Skip to main content
Article
Comments on Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively
Scholarly Works
  • Michael Wells, University of Georgia School of Law
Professor Elliott begins his Article Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 1053, 1054 (1989), by proclaiming that “a fundamental revolution has reshaped the intellectual underpinnings of tort law.” He maintains that torts has shifted “[f]rom a system for punishing wrongdoers and compensating victims ... [to] a system that aspires to regulate safety in all aspects of our lives.” What are the implications of this change in emphasis for the place of punitive damages in contemporary accident law? They “stand out as a good candidate for rejection as a ‘relic’ that does not fit the new paradigm.” Why? Because they are not an effective deterrent to corporate misconduct. Their imposition is insufficiently swift and too uncertain, and their magnitude is too small. While Elliott's Article sets forth an interesting and provocative argument, I believe it is vulnerable to attack on three grounds.
Publication Date
1-1-1989
Abstract

Professor Elliott begins his Article by proclaiming that “a fundamental revolution has reshaped the intellectual underpinnings of tort law.”

Citation Information
Michael Wells. "Comments on Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively" (1989)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/michael_wells/47/