This article challenges the conventional wisdom that not much can be done under the existing atomistic system of antitrust enforcement to solve the problem of sub-optimal deterrence of international cartels. Low deterrence results from two main facts: first, international cartels are generally prosecuted by only a fraction of the jurisdictions harmed by them. Second, monetary sanctions imposed by those jurisdictions are generally based only on the harm incurred to their domestic markets. To solve this problem, this article proposes a novel legal tool that would enable countries to adopt and rely upon foreign findings of international hard-core cartels, provided that the foreign decisions meet criteria that ensure that such reliance is reasonable and fair. As elaborated, this free movement of judgments holds potential to overcome the main obstacles to efficient deterrence and to significantly increase both domestic as well as global welfare. Its costs can be overcome to a great extent by designing appropriate solutions. The political implications are also not prohibitive. As shown, jurisdictions already rely on foreign judgments that do not significantly differ from the decisions at hand.
- international cartels,
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/michal_gal/1/