with Iran and North Korea. Washington also continues to express its fears about the stability of Pakistan's command and control structure and the possibility of their nukes falling in the hands of militant Muslims. Despite Pakistan's repeated reassurances on both counts, Washington continues to maintain its doubts.

Every time Indians meet with Israelis, the conversation is the same. Israelis ask, “What can you do for us?” The Indians respond by asking, “What are you going to do about Pakistan?” So far, Israel has not expressed much concern over Pakistani nukes; it is more worried about Iran's nuclear program. But growing Indo-Israeli military and

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intelligence cooperation, combined with Indo-U.S. military exercises in Kashmir are definitely raising the fear barometer in Islamabad. The United States must understand that it cannot enhance its own security by making others feel insecure. While it works to keep Taliban types out of power and away from Pakistan's nuclear launch switches, the United States must also work to reduce the stress and uncertainty in the minds of those who are currently poised to press the red buttons.

**Steps Washington Could Take in Pakistan**

The United States should use the war on terror to develop a semi-formal regional security institution involving the United States, India, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Starting with a basic limited goal that is in the interest of all four nations—that of keeping the Taliban out of power in South-Central Asia and maintaining regional stability—the United States could reduce tensions and allay fears. This organization would also be a handy forum for any future Indo-Pak peace process and for resolving the Kashmir issue through regional summits. In addition, while the United States continues to guarantee Israeli security, it must use the leverage from this guarantee to keep Israel from destabilizing other regions in pursuit of real or imagined threats. An institutional U.S. security interest in South-Central Asia will also help to reduce Israeli fears about Pakistani nuclear weapons.

Finally the United States must learn that it cannot have an instrumentalist approach to other nations. It cannot force Pakistan to take risks of upsetting its domestic and international balance of power without also taking steps to ensure that Pakistan is not over-exposed to strategic threats as a result. A disregard for Pakistani domestic politics gave the Islamist parties a historically unprecedented victory in the last elections contributing to current fears in Washington, Tel-Aviv and New Delhi. As far as bilateral relations, Pakistan is the Bush administration's only success story. It cannot and must not jeopardize this alliance through geopolitical monkeying or by failing to assure Pakistan that its decision to join the United States as a partner against the Taliban and Al Qaeda was not a mistake.

**Conclusion**

The world is becoming anti-American. Not only do most people across the planet look upon the United States with disfavor, they also dislike President Bush. More and more people are less keen on cooperating with the United States in foreign policy or on the war on terror. Growing anti-Americanism will not only undermine the war on terror, but its extreme manifestations in the Muslim world is attracting new and numerous
recruits to the ranks of Al Qaeda. Experts are in agreement that the primary reason why people now hate the United States is U.S. foreign policy.

The United States’ exclusively self-regarding outlook, its arrogant unilateralism, its unwise and untrustworthy rhetoric and its belligerent posture are alienating and angering people in the East and the West. The fear that the United States is out to attack other countries makes the global security environment less stable. It discourages cooperation, makes the world unsafe for U.S. citizens to travel and conduct business overseas and radicalizes moderates. It increases the flow of material and moral support to militant groups, and places U.S. allies and pro-democracy intellectuals and groups on the defensive. In general anti-Americanism makes it difficult to promote peace and stability and fight extremism. Rather than ensuring U.S. security, it seems that U.S. foreign policy, particularly its invasion and now occupation of Iraq, have created conditions that put the United States and its interests at greater risk.¹³

President Bush is surrounded by policy hawks that view 11 September as an opportunity to reassert the prerogatives of the U.S. empire through unilateral use of force.¹⁴ They wish to reshape the world to perpetuate U.S. imperial aspirations. Unfortunately for them the world is unwilling to cooperate. The harder they push the more resentment they will generate and the more difficult it will become to save the empire and its interests at minimal costs. It is time to take the world seriously and reassess the tactics that have been employed until now. Perhaps the President may do well to change his foreign policy team as he did with his economic policy team. At the least, he must return the foreign policy portfolio to the State Department and insist that the Department of Defense execute, not make foreign policy. The President might also do well to focus on allaying the fears of the global community and reassure them that the United States is neither threatening them nor is it going to pursue interests at the expense of everyone else.

A review of some of the key foreign policy decisions and applications suggests that the postmodern imperial agenda and the haughty Bush doctrine are not serving U.S. security and long-term political and diplomatic interests well. The United States, in its moment of glory as an unmatched and indispensable super-power is also becoming an international pariah. U.S. soft power is rapidly diminishing, along with its reputation and credibility. Reduced soft power limits the United States’ ability to persuade other nations to follow its lead, making force and coercion the only available option. Post-war Iraq has exposed the limits of U.S. military, economic and political staying power and underscored the United States’ need to work within and with the international system to achieve its legitimate goals. The new U.S. foreign policy takes the United States out of the system and hence increases its inability to effect positive change in key cases.¹⁵
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NOTES

1 Attorney General Ashcroft, in a Senate Testimony, accused critics of the new measures in the war on terror of aiding terrorists and undermining U.S. unity. Such accusations from the administration have not only silenced the Democratic Party, which disagrees on issues of domestic politics but also many critics in the media and academia. See Dan Eggen, “Ashcroft Defends Anti-Terror Tactics,” The Washington Post, 7 December, 2001. Reports in the media attacking dissent have also contributed to silencing dissent; see Leslie Carbone, Terror’s Academic Sympathizers, FrontPage, 9 December, 2002.


3 Ibid.


5 Paul Wollowitz stated in an interview to Vanity Fair magazine (May 2003, 2003) “for bureaucratic reasons, we settled on one issue: weapons of mass destruction, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on.” See also M. A. Muqtedar Khan, “Neo-conservative Plans on the Rocks,” AlAhram (16-22 October, 2003).


8 For analysis of the United States’ imperial temptations see G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” Foreign Affairs, 81, no. 5 (September/October 2003), p. 44; Also see Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2002).

9 For an account sympathetic to the administration’s policy on Iraq see William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan (Eds.), The War over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s Mission (New York: Encounter Books, 2003).

10 For an excellent account of how the United States entered into war in Iraq see James P. Rubin, “Stumbling into War,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 5 (September/October 2003), p. 46.


13 Former Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, echoes similar sentiments. See her article “Bridges, Bombs or Blustees,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 5 (September/October 2003), p. 2.

14 There have been some reports in the media suggesting that President George W. Bush may finally
have some doubts in the wisdom of his present foreign policy advisers. See John Walcott, “Bush Starting to Question Advice from Some Top Aides,” Knight Ridder Newspapers, 21 Sunday, 2003; In a recent article the President has been advised to replace his entire foreign policy team and divest this nation of its imperial agenda. See Muqtedar Khan, “Prospects for Democracy in the Muslim World: The Role of U.S. Policy,” Middle East Policy Journal, vol. 10, no. 3 (Fall 2003), pp. 79-89.