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Wittgenstein, value pluralism and politics
Philosophy & Social Criticism
  • Matthew Moore, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo
Publication Date
This article makes three main claims: (1) that the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, properly understood, has no normative or political implications whatsoever; (2) that scholars with otherwise dramatically conflicting interpretations of Wittgenstein should nonetheless all agree with this conclusion; and (3) that understanding the (non-) implications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy helps to answer the two motivating questions of the literature on value pluralism — whether values are (or can be) plural (yes), and whether value pluralism leads to, requires, or reveals some particular normative or political response (no).
Citation Information
Matthew Moore. "Wittgenstein, value pluralism and politics" Philosophy & Social Criticism Vol. 36 Iss. 9 (2010) p. 1113 - 1136
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