Article
The Optimal Standard of Proof with Adjudication Avoidance
Review of Law & Economics
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
10-2019
ISSN
1555-5879
DOI
10.1515/rle-2019-0019
Abstract
Actors, whether guilty or innocent, may invest in costly measures to reduce their likelihood of being audited. The value of these investments are increasing in the probability with which they expect to be found guilty conditional on being audited. Because strengthening the standard of proof reduces the probability of conviction, it also lowers the investments by actors to reduce their likelihood of being audited. Therefore, when balancing such avoidance costs and deterrence effects, it is optimal to employ a stronger standard than that which maximizes deterrence, namely stronger than preponderance of the evidence.
Publisher
De Gruyter
Disciplines
Citation Information
Murat C. Mungan. "The Optimal Standard of Proof with Adjudication Avoidance" Review of Law & Economics Vol. 16 Iss. 1 (2019) p. 20190019 Available at: http://works.bepress.com/mungan/85/