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Chinese Homicide Law, Irrationality and Incremental Change

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Chinese Homicide Law, Irrationality and Incremental Change

By Cary Bricker* and Michael Vitiello**

I. Introduction

Having learned that his wife was having an affair, the defendant mulled over his options. After deliberation, he decided to shoot her and her lover. Sneaking up on them as they sat together in an isolated area, the defendant shot each in the chest. Because they were far from the nearest city, they received no first aid and both bled to death.1 Charged with first degree murder, the defendant has asked you to represent him. In your first interview, the defendant explains that he did not intend to kill his victims and instead intended only to injure them by shooting them in the torso, not aiming for their hearts.

After reflecting on all the facts, you would quickly explain to your client that his “defense” is inapposite under American criminal laws. Long ago, American legislatures and courts rejected such a claim for various reasons that make sense under both a utilitarian and retributivist model of punishment.2 Prior to developments in modern medicine, many injuries, curable today, led to death,3 and were treated as murder under different theories, like depraved heart murder. Further, based on the immutable facts in the case, the defendant’s claim seems inherently implausible. Shooting someone near a vital organ just creates too great a risk of death, even in the days of modern medical procedures.4 Distinguishing between a defendant who aims near a vital organ and one who aims at a vital organ makes little moral sense. Or so it would

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1 Cf. Public Prosecutor v. Luifang, Gu XX & Others, 1 China L. Rep. 117, 122 (1992) (China) (describing the details of the crime: a wife, angry at her husband for an extramarital affair and overall neglect of the family, engaged her sons and other minors in a plot to attack him. The group beat the husband with rocks and their fists and slit blood vessels in his left and right heels. Unable to escape because his shoelaces were tied together, the husband bled to death).

2 See, e.g., People v. Knoller, 158 P.3d 731 (“[A] conviction for second degree murder, based on a theory of implied malice, requires proof that a defendant acted with conscious disregard of the danger to human life.”).

3 See Susan Ferraro, The Century’s Top Medical Marvels These Advances Have Saved Millions, NY DAILY NEWS (Dec. 12, 1999), http://articles.nydailynews.com/1999-12-12/news/18120866_1_framingham-heart-study-infections-sulfa-drugs (listing the top ten medical advancements that have saved numerous lives).

seem, at least to students of American criminal law: even if one credits the defendant’s story – questionable at best – he intends to cause harm and knows of the high probability that death will result.

By comparison, the post-Maoist Chinese criminal law makes just such a distinction. Enacted in 1987 and recodified in 1997, Article 5 of the Chinese Criminal Code directly links the degree of one’s offense and punishment to the actor’s intent, irrespective of whether the actus reus caused death and whether that death was foreseeable to the actor. Beginning with substantive criminal law reform after Mao’s death, two provisions of Chinese law – Articles 232 and 234 -- distinguish between degrees of homicide: intentional killing versus “intentional injury resulting in death.” The former exposes the offender to more harsh punishment than the latter. Thus, our hypothetical defendant can mitigate his crime and punishment by proving that he intended to shoot near a vital organ, but did not intend to kill, even when death was a foreseeable result of his actions and one that he actually foresaw.

When we first encountered these provisions of Chinese law, we were tempted to conclude that they were irrational and indefensible. Further inquiry has convinced us that these provisions demonstrate a toehold –small but present— for death penalty abolitionists. Thus the “intentional injury with death” statute is one step toward making incremental inroads into reducing the widespread use of capital punishment. Our further inquiry convinces us that abolitionists in the United States, over the course of 200 years, proceeded in a similar manner. Unable to build a broad public anti-death penalty consensus, abolitionists have achieved incremental victories by encouraging legislators to enact homicide statutes that ostensibly distinguish heinous offenders from those with lesser culpability. But as with incremental reforms to the Chinese criminal code, the resulting legal rules have drawn irrational distinctions, a fact demonstrated by the laws’ applications.

That leads to the two main insights of this paper: the first is that, similar to the seeming irrationality produced by post-Maoist reforms in the arena of homicide law, early efforts to divide murder into degrees of homicide in the United States, with an eye toward reducing the incidence of capital punishment, led to irrational distinctions in application. Modern efforts at reform in this arena have not eliminated such irrational distinctions in the imposition of the death penalty. For example, even § 210.6 of the Model Penal Code, the highly influential provision dealing with the death penalty, has resulted in a system allowing the imposition of the death penalty in arbitrary and discriminatory ways. The second is that understanding the irrationality

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5ZhōnghuáRénmínGònghéguóxinfăxiūzhèng’ànwŭ(中华人民共和国刑法修正案 (五) (附英)[Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Fifth National People’s Congress, Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997 ), art. 5, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/clotproc361/ (judges determine the actor’s intent based on a number of factors, including: knowledge that the conduct would produce “socially dangerous consequences,” whether the person knew or should have known of dangerous consequences, and whether the consequences were “unavoidable or unforeseeable.”)
6Id. at 232, 234.
7See discussion infra Part II.A.
8See discussion infra Part III.
9See discussion infra Part III.
10See discussion infra Part III (MPC § 210.6 states that, in determining whether to impose the death penalty, the Court must balance aggravating and mitigating factors, including prior criminal activity, whether the murder was
of our system offers insight into what may be afoot in China. Although articles 232 and 234 have some overlap in punishment, Article 234 invites courts to sentence defendants to prison, instead of imposing the death penalty, despite evidence of mens rea that would allow a conviction for the higher offense.\footnote{See discussion \textit{infra} Part II. B; see also Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gòngghéguó xíng fá zhèng àn wǔ (中华人民共和国刑法修正案 (五) (附英)) [Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Fifth National People’s Congress, Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), art. 234, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/clotproc361/ (stating that a defendant may be sentenced to a fixed term in prison, life in prison, or death for intentionally inflicting bodily injury on another person; the sentencing options are listed in that order, with death last).} Chinese abolitionists are struggling to affect change in an historically resistant society.\footnote{See discussion \textit{infra} Part III.} Indeed, the seeming irrationality of Chinese homicide law demonstrates the existence of reformist sentiment in a country that, left unchecked, seems all too willing to execute its citizens in large numbers.

Part II of this article offers a brief evolution of homicide statutes in China and the role of the death penalty from the Imperial to post-Maoist world. We then discuss some of the cases decided in Chinese courts under Articles 232 and 234. In that section, we explore the anomalous results that appear to flow from the law’s odd distinctions between two homicide offenses that seem to overlap with little basis for rational distinction.\footnote{See discussion \textit{infra} Part IV.} Part III compares developments in American homicide law, starting with efforts in Pennsylvania that led to the long-standing division of murder into degrees. It also reviews more modern efforts that have led to apparent irrationality in our capital sentencing law.\footnote{See discussion \textit{infra} Part IV.} Part IV discusses inferences that we draw from developments in China homicide law based on the comparison to developments in the United States. Specifically, while we are not apologists for the death penalty systems in the United States or China, we see irrationality as the result of small abolitionist victories. And while the United States has a system that no one can love, those small victories have narrowed the application of the death penalty in the United States. It is yet to be determined whether small victories in China will lead to a significant reduction in executions in China.\footnote{See discussion \textit{infra} Part IV.}

\footnote{Death Penalty 2011: Alarming levels of executions in the few countries that kill, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 27, 2012, 5:33 PM), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/death-penalty-2011-alarming-levels-executions-few-countries-kill-2012-03-27 [hereinafter \textit{Amnesty News Release}] (“Thousands of people were executed in China in 2011, more than the rest of the world put together. Figures on the death penalty are a state secret. Amnesty International has stopped publishing figures it collects from public sources in China as these are likely to grossly underestimate the true number”)}

\footnote{See discussion \textit{infra} Part II.}

\footnote{See discussion \textit{infra} Part III.}

\footnote{See discussion \textit{infra} Part IV.}
II. Evolution of China’s Homicide Laws

A. A Brief Overview

The death penalty has been part of Chinese culture for over 5000 years. As with other undeveloped countries, for most of that history, it was not restricted to only the most heinous crimes. Through most of China’s history, the government has used the death penalty as a means of social control and has not attempted to make it a proportional punishment. Over centuries, the list of death penalty eligible offenses increased. One scholar estimates that one point in China’s Imperial history, the government authorized the death penalty for over 10,000 offenses. These death eligible offenses ranged from minor property theft to murder.

During some dynasties, emperors espoused the importance of the concept of “proportionality in sentencing.” But consistent with China’s centuries-old commitment to promoting “universal harmony,” their concept bore little resemblance to western principles of proportionality. As reflected in United States Supreme Court Eight Amendment jurisprudence, Americans now focus on whether the punishment fits the crime. By comparison, for centuries the Chinese principle of proportionality focused on the method of execution and the effect that method might have on the criminal’s soul.

At various times, Imperial rulers promised reform. But rarely did they achieve it in the area of death penalty abolition. The Quig dynasty, the last in a long line of Imperial dynasties, is quite typical of purported versus actualized goals in this area. Chinese historians confirm that the Qing dynasty made a commitment to limit the death penalty to the most heinous criminals, consistent with more western notions of proportionality. But by the end of its reign, the number of capital offenses it carried out was the highest in centuries.

17See id. at 63-64 (explaining how the use of the death penalty was consistent with Confucianism: similar to that philosophy, the government’s role was to maintain social harmony even when that infringed on the rights of individuals. Along that same vein, the “rule of the person” prevailed in Imperial China, whereby a person in a position of authority exercised discretion to determine when to implement punishment. Often, circumstances independent of the accused’s wrongful conduct informed the exercise of discretion.).

18Id.
20Id.
21See Florio, supra note 17, at 65 (“Various imperial codes sanctioned the death penalty for many crimes, and included elaborate formulas to calculate mitigating and aggravating circumstances, premised on the notion that ‘punishment should correspond to the seriousness of the offense, as determined by its repercussions on universal harmony.’ Despite the perceived harshness of the criminal justice system, imperial China remained committed to promoting the interests of the state via the enforcement of its codes. The government viewed individual rights as a secondary matter.”)
23Florio, supra note 17, at 65.
24Id. at 65-66.
25Id. at 65.
26Xingliang, supra note 19, at 55.
In 1911, after becoming a republic, China appeared for a brief period of time to embrace western concepts of proportionality in sentencing, including the death penalty. The Nationalist Party led the reform of its criminal law and procedure. Its code reduced death eligible offenses from about 800 to 20, by far the lowest in its history. However, in 1949, the Communist Party, led by Chairman Moa, defeated the Nationalist Party in a civil war, this movement towards greater individual rights proved to be short-lived. One of the first steps Mao’s government took included repealing Nationalist Party legislation, effectively curtailing any meaningful efforts to limit the death penalty.

Borrowing heavily from the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China adopted a “revolutionary judicial system characterized by informal mediation, mass trials, retributive justice, and frequent summary executions.” Under Mao’s leadership, China returned to its traditional Confucian “rule of the person.” The trend culminated with the 10 year reign of the Cultural Revolution. Despite the absence of legal codes or a formal criminal justice system, the government executed hundreds of thousands of citizens, usually for “counterrevolutionary” crimes and without any semblance of due process. One could find no trace of Western notions of proportionality in connection with the imposition of most of these executions.

Mao’s successors attempted to repair some of the extensive damage caused by the Cultural Revolution by promulgating new criminal laws, beginning in 1979. China’s newly enacted Criminal Law and Procedure Law of 1979 contained due process protections and reforms. Scholars maintain that the code’s proponents, hoping to increase their presence in the global economy and responding to world pressure, intended, in part, to limit the death penalty. These codes contained laws that included a number of reforms, including a provision allowing a judge to suspend a death sentence for two years. The condemned criminal could then engage in hard labor; at the end of that period, the judge had discretion to commute the death sentence to a term of years. The code mandated that any time a court imposed the death penalty, the country’s Supreme Court granted automatic review. Further, in a precursor to Articles 232 and 234, discussed below, for the first time in China’s history the law broke

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27 Florio, supra note 17, at 66.
28 See id. (stating that the number of death eligible crimes fell from more than 800 to 20 after China became a republic).
29 Id. at 66-67.
32 Florio, supra note 17, at 67.
33 Id. at 67-68; 56
34 Xingliang, supra note 19, at 56 (stating that reforms included a “two-year reprieve” for capital offenders who demonstrated rehabilitation, which was a codification of “the Chinese practice of the suspended death sentence”)
35 Id. (discussing limitations to the death penalty, including making only the “most atrocious” crimes death eligible, proscribing use of the death penalty against pregnant women and minors, and reducing the roster of capital offenses to 28.)
36 Id.
37 Id.
homicide into degrees, with the lesser offenses less likely to lead to the imposition of the death penalty.\textsuperscript{38}

Despite significant retrenchment in the 1980s,\textsuperscript{39} China’s tentative reform of its criminal law regained an abolitionist toehold in the 1990s. While government cracked down on the new criminal class for more than a decade, the 1990s, saw the enactment of an amended criminal code which may have had the effect of reducing the number of death sentences imposed. We explore the relevant portions of that code in more detail below.

\textbf{B. Articles 5, 232 and 234}

By the 1990s, China was under pressure from the West on various fronts.\textsuperscript{40} As it sought full economic engagement, its human rights record came under increased scrutiny. Having just gone through a period of quelling the rise in criminal activity through the imposition of Severe Strikes and the suspension of due process, China responded in various ways, including enactment of Article 5 of the Chinese Criminal Code.\textsuperscript{41} The Criminal Code now provides that “the death penalty shall only be applied to criminals who have committed extremely serious crimes.”\textsuperscript{42} Article 5 states a principle equivalent to the American proportionality principle: “The degree of punishment shall be commensurate with the crime committed and the criminal responsibility to be borne by the offender.”\textsuperscript{43}

To implement these reformist goals, the National People’s Congress broke homicide into three separate offenses, limiting instances in which the death sentence would be imposed. Anyone who “intentionally commits homicide” can be charged with a violation of Article 232 of the Criminal Code.\textsuperscript{44} Article 14 defines intent as “an act committed by a person who clearly knows that his act will entail harmful consequences to society but who wishes or allows such

\textsuperscript{39}As has happened often in China’s history, this period of liberalizing reforms was followed by a crackdown. Deng’s reforms led to relaxation on governmental controls of economic activity. Xingliang, supra note 19, at 56. The resulting increase in criminal activity, including white collar crime, drug use and blackmail, led to a period of repression. The government engaged in repeated “Strike Hard” campaigns. For example, in 1983, the government rounded up as many as 50,000 people deemed antisocial and thousands were executed without benefit of due process. Id. The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress suspended the Supreme Court’s mandatory review of capital sentences. Florio, supra note 17, at 70.
\textsuperscript{43}Id. art. 5.
\textsuperscript{44}Id. art. 232.
consequences to occur.”

Thus, literally construed, any person who knows his act will result in death is guilty of “intentional” killing.

The Code also defines offenses equivalent to voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The second paragraph of Article 232 states that “if the circumstances are minor,” the court should reduce the offender’s sentence. Despite a parallel to American law (specifically to heat of passion voluntary manslaughter and incomplete self defense manslaughter), Chinese law goes much further. For example, the government may charge righteous and indignant killers under this provision. Article 233 is similar to involuntary manslaughter in the United States; it creates criminal liability for negligent killers.

Of special interest for this article is Article 234. It establishes an unusual crime, at least from an American perspective that in its application leads to irrational results. Article 234 provides that “if the circumstances are minor,” the court should reduce the offender’s sentence.

Concededly, Chinese law makes both Article 232 and 234 violations death penalty eligible. The intentional homicide and “intentional injury resulting in death” statutes, however, place the death penalty in different positions in their respective lists of available punishments, suggesting that that the drafters felt that imprisonment rather than death was the appropriate punishment in the event of conviction under this statute. Article 232 lists the available punishments for intentional homicide as “death, life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years,”

53While Article 234 charges that “intentional injury resulting in death” is

45Id. art. 14.
46Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1043 (9th ed. 2009) (defining malice aforethought: “The requisite mental state for common-law murder, encompassing any one of the following: (1) the intent to kill, (2) the intent to commit grievous bodily harm, (3) extremely reckless indifference to the value of human life . . . or (4) the intent to commit a dangerous felony . . .”).
47Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 48, at 1050 (defining voluntary manslaughter as “[a]n act of murder reduced to manslaughter because of extenuating circumstances such as adequate provocation (arousing the ‘heat of passion’) or diminished capacity); id. at 1481 (defining imperfect self-defense as “[t]he use of force by one who makes an honest but unreasonable mistake that force is necessary to repel an attack. In some jurisdictions, such a self-defender will be charged with a lesser offense than the one committed.”).
48See discussion infra pp. 8-11.
50Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 42, art. 232 (stating an offender is liable, at least as defined in the Code, for what would be ordinary, not criminal, negligence in the United States).
punishable by “fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years, life imprisonment, or death.” The Code does not specify the relevance of the order in which the National People’s Congress listed the available punishments, but from the differences one can infer that the recommended punishment for intentional homicide is that which is listed first -- death; the same would be true of “intentional injury resulting in death, which leads with 10 years. If the drafters had no preference as to punishment, they would likely have organized the lists identically. Further, in keeping with China’s ostensible desire to utilize the death penalty only in the cases of the “most serious crimes,” the National People’s Congress must have intended that the more serious cases of intentional homicide receive the death penalty more often than those of “intentional injury resulting in death.”

One might argue that Article 234 allows a prosecutor to charge a negligent offender with “intentional injury resulting in death” as a way to expose the offender to the death penalty. Imagine a case in which an offender commits an intentional act or intentionally omits an act, with knowledge that it exposes the victim to potential harm. That seems to fit both the definition of negligence and “intentional injury resulting in death.” A conviction of an Article 234 offense would expose the actor to the death penalty as one of the possible sentences. But upon closer examination, the alternative inference – that Article 234 allows prosecutors to charge a killer who meets 232’s elements with a lesser offense – is more plausible.

Practice supports the latter inference. It also suggests the seeming irrationality of the law. In at least some cases, prosecutors charge criminal acts that exhibit all elements of intentional homicide as “intentional injury resulting in death.” The following cases are illustrative.

In *Tang Tao*, the defendant noticed the victim, Wang Ying, ogling Tao’s girlfriend in an internet café. Tao confronted the man, and the man struck him and knocked him to the ground. Tao then walked up to the cashier and demanded the personal items he had stowed behind the counter. From his possessions, he withdrew a 40 to 50 centimeter dagger from its scabbard and shouted: “Whoever looks at me, I’ll dig his eyeballs out.” Tao then stabbed the victim in the belly. The victim ran outside, followed by Tao and his friends, one of whom knocked the victim to the ground with an ashtray. While the victim was on the ground, Tao pushed his friends out of the way, stabbed the victim again in the abdomen and walked away. The wounds were deep, puncturing his liver and stomach. The victim died from hemorrhagic shock. The State charged and convicted Tao of “intentional injury resulting in death,” and sentenced him to 12 years in prison.

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55*Id.* art. 234.  
58*Id.* at 2.  
59*Id.* at 3.  
60*Id.*  
61*Id.*  
62*Id.*  
63*Id.*  
64*Id.*
Tao’s act demonstrates an intention to kill the defendant, rather than merely injure, and thus the requisite “malice aforethought” necessary to have committed intentional murder. First, the victim knocked the defendant to the ground in front of his friends and girlfriend. This provides a motive for the defendant to kill him, increasing the probability that he intended to do so. The defendant escalated the physical altercation from a simple fistfight when he withdrew the dagger he had stowed at the front desk. The introduction of a deadly weapon indicates his desire to inflict more than mere physical injury on the victim. The defendant stabbed the victim twice in the abdomen, a minimally protected part of the human body, and hence where he could cause severe damage, and heighten the risk of death. The medical examiner described the wounds the defendant inflicted as “deep,”65 indicating the defendant’s lack of hesitation and desire to exact as much damage as possible, further enhancing the likelihood of death. Finally, Tao inflicted the second stab wound while the victim was on the ground and restrained by a group of the defendant’s friends. Tao plunged his dagger deep into the victim’s abdomen.

Similarly, in LuiYufang,66 the defendant and her son organized a group of three men to attack her husband. Yufang’s husband was a notorious deadbeat who neglected the family’s household and abused her.67 The three men attacked the victim while he was alone in a field, bound, and beat him.68 They then slit the blood vessels in the victim’s heels and left him to die; and he did.69 All five members of the group were charged and convicted of “intentional injury resulting in death.”70 The court sentenced Yufang, as the group’s organizer, most severely. She received a 15-year imprisonment.71

The culpability of the three who physically instigated the attack bears the hallmark of “malice aforethought” required for murder. They attacked and bound the victim where they knew he would be isolated in the middle of a field. They then slit the blood vessels in his feet and left him, bound, bleeding, and without help. The mere intent to injure the victim became an intent to kill when they opened the heels of his feet to let him bleed out, and fled. Had they only intended to injure him, they could have done so; instead, they inflicted a mortal wound and abandoned him to bleed to death as a result of it. Under Chinese law a person who organizes and leads a criminal group is punished according to the crime she organized.72 Therefore, if the group Yufang organized to attack her husband displayed the requisite intentionality to have committed murder, Yufang would be guilty of the same crime. Yet the court convicted her of intentional injury resulting in death.

The circumstances of both cases appear to have been sufficient to support charges under Article 232. Both killers had the victims at their mercy prior to inflicting the mortal injuries. Thus, in either case the killer could have inflicted an intentional injury that fell short of a slaying, and yet intentionally inflicted additional injuries that resulted in the victim’s death. In both cases, the killers had homicidal motive. Tao’s victim knocked him to the ground when he started a fistfight, and so he vengefully upped the ante and returned to the melee with a knife. Yufang

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65 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
wanted to escape an abusive marriage, a daunting prospect for a rural Chinese woman in 1992.\textsuperscript{73} In both cases, the killer displayed a degree of premeditation even beyond an intent to kill: Tao removed himself from the altercation to obtain his dagger and shouted he would cut out the victim’s eyeballs; Yufang and her co-conspirators planned the attack prior to following through with it.\textsuperscript{74} And while premeditation is not a formal requirement for intentional murder under Chinese law, it does demonstrate that the killers had time to reflect upon the results of their actions prior to undertaking them. Both murders exhibit a degree of brutality most likely associated with an intentional killing rather than mere injury: in Tang Tao “deep” stab wounds to the victim’s gut, in Lui Yufang a vicious beating and the group leaving the victim to bleed to death slowly.

In both cases, there are circumstances that may have persuaded a prosecutor to avoid pursuing the more serious charges of intentional homicide. The Tang Tao court addressed certain aspects of Tao’s circumstances that demonstrate a need for that punishment to be “mitigated,” his youth and the fact that he voluntarily surrendered to the police.\textsuperscript{75} The same factors that mitigated his punishment may have led to his reduced initial charges.\textsuperscript{76} In Lui Yufang, the victim’s history of abuse and poor family leadership likely made him less sympathetic and his longsuffering wife more so. While there is no explicit discussion of the rationale for charging the perpetrators of these crimes with “intentional injury resulting in death,” the presence of such mitigating circumstances in both cases suggests that prosecutors may have sought the lesser charges in an effort to limit intentional murder charges, and the accompanying death sentence. Circumstances like the defendants’ mentioned above, while compelling, do not affect the assessment of whether they committed the crime of intentional murder. Their actions were chargeable as intentional murder, and their personal circumstances cannot explain the apparent irrationality in charging their crimes.

In summary, while Article 234 overlaps with involuntary manslaughter – leaving open the possibility of exposing an offender to the death penalty for what would otherwise be a negligent killing – the case law seems to be to the contrary. In practice, as the cases above illustrate, the statute has been applied irrationally. Prosecutors have charged slayers whose acts are intentional homicides under the “intentional injury resulting in death” statute, perhaps because of their individual mitigating characteristics. While the likely intention of the statute was to link punishment to the culpability of the actions of the perpetrator, and thus reduce death sentences, prosecutors have charged individuals under the statute whose actions are as culpable as that of the intentional murderer.

\textsuperscript{73} Jim Yardley, \textit{Women in China Embrace Divorce as Stigma Eases}, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005 at A9 (stating that prior to the Chinese government’s 2003 streamlining of divorce laws, the process was extensive, even requiring approval from the prospective divorcees’ respective employers).

\textsuperscript{74} If the facts of these cases arose in the United States, a prosecutor could charge the defendants with first degree murder. Under the precedent in many jurisdictions, the defendants had ample time to premeditate. Cf. \textit{Commonwealth v. Carroll}, 412 Pa 525, 194 A.2d 911 (Pa. 1963), \textit{State v. Guthrie}, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (W.Va. 1995).

\textsuperscript{75} Yufang, \textit{supra} note 77, at 4.

\textsuperscript{76} Because Tang Tao was a minor, see Tao \textit{supra} note 68, he could not have been executed under Criminal Law Article 49. \textit{See} The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, \textit{supra} note 42, art. 49. However, there is no such limitation on charging him with intentional murder rather than “intentional injury resulting in death".
Despite frequent scholarly criticism when courts or legislatures create irrational rules, courts and legislatures often create such rules out of compromise. Our conclusion is that the kind of irrational lines described above reflect the small toehold established by death penalty abolitionists. That irrationality was not simply a product of the law’s application but is inherent in the distinction drawn in Articles 232 and 234. That is supported by our reading of the irrational distinctions in American murder and death penalty law. That is our next topic.
III. Capital Murder in America

American homicide statutes had their antecedents in early English common law. At common law, murder was defined as “the unlawful killing of another with malice aforethought.” Jurisdictions routinely executed offenders found guilty of murder as well as for a host of other offenses. Further, the scope of felonious homicide was wide with few homicides considered innocent. A defendant’s best hope for many years was jury nullification in cases where a wound causing death may have been minor or where the death penalty seemed otherwise disproportionate.

The most significant change in homicide laws in the Colonial and immediate post-Colonial era took place in Pennsylvania. In 1776, in its first constitution, Pennsylvania included language emphasizing the importance of proportionality in punishment. Influenced by Quaker abolitionists, the Pennsylvania legislature in 1794 departed from common-law classifications by dividing murder into degrees. The new law provided that:

All murder, which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate or premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or burglary shall be deemed murder in the first degree; and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree.

The clear purpose of the law was to limit the death penalty to the most heinous killings. Prior to the post-Furman era, this legislation was the template for most states in the United States.

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77 THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, THE JURY AND ENGLISH LAW OF HOMICIDE
79 See Green, supra note 88, at 417-418 (stating that there were narrow exceptions to the imposition of the death penalty, including “justifiable homicide,” defined as killings authorized by the government of the law, e.g. killing pursuant to a royal order or killings in connection with arresting an escaping felon).
80 See Death Penalty for Offenses Other Than Murder, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-offenses-other-murder (last visited July 15, 2012) (listing capital, non-murder offenses existing in state law, including aggravated kidnapping, espionage, and placing a bomb near a bus terminal).
81 Early on, the only “innocent” killings were those resulting from enforcement of justice. Over time, courts developed the concept of “excusable” homicide, allowing defendants found guilty of killing by accident or in self-defense to avoid the death penalty. Green, supra note 88, at 420.
82 Id.
83 Edwin R. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 766-777 (quoting Pa. Const. Sec. 38 (1776), 9 Stat. at Large 600: “the penal laws, as heretofore, used, shall be reformed by the future Legislature of this State, as soon as may be, and punishments made in some cases less sanguinary, and in general more proportionate to the crimes).
84 Albert Post, Early Efforts to Abolish Capital Punishment in Pennsylvania, 68 THE PENNSYLVANIA MAGAZINE OF HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY 38, 39-40 (1944) (“Like their English brethren the Friends of Pennsylvania showed a keen interest in the reformation of the criminal code”).
85 MODEL PENAL CODE § 16 (1962).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (stating, in a divided decision, that the death penalty, as currently administered, was unconstitutional).
89 THE AM. LAW INST., MPC AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 104, at 6.
While the intent of the 1794 legislation was clear, the distinction between first and second degree murder – in essence, premeditation – does not do a very good job of dividing the most heinous from less heinous killings. Anyone who has taught Criminal Law knows how the leading casebooks make sport of the distinction. For example, both the Kadish, et al. and Dressler casebooks lead students through a series of cases where the courts have had to determine whether the defendant had sufficient time to premeditate. Students are introduced first to cases in which courts find that the defendant may have had sufficient time to premeditate or deliberate, even though the killer may not seem like the worst of the worst. For example, Kadish and Dressler use State v. Guthrie, to introduce students to the temporal problem. Guthrie killed a co-worker who teased the defendant and snapped a dishtowel at him. Enraged, Guthrie stabbed the victim in the neck. Mentally ill and prone to panic attacks, Guthrie hardly seems like a suitable candidate for first degree murder. Nonetheless, the jury convicted him. Although the West Virginia Supreme Court remanded the case for a retrial and proper jury instruction on whether the defendant had sufficient time to premeditate, on retrial, the jury again convicted him of first degree murder.

Apart from the lack of clarity of the legal standard, both casebooks use other cases where the offenders have clearly premeditated. For example, Kadish includes Commonwealth v. Carroll, a case in which a man kills his wife, a woman who is mentally ill and abusive to their children. In the notes following the lead case, the editors describe the particularly gruesome killing in People v. Anderson, where an drunken live-in boyfriend brutally murdered the young daughter of his girlfriend, as evidenced by over 60 stab wounds. Dressler juxtaposes Midgett v. State and State v. Forrest. Midgett, a large man, beat to death his eight year old son, whereas Forrest shot his ailing, dying father, presumably out of concern for his deteriorating condition.

The cases present clear examples where evidence is insufficient to show premeditation (Anderson and Midgett) and where evidence of premeditation is quite clear (Carroll and Forrest). Students almost universally get the point: if they rank order various offenders based on their culpability, the brutal killers who act without prior reflection seem far more heinous than do the killers who act after deliberating. As summarized by the Model Penal Code drafters,

Prior reflection may reveal the uncertainties of a tortured conscience rather than exceptional depravity. The very fact of a long internal struggle may be evidence that the homicidal impulse was deeply aberrational and far more the product of extraordinary circumstances than a true reflection of the actor’s normal character. Thus, for example, one suspects that most mercy killings are the consequence of long and careful

91JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 253-264 (West, 5th ed. 2009)
92461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995); KADISH ET AL., supra note 116, at 432-434; DRESSLER, supra note 117, at 253-256.
93State v. Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d at 171.
94Id. at 183.
95194 A.2d 911 (Pa. 1963); KADISH ET AL., supra note 116, at 427-431.
96Commonwealth v. Carroll, 194 A.2d at 913-914.
9770 Cal.2d 15, 21-22 (1968); KADISH ET AL., supra note 116, at 436.
98729 S.W.2d 410 (Ark. 1987); DRESSLER, supra note 116, at 258-260.
99362 S.E.2d 252 (N.C. 1987); DRESSLER, supra note 116, at 261-263.
deliberation, but they are not especially appropriate cases for imposition of capital punishment.\textsuperscript{100}

That is, the major early reform to limit the scope of the death penalty unquestionably led to irrational results.\textsuperscript{101}

The recognition of how badly the premeditation formula worked as a gatekeeper, separating the most heinous from less heinous offenders, explains the original approach taken by the Model Penal Code drafters. It rejected the deliberation formula.\textsuperscript{102} The American Law Institute was divided over whether to endorse the death penalty.\textsuperscript{103} But while the Institute took no position on the desirability of the death penalty,\textsuperscript{104} it included a provision intended to rationalize the imposition of the death penalty for states retaining capital punishment.\textsuperscript{105}

After discussing a trend among states to limit the mandatory imposition of the death penalty for certain crimes, the Institute also rejected unguided discretion. Noting that discretionary sentencing obscured the problems with the administration of the death penalty, the drafters observed that “Discretion always includes the possibility of abuse, and discretion that is neither disciplined nor informed by intelligible standards is all the more likely to be exercised on unacceptable bases.”\textsuperscript{106} States retaining the death penalty, the Institute concluded, should adopt a forum of guided discretion reflected in § 210.6.\textsuperscript{107}

Section 210.6 rejected categorically the death penalty for certain offenders, including defendants under 18 at the time of their killings and sufficiently mentally and physically impaired defendants.\textsuperscript{108} For other offenders, § 210.6 instructs the court to conduct a separate sentencing hearing after a finding of guilt. At that hearing, litigants may present aggravating and mitigating evidence.\textsuperscript{109}

In 1972, a deeply divided Court found that the death penalty as then-administered violated the Constitution.\textsuperscript{110} The 5 justices constituting the majority did not agree on a rationale, with three justices suggesting ways in which states could comply with the Constitution.\textsuperscript{111} Subsequent decisions by the Court have held, in effect, “that Section 210.6 of the Model Code is a model for constitutional adjudication as well as for state legislation.”\textsuperscript{112}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[100] The American Law Inst., MPC and Commentaries, supra note 115, at 127.
\item[101] Id. at 128 ("In short, the notion that prior reflection should distinguish capital from non-capital murder is fundamentally unsound.").
\item[102] Id.
\item[104] The American Law Inst., MPC and Commentaries, supra note 104, at 107.
\item[105] Id.
\item[106] The American Law Inst., MPC and Commentaries, supra note 104, at 132.
\item[107] Id.
\item[111] The American Law Inst., MPC and Commentaries, supra note 104, at 153-156.
\item[112] Id. at 167.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
enacted in the 1970s “resemble[] the Model Code provision and provide[] for bifurcation and consideration of specified aggravating circumstances.”\textsuperscript{113}

Again, while the Institute did not endorse adoption of the death penalty, the Commentaries suggest that its approach was influential, and, implicitly, sensible.\textsuperscript{114} So the story goes. Indeed, if so inclined, a professor using Kadish or Dressler might ask her class how cases like Anderson, Midgett, Carroll and Forrest might be decided under § 210.6. Students should see that a prosecutor pursuing the death penalty for Anderson or Midgett might point to § 210.6(3)(h) as support for its imposition: the crimes were “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity.”\textsuperscript{115} Similarly, defense counsel, defending Carroll or Forrest might point to various mitigating factors in § 210.6(4), including the offenders’ lack of prior criminal record and emotional disturbance at the time of the killing, and perhaps, the moral justification of the offenders’ conduct.\textsuperscript{116}

But even this brief description of the Model Penal Code approach suggests the obvious criticism of balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.\textsuperscript{117} Such an approach begs many questions, including one suggested in the Commentaries. If unguided discretion is a bad thing – and it is, largely beyond dispute, we believe – how much guidance do the Model Penal Code criteria provide? When we fast-forward to the 2000s, no one familiar with the death penalty in America can pretend that the prevailing approach yields consistent results. Critics point to the sheer randomness of the imposition of the death penalty across America\textsuperscript{118} and the real fear that improper criteria, notably race, influence the imposition of the death penalty.\textsuperscript{119}

Thus, as with the early efforts of Pennsylvanian abolitionists and reformers, the American Law Institute, unable to achieve a majority to oppose the death penalty, proposed an alternative reform. It did so because it believed earlier reforms produced irrational, indefensible results.\textsuperscript{120} But its reform also produced similar irrational results.

While some states have abolished the death penalty, abolition remains controversial.\textsuperscript{121} That became obvious once again in the American Law Institute deliberations. After the Institute decided to reexamine the Model Penal Code sentencing provisions in 2001,\textsuperscript{122} Law Professors Roger Clark and Ellen Podgar introduced a resolution in 2007 that would have had the Institute take a position opposing the death penalty.\textsuperscript{123} The Institute submitted the matter for further

\textsuperscript{113}Id. at 169.
\textsuperscript{114}Id.
\textsuperscript{115}\textsc{Model Penal Code} § 210.6(3)(h) (1962) (repealed 2009).
\textsuperscript{116}\textsc{Model Penal Code} § 210.6(4) (1962) (repealed 2009).
\textsuperscript{117}See \textsc{Linda E. Carter et al., Understanding Capital Punishment Law} 131-150 (LexisNexis, 2d ed. 2008) (discussing that an additional problem is which circumstances should count as aggravating and mitigating circumstances; over time, the Supreme Court has opened the door to many additional circumstances that a defendant may introduce as mitigation).
\textsuperscript{118}See id.
\textsuperscript{119}Id. at 279-296.
\textsuperscript{120}The Am. Law Inst., \textit{supra} note 129, at 3-5.
\textsuperscript{121}Franklin E. Zimring, \textsc{The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment} 5-15 (Oxford University Press, 2003).
\textsuperscript{122}The Am. Law Inst., \textit{supra} note 129, at 2.
\textsuperscript{123}Id.
study. Ultimately, it rejected the Clark-Podgar resolution, but in a subsequent move, Clark and Podgar achieved part of their objective: the Institute has withdrawn its support for § 210.6. Largely because of the Institute members’ doubts that the death penalty can be imposed rationally and fairly, the Institute no longer supports the predominate model for its imposition around the country.

Thus, at least according to one of the most highly respected law reform organizations, the imposition of the death penalty in America is irrational. That is not especially surprising to any student of the criminal law. But we believe that, at least in part, irrationality has been a bi-product of reformist-abolitionists’ efforts. In 1794, few Americans outside religious groups like the Quakers would have voted to abolish the death penalty entirely. Abolitionists gained ground by limiting the crimes for which death was the appropriate sentence.

Almost 200 years later, members of the ALI could not agree on whether to abolish the death penalty. They knew that no single criterion could do the job of dividing the worst of the worst from less heinous killers. Many must have known that their solution would produce irrational results as well. And yet, again, the effect of § 210.6 was to reduce the number of offenders who would be subject to the death penalty.

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124 Id. at 2-3.
125 Id. at 3. (stating that the American Law Institute would withdraw §210.6, but would not “endorse capital punishment or call for its abolition”).
126 Id. at 4 (“Many on the Council have concerns, convincingly described in the Steikers’ paper and other sources, about the administration of the law of capital punishment in the United States, including the administration of death-penalty laws derived from § 210.6”).
127 See id. at 5 (stating reasoning for why there is concern about the fairness of death penalty systems in the United states, including racial bias, judicial elections, and inadequate legal representation).
128 See Introduction to the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty (last visited July 19, 2012) (although public opinion polls are not available from that era, we draw the inference of wide public support for the death penalty from its availability in such a wide array of cases, including “striking one's mother or father, or denying the ‘true God’”).
IV. Inferences to be Drawn

Many Europeans look at America’s use of the death penalty as barbaric.129 After all, the United States remains one of the few advanced democracies where the death penalty remains in force.130 And yet, abolitionists can point to a number of incremental developments moving slowly towards the elimination of the death penalty, or, at least, to its infrequent use.131 For example, in recent years, the Supreme Court has reduced the categories of cases in which the death penalty may be imposed by holding that executing mentally retarded defendants132 and offenders who were minors when they committed their crimes133 violate the Eighth Amendment. Further, while leaving open whether the death penalty is ever proportional absent a death, the Court has come close to so holding in a case involving the brutal rape of a child who did not die.134 While juries wax and wane on their willingness to impose the death penalty,135 courts, especially federal courts, reverse a high percentage of all death penalty cases.136 In some states, like California, procedural protections contribute to a startling reality that a death row inmate is more likely to die of natural causes than from the death penalty.137

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129 See Editorial, Europe’s Views of the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/13/opinion/europe-s-view-of-the-death-penalty.html (“European politicians and intellectuals, who view the death penalty as a human rights issue, are incredulous that Americans support a punishment that fails to deter crime, targets mainly those who cannot afford a decent lawyer, is used on the mentally retarded and has often gotten the wrong man. America’s high execution rate stands in striking contrast to its history of respect for individual rights and its role as an international champion of human rights”); see also EU Memorandum on the Death Penalty, EUROPEAN UNION, DELEGATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO THE USA, http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/deathpenalty/eumemorandum.htm (last visited July 19, 2012) (“At the dawn of a new millennium the EU wishes to share with the USA the principles, experiences, policies and alternative solutions guiding the European abolitionist movement, all the EU Member States having abolished the death penalty. By doing so, the EU hopes that the USA, which has risen upon the principles of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, considers joining the abolitionist vanguard, including as a first step towards abolition establishing a moratorium in the use of the death penalty, and by this way becoming itself a paradigm for retentionist countries”).

130 Europe’s View of the Death Penalty, supra note 140 (“The McVeigh saga and the media's response are "the latest twisted piece of Americana," according to The Sunday Herald of Glasgow, expressing a typical view. Such commentary underscores the fact that the United States, in its belief that execution is an appropriate punishment, stands nearly alone in the community of democracies.”)


The death penalty system in the United States may be a system that no one can like. But it is one where application of the death penalty is on a slow decline. Abolitionists have not been able to win a decisive victory declaring the death penalty illegal across the country. Nonetheless, they have won enough incremental victories that have led to the decline in the use of the death penalty. As we have argued, those victories may come at the expense of applying the law irrationally. Outside observers have relatively little reason to be optimistic about a dramatic decline in the application of the death penalty in China. Most international human rights organizations remind us that the death penalty is still in full force there. We do not pretend that China is close to abolishing or dramatically reducing its dependence on the death penalty. Instead, our conclusion is much more modest: we see the willingness of Chinese legislators to adopt Article 232 as a small toehold for abolitionists. Yes, the provision seems to lead to irrational results. But that seems to be symptomatic of incremental change, as we have argued has been the case in the United States.

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