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The Indirect Effects of Tipping Policies on Patronage Intentions through Perceived Expensiveness, Fairness, and Quality
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  • Michael Lynn, Cornell University
  • Shuo Wang, Cornell University
Publication Date
1-1-2013
Abstract

Many service firms allow their employees to be directly compensated by customers via the institution of tipping despite the fact this practice exposes firms to substantial risks, such as collusion between employees and customers against the firm. This paper examines a potential reason businesses may accept these risks. Specifically, it reports on a study finding that voluntary tipping policies increase potential demand by reducing perceived expensiveness, increasing perceived tipping policy fairness, and increasing a-priori expectations of service quality.

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Required Publisher Statement
© Elsevier. Final version published as: Lynn, M., & Wang, S. (2013). The indirect effects of tipping policies on patronage intentions through perceived expensiveness, fairness, and quality. Journal of Economic Psychology, 39, 62-71. DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2013.07.003. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.

Citation Information

Lynn, M., & Wang, S. (2013). The indirect effects of tipping policies on patronage intentions through perceived expensiveness, fairness, and quality [Electronic version]. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, School of Hospitality Administration site:http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/37