Causal Ambiguity as a Source of Sustained Capability-Based Advantages

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Causal Ambiguity, Complexity, and Capability-Based Advantage

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This paper presents the first formal examination of role of causal ambiguity as a barrier to imitation. Here, the aspiring imitator faces a knowledge (i.e., "capabilities-based") barrier to imitation that is both causal and ambiguous in a precise sense of both words. Imitation conforms to a well-explicated process of learning by observing. I provide a precise distinction between the intrinsic causal ambiguity associated with a particular strategy and the subjective ambiguity perceived by a challenger. I find that intrinsic ambiguity is a necessary but insufficient condition for a sustained capability-based advantage. I also demonstrate that combinatorial complexity, a phenomenon that has attracted the recent attention of strategy theorists, and causal ambiguity are distinct barriers to imitation. The former acts as a barrier to explorative/active learning and the latter as one to absorptive/passive learning. One implication of this is that learning by doing and learning by observing are complementary strategic activities, not substitutes—in most cases, we should expect firm strategies to seek performance enhancement using efforts of both types.

Key words: causal ambiguity; competitive inference; NK complexity; sustained advantage; imitation barrier; learning by observing; learning by doing

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1. Introduction

A central proposition in strategy is that firms sustain relative performance advantages only if their existing and potential rivals cannot imitate them (Nelson and Winter 1982, Dierickx and Cool 1989, Barney 1991). In this context, “imitation” means the purposeful endeavor to improve performance by copying the form and strategy of a superior rival. An imitation strategy is one of many ways two firms may become similar in appearance and performance. For example, de novo innovation can result in such similarities and, when it does, also be referred to as “imitation” (as in Lippman and Rumelt 1982). This paper is the first to provide a formal analysis of causal ambiguity as a barrier to imitation.

Generally speaking, imitation fails when it is physically impossible, legally prevented, economically unattractive, or the necessary knowledge is lacking. Saloner et al. (2001) label barriers of the first three types “positional” and those of the last “capabilities based.” The conditions leading to positional barriers (e.g., switching costs, entry costs, scope and scale economies, and the likelihood of ex post retaliation) have been extensively studied in both formal and informal settings and are presently well understood (e.g., Porter 1980, Tirole 1988).

Capabilities-based barriers have received much less in the way of formal attention. When imitation is hampered by a lack of knowledge, learning becomes a central issue. Learning can be explorative in the active sense of learning from one’s own experience (learning by doing), or absorptive in the passive sense of learning from external information (learning by observing). Thus, a capabilities-based advantage is sustained only if learning of both types is effectively blocked.

An important exception to the scarcity of formal work in this area is the recent stream examining combinatorial complexity as a capabilities-based barrier to imitation (Levinthal 1997; Ghemawat and Levinthal 2000; Rivkin 2000; Lenox et al. 2006, 2007). This work applies the formalism of Kaufman’s (1993) “NK” model of evolutionary biology to competition between firms. In this setting, managers do not know the relationship between activities and performance. They learn by exploring in the “local neighborhood” of their current activities or, if attempting to imitate,

1 There are multiple streams of literature in strategy that focus on learning by doing, each deserving a survey paper in its own right. These include papers on learning curves (e.g., Lieberman 1984, Ghemawat 1985), exploration (e.g., March 1991, Levinthal and March 1993), dynamic experimentation (e.g., Besanko et al. 2007), and search (e.g., Lippman and Rumelt 1982, Rivkin 2000). Learning by observing has seen much less attention, a notable exception being the work on absorbptive capacity (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal 1990).
in the neighborhood of an industry leader. When combinatorial complexity is high, interactions between activities make local exploration much less effective. Thus, combinatorial complexity can be a source of sustained capabilities-based advantage.

The focus here is on a different obstacle to imitation, causal ambiguity. In my analysis, causal ambiguity operates as a barrier to absorptive, or passive, learning. The term “causal ambiguity” in its traditional usage refers to any knowledge-based impediment to imitation (e.g., Saloner et al. 2001, p. 49). The first strategy paper using this term appears to be Lippman and Rumelt (1982, p. 418), who assert, “basic ambiguity concerning the nature of the causal connections between actions and results” can result in persistent performance heterogeneity because “the factors responsible for performance differentials resist precise identification.” Although Lippman and Rumelt (1982) present a formal model, causal ambiguity does not enter into it as a specific object of analysis. Just the same, the preceding assertion is now commonplace (often supported by a reference to Lippman and Rumelt 1982), appearing in everything from foundational scholarly contributions (e.g., Barney 1991, p. 107; Peteraf 1993, p. 182) to MBA textbooks (e.g., Besanko et al. 1996, p. 552; Collis and Montgomery 1998, p. 34; Grant 2002, p. 238). The point of view taken here is that when “causal ambiguity” is as broadly defined as “the state in which managers do not know how their actions map to consequences,” the statement “managers experience causal ambiguity” is indistinguishable from “managers don’t know what they’re doing,” in which case a bias toward plain language should favor the latter. This paper is motivated by the interesting possibility, as initially raised by Lippman and Rumelt (1982), that a particular type of confusion can arise in the context of competitive imitation that is both “causal” and “ambiguous” in a precise sense of both words.

To explore this possibility, I create a model in which firms are conceptualized as a collection of activity centers, with differences in firm performance arising from differences in activities undertaken. This is consistent with Porter (1996) and the previously cited work on combinatorial complexity. Here, however, managers cannot choose the entirety of firm-wide activities with deterministic precision but, instead, can only foster influence relations between subordinates who themselves decide which activities get done. Different influence networks generate different probability distributions over activities and, hence, different levels of expected profit. The potential imitator knows neither the stochastic implications of influence structure nor the actual influence relations chosen by an industry exemplar. It does, however, observe the activities of the exemplary firm and, from these observations, may be able to piece together the network of influence relations underlying its successful performance.

Where does causal ambiguity enter the analysis? First, when the behavior of activity centers is consistent with the overarching network of influence relations (in a very natural way), the firm’s operations can be represented as a stochastic causal system. As a result, a potential imitator can attempt to learn the influence structure of a rival by applying standard techniques of causal inference to that rival’s observed activities. Second, because the imitator begins with subjective beliefs about the stochastic implications of influence relations and about the true structure underlying the superior performance of its target—i.e., beliefs over probabilities—ambiguity is also at play; thus am I able to provide precise definitions of both subjective causal ambiguity, pertaining to the imitator’s subjective beliefs, and intrinsic causal ambiguity, a measure of an influence network’s inherent resistance to causal inference.

I demonstrate that the intrinsic ambiguity of a firm’s internal influence network presents a long-run upper bound on the subjective ambiguity experienced by its challengers. When financial risk is factored into the analysis, I show that this suggests that imitation is less likely in industries characterized by higher levels of intrinsic ambiguity. Because the relationship between causal ambiguity and the density of influence relations does not increase monotonically, some causally ambiguous strategies may be complex but others deceptively simple. This last point suggests that—contrary to the conventional wisdom—the strategies of small, younger firms may be inherently more difficult to imitate than those of their of larger, more established counterparts. It also implies a normative conclusion that, sometimes, simpler strategies may be better than complex ones. Because the analysis focuses on a firm’s observable activities, my propositions are particularly amenable to direct empirical refutation. Finally, I demonstrate that combinatorial complexity and causal ambiguity are, indeed, distinct barriers to imitation. This leads to the nice implication that, to the extent combinatorial complexity and causal ambiguity are both present in the competitive environment, explorative and absorptive learning

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4 That is, in the technical sense of Einhorn and Hogarth (1986).
are complementary strategic activities, not substitutes. From a positive standpoint, we should expect firms to seek performance enhancement via learning programs of both types.

In the next section, I use some simple examples to illustrate the key concepts. The setup, key assumptions, and essential formal objects are presented in §3. Section 4 introduces a result on the observational equivalence of causal systems from the causal inference literature. Section 5 specifies the degree of managerial rationality assumed in the model. The formal definition of causal ambiguity is presented in §6. The main results are in §7 and §8. Links to the NK literature are discussed in §9, and concluding thoughts are provided in §10. A glossary and proofs to the propositions can be found in the online supplement (provided in the e-companion).

2. “Causal Ambiguity” vs. Other Confusions

Consider a simple version of the setup in Lenox et al. (2006). A potential entrant faces an incumbent in a homogeneous-goods market in which price is set according to Cournot competition with linear market demand \( p(q^c, q^e) = \alpha - \beta (q^c + q^e) \), where \( p \) is price and superscripts \( I \) and \( E \) indicate the incumbent and entrant, respectively. \( E \)'s profit function is

\[
\pi^E(q^I, q^E, a) \equiv (p(q^I, q^E) - c^E(a))q^E - \kappa, \tag{1}
\]

where \( \kappa \) is a fixed operating cost, and \( c^E \) is a constant marginal cost (on \( q^E \)) that depends upon an activity profile \( a \). Suppose, the firm has three cost-relevant activities, each of which can be in one of two states. This is represented as \( a = (a_1, a_2, a_3) \) with \( a_i \in \{0, 1\} \); i.e., \( a \) is a 3-tuple of zeros and ones. For example, if the challenger is an airline, then activities might include the heterogeneity of aircraft types employed, choice of routes, the frequency of service along routes, the specific of frequent flyer programs, passenger boarding procedures, crew decision rights, and so on.

There are \( 8 = 2^3 \) possible joint activity outcomes. Assume the activity–cost relationship is as shown in Table 1. To distinguish between causal ambiguity and combinatorial complexity, this cost function is designed to exhibit maximal combinatorial complexity (i.e., an NK fitness landscape with \( N = 3, K = 2 \)). The cost-minimizing activity configuration is \( a = (111) \). Suppose that (i) the challenger can observe the incumbent’s activities, (ii) managers can simply set all activities to their desired values, and (iii) the market can support two efficient firms. Then, \( E \) enters, implements \( a = (111) \) by managerial fiat and immediately succeeds in imitating \( I \).

Now, consider the ways in which an entrant might misunderstand the situation. It may not know the forms taken by \( p, \pi^E, \) and \( c^E \) or the specific values of \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \); whether there are other entrants lurking in the shadows; the actions available to the incumbent; whether the game is Cournot versus Stackelburg; or whether the incumbent irrationally punishes entrants by flooding the market with product. Each of these problems are well studied in game theory (e.g., games of imperfect information, of incomplete information, subjective games, etc.).

In Lenox et al. (2006), the relationship between activities and cost is not known. Firms attempt to learn this relationship via exploration. To see the problem presented by combinatorial complexity, assume \( E \) enters and, for whatever reason, chooses \( a = 000 \) with \( c^E = 52 \). Suppose \( E \) searches “locally” by experimenting with one activity each period. Among the activity profiles in the one-flip neighborhood of \( 000 \) (i.e., profiles \( 100, 010, \) and \( 001 \)), \( E \) eventually discovers the best, \( 100 \), and improves performance to \( c^E = 32 \). Searching in the local neighborhood of \( 100 \) yields no gains. Hence, in this case, exploration ceases even though the global optimum is not found. Combinatorial complexity acts as a barrier to local exploration.

Any of these confusions could, loosely, be termed “causal ambiguity” in the broadest sense that the entrant does not know the exact consequences of its actions. My goal here is to create a setting in which “causal ambiguity” describes incomprehension with respect to a distinct type of knowledge, one that involves both causality and ambiguity.

What is causal knowledge and why does it matter? One situation in which causal knowledge plays an important role is when agents must choose among interventions designed to shift outcomes in some favored direction. For example, suppose superior performing firms tend to have “high-powered” sales incentive systems coupled with “aggressive” sales cultures. Does the incentive system drive the culture, or is it the other way around? Confusion as to the correct answer might lead a firm to implement...
high-powered incentives and let the sales force adapt when it should have hired an aggressive sales force and then adapted the incentive system to them.

A second situation in which causal knowledge is an issue is when influence relations are not an exogenous feature of the environment but, instead, an object of choice. This is the issue studied here. Both Rivkin (2000) and Ghemawat and Levinthal (2000) suggest that, within the firm, influence relations may be malleable. That is, some strategic decisions may actually involve the creation of a causal system. For example, managerial policies may induce an internal network of influence relations across activity centers. Presumably, different networks generate different outcomes—hence, inducing an effective influence network may be a key strategic objective. If so, learning and imitating an exemplar’s influence structure may be an important step toward improved performance. If the firm knows where and in what direction the influence relations flow, it is well on its way toward successful imitation. Unfortunately, although the exemplar’s operating activities may be observed in great detail, the influence relations driving them may well remain hidden and resistant to discovery, thereby creating a capabilities-based barrier to imitation.

How do managers structure influence relationships between activity centers? At the more tangible end of the spectrum is the organization of work in process between factory units. Organization of this kind is often imposed explicitly, in great detail, and vigorously monitored and enforced. For example, in semiconductor production, manufacturing proceeds through a sequence of activities—planarization, cleaning, etching, diffusion, chemical coating, lithography, oxidation, implantation, sputtering, grinding, polishing, vapor deposition, testing, and spinning—each typically conducted within a specific work unit.

More generally, activity centers (department, shop team, task force, etc.) are influenced by their formal objectives, the individual preferences of their constituent employees (which may be at odds with their formal objectives), the employees’ skills and knowledge, the firm’s incentive and compensation schemes, and so on. It seems uncontroversial to assert that, in the real world, managers do not have the resources or knowledge required to force each and every activity center to produce a desired outcome every period. Rather, senior managers must rely on a set of fairly blunt organizational instruments to push efforts roughly in the desired strategic direction.\(^8\)

Without changing any center’s ability to hit targets (90% success rate), Table 2 summarizes the frequency of joint activities that is, over time, generated by this organizational strategy. As a result, expected cost performance is improved by 5% over the scheme with independent targets. Qualitatively, the influence relationships created by the new policy are neatly summarized by

\[ a_1 \rightarrow a_3 \leftarrow a_2, \]

meaning that activities of area 3 are influenced by the activities of its two independently operating counterparts. When entrant \( E \) knows neither (2) nor the performance implications summarized in Table 2, it faces a problem of causal ambiguity.

Suppose \( I \) is considered a shining example of superior strategic design and, as such, has had its operations examined in intimate detail—in academic papers, business case studies, and the popular press. Assume that \( I \)’s operating history is public but that the organizational structure underlying that performance is hidden to outsiders. \( E \), having read all the studies, is aware of the information in Table 2.

\(^8\) This is in the spirit of Ghemawat and Levinthal (2000, p. 2), who say, “Discussions of cross-sectional linkages often presume that a coherent system of policy choices is arrived at by some process of a priori theorizing. . . . A more plausible characterization is that a firm makes a few choices about how it will compete and these choices, in turn, influence subsequent decisions.”
I call these frequencies the empirical distribution on activities induced by (2) and denote it by \( \mu \).

Assume \( E \) does not know the cost landscape, \( I \)'s organizational strategy (2), nor the rate at which departmental targets are attained. Assume \( E \) has access to all the same productive resources available to \( I \) (and, hence, could instantly imitate if it knew which influence relationships to establish between activity centers). Does Table 2 provide sufficient information to imitate? The answer, as it turns out, is yes. Moreover, the path to enlightenment, in this case, is provided by what are now standard techniques of causal inference.

One hypothesis that might be entertained by \( E \) is that \( I \)'s activity centers operate independently. If so, \( \mu \) is fully described by three influence parameters, \( \theta_1, \theta_2, \) and \( \theta_3 \), each corresponding to a “local” probability associated with the independent operating structure; i.e., \( \mu(a_1 = 1) = \theta_1 \). Then, according to Table 2,

\[
\begin{align*}
\mu(111) &= \theta_1 \theta_2 \theta_3 = 0.729, \\
\mu(110) &= \theta_1 \theta_2 (1 - \theta_3) = 0.081, \\
\mu(101) &= \theta_1 (1 - \theta_2) \theta_3 = 0.009.
\end{align*}
\]

A moment’s reflection should convince \( E \) (and us) that these equalities cannot be consistently satisfied by any choice of parameter values. Hence, even though \( E \) is ignorant of \( I \)'s hidden operating structure, it should at least rule out “establish independent operations” as its imitative goal.

Alternatively, suppose \( E \) hypothesizes that \( I \) has access to (2). Then, \( \mu \) is fully described by the set of local influence parameters \( \{\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_{3|00}, \theta_{3|10}, \theta_{3|01}, \theta_{3|11}\} \) where, e.g., \( \theta_{3|00} \) is the likelihood that \( a_3 = 1 \) when \( a_1 = a_2 = 0 \). For these to be consistent with Table 2, they must satisfy

\[
\begin{align*}
\mu(111) &= \theta_1 \theta_2 \theta_{3|11} = 0.729, \\
\mu(110) &= \theta_1 \theta_2 (1 - \theta_{3|11}) = 0.081, \\
\mu(101) &= \theta_1 (1 - \theta_2) \theta_{3|10} = 0.009.
\end{align*}
\]

As we know (from the construction of Table 2), these parameters do, indeed, exist. Thus, the entrant cannot rule out (2).

By applying this procedure to the remaining possibilities, the only influence network that survives is the true one. This is so in spite of the combinatorial complexity of the cost function. Indeed, combinatorial complexity does not enter the preceding analysis in any way. By carefully observing the operations of \( I \), \( E \) can infer the efficient structure and imitate \( I \) immediately upon entry (without exploration). As we will see, the transparency of this case happens to be very special. More generally, the optimal network of organizational influence relations is causally ambiguous. This ambiguity can foil inferences of the type illustrated above—a result that does not rely on any assumption of short-run fixity of resources or other exogenously imposed technological constraint (i.e., one that is strictly knowledge based). Characterizing this barrier is the task to which I now turn.

3. The Model

To start, assume that a lone incumbent, \( I \), faces a single potential entrant, \( E \). Because I wish to isolate the effects of causal ambiguity from differences in firm capabilities, assume that both firms have access to identical technologies and resource portfolios. In particular, both firms consist of \( 2 \leq r < \infty \) activity centers. Firms also share a common discount factor \( \delta \).

Competition is dynamic. The timing of events within each period is as follows. \( E \) decides whether to enter and, if so, how to organize its influence relations. \( I \) always enters and implements the superior organization (as described in the next section). Activities are simultaneously generated for \( I \) and, if it enters, \( E \) via a stochastic process that is induced by the firms’ respective influence structures. These activities determine the marginal costs under which the firms compete Cournot-style to receive their payoffs.

3.1. Activities and Performance Outcomes

An activity profile for firm \( i \) in period \( t \), denoted \( a_i^t \), is an \( r \)-vector of zeros and ones; e.g., the \( k \)th component \( a_i^t_k \in \{0,1\} \) so that, e.g., \( a_i^t = (100 \ldots 10) \). Broadly, “activities” are externally observed resource state variables indicating the quality, quantities, or prices of productive inputs, inventory levels, plant locations, composition of workforce skills, production processes utilized, and so on. Define \( A \) to be the set of all possible activity profiles including a null profile, \( a_\varnothing \), to go with the no-entry case.\(^9\)

Let \( \pi^i(a_i^t, a_i^t) \) be the period-\( t \) profit to firm \( i \) when the firms’ activity profiles are \( a_i^t \) and \( a_i^t \). Assume that (i) there is an efficient activity profile \( a^{\text{best}}_i \) such that \( \pi^i(a^{\text{best}}_i, a^{\text{best}}_i) > 0 \), and (ii) there is a profit-minimizing activity profile \( a^{\text{worst}}_i \neq a_\varnothing \) such that \( \pi^i(a_i^t, a^{\text{worst}}_i) = -\kappa \), regardless of the value of \( a_i^t \). Normalize the payoff to staying out of the industry to zero: \( \pi^i(a_i^t, a_i^t) = 0 \) if \( a_i^t = a_\varnothing \) (i.e., not entering implies zero economic profit).\(^10\) Note that the Cournot setup in (1), with \( NK \)-tuned costs, is a special case of these assumptions.

\(^9\) \( A \equiv \{0,1\}^r \cup a_\varnothing \). Unless otherwise indicated, all sets are finite.
\(^10\) It should be mentioned that the following results hold in much more general settings, including those with multiple entrants, large activity domains \( (a_i^t_k \in \{0, \ldots, k\} \), \( k < \infty \), and environments in which individual profits depend directly upon \( a_i \) (allowing, e.g., activity-contingent product differentiation).
3.2. Policy Choices
In this model, the influence network between activity centers is an object of managerial choice (i.e., through organizational policy). I refer to these networks as firm operating structures and, formally, depict them with directed, acyclic graphs in which the nodes correspond to the firm’s individual activity centers and the edges correspond to the direct influence relationships between them. For example, Intel’s arrangement of the 10 semiconductor activities mentioned previously, is described by the graph

\[ a_{10,1}^{\text{Intel}} \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow a_{1,1}^{\text{Intel}}, \]

e.g., the output of vapor deposition directly influences testing results, \( a_{\text{test},\text{dep}}^{\text{Intel}} \rightarrow a_{\text{test},\text{test}}^{\text{Intel}}, \) whereas planarization affects testing as well, but indirectly through its influence on the outcomes of intermediating processes. \(^{11}\)

As an object of analysis, operating structure is intended to capture the actual influence relationships that drive outcomes. Often, these do not correspond to any official organizational chart but, instead, are tacit and, hence, invisible to outside observers (such relationships are commonly referred to as the “informal organization”). For example, Moody (1995), chronicles a year spent at Microsoft shadowing the Encarta design and development team. As Moody (1995) points out, managers often imposed broad structure on the informal organization in the sense I have in mind here; referring to one senior manager, Moody says (p. 217), “His direct interventions in team disputes invariably were in support of Bjerke—an endorsement, it seemed to me, of the decisions she was making,” where Bjerke represented the Design component of this team (the other departments included Development and Marketing). This observation is consistent with

\[ a_{\text{Design}} \rightarrow a_{\text{Development}} \rightarrow a_{\text{Marketing}} \]

Any operating structure is permitted, provided it is free of influence loops (acyclic). \(^{12}\) Structures need not be fully connected nor are they required to be sensible. For example, Intel is allowed to try

\[ a_{10,1}^{\text{Intel}} \rightarrow a_{9,1}^{\text{Intel}} \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow a_{1,1}^{\text{Intel}}, \]

presumably with disastrous results.

Index the various operating structures that can be arranged using the \( r \) activity centers by \( 1, \ldots, m \). Robinson (1977) demonstrates that there are

\[ m(r) = \sum_{k=1}^{r} (-1)^{k+1} \binom{r}{k} 2^{k(r-k)} m(r-k), \quad (3) \]

directed acyclic graphs that can be constructed from \( r \) nodes (where \( m(0) \equiv 1 \)). By (3), \( m(1) = 1, m(2) = 3, m(3) = 25, m(4) = 543, m(5) = 29,281, \) and so on.

Let \( S \) denote the set of \( m \) operating structures available to both firms, with a typical element (structure) denoted \( S_i \) and including a null structure, \( S_\varnothing \). In the initial, entry-organization phase of period \( t \), firm \( i \) chooses a structure \( S_i^t \in S \) in which the options are stay out (\( S_i^t = S_\varnothing \)) or enter using one of the \( m \) non-null operating structures (e.g., \( S_i^t = S_i \)). If \( S_i^t = S_\varnothing \), then \( a_{i,t} = a_{\varnothing} \) is certain.

3.3. Performance Implications of Structure
In the Microsoft case mentioned above, different elements of the Encarta team (at the time, code-named Sendak) had different agendas (Moody 1995, p. 27): “Sendak’s designers and editors would want to pack the encyclopedia with features seen nowhere else… Sendak’s developers would want a far less ambitious set of new features and ample time in which to write code for them.” In this situation, “…which element held sway would largely determine the functionality of the software, the timing of its release and, ultimately, its success in the marketplace” (emphasis added). In this model, the strategic decision facing managers is determining which activity centers “hold sway” over one another. Inevitably, productive activities of all kinds are prone to a certain measure of unpredictability. In addition to independent “noise” at the local level, I assume activity likelihoods vary in systematic ways with choice of influence structure.

To represent these effects, assume that once an operating structure is established, it generates activities according to a stochastic process along the lines presented in the preceding examples. Suppose \( S_i^t = S_j \). The empirical distribution generated by \( S_j \), denoted \( \mu_j \), is a probability distribution on \( A \). Thus, all firms implementing structure \( S_j \) experience the same expected operating performance. Rather than keeping track of the local influence parameters associated with \( S_j \) (i.e., the \( \theta \)s of the introductory example) and then using them to construct \( \mu_j \), I simply take \( \mu_j \) as a primitive and make an assumption that guarantees the existence of parameter values that will generate \( \mu_j \) in
the desired way. This assumption is what makes the activity centers behave as a causal system; it creates a link between structure and activity that makes causal inference possible.

**Assumption 1 (Faithfulness).** For all \( S_k \in S \) and \( i = 1, \ldots, r \):
1. \( a_i \) is \( \mu_k \)-conditionally independent of all its nondescendents given the outcomes of its parents in \( S_i \) and
2. The removal of any edge in \( S_k \) causes item 1 to fail for some \( a_i \).

For example, if \( \mu \) is faithful to (2), then it is the case that, for all \( a \in A \), \( \mu(a) = \mu(a_1) \mu(a_2) \mu(a_3 | a_1, a_2) \) but not \( \mu(a) = \mu(a_1) \mu(a_2) \mu(a_3) \).\(^{13}\) I also assume that the \( \mu_k \) are positive on \( A \) (i.e., managers cannot eliminate undesired action profiles by choice of structure). Let \( F_k \) denote the set of empirical distributions that are faithful to \( S_k \) (i.e., for \( S_k \neq S_k \)).

Let \( \bar{\pi}_k^E \) denote the expected profit for \( E \) when it chooses entry structure \( S_k \) (i.e., before actual activity profiles are generated),

\[
\bar{\pi}_k^E = \sum_{a'^1 \in A} \sum_{a'^2 \in A} \pi^E(a'^1, a'^2) \mu_1(a'^1) \mu_2(a'^2),
\]

(4)

where \( \pi^E(a'^1, a'^2) \) meets the conditions enumerated in §3.1. Assume that there is a strictly dominant operating structure in the sense of maximizing expected profit regardless of the operating structure of one’s competitor. Label this \( S_1 \). Fix the incumbent’s actions to \( S_1 = S_1 \) for all \( t \). Hence, \( E \) certainly enters if imitation is guaranteed. I prefers that \( E \) stay out. Barring that, \( E \) prefers that \( E \) choose an inefficient operating structure because \( I \)’s profit is inversely proportional to \( E \)’s cost.\(^{14}\)

### 4. Observational Indistinguishability Theorem

\( S_1 \) is said to be **observationally indistinguishable from \( S_k \)** if the empirical distribution generated by \( S_1 \) is also faithful to \( S_k \) (i.e., if \( \mu_k \in F_k \)). To see why this distinction is important, suppose that, over a sufficient period of observation, the challenger develops an arbitrarily accurate assessment of the empirical distribution on the incumbent’s activities, \( \mu_1 \). If \( \mu_k \in F_k \) where \( k \neq 1 \), the challenger (who does not observe the incumbent’s actual operating structure, \( S_1 \)) cannot tell which of \( S_1 \) or \( S_k \) is actually generating the results. This is where

the opportunity for confusion arises. \( E \) might choose to implement \( S_k \), in which case direct experience will eventually reveal that it is not the optimal structure.\(^{15}\) However, if \( E \) is worried that the incorrect choice results in very poor performance, it might choose to skip entry and stick with something safer (i.e., its known outside alternative). Alternatively, as I will show, if \( \mu_2 \notin \mu_3 \) then \( S_k \) can, over time, be ruled out strictly via passive observation.

Let \( OI_k \) denote the set of structures with which \( S_k \) is observationally indistinguishable. Under the faithfulness assumption, \( S_1 \in OI_k \) if and only if \( \mu_k \notin F_k \). Thus, if \( S_1 \) is completely “transparent” in the sense that no other structure is observationally indistinguishable from it \((OI_1 = \{S_1\})\), then it is generally only a matter of time before the challenger properly identifies the efficient organization and enters. As we will see, operating structures are, in general, not so transparent.

Consider, for example, the simple operating structure \( a_1 \leftarrow a_2 \rightarrow a_3 \). Suppose that the influence parameters of are \( \theta_2 = 0.90, \theta_{10} = 0.10, \theta_{11} = 0.90, \theta_{30} = 0.80 \), and \( \theta_{31} = 0.90 \). Then, the empirical distribution on activity profiles is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( a_1 )</th>
<th>( a_2 )</th>
<th>( a_3 )</th>
<th>( \mu )</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, this **same** distribution is implied under \( a_1 \rightarrow a_2 \rightarrow a_3 \) by parameters \( \theta_2 = 0.82, \theta_{10} = 0.50, \theta_{21} = 0.98, \theta_{30} = 0.08, \) and \( \theta_{31} = 0.90 \). Similarly, \( a_1 \leftarrow a_2 \leftarrow a_3 \) induces this distribution when \( \theta_3 = 0.90, \theta_{21} = 0.90, \theta_{21} = 0.90, \theta_{10} = 0.90, \) and \( \theta_{11} = 0.90 \). Thus, an observer of (5), could not tell which of these three operating structures actually generated the data.

It would certainly be useful if the observational indistinguishability class of the incumbent’s operating structure could be constructed directly from the features of its influence network (i.e., and not require “brute force” construction by repeated application of Bayes rule to all \( m \) possibilities). Fortunately, as it turns out, this is possible. For the following theorem, given a structure \( S_i \), three activities are said to constitute a local structure identifier (LSI) if two unlinked activities are organized to influence the third directly, e.g., a structure like \( a_1 \leftarrow a_3 \leftarrow a_2 \).

**Theorem 1 (Verma and Pearl 1990).** Two organizational structures are observationally indistinguishable if

\(^{13}\) See Spirtes et al. (2000, p. 13) for additional technical details. Faithfulness turns out to be a “reasonable” assumption in the sense that, under mild regularity conditions, of all possible parameter values (\( \theta \)), the set failing the faithfulness condition has Lebesgue measure zero (Meek 1995).

\(^{14}\) Loss-assuring \( \pi_{\text{ann}} \) implies, for all \( S_k \), that there are faithful empirical distributions, \( \mu_k \in F_k \), under which \( \bar{\pi}_k^E < 0 \).

\(^{15}\) Over time, \( E \) learns that its performance is, on average, different from \( I \)’s (\( \mu_k \neq \mu_i \)). Because \( S_k \) is assumed to be uniquely efficient, it also discovers \( \bar{\pi}_k^E < \bar{\pi}_k^E \).
Suppose, for example, that the incumbent’s organization is \( a_1 \leftarrow a_3 \rightarrow a_2 \). Using Theorem 1, we determine, via visual inspection alone,

\[
O_1 = \{a_1 \leftarrow a_3 \rightarrow a_2, a_1 \rightarrow a_3 \rightarrow a_2, a_1 \leftarrow a_3 \rightarrow a_2\}. \tag{6}
\]

to see this, first note that a structure is observationally indistinguishable with \( a_1 \leftarrow a_3 \rightarrow a_2 \) only if it has the same edges: the only possibilities are those shown in (6) plus \( a_1 \rightarrow a_3 \rightleftharpoons a_2 \). None of the structures in (6) are ruled out because they all have the same set of LSIs (the empty set). However, this is not true of \( a_1 \rightarrow a_3 \leftarrow a_2 \) because, as configured, this structure constains one LSI (in this case, the graph itself).

**Example 1 (Gatekeeper).** Alternatively, consider the following structure involving five activity centers: Budgeting, Engineering, Finance, Manufacturing, and Marketing.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Bud} & \xrightarrow{} \text{Eng} \\
\text{Fin} & \xleftarrow{} \\
\text{Mfg} & \xrightarrow{} \text{Mkt}
\end{align*}
\]

Here, Financial Analysis serves as a gatekeeper, checking Engineering projects against Budget’s projections before forwarding approved projects to Manufacturing and Engineering. By Theorem 1, there are no other structures in the observational indistinguishability class: keeping the edges constant, there is no way to reverse an arrow without breaking an LSI or forming a new one.

This result is important because it demonstrates a general insight on strategic inference with respect to organizational influence: larger and/or denser networks can make the organization more transparent. Moreover, Theorem 1 tells us exactly what kinds of relationships serve to increase this transparency.

### 5. Subjective Rationality

To keep our attention on the causal inference problem, assume that \( E \) is aware of all environmental primitives except (i) which structure is the efficient one consistently chosen by \( I \), and (ii) the actual empirical distributions associated with each of the \( m \) available operating structures.\(^\text{16}\) In this scenario, \( E \) is far better informed than most real-world counterparts would be under similar circumstances. For example, it knows what its resources are, how to parameterize market demand, how to organize its activity centers to create the desired influence relationships, and so on. Still, a crucial piece of the strategic puzzle—which operating structure is efficient—is missing.

Assume that, following each period, \( E \) observes \( I \)’s activity profile. \( E \) also knows its own entry/organization decisions and activity profile outcomes. Therefore, at the start of period \( t \), \( E \) observes a history of the form \( h_t \equiv (h_{I,0}, S_t^1, a_t^1, a_t^F, \ldots, S_{t-1}^F, a_t^{I-1}, a_t^{E-1}) \), where \( h_0 \) is the null history.

I adopt the notational convention of using hats to indicate \( E \)’s assessment with respect to an object. So, whereas \( \bar{\mu}(\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_m) \) summarizes the true empirical distributions associated with each of the \( m \) possible structures, \( \bar{\mu}_t \equiv (\hat{\mu}_1, \ldots, \hat{\mu}_m) \) summarizes \( E \)’s initial beliefs about them. Let \( \hat{\mu}_0 \equiv (\hat{\mu}_{1,0}, \ldots, \hat{\mu}_{m,0}) \) be \( E \)’s initial assessment about which structure is optimal; e.g., \( \hat{\mu}_{1,0} \) is \( E \)’s period-0 belief that \( S_t \) is the true efficient structure (the one employed by \( I \)). \( \hat{\mu}_0 \) is a set of beliefs that is used to weigh other beliefs, thereby adding the ambiguity dimension to the model.\(^\text{17}\) Let \( \hat{\mu}_t(h_t) \) be \( E \)’s updated assessment of \( \mu_k \) given the history \( h_t \). When the history is implied, I write \( \hat{\mu}_{k,t} \) (when it is clear from the context, I further simplify notation by dropping the time subscripts on \( \hat{\mu} \) and \( \hat{\rho} \) altogether). \( E \) is savvy to the idea of using causal inference to infer \( I \)’s operating structure: it knows that, for any \( S_t, \mu_k \in F_t \). Finally, assume that \( E \)’s initial priors are independent, Dirichlet distributed, and result in strictly positive multinomial distributions.\(^\text{18}\)

From \( E \)’s perspective, there are \( m \) relevant “states of the world”—one corresponding to each structure in which that structure is the optimal choice (\( \hat{\rho} \) weighs these states each period). \( E \) may have different assessments conditional upon which state of the world it finds itself.

A dynamic strategy, denoted \( \sigma \), for firm \( E \) specifies a (possibly random) entry/organization choice for every history: formally, \( \sigma(S_t | h_t) \) is the probability that \( E \) chooses \( S_t^F = S_t \) upon observing the history \( h_t \); \( \sigma \) can encode simple strategies (“stay out forever,” “enter in even periods under \( S_t \),” etc.) as well as much more sophisticated, outcome-dependent ones (“fix \( e \in [0,1] \) and enter with \( S_t \) in any period \( t \) where \( \hat{\rho}_{k,t} \geq 1 - e \),” “employ NK-style search from period \( t \) on,” “embark on a subjectively optimal program of Bayesian experimentation,” etc.).

Assume \( E \) is subjectively rational, meaning that (i) beliefs are updated in Bayesian fashion, and

16 Previous versions of this paper included uncertainty about the general mapping from activity configurations to payoffs and, in the case with multiple entrants, the strategies of rivals. The results were virtually identical at the expense of a massive increase in mathematical complexity.

17 In this formulation, \( \hat{\mu} \) depends upon \( \hat{\rho} \). See the online proofs supplement for the technical details.

18 The Dirichlet assumption is primarily to ensure that \( E \) can, indeed, update its beliefs in response to new information. Interested readers are referred to Neapolitan (2004, p. 309).
(ii) $\sigma$ maximizes the subjective expected present value of profits in every period. Given the assumptions, entry from period 1 on is, in fact, the optimal strategy. The only way imitation is forestalled, therefore, is if $E$'s subjective assessments are persistently wrong. If $E$ is allowed to believe anything (e.g., "Martians always strike down imitators with death rays") then finding beliefs that cause imitation to fail is trivial. However, $E$ is not only a subjective optimizer, but also a rational learner—its beliefs are properly updated in response to new information. Thus, it is not obvious that there are any initial beliefs that, ultimately, cause imitation to fail.

6. Causal Ambiguity

Given this setup, it is possible to introduce two measures of causal ambiguity, one with respect to the inherent transparency of the incumbent’s operating structure and another with respect to a firm’s subjective beliefs regarding which structure that is. Given perfect knowledge of $\mu_1$ (I’s empirical distribution), there is a limited number of structures that $E$ might confuse with $S_1$ under the faithfulness assumption. The idea is to relate this number to the subjective beliefs of $E$ over time under Bayesian learning. Presumably, $E$’s beliefs must at least converge (almost surely) to place positive weight only on structures faithful to $S_1$. Less obvious is whether, under subjective rationality, the opportunity to enter and experiment with structures of its own implies that $E$ must inevitably learn the efficient structure.

**Definition 1.** Given beliefs $\hat{\rho}$, $E$’s subjective degree of causal ambiguity is

$$\lambda(\hat{\rho}) \equiv -\sum_{k=1}^{m} \hat{\rho}_k \ln(\hat{\rho}_k).$$

This measure ranges from zero to $|\ln(m)|$ (a positive number). It equals $|\ln(m)|$ when the challenger’s priors regarding the optimal structure are uninformative (i.e., $\hat{\rho}_1 = \cdots = \hat{\rho}_m = 1/m$) and zero when the challenger is certain that it knows which structure is the optimal one. This definition is useful because it summarizes each firm’s uncertainty regarding the efficient structure in a single number. Let $m_1$ be the number of structures that are observationally indistinguishable from $S_1$ (i.e., the set cardinality of $O_1$).

**Definition 2.** The intrinsic ambiguity of $S_1$ is $\lambda^* \equiv |\ln(m_1)|$.

Intrinsic ambiguity is equal to the subjective degree of causal ambiguity when managers place equal weight on, and only on, the elements of a structure’s observational indistinguishability set. Other than the requirement that $E$ not initially rule out any structure from potentially being the efficient one, $\hat{\rho}$ is fairly unrestricted. Therefore, it is not obvious what, if any, long-run relationship exists between $\lambda$ and $\lambda^*$. For example, if the subjectively optimal strategy specifies entry and experimentation until the true structure is discovered, $\lambda$ must eventually converge to 0.

Suppose, for example, that there are three structures in the observational indistinguishability class of $S_1$. Then $\lambda^* = \ln(3) = 1.1$. Suppose that $r = 3$ and that $E$ has uninformative initial beliefs (places equal weight on each of the $m = 25$ possible structures that it is the efficient one). Then, $\lambda(\hat{\rho}) = \ln(25) = 3.2$. Alternatively, the structure in Example 1 has $\lambda^* = 0$ even though, in total, there are $m = 29,281$ ways to organize these units. Compare this against $a_1 \leftarrow a_3 \rightarrow a_2$, which has $\lambda^* = 1.1$ even though $m = 25$.

7. Result on Long-Run Ambiguity

The questions of interest in this section include the following, assuming $E$ stays out and, hence, gains no first-hand knowledge regarding the structure—performance relationship: To what extent does $E$ learn to predict the I’s operating activities? How accurate does $E$’s assessment eventually become regarding the efficient structure? What is the relationship between intrinsic ambiguity and $E$’s long-run subjective ambiguity?

First, how well does $E$ come to predict I’s operating behavior? Let $\hat{\mu}_t^I$ denote $E$’s period-$t$ assessment of the incumbent’s true empirical distribution. Then, the answer, provided by the next lemma, is that $\hat{\mu}_t^I$ converges to reality with probability 1. Because I’s activities are stochastically determined, it is always possible that the actual history observed by $E$ will, by pure chance, happen to mimic data driven by some distribution other than $\mu_1$. What the lemma says is that, over time, large discrepancies between $E$’s beliefs and the truth are highly unlikely. This degree of learning occurs even under a strategy of strictly passive observation ($E$ stays out forever).

**Lemma 1.** For all strategies $\sigma$ and initial beliefs $\hat{\rho}$, $E$’s subjective assessment $\hat{\mu}_t^I$ converges in probability to $\mu_1$. Formally,

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \hat{\mu}_t^I = \mu_1.$$

20 The reference distribution in these propositions is always reality (i.e., the distribution over histories implied by the policy choices of I and E and the true empirical distributions associated with each operating structure).
Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 imply that $E$’s beliefs regarding $I$’s operating structure are virtually certain to become concentrated with weight 1 on the set of structures in $S'_1$’s observational indistinguishability class, $OI_1$. Thus, because causal structures induce specific, well-defined regularities in the observations they induce, shrewd scrutiny of incumbent conduct cannot but help to reduce the number of structures considered likely candidates for imitation. This important result is stated formally in the following proposition.

**Proposition 1.** For all strategies $\sigma$ and initial beliefs $\hat{\mu}$, $E$’s subjective likelihood that $S'_1 \in OI_1$ converges in probability to 1:

$$\text{plim } \sum_{S'_1 \in OI_1} \hat{\rho}_{k,t} = 1.$$  

As we now know, more activities permit more linkage choices, which can, in many cases, make the overall structure more transparent. More generally, $E$’s subjective ambiguity is limited by the intrinsic ambiguity of $I$’s operating structure as described in Corollary 1, below.

**Corollary 1.** For all strategies $\sigma$ and initial beliefs $\hat{\mu}$, $E$’s subjective degree of causal ambiguity converges in probability to a number bounded by the intrinsic ambiguity of $S'_1$:

$$\text{plim } \hat{\lambda}(\hat{\rho}_t) = x \leq \lambda^*.$$  

Even the challenger that never enters and, hence, never experiments with operations of its own, eventually learns the incumbent’s empirical distribution to an arbitrary degree of accuracy. By Theorem 1, this limits beliefs with respect to what the incumbent is actually doing to generate its observed behavior. Of course, under sufficient experimentation, ambiguity may be reduced even further and, perhaps, eliminated altogether. However, even these results are sufficient to refine the NK hypothesis.

**Corollary 2.** $E$’s subjective degree of causal ambiguity converges in probability to a value that is not monotonic in the combinatorial complexity of the profit function.

Corollary 2 makes an important point about causal ambiguity in the real world, one that slips through the intuitively appealing reasoning employed in traditional discussions on this topic. Causal ambiguity arises as an issue in strategy because it is thought to be a source of the kind of confusion that prevents managers from imitating the performance of their more successful competitors. As we see in (3), the aggregate number of feasible causal structures is, indeed, exponentially increasing in the number of observed activities. However, the very context of the problem—posed as a challenger attempting to imitate a successful incumbent—already implies that the challenger observes certain aspects of the exemplary firm’s behavior. This, in turn, implies the possibility of applying the tools of causal inference to the observed history. Over time, $E$ learns $\mu$, and, in turn, the observational equivalence class of structures capable of generating it.

Sometimes problems with a lot of choices are hard to solve and sometimes they are easy—it all depends upon the ruggedness of the landscape. Similarly, if points on a rugged landscape emit data according to a location-specific causal process, then sometimes the area of search is small and sometimes large—it all depends upon the degree of causal ambiguity. As in (7), the lucky case for the entrant is when the incumbent’s location can be narrowed down to a single point. Such cases may be rare because the intrinsic ambiguity of most operating structures is greater than zero. Of course, once causal inference is taken as far as it will go, $E$ may very well wish to enter and apply active learning procedures to assess the remaining options. The fact that $\lambda^* < |\ln(m)|$ implies that learning by observing always results in a reduction in the search space.

### 8. Result on Sustained Advantage

Because $E$ controls the same technology as $I$, any sustainable advantage for the incumbent is “capability based” in the sense of Saloner et al. (2001, pp. 41–55). Therefore, $I$ is said to sustain a strong capabilities-based advantage if $E$ never enters. This is a very strong form of imitative failure. In this case, the incumbent’s advantage with respect to the potential entrant is sufficient to guarantee it monopoly profits. Alternatively, a weak advantage is one in which $E$ never imitates. $I$ would enjoy a weak advantage if $E$ attempted imitation, found a profitable but suboptimal structure and decided the risks of further organizational innovation offset the perceived benefits. A strong advantage implies a weak advantage but not conversely (hence, the terminology).

To decide its course of action, $E$ must conduct a subjectively rational risk analysis. That is, $E$ must convert its beliefs regarding its various organizational options—whatever their degree of ambiguity—into an appropriate profit assessment. Ambiguity by itself is never sufficient to deter entry or imitation. For example, an entrant may have strong expectations that entry is profitable under any of the firm’s feasible range of activity profiles (i.e., the entrant’s priors place high probabilities on good outcomes under every choice of structure). Even if this assessment is overly optimistic, entry occurs and, at best, only a weak advantage obtains. However, if entry is perceived to be sufficiently risky, it may be deterred altogether (with causal ambiguity playing a key supporting role). To capture these considerations, I now introduce the following risk measure.
Definition 3. The intrinsic risk of $S_i$ is

$$\xi \equiv -\left(\frac{1}{m_i} \lambda^E_i - \frac{m_i - 1}{m_i} \kappa^E\right).$$

It is important to note that this measure does not depend upon $E$’s subjective beliefs—it is computed from the objective primitives of the model. To interpret $\xi$, consider a situation in which sufficient time has passed that $E$’s beliefs regarding $\mu_i$ are arbitrarily accurate (as Lemma 1 guarantees). Suppose that no entry has occurred up to this point. $E$ knows that there are $m_i$ structures in $\mathcal{O}_1$, and that one of these structures is the one generating $\mu_i$. What $E$ does not know is which empirical distributions go with which structures. In this case, a lower bound on the worst possible payoff should $E$ choose unwisely is $-\kappa$.\footnote{For each structure $S_i$ and all $\epsilon > 0$, there exists an empirical distribution $\mu_i \in \mathcal{F}_i$ such that $\bar{\pi}^E_i = \epsilon - \kappa.$} $\xi$ is the Bayes risk (see DeGroot 1970, pp. 121-123) of an extremely pessimistic challenger who knows the true empirical distribution is $\mu_i$ but has uninformative beliefs with respect to which structure in $\mathcal{O}_1$ is the efficient one.

Proposition 2. Assume that $E$ knows $\mu^E_i = \mu_i$. If $\xi < 0$, then $I$ does not enjoy a strong capabilities-based advantage nor, with probability 1, does it enjoy a weak capabilities-based advantage.

If $\xi < 0$, then entry happens immediately because even the most pessimistic beliefs cannot deter it. Indeed, the situation is even worse: $E$ not only enters but persists in experimenting until imitation succeeds. Although I may enjoy a weak advantage for some time, it is highly unlikely to last forever (i.e., there are sequences of random events under which $E$ never imitates, but they occur with probability 0). Eventually, $E$ figures out that its current structure is not performing to expectation and tries something different (because $\xi < 0$, $E$ does not exit). Notice the connection to intrinsic ambiguity. When intrinsic causal ambiguity is zero, $m_i = 1$ and $\xi < 0$. This implies the following corollary.

Corollary 3. Assume that $E$ knows $\mu^E_i = \mu_i$. If $\lambda^E = 0$, then $I$ does not enjoy a strong capabilities-based advantage nor, with probability 1, does it enjoy a weak capabilities-based advantage.

The point of Corollary 3 is that, regardless of the financial risk, $E$ will always enter and, with virtual certainty, successfully imitate the incumbent when the operating structure of the latter is intrinsically transparent. Essentially, this structural transparency eliminates financial risk by making the likelihood of successful imitation enormous relative to the likelihood of failure.

It is very important to note that, when $\xi \geq 0$, it is not hard to construct subjective beliefs that support $E$ staying out with probability 1. This holds even though, in this setup, the direct cost of entry/imitation is zero. Interestingly, subjectively optimal experimentation—as must arise under the assumption that $E$ is subjectively rational—is not sufficient to assure objectively optimal behavior. Corollary 3 confirms the conventional wisdom in strategy insofar as causal ambiguity is a necessary condition for imitation to fail. However, it is not sufficient: if the financial benefit of successful imitation is too strong relative to the cost of failure, challengers enter and doggedly experiment with organizational structures until they get it right. To gain some intuition into these effects and their relationship to $\xi$, let us turn to a final example.

Example 2. Consider a situation in which there are two activity centers ($r = 2$). Let $S_1 = a_1 \rightarrow a_2$, $S_2 = a_1 \rightarrow a_2$, and $S_3 = (a_1, a_2)$. Let $E$’s initial priors on $S^E = S_1$, $S^E = S_2$, and $S^E = S_3$. Because $E$ knows that $\mu^E_i = \mu_i$ is generated by a causal system, it knows at least that $S^E \in \mathcal{O}_1 = \{S_1, S_2, S_3\}$.

In addition to not knowing which structure is the optimal way to organize its two activity centers, it also does not know the empirical distribution associated with the wrong choice. Assume that $E$ is very pessimistic: it believes the wrong choice of structure generates the bad activity profile $a^{\text{wrong}}$ with certainty, resulting in an expected loss equal to fixed operating costs $\kappa$.\footnote{More properly, $E$ believes $a^{\text{wrong}}$ occurs with probability $1 - \epsilon$ for $\epsilon > 0$ arbitrarily small, a technical detail I ignore for the purpose of the example.}

Now, from $E$’s perspective, if it enters and chooses wisely, it enjoys expected profit of $\pi^E_{\text{good}}$ where $\pi^E_{\text{good}} = \pi^E_1 = 1$. However, if it chooses unwisely, it suffers an expected loss of $\pi^E_{\text{bad}} = -\kappa$. To simplify things even further, assume that exploration is incredibly effective; specifically, if $E$ enters in period 1, then it learns beyond a doubt whether its organization is the efficient one. Of course, if $E$ stays out, it learns no additional information.

$E$ has three logical choices: (i) stay out, (ii) enter under $S_1$, and (iii) enter under $S_2$. If staying out is optimal in period 1, given the fact that $E$ learns nothing new, it is also optimal in period 2. The net present value of the stay out strategy is, therefore, 0. If $E$
enters under $S_1$, then, with probability $\hat{\rho}_1$, it earns period 1 profits of $\hat{\pi}_1^{good}$ and with probability $(1 - \hat{\rho}_1)$ a loss of $\hat{\pi}_1^{bad}$. However, by entering in period 1, it learns the correct structure and, therefore, is assured a payoff of $\hat{\pi}_1^{good}$ in period 2. Recalling that the discount rate is $\delta$, the subjective expected present value of this plan is

$$V_1 \equiv \hat{\rho}_1 \hat{\pi}_1^{good} + (1 - \hat{\rho}_1) \hat{\pi}_1^{bad} + \delta \hat{\pi}_1^{good} = (\hat{\rho}_1 + \delta) \hat{\pi}_1^{good} - (1 - \hat{\rho}_1) \kappa.$$  

Similarly, $E$’s assessment of the present value of entering under $S_2$ is

$$V_2 \equiv (\hat{\rho}_2 + \delta) \hat{\pi}_1^{bad} - (1 - \hat{\rho}_2) \kappa,$$  

where $\hat{\rho}_2 = (1 - \hat{\rho}_1)$.

Because $E$ is subjectively rational, if it does enter, it chooses the structure corresponding to the larger of $V_1$ or $V_2$. This is entirely determined by the larger of $\hat{\rho}_1$ or $\hat{\rho}_2$. Let $V_e = \max\{V_1, V_2\}$. Then, because it can stay out and be assured a payoff of 0, $E$ does not enter if $V_e < 0$, that is

$$(\hat{\rho}_e + \delta) \hat{\pi}_1^{good} - (1 - \hat{\rho}_e) \kappa < 0,$$  

where, because $S_e$ is the value-maximizing entry choice, $\hat{\rho}_e \geq \frac{1}{2}$. Rearranging terms,

$$\frac{1}{2} \leq \hat{\rho}_e < \frac{\kappa - \delta \hat{\pi}_1^{bad}}{\kappa + \hat{\pi}_1^{bad}}.$$  

This example highlights several insights that carry through to the more general case. First, condition (11) and, hence, the possibility of failed imitation only arises as a result of causal ambiguity. If $E$ knows that $S' = S_1$ (i.e., $\hat{\rho}_1 = 1$), it always enters and earns $(1 + \delta) \hat{\pi}_1^{bad}$. Second, entry offers the opportunity to gain additional knowledge via direct experience. Here, all of the learning happens in one period. This is unrealistically fast, but is consistent with what happens over longer periods (with high probability). Thus, the pessimistic $E$ must trade off the benefit from learning (here, getting $\hat{\pi}_1^{bad}$ for certain in period 2) with the downside of implementing the wrong structure in period 1. From condition (11), we see that $E$ is less likely to enter the more impatient it is (low $\delta$) and the lower the relative benefit to learning (i.e., the size of $\hat{\pi}_1^{bad}$ relative to $\kappa$). In particular, when $\kappa - \delta \hat{\pi}_1^{bad} < \frac{1}{2}$, the payoff to experimentation is sufficiently large that $E$ always enters.

Tying the example back to our main result, note that $m_1 = 2$ so that

$$\xi = -\left(\frac{1}{2} \hat{\pi}_1^{bad} - \frac{1}{2} \kappa\right).$$

Suppose $\xi < 0$. Then, $\hat{\pi}_1^{bad} - \kappa > 0$. But, from (10) and the fact that $\hat{\rho}_e \geq \frac{1}{2}$, this implies that $E$’s subjectively best choice of entry structure (whichever it is) results in a strictly positive expected payoff in period 1. Therefore, there is no trade-off to make—entry is the strictly dominant, subjectively optimal decision! Keep in mind, we constructed $E$’s beliefs to be maximally pessimistic given its knowledge of $I$’s operating performance. Thus, if $E$ enters under these beliefs, it enters under any beliefs (consistent with $\hat{\rho}_1 = \mu_1$). Moreover, even in the more general case, $E$ never exits the market. It continues to learn and adopt subjectively optimal structures until (with probability 1) it succeeds in imitating.

Let me conclude this section with the following observation. Because $\xi$ is constructed from objective primitives, Proposition 2 is, in theory, empirically refutable. In the simplest setting, this requires estimating $\mu_1$ and $\hat{\pi}_1^{bad}$ from incumbent operating data. The estimate of $\mu_1$ then implies $OI_1$, and, hence, $m_1$. Finally, $\kappa$ would be estimated as the expected profit in the worst-case organizational scenario. In the real world, the analysis is complicated by hidden causal relationships, multiple firms, etc. However, analytic techniques do exist for estimating causal structures from the data they generate under these complications. Refuting the corollary is a somewhat simpler affair, requiring “only” the estimation of $\mu_1$ and comparing the resulting $\lambda$ to some measure of imitative success within the industry of study.

9. Causal Ambiguity vs. Combinatorial Complexity

As illustrated by the introductory example, my model can be specified to extend Lenox et al. (2006) in a very transparent way, thereby facilitating comparisons with the growing number of strategy applications that utilize the NK formalism. Specifically, with profits determined by the equilibrium in a Cournot game with activity-determined costs that are NK tuned, the preceding results in no way depend upon any choices for $N$ and $K$. This demonstrates that causal ambiguity is, indeed, a distinct barrier to imitation. Still, comparisons must be made with care. Here, unlike Lenox et al. (2006), activities in my model are (quite purposefully) not managerial choice variables. Thus, on one hand, I have shown a set of circumstances under which managers facing an NK-complex cost landscape can avoid the correspondent search problem by applying causal inference to the operations of the incumbent.25 On the other hand, as the astute reader might (rightly) point out, this result is achieved by shifting the object of managerial choice from action profiles to operating structures, thereby

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25 When $\lambda = 0$, $E$ need not know anything about the mapping from action profiles to costs (or even profits) to imitate successfully.
causing a mismatch on a very critical dimension. As Rivkin (2000) is careful to emphasize, the issue is the complexity of the decision problem; i.e., the mapping from decisions/policies/choices to payoff outcomes.26 Thus, because the only policy variable here is choice of operating structure, one might suspect that the original, complex decision problem was simply replaced with a relatively simple one.

To see that the essential message of this paper with respect to imitation withstands this observation, it suffices to consider an instance of the model in which the choice of operating structure is, itself, NK complex. To make things concrete, return to the three-activity case. By (3), there are 25 possible operating structures that meet the acyclical requirement (not counting the stay-out option). Arbitrarily index these 1 to 25 and assign each their number in five-digit binary (e.g., structure #1 = 00001, #9 = 01001); the optimal structure need no longer be #1. As we know, assuming the incumbent chooses the optimal structure (whichever one it is), each five-digit string corresponds to an expected payoff; e.g., if the optimal structure happens to be #2, the entrant gets an expected payoff of \( \pi^2(S_{00001}, S_{10001}) \) when it picks structure #9. It should be easy to see that by manipulating the demand parameters, cost function, and activity probabilities, we can tune \( \pi^2 \) to any level of NK complexity.27

My model is sufficiently general to allow \( E \) to adopt a strategy \( \sigma \) in which it enters and pursues an exploration strategy using an NK-style hill-climbing algorithm. Indeed, the model requires that \( E \) do exactly this whenever subjective rationality demands it. At the same time, because \( \sigma \) must be optimal with respect to \( E \)'s updated beliefs in every period, the implications of causal inference must also be respected. That is, to the extent that causal inference rules out certain structures, these must be removed from the set upon which \( \sigma \) searches. Therefore, my results complement the NK studies by saying something about the likely “area of the landscape” upon which firms in a particular industry search (as well as how that area changes over time).

Viewed in this way, the theory implies that explorative and absorptive learning strategies should not be viewed as substitutes but as complements, each defeating a different type of learning barrier. My results demonstrate that passive learning (e.g., accumulating competitive intelligence) inevitably shrinks the search space upon which active learning operates. Conversely, active learning (e.g., attempts at de novo innovation via experimentation) create new information that cannot but help to refine a firm’s understanding of how the world works, thereby improving its ability to decipher the behavior of an industry’s superior performers.

From a positive point of view, subjective rationality implies both of these approaches are constantly being weighed, with efforts on each typically being applied contemporaneously. Thinking of firms as employing either an active or passive imitation strategy is too narrow. When intrinsic ambiguity is low, more emphasis may be placed on the latter (only in the extreme case of zero ambiguity is exploration entirely uncalled for). When ambiguity is high, less is learned by observing, the benefits to exploration are greater and, as a result, we should observe more of it. This also implies some caution in inferring firm strategies from outcomes: innovative search on a landscape narrowed by causal induction can produce outcomes that—to the outside observer—look either more like imitation or more like innovation.

10. Conclusions

On one hand, the preceding results confirm the conjecture that causal ambiguity may well play an important role in developing a capabilities-based advantage. On the other, its mere existence is not sufficient to ensure it. Given enough experimentation, an entrant eventually discovers the optimal operating policy. More patient firms place greater weight on the benefits of experimentation and, hence, are more likely to adopt exploration strategies. Firms with a fairly high level of confidence (lower subjective ambiguity) in their ability to imitate may also view the downside to doing so sufficiently limited that they attempt it. This confidence may be misplaced. Even so, once the process of exploration begins, it may yet lead to success.

My results highlight three dimensions that are important in analyzing the sustainability of capabilities-based advantages under causal ambiguity: (1) the intrinsic riskiness of entry associated with the optimal structure, (2) intrinsic level of causal ambiguity of that structure, and (3) the accuracy of challenger beliefs with respect to the elements in this class. The first item is intimately related to the second. However, items 1 and 2 are not sufficient to guarantee a strong capability-based advantage—challengers’ initial priors (item 3) also play a strong role. Sufficiently optimistic challengers always enter in the short term and may spend a long time experimenting, thereby reducing a strong capabilities-based advantage to, at best, a weak one.

If the implied performance differences between causal structures are small, then picking a random

26 Lenox et al. (2006) is similarly careful; the interpretation of binary strings as “activity decisions” happens to arise naturally in their setting.

27 At least to within an arbitrary margin of error.
structure in the equivalence class is almost as good as
imitating the incumbent. As described above, the
bias under such circumstances should be toward sus-
tained entry. However, there is also little incentive to
literally imitate the incumbent, especially if changing
causal relations involve switching costs (not consid-
ered here). Entry occurs and erodes the incumbent’s
profits, but the incremental return to entrants getting
it exactly right is low. If imitation is risky (high intrin-
sic ambiguity coupled with high risk), the opposite
dynamic is at work. That is, the risks of entry keep
such activity low, but those firms that do enter are
compelled to get it right.

One of the more interesting findings, especially
given the growing interest in the relationship of
complexity to performance, is that denser causal rela-
tionships do not necessarily imply greater causal
ambiguity. The fact that more interrelationships
between observable operating variables may actu-
ally reveal a lot to potential imitators has implica-
tions. Much has been written, for example, about the
relative performance advantages enjoyed by South-
west Airlines and the difficulty of its larger com-
petitors in their attempts to imitate it. This is true
even though its activities are simpler than its com-
petitors and fairly transparent (and, indeed, well doc-
umented). The organization is informal, there is no
ticketing, routes are simple point-to-point, equipment
is standardized, and teams are independent.28 Each
of these operational features imply either fewer influ-
ence relations between activities or greater difficulty
in observing heterogeneity in outcomes (e.g., due
to equipment standardization). These devices make
strategic sense if they have the effect of simplifying
operations in a way that increases the intrinsic ambi-
guity of Southwest’s operations and, thereby, prevent
imitation. Moreover, this argument does not rely upon
any assumption of resource “stickiness” on the part of
Southwest’s competitors. Rather, the linkages adopted
by Southwest may be sufficiently ambiguous, and the
risk of experimentation sufficiently high, that imita-
tion is foreclosed.

For similar reasons, small startups may be more
difficult to imitate than larger, established firms—
which may be one reason they tend to be good ac-
quision candidates (i.e., because this may be the
only way to observe their hidden structure). Alterna-
tively, outsourcing is a way to introduce independ-
encies in observed operations. Done appropriately,
this can actually increase the level causal ambiguity
connected to a firm’s strategy. So-called “flat” or-
nizations (a feature of Southwest) also push in the
direction of fewer interrelationships. Although it may
be simple enough to create a flat organization, it may
be quite difficult to do so successfully—even when
observing the behavior of those who have.

Finally, let us speculate on some possible exten-
sions of this theory. Throughout the analysis, it was
assumed that the incumbent simply implemented
the optimal structure. An obvious extension is to
examine the incumbent as a strategic player. For
example, it seems unlikely that a firm would adopt
an easily imitated operating structure, even though
highly efficient. What are the competitive trade-offs
between operating performance and causal ambigu-
ity? Answering this may improve our general under-
standing of when, e.g., the kinds of simplifying and
decoupling devices seen at Southwest are likely to be
implemented for strategic purposes.

It was also assumed that causal relationships be-
tween key, observable operating variables could be
represented by directed acyclic graphs. When im-
portant operating variables are not observed, this
assumption is no longer appropriate because correla-
tions may be induced by hidden causes. In such cases,
more general approaches must be used (e.g., “chain”
graphs) to represent the relations observed by out-
siders. Fortunately, the literature on probabilistic net-
works includes numerous approaches to this issue.

Another significant assumption was that managers
knew the causal implications of their operating plans.
However, the strategy literature also raises the pos-
sibility that these implications may not be known,
resulting in causal ambiguity with respect to one’s
own structure. Also, the actions of senior managers
aim not only to implement an appropriate set of inter-
relationships between operating entities but also to
affect the local behaviors of those entities (i.e., to
influence the parameters that determine the empiri-
cal distribution). It may be worthwhile to extend
the analysis presented here to these cases.

Finally, much of the literature on probabilistic net-
works is concerned with the empirical exercise of esti-
mating equivalence classes of causal structures from
real-world history. This raises the interesting possi-
bility of investigating the propositions presented here
via empirical methods.

11. Electronic Companion
An electronic companion to this paper is available as
part of the online version that can be found at http://
mansci.journal.informs.org/.

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