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Article
Transfer pricing in a multidivisional firm : a cooperative game analysis
Operations Research Letters
  • Mingming LENG, Department of Computing and Decision Sciences, Faculty of Business, Lingnan University
  • Mahmut PARLAR, McMaster University
Document Type
Journal article
Publication Date
9-1-2012
Keywords
  • Transfer price; Cooperative game theory; The core; Shapley value
Abstract
We consider the transfer pricing decision for a multidivisional firm with an upstream division and multiple downstream divisions. The downstream divisions can independently determine their retail prices, and decide on whether or not they will purchase from the upstream division at negotiated transfer prices. To allocate the firm-wide profit between upstream and downstream divisions, we construct a cooperative game, show the convexity of the game, and then compute the Shapley value-based transfer prices for the firm.
DOI
10.1016/j.orl.2012.04.009
E-ISSN
18727468
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Accepted Author Manuscript
Citation Information
Leng, M., & Parlar, M. (2012). Transfer pricing in a multidivisional firm: A cooperative game analysis. Operations Research Letters, 40(5), 364-369. doi: 10.1016/j.orl.2012.04.009