In the past two decades the number of jurisdictions which have empowered their Competition Authorities to engage in market inquiries (MIs) has grown substantially. Although jurisdictions differ in the scope and procedure adopted for such studies, they all share an important common trait: attempting to allocate the roots of limited competition in the studied market. Market studies differ from traditional competition law tools in their triggers, range, object, and the level of pro-activity of the Competition Authority. They are not triggered by a suspicion of anti-competitive conduct of specific firm(s), but rather allow the Authority to use a broad prism which focuses on a wider set of potential obstacles to competition, including the Authority's own past conduct, in order to find ways to enhance competition. MIs entail many advantages. Yet, bestowing this power upon a Competition Authority is not self-explanatory. Furthermore, it is far from costless. Beyond the direct costs imposed on both the Authority and market participants, MIs often carry less tangible price tags. They raise a host of constitutional, democratic and practical issues that have not been thoroughly studied as of yet, which are the focus of this paper. In so doing, the paper builds, inter alia, on the recent administrative law literature which focuses on multi-agency interactions. Accordingly, this paper seeks to provide a synergetic analysis of MIs for the benefit of policymakers.
- market inquiry,
- market studies,
- competition law,
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/michal_gal/45/