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Analyzing Framing Processes in Conflicts and Communication by Means of Logical Argument Mapping

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This paper has been published in the meantime:


However, in this publication a passage at the end of p. 153 has been deleted by the publisher (pp. 18-19 in this version).

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Abstract:

The primary goal of this chapter is to present a new method—called Logical Argument Mapping (LAM)—for the analysis of framing processes as they occur in any communication, but especially in conflicts. I start with a distinction between boundary setting, meaning construction, and sensemaking as three forms or aspects of framing, and argue that crucial for the resolution of frame-based controversies is our ability to deal with those “webs” of mutually supporting beliefs that determine sensemaking processes. Since any analysis of framing in conflicts and communication is itself influenced by sensemaking—there is no “frame-neutrality”—the main problem for an analyst is to cope with his or her own cognitive limitations. LAM offers a solution to this problem. The method will be exemplified with an analysis of two conflicting interpretations of how the international community should deal with Hamas after its election victory in 2006.
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Introduction

Based on a long debate on “framing” in areas like communication theory, conflict research, and policy studies we know that an understanding of framing processes is crucial when it comes to problems like communication; social, cultural, and political interaction; deliberation; and the resolution of conflicts and controversies. Whenever we try to understand something or talk to each other, framing is involved in one way or another.

Up to this point there is agreement in the literature about “framing.” This agreement, however, disappears when we ask for a precise definition of the term. What exactly is “framing”? Looking at the various ways the concept has been used, I would propose a basic distinction between “semiotic” and “cognitive framing,” and a further one that differentiates semiotic framing into “boundary setting” and “meaning construction.” In “boundary setting” we frame something by talking only about certain things, that is we are using language in a way that indicates what is excluded from our horizon of awareness and what is included. This process of setting boundaries around an issue comes closest to the literal meaning of “frame” as something that surrounds something else, say a painting or a mirror. “Meaning construction,” on the other hand, refers to the process of assigning meaning to the things within our boundaries by using further signs. For example, we present ideas in a certain light, we explain things, or we indicate approval by gestures and body language, mimics, prosody, and so on.

Both boundary setting and meaning construction are “semiotic” processes of framing because they depend on the use of signs. On the one hand, these signs indicate how somebody sets the boundaries around an issue or constructs the meaning of what is within these boundaries; on the other, we can use signs deliberately to induce certain interpretations of events, facts, or utterances in an audience. While semiotic framing can thus be defined as the process of producing signs, “cognitive framing” is the process of interpreting signs, actions, other people, and so on. Cognitive framing happens all the time when we are making sense of what is going on around us. While semiotic framing in its two forms of boundary setting and meaning construction can be used both deliberately to influence what other people think and unconsciously in any communication, cognitive framing—which I will call “sensemaking” in this context—happens either unconsciously or mediated by reflection. Of course, the way somebody makes sense of something
can become visible again in the signs this person produces in semiotic framing.

In the literature, the concept of framing is mostly used in ways that cover more than one of the concepts I propose. However, C. West Churchman (1979) and Werner Ulrich (2001, 2003) come closest to my concept of “boundary setting” when they describe mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion as “boundary judgments.” “Meaning construction” has been addressed more specifically in the approaches of Gregory Bateson (1972 <1955>) and George Lakoff (2002). And “sensemaking” as a cognitive process of framing has been described by Marvin Minsky (1997 <1974>).

A first objective of this chapter is to define meaning construction, boundary setting, and sensemaking more clearly so that we can answer the question whether these processes can be taken as different forms of framing that could exist independently of each other, or as different aspects of one and the same process of framing. With regard to this question, I will argue that meaning construction and boundary setting are indeed two possible forms of framing, but that both of them are inseparably connected with the more fundamental cognitive process of sensemaking. While we can set semiotic framing deliberately and strategically into play, the way we do this is always conditioned on prior processes of sensemaking. When we are using signs to communicate something in a certain way, we are guided by a certain understanding of what is going on, that is the cognitive process of sensemaking precedes semiotic framing. There is no boundary setting and meaning construction, I would argue, without prior sensemaking.

A consequence of this consideration is that changing mechanisms of sensemaking is key for the resolution of conflicts and the improvement of communication in those situations where the main problems are mutual misunderstanding and conflicting interpretations of what is going on. When we observe that parties to a conflict interpret the same events completely differently or when their understanding of their opponents does not fit to these opponents’ intentions, then we know that changing the underlying sensemaking mechanisms is crucial for a productive development of the conflict.

I am convinced that changing sensemaking mechanisms is possible when they can be visualized to the sensemaker in a way that motivates self-critical reflection (Hoffmann, 2008). That means, we need methods and tools that are specifically designed to support the visualization of sensemaking processes. However, even if we have got those methods and tools, there is still another problem: If we assume that sensemaking visualization methods should be used by mediators and facilitators in conflicts, or by external analysts, and if we assume that sensemaking is basic for all human cognition, then it seems to be clear that any analysis of sensemaking processes is itself influenced by what it analyzes: sensemaking. As Donald Schön and Martin Rein argued in their book Frame Reflection (1994), there is no “frame-neutrality”; there is no view from nowhere, and this is true also for those who are not personally involved in an issue, who are
“only” observers:

there is a generic, theoretical difficulty that does not yield in any obvious way to careful methods of observation and analysis. Frames must be constructed by someone, and those who construct frames (the authors of this book, for example) do not do so from positions of unassailable frame-neutrality. They bring their own frames to the enterprise and, what is more, they may be unaware of doing so. (Schön & Rein, 1994, p. 36)

This, indeed, is the deepest dilemma for those working on the question of how communication, interaction, and the resolution of conflicts and controversies might be possible when failures of mutual understanding are caused by conflicting sensemaking mechanisms. On the one hand, we know how sensemaking mechanisms work in principle, but since we know as well that they are a universal, inevitable phenomenon, we have to concede, on the other hand, that any concrete reconstruction and analysis of framing processes is itself determined and constrained by the very same mechanisms it attempts to describe—only on a different level.

The main objective of this chapter—after clarifying the processes of boundary setting, meaning construction, and sensemaking—is to present a method for the analysis of framing processes that is designed to cope with the problem of missing frame-neutrality on the analyst’s side as far as it is possible. In the literature on framing, the most differentiated instrument for the analysis of framing seems to be the typology of frames developed by Barbara Gray in several publications (Gray, 2003, 2006, 2007). Gray distinguishes, for example, a series of different “conflict management frames” that become visible in the ways stakeholders try to deal with a conflict; “power frames” that describe how parties perceive and create social and moral authorities, roles, and the distribution of resources; “social control frames” that refer to disputants’ expectations about how decisions in society will be made; “whole story frames” that sum up the essence of a conflict in a few sentences; “identity frames” and “characterization frames” by which we describe ourselves and others; and frames on how to deal with risks, and gains versus losses.

The main idea of Gray’s approach is that a “frame analysis” that is based on such a typology of frames can both improve our understanding of what is going on in a conflict, and “can also create opportunities for reframing or for frame enlargement among the parties—processes which may increase civil dialogue among them and increase possibilities for collaborative action.” Those “frame-based interventions” include: “(a) self-reflective frame exploration, (b) perspective taking exercises that encourage disputants to begin to hear (without judgment) the ways other disputants experience the conflict, and (c) rewriting of stereotypes” (Gray, 2007, p. 224). Additionally, such a frame analysis can help us to distinguish those aspects of a conflict that are negotiable and those that are not (Campbell & Docherty, 2006).

Compared to Gray’s approach to frame analysis, my suggestion for a method to analyze framing processes is very different. Based on the distinction between boundary setting, meaning con-
struction, and sensemaking, and based on the thesis—which I elaborate in the first section—that the crucial point for the resolution of frame-based controversies is our ability to deal with entire “webs” of mutually supporting beliefs, my approach is more holistic. Instead of identifying and separating frames by means of a typology, I am focusing on the visualization of the argumentative structure of stakeholders’ positions as a whole. The basic idea is the following: If sensemaking processes that form the cognitive basis of understanding are determined by webs of mutually supporting beliefs, then a substantial change of mind (“reframing”) is only possible when the whole web is addressed. Since “mutually supporting” regarding beliefs can be translated into the assumption that there is an inferential structure among those beliefs, the best way to represent those webs of beliefs should be to present them as networks of mutually supporting arguments. However, since those networks can be very complex, we need special methods to visualize their structure. For this reason, the method I am proposing for the analysis of framing processes focuses on the graphical construction of argument maps. The inferential structure of such a map would then be the glue that holds beliefs together.

The method I am proposing is called Logical Argument Mapping (LAM). It has originally been developed as a tool to induce cognitive change in stakeholders who participate in facilitated conflict negotiations (Hoffmann, 2005). While LAM has been designed in this initial approach as an intervention tool, the focus here is on using it as an analytical tool. My goal is to show that the method can be used for the analysis of framing processes as they are visible in texts, narratives, and communication.

With regard to both these possible applications of Logical Argument Mapping, three considerations are crucial: first, that visualizing what we think about an issue helps us to reflect on our own thinking; second, that the best way to represent entire “webs” of mutually supporting beliefs is to present them as networks of mutually supporting arguments, that is as an argument map with an inferential structure; and third, that imposing the normative standard of logical validity on the construction of argument maps (a) challenges the analyst to reconstruct an argumentation completely so that its soundness can be evaluated; (b) helps to visualize implicit assumptions; and (c) involves the analyst in a kind of dialectic process in which she deepens, on the one hand, step by step her understanding of the material and, on the other, is enabled to overcome, at least partly, the limitations of her own sensemaking mechanisms.

This last point leads us back to the problem of frame-neutrality in the analysis of sensemaking processes. Although there is, of course, no guarantee that a logical consistent representation of a framing process that an analyst constructs is adequate, true, objective, or not biased by this analyst’s own sensemaking processes, imposing logical consistency as a normative standard that must be fulfilled in any reconstruction of an argumentation has three advantages. The first one is that it prevents premature simplifications, motivates a complete reconstruction of a position, and
fulfills thus a minimal requirement of fairness. The reason for that is that a deductively valid reconstruction of an argument forces us to add premises that are not explicitly stated, mostly those premises—called “inference rules”—that we need to justify that a reason somebody provides for a claim is indeed sufficient to make this claim a necessary conclusion. For example, if someone offers the proposition $p$ as a reason for the claim $q$, this simple argument can easily be transformed into a logically valid argument by adding the premise “if $p$, then $q$.” This additional premise works as an inference rule in the argument. Making this inference rule explicit in an argument reconstruction creates not only a much stronger argument, but visualizes at the same time a new challenge: We see now that it might not only be necessary to defend our reasons by further arguments, but also the inference rules. Based on the need to defend those reasons and inference rules, the analyst is forced to reconstruct not only an argument, but an entire argumentation—defined here as a set of mutually supporting arguments—as completely as possible.

The second advantage of establishing logical validity as a normative standard for argument mapping is linked to the first one. Since nobody would propose a certain reason $p$ for a certain claim $q$ without implicitly assuming that $p$ is indeed a sufficient reason for $q$, visualizing an inference rule like “if $p$, then $q$” means visualizing a part of a stakeholder’s implicit beliefs. Although Logical Argument Mapping, by making inference rules explicit, might create more than is explicitly provided in a given text or statement, what gets constructed in this way could be more important than what is directly visible because implicit beliefs determine sensemaking processes.

The third advantage is the following: If an analyst is challenged to reconstruct the belief system of a stakeholder in the form of a logically valid argumentation, his or her analysis will be guided, and can be evaluated, by a clear standard. Trying to meet the normative standard of logical validity means that the analyst will have to revise and refine the reconstruction as long as it takes to represent the stakeholder’s position as completely and adequately as possible. The reason for this is that a logically complete reconstruction of an argument reveals immediately its weaknesses. We might accept, for example, someone’s reason for a claim as being true, but we may doubt the acceptability of the inference rule once it has been visualized. If this inference rule is not acceptable in itself, the stakeholder whose position we try to analyze must either have further reasons for this inference rule, or this inference rule is a weakness in his argument, or our reconstruction was not adequate from the start. This way, Logical Argument Mapping is a method that provides a solution for the problem of missing frame-neutrality: Although an analyst can never be sure that her analysis is not biased by sensemaking mechanisms, she will at least remain challenged to reconstruct positions as completely as possible, and as close to a stakeholder’s intention as it can get. Although there is no guarantee of frame-neutrality, the method in itself poses a challenge that realizes an imperative for controversial dialogues that has been formulated by Thomas Aquinas already hundreds of years ago: to make an opponent’s argument as strong as possible before you criticize it.
The following considerations are divided into three parts. In the first one, I describe the problem that Logical Argument Mapping is supposed to address more precisely, especially the role of “webs” of mutually supporting beliefs for framing processes. The second part tries to clarify the concept of framing by defining boundary setting, meaning construction, and sensemaking. The third part, finally, introduces Logical Argument Mapping as a method for analyzing framing processes. As an example of such an analysis, I reconstruct two conflicting arguments about Hamas, the Palestinian organization that won the election on January 25 in 2006, and that is listed by many countries to this date as a terrorist group.

The problem

In order to clarify, first of all, the problem space that I am trying to address, it might be useful to start with the distinction between “disagreements” and “controversies” that has been introduced by Schön and Rein with regard to policy disputes. While the former “may be settled by reasoned discourse ... in which the parties to contention are able to resolve the questions at the heart of their disputes by examining the facts” and by “recourse to evidence to which all of the contending parties will agree,” controversies are—according to their terminology—“stubbornly resistant to resolution through the exercise of reason” (Schön & Rein, 1994, p. 3). This intractability of controversies results from problems with those “facts” that are rather unproblematic for disagreements:

“Facts” play a very different role in policy controversies than in policy disagreements.

First, the parties to a controversy employ different strategies of selective attention. Depending on their views of the issue, they differ as to what facts are relevant. For example, in debates over the alleged decline of the welfare state, political controversies tend to focus on data that pertain to economic competitiveness. They argue that welfare expenditures erode the comparative advantage of industrialized countries and undermine their ability to compete with Third World industry. Liberals, on the other hand, tend to dismiss the ‘can’t afford’ arguments of the conservatives; they focus on data that demonstrate either the need for income support or the inequity of income distribution.

Second, even when the parties to a controversy focus their attention on the same facts, they tend to give them different interpretations. For example, a secular trend that shows an increase in the proportion of men not working may be seen either as evidence of a decrease in opportunities for work or as a deterioration in the will to work. In the War on Drugs, a decline in the rate of interdiction of drug-runners at the borders of the United States and Mexico may be seen either as a sign of the ineffectiveness of the policy of interdiction or as evidence that the strategy is functioning as an effective deterrent. (Schön & Rein, 1994, pp. 4-5)

But why is the recourse to “facts” problematic in controversies? Why are people selective in
their attention, and why do they interpret differently what they select as relevant? And why shouldn’t it be easy to overcome those difficulties? Prominent answers to these questions have been suggested in philosophy on the one hand, and social psychology on the other.

In philosophy, Robert Fogelin proposed some time ago a distinction that is similar to Schön and Rein’s distinction between “disagreements” and “controversies,” namely that between “normal” argumentative exchange and “deep disagreements.” While “normal” exchange takes place “within a context of broadly shared beliefs and preferences” (Fogelin, 1985, p. 3), we “get a deep disagreement when the argument is generated by a clash of framework propositions” (p. 5). Looking at disputes like those over the morality of abortion and affirmative action quotas, Fogelin argues that agreement is only possible when there is “a shared background of beliefs and preferences” (p. 5). However, if there is “a clash of framework propositions,” no appeal to reasons or facts can change people’s minds. Although a rational approach would try “to surface these background propositions and then discuss them directly,” experience shows that the main problem is that “we do not simply find isolated propositions” at the root of deep disagreements, “but instead a whole system of mutually supporting propositions (and paradigms, models, styles of acting and thinking) that constitute, if I may use the phrase, a form of life” (pp. 5-6).

Fogelin’s main argument is that “deep disagreements cannot be resolved through the use of argument, for they undercut the conditions essential to arguing,” namely first of all the condition that any argument must eventually refer to a shared framework of background assumptions (p. 5). However, it is less clear what exactly the relevance of his considerations on the systemic character of our beliefs is. This point has been clarified by Allen Buchanan in a paper on “social moral epistemology” (Buchanan, 2002). Buchanan shows that any “web” of mutually supporting beliefs can easily be defended against any sort of evidence to the contrary by ad hoc hypotheses. An ad hoc hypothesis is a hypothesis whose main function is to keep systems of belief consistent without changing core assumptions. The idea and the concept have been developed in philosophy of science to describe the strategies scientists often use to avoid what Thomas Kuhn called “paradigm shifts,” that is a “revolution” of systematic bodies of knowledge.¹

In order both to illuminate the distinction between ad hoc hypotheses and core assumptions and to clarify the concept of “webs of beliefs,” it might be useful to reflect in a little more detail on some recent discussions in philosophy of science. Based on a long and thorough criticism of logical positivism—the tradition that determined philosophy of science in the first half of the previous century—there is widely shared agreement today that scientific hypotheses cannot simply be justified by reference to particular observations. Justifying the objectivity of knowledge by

means of particular evidence seems to be impossible since any observation, but especially observations intended to justify hypotheses about non-observable entities like atoms, neutrinos, quarks, etc.—which are, obviously, the most important and interesting ones in science—is considered “theory-laden,” that is influenced by those theories and conceptual frameworks that we need to determine what we are talking about. Helen Longino emphasized that the relation between hypotheses and the states of affairs that are supposed to provide the evidence for these hypotheses is always “mediated by background assumptions that themselves may not be subject to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation, and that may be infused with metaphysical or normative considerations” (Longino, 1990, p. 75).

For instance, a set of footprints preserved in volcanic ash at Laetoli and discovered by Mary Leakey in 1976 is cited as evidence that bipedal hominids had developed at least 3.59 million years ago. Here, too, assumptions are required to connect the data to the hypothesis. In this case the assumptions are generalizations embedded in coherent and accepted understandings (theories) of sets of phenomena. For instance, simple and readily made observations enable us to gauge the pressure exerted by the feet of fully upright walkers and quadruples or knucklewalkers, and to establish the foot design necessary for these forms of locomotion. This facilitates the inference that the prints were left by hominids rather than by incompletely bipedal or nonbipedal creatures. Contemporary physics and chemistry have seen the development of a number of different but mutually consistent tests for dating fossils and other remains. This mutual coherence supports reliance on the potassium-argon test that assign to the volcanic tuff an age of 3.59 to 3.77 million years. (Longino, 1990, p. 110)

It is an entire “web” of theories, assumptions, and beliefs that determine what we “see” when taking certain observations as “evidence” for certain hypotheses. This web, however, is not simply an amorphous mass but it is structured in a way that we can distinguish core assumptions and those assumptions on the “fringes” that are easier to change. Core assumptions—since they are uncontroversial for entire fields or epochs—are often so basic that people do not even know that their scientific work is determined and constrained by them; they remain unconscious and tacit. Longino hints at the classical, mechanistic philosophy that replaced piece by piece the Aristotelian world view in the rise of modernity, and that determined eventually what kind of questions were asked and which hypotheses seemed to be appropriate and which not (pp. 94-102). Over centuries, for example, scholars took the Aristotelian distinction of four different kinds of causation for granted—causa materialis, causa formalis, causa efficiens, and causa finalis—while the mechanists accepted only what we know today as the cause–effect relation, that is causa efficiens in Aristotelian terms. How crucial this shift was becomes evident when we consider that Aristotle’s causa finalis and the teleology and “purpose-orientation” it involved formed a kind of ‘natural bridge’ to Christianity that did not hold anymore in the centuries to come.

Our ideas about causation are obviously part of our core assumptions. Hardly anybody reflects
on them in the normal course of doing science, we take them simply for granted. But when somebody comes up with the suggestion that it should be time for change—that we should give up or fundamentally revise, for example, the whole idea of causation since it is insufficient to grasp new phenomena such as instabilities, nonlinear dynamics, chaos, complexity, self-organization, pattern formation, and so on—many of us might react with *ad hoc* hypotheses like, “These are only extraordinary phenomena that can be dealt with without changing our core assumptions on causality.”

These considerations about hierarchically structured webs of belief and the need for background assumptions that mediate between claims and evidence are not only relevant for philosophy of science, but also for an understanding of cognitive processes in general. This is exactly the point that Allen Buchanan makes when he uses the distinction between *ad hoc* hypotheses and core assumptions to clarify the difficulties we face when it becomes necessary to change our mind and to “reframe” our perceptions. Any argument and evidence that counters one’s position can be rejected by *ad hoc* assumptions that enforce a “systematic exclusion” of alternative perspectives. Referring to his own childhood in the racist American South, Buchanan describes this point as follows:

As a result of this structural inequality, which greatly reduced the chances that whites would have experiences that revealed the full mental capacities of blacks, the belief in the mental inferiority of blacks was deeply entrenched. As a result, when a particular black person clearly exhibited extraordinary mental abilities, instead of abandoning their belief in blacks’ natural inferiority, whites simply appealed to another strand in their complex web of racist beliefs: the notion that the presence of some “white blood” in a black person could raise him above the low position of blacks generally. Thus, instead of regarding the experience of seeing extraordinary mental abilities in a particular black person as disconfirming the universalization that blacks are mentally inferior, whites “saved the hypothesis” by assuming that that black person “must have some white blood.” (Buchanan, 2002, p. 139-40)

That means, in short, that the framing processes described by Schön and Rein—selective attention and different interpretations of what gets selected—can be explained by the existence of webs of mutually supporting beliefs that are highly dynamic when it comes to counterevidence, but absolutely petrified with regard to core assumptions.

In social psychology, Daniel Bar-Tal developed—in an attempt to explain the intractability of conflicts like those in Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Kashmir, and the Middle East—the concept of a “sociopsychological infrastructure” that works like “a prism through which society members construe their reality, collect new information, interpret their experiences, and make decisions about their course of action” (Bar-Tal, 2007, p. 1430). Simply in order to cope with pain, threats, stress, exhaustion, and costs inflicted by an intractable conflict, and in order to withstand the rival, parties on both sides must develop a sociopsychological infrastructure that allows them to
form and maintain a strong social identity, to develop a sense of differentiation and superiority, and to motivate solidarity, mobilization, and action. All this, of course, stabilizes first of all the conflict itself and makes it resistant to any change.

While Bar-Tal proposes a rather narrow definition of “intractability” that includes, for example, “physical violence in which society members (soldiers and civilians) are killed and wounded” (p. 1432), it seems fair to assume that similar sociopsychological mechanisms are relevant in all sorts of conflicts, controversies, and deep disagreements. They can explain why it is so hard to change whole systems of belief. It is easier to react to challenges to belief systems by means of *ad hoc* hypotheses than risking one’s own social and individual identity in a “revolution of thinking” whose outcome and costs—cognitive and others—are impossible to anticipate.

At this point, however, I would argue that it is a mistake to assume that webs of beliefs and sociopsychological infrastructures are relevant only in conflicts and controversies. If we assume—following the already mentioned idea of “theory-ladenness of observation” (Hanson, 1972 <1958>)—that any cognitive access to something in our environment is *conditioned*, and constrained, by those conceptual frameworks, theories, beliefs, values, attitudes, models, images, and narratives that we have at our disposal in a certain moment, then it is clear that there are no “facts” that could simply be taken for granted. Any perception, any understanding of something, is at least co-determined by the cognitive means we bring with us, as individuals as well as as societies and cultures. The task is always to mentally present the world around us, and since this world is in flux and full of complexities, interdependencies, and without priorly defined boundaries and structures, any representation is inevitably a reduction and simplification that raises the question: what is an *adequate* representation?

Fogelin’s and Buchanan’s talk about whole “systems,” or “webs,” of mutually supporting beliefs provides a good description of how those reductions and simplifications work. But these holistic webs and systems are not only relevant for people in controversies; rather, they form the framework of conditions on which any knowledge and any understanding whatsoever depends. The point is only that usually there is not much of a need to reflect on this fact. Only in conflicts is a reflection on those hidden conditions of understanding necessary and useful.

This epistemological argument is the main reason for my previously formulated assumption that sensemaking processes are indeed a universal and inevitable phenomenon. The cognitive mechanisms described by Buchanan and Bar-Tal not only stabilize social and personal identities, but also help us to cope with any sort of complexity most efficiently; efficiently from a cognitive point of view. Since there is no reason to assume that people with an academic background are any different from anybody else regarding basic, cognitive principles, the crucial message at this point must be that the analyst of a controversy—although equipped with all the tools of her discipline—is, in the end, no better off than the parties whose framing mechanisms she analyzes.
To sum up these considerations, we can conclude that there are two fundamental problems when it comes to framing processes. On the level of framing as the subject of our analysis, we can see that there are two main reasons that it is so hard to overcome the phenomena of selective attention and different interpretations: first, because any perception of something is determined by webs of mutually supporting beliefs and, second, because stabilizing those webs as part of a robust sociopsychological infrastructure is simply efficient from a cognitive point of view. And on the level of framing as a process in which we ourselves are involved as analysts, we have to acknowledge that we are subject to the same mechanisms we try to describe and manage; there is no frame-neutrality. And this again means that we need specific methods to cope with this problem.

**Boundary setting, meaning construction, and sensemaking**

It is easy to see that what Schön and Rein discuss as “selective attention” can be connected to what I dubbed “boundary setting,” a term that refers to what C. West Churchman (1979) called “boundary judgments.” A discussion of this concept recently played a significant role in so-called “critical systems thinking” in management and organization theory. As Flood (1999) describes it, the starting point of critical systemic thinking in the sense of Churchman is the insight “that the human mind is not able to know the whole, ... that every worldview is terribly restricted” (p. 252). One important implication of this limitation has been illuminated by Werner Ulrich as follows:

No argument can be completely rational in the sense of justifying all the assumptions on which it depends as well as all the consequences it may have. What ought to count as knowledge, that is, as relevant circumstances, ‘facts’ and ‘evidence’ that should be considered? And what counts as relevant concerns, that is, value judgments concerning purposes, measures of success and other criteria of evaluation (‘norms’)? Whose facts and whose concerns should they represent? Ultimately, there is no single right way to decide such questions. Yet at some point argumentation has to end and practical action has to begin. *Boundary judgments* define the boundaries of argumentation. (Ulrich, 2001, p. 91; see also Ulrich, 2003)

While the term boundary “judgment” seems to presuppose explicit statements and considerations on how to define those boundaries, “boundary setting”—as I use the term—can also be performed implicitly simply by talking only about a selection of things. I would propose the following

**Definition of “boundary setting”:**

Boundary setting is the process of producing signs in a way that the entirety of the signs used in a certain situation indicates which issues, facts, values, norms, con-
cerns, involved people, etc. are within the sign user’s horizon of awareness and which are outside.

While the concept of boundary setting allows us to reflect on mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, the concept of “meaning construction” provides a means to reflect on the fact that everything that is within the boundaries of our awareness can itself be interpreted by completely different reference systems. Gregory Bateson (1972 <1955>) used the example of two monkeys he observed in the zoo biting each other. Although this biting was similar to what can be observed in real fights, it was obvious to him that what was happening was only play. He concluded that even animals are able to engage in what he called “meta-communication.” They exchange signs that allow them to distinguish whether a biting has to be framed as play or as serious fight (p. 179). We can observe processes of meaning construction only if people produce certain signs that indicate how they interpret an issue, and how they want others to interpret this issue. Based on this consideration, I would define “meaning construction” as follows.

**Definition of “meaning construction”:**

Meaning construction is the process of producing signs in a way that the entirety of those signs indicate a reference systems (i.e. a “frame”) that determines the meanings somebody assigns to the issues, facts, values, norms, concerns, involved people, etc. that are within the sign user’s horizon of awareness. The signs produced can be language-related signs, but also mimics, gestures, voice modulation, body language, dressing, and things like diagrams, maps, charts, etc.).

This definition builds on a similar definition proposed by Barbara Gray:

> Framing refers to the process of constructing and representing our interpretations of the world around us. We construct frames by sorting and categorizing our experience—weighing new information against our previous interpretations. (Gray, 2003, p. 12)

While Gray focuses on framing from the first person perspective—without, as it seems, making a clear distinction between *semiotic* (i.e., the process of producing signs) and *cognitive* framing—my definition is formulated from an observer’s point of view. For this perspective it is crucial that identifying and analyzing processes of meaning construction depend heavily on hypotheses and guesses. We cannot see how somebody “interprets” something; the only thing we can see is what we interpret as signs for a certain way of constructing meaning. The “entirety” of signs I am referring to is, of course, always relative to our own capacities—and time—to observe those signs.

Constructing meaning is important, on the one hand, for parties to a conflict who use framing strategically, “aiming to persuade others to our point of view, gain advantage in negotiations,
and rally like-minded people to our causes” (Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufman, 2006, p. 209). On the other hand, it is a central instrument for conflict management. Thus, Gray (2006) argues for framing as a “mediation technique. ... The mediator’s role is to help frame the conflict and its potential resolution in a way that all parties perceive to be fair” (cf. Drake & Donohue, 1996, p. 314; Dewulf et al., 2005, p. 3).

While my definitions of “meaning construction” and “boundary setting” stress the expressive side of what happens in communication and interaction—both are defined as semiotic processes—there is of course also an underlying cognitive process that determines how we set boundaries in concrete situations, and how we construct the meaning of what is within those boundaries. I call this cognitive process “sensemaking.”

**Definition of “sensemaking” and further involved concepts:**

Sensemaking is the process of interpreting data in a way that they fit into a belief-value-attitude system. “Data” can be externally observable signs, people, things, events, etc., but also ideas or thoughts. A “belief-value-attitude system” is a web of beliefs, values, and attitudes that is consistent from its bearer’s point of view. A “belief” is defined here as that cognitive state we are in whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true, implicitly or explicitly; thus, a belief is representable in the form of a factual or conditional statement. “Values” are defined as behavior guiding beliefs that are based on principles, needs, interests, or preferences. “Attitudes” are emotions someone feels with regard to certain data. The “fit” of data into a belief-value-attitude system can be achieved in three different ways: (a) by constraining the data (neglecting what is incomprehensible, or interpreting it in a way that it fits); (b) by changing the system; or (c) by a mixture of (a) and (b).

This definition relates my discussion of webs of mutually supporting beliefs in the first section of this chapter to “framing as sensemaking” as discussed recently by Deborah Shmueli, Michael Elliott, and Sandra Kaufman. They describe how frames are used as

... cognitive devices or shortcuts for making sense of complex information ... These cognitive structures help reduce information overload and operate as models of reality that, by necessity, trade detail for clarity. Frames organize phenomena into coherent, understandable categories, giving meaning to some observed aspects while discounting others that appear irrelevant or counterintuitive. This selective simplification filters people’s perceptions and defines their fields of vision. It can lead to sharply divergent interpretations of an event. (Shmueli et al., 2006, p. 208)

The important point is that while sensemaking refers to understanding and interpreting in my terminology, meaning construction refers to expression and sign production. The three defini-
tions I am proposing here to distinguish different meanings of the term “framing” are supposed to fulfill various functions:

1. They allow a distinction between *semiotic* and *cognitive* processes of framing. This is important because it is possible to construct meanings and set boundaries in deliberate contrast to what we really think about an issue. We can use semiotic framing strategically, or we can lie about something, or simply frame an issue according to conventions that are determined by cultural standards like politeness. Sensemaking as a cognitive process, by contrast, is always determined by a need for consistency, even if we do not necessarily know whether our belief-value-attitude system is consistent or not.

2. Based on the distinction between semiotic and cognitive framing we can say that while it is possible to make sense of something without expressing anything about it, any boundary setting and meaning construction *depends* on sensemaking. Therefore, while sensemaking might be independent of the semiotic processes, the semiotic processes are not independent of their cognitive foundation.

3. Two elements of the definition of sensemaking allow us to explain concrete cases of boundary setting and meaning construction: first, that whatever we observe or communicate gets to be interpreted by means of a certain belief-value-attitude system and, second, that the process of interpreting and integrating data is driven by efforts to keep the whole thing consistent—or at least to avoid obvious contradictions.

4. The distinction between the two semiotic processes of framing on the one hand and sensemaking on the other is necessary for the analysis of framing processes from an observer’s point of view. Since we can never directly observe how people interpret what is going on in their environment, any analysis depends on the signs people use in boundary setting and meaning construction. Only signs are directly observable, although their meaning depends necessarily on interpretation. That means, when we try to reconstruct cognitive sensemaking processes, we are dependent on semiotic processes as proxies.

5. The distinction between boundary setting and meaning construction is important because it makes a difference whether we simply do not talk about certain things or interpret what we are talking about in a certain way.

**Logical Argument Mapping**

Allen Buchanan in the article discussed above stresses that, in a situation where webs of mutually supporting beliefs are defended by *ad hoc* hypotheses, there is no way to change things when we try to refute one point after the other without “attacking a large set of mutually supporting
“beliefs” as a whole (Buchanan, 2002, p. 140). Understanding conflicting sets of mutually supporting beliefs, values, and attitudes in their entirety is obviously also crucial for the analysis of conflicts. However, the possibility of such an analysis depends on our ability to represent and to visualize, first of all, such a web as a whole. Just this is the main function of Logical Argument Mapping (LAM), the method I want to propose here for the analysis of framing processes as they are visible in boundary setting and meaning construction.

A second function is that visualizing what we think as analysts about a stakeholder’s web of beliefs helps us to clarify our own thinking process. In Logical Argument Mapping we enter a kind of dialectical process that leads us back and forth between improving our own understanding of the material and revealing the limits of the material’s rationality. The significance of visualizations for cognitive processes has been stressed by many in the field of argument mapping. The idea goes back to Charles Peirce’s concept of “diagrammatic reasoning” (Hoffmann, 2004, 2007b), but it got real momentum when software tools became available for things like “dialog mapping” (Conklin, 2006), “argument visualization” (Kirschner, Buckingham Shum, & Carr, 2003), and “knowledge cartography” (Okada, Buckingham Shum, & Sherborne, 2008).

The decisive difference between Logical Argument Mapping and the majority of tools developed in these fields is that LAM requires logical validity as a normative standard for the construction of arguments (see Hoffmann, 2007a). This is supposed to fulfill the method’s third function: to cope with the problem of missing frame-neutrality, that is the problem that even an impartial observer is always constrained in his or her analysis by certain beliefs and background assumptions. As discussed at the end of the introduction, the normative standard of logical validity poses a permanent challenge for an analyst to revise and refine the reconstruction of a stakeholder’s position as long as it takes to represent it as completely and adequately as possible. The rules and the procedure of Logical Argument Mapping are defined in a way that the user is permanently challenged to reflect on how to improve her or his construction or reconstruction of an argument in order to meet this standard.

Three simple rules define the normative standard of LAM: (1.) Represent your main argument—and every sub-argument that might be controversial—according to an argument scheme whose deductive validity is evident or can be made plausible (e.g., modus ponens, modus tollens, disjunctive syllogism, conditional syllogism, etc., but also argument schemes that are transformed from invalid forms into valid ones like complete induction, argument from perfect authority, and argument from perfect analogy). (2.) Consider the acceptability of all your premises, and provide further arguments for those whose acceptability is either not evident or controversial. And (3.), make sure that all your premises are consistent with each other.
The details of the method are described elsewhere. In this chapter, I will concentrate on an example that shows how the method can be used for the analysis of two conflicting framing processes. The LAM maps below represent the analysis of two articles that were published after Hamas won the Palestinian elections on January 25, 2006. The broader horizon of both articles is, roughly, the question of how the international community should deal with Hamas. I do not have any intention to decide who is right and who is wrong in this controversy, and I am not interested to reflect on any further considerations that should be discussed to decide this question, or to get a more appropriate picture of the problem—although it should be clear, based on the problem of frame-neutrality discussed above, that I cannot exclude being biased myself either.

The selection of both articles is more or less arbitrary; I found them (in March 2007) by searching the most recent publications on Hamas that are listed in the “Web of Science” database which provides web access to three ISI databases: Science Citation Index Expanded, Social Sciences Citation Index, and Arts & Humanities Search. Based on the selection criteria of these databases and the journals they cover, the scientific quality of both articles shouldn’t be a concern.

Shortly after the elections, in the March-April issue of Foreign Affairs, Michael Herzog published an article titled “Can Hamas be tamed?” (Herzog, 2006). A short biographical note at the end of the article describes the author as:

a Brigadier General in the Israel Defense Forces and a Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He was formerly the senior military aide to Israel’s Minister of Defense and the head of strategic planning for the IDF.

The second article was published by Khaled Hroub a few months later in the summer 2006 issue of Journal of Palestine Studies under the heading “A ‘new Hamas’ through its new documents” (Hroub, 2006). As a short note says, Khaled Hroub, “a leading expert on Hamas, is the author of Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (IPS, 2000) and Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide (forthcoming from Pluto Press, 2006)” (p. 6).

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2 A manual that provides—besides descriptions of the rules, conventions, and the procedure—lists of logically valid argument schemes, and also some conflict schemes to represent objections, is available at http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~mh327/LAM. See also Hoffmann (2009).
The first step in a LAM analysis is to identify the central claim of a position, and to formulate this claim as the conclusion of an argument. Since the understanding of an argument is facilitated when we know the central claim from the very beginning, and based on Western reading habits, this claim is always located on top of the map in the left corner.\(^3\) (Further mapping conventions are described in Figure 1.) Starting with Herzog’s article, a first analysis could result in the map in Figure 2. Crucial is here, first, that the long quotes on the right side are summarized in a short formulation of his main reason and, second, that an “inference rule” has been added according to the valid argument scheme which is traditionally called *modus ponens*. An “inference rule” is defined as a statement that is sufficient to transform any argument into a logically valid argument. That means, the inference rule must be formulated in a way that—given the truth of both this inference rule and the reason—the conclusion must be *necessarily* true. That this is the case in a *modus ponens* argument can easily be seen if we look at its symbolized form which

\(^3\) There is a further reason for this layout-decision. The goal to visualize entire webs of mutually supporting beliefs in an ongoing process can only be realized if there is an “open space” for doing this. Since in cmap, the software I am using here, only the top left corner of the available space is determined, and since we are working from the conclusion backwards, this should be the starting point.
combines two premises and one conclusion as follows: if \( p \), then \( q \); \( p \); therefore, \( q \) (\( p \) and \( q \) represent propositions, that is sentences that can be true or false). Explicating the inference rule is the most important step in LAM for three reasons: First, since nobody would provide a certain reason without assuming at least implicitly that this reason is sufficient to justify a claim, and since such a justification is usually not explicitly stated—mainly based on its repetitive character—the formulation of the inference rule reveals an important part of the arguer’s implicit web of beliefs. Second, this inference rule must be explicitly stated in order to scrutinize the argument’s soundness—which is defined by two criteria: the argument must be logically valid and all the premises must be true (for validity the truth is only presupposed, but not actually defended); we can check the soundness of an argument only if all its parts are visible. And third, visualizing an argument in its strongest possible form—that is, as a logically valid argument—puts everything on the table that must be defended by further arguments if it is controversial. This last point challenges the analyst—or the constructor of an argument—to represent not only individual arguments but entire argumentations, that is webs of mutually supporting arguments. This way, Logical Argument Mapping is expected to reveal the inferential structure of an entire web of beliefs as it determines a stakeholder’s sensemaking processes.

Based on their importance, the inference rules are highlighted in LAM by putting them into oval text boxes. Another convention for constructing maps is to indicate the argument scheme (“ArgScheme”) that is used in each case. This is important as a reminder that argument schemes can always be replaced by alternative schemes. Since the concrete formulation of the inference
rule and all the other statements depends on the chosen argument scheme, the selection of the most appropriate scheme is a creative act that one might want to correct when it turns out that an argument is hard to defend.
If a group is an Islamist movement that propagates violence, then granting this group legitimate political status and access to the prerogatives of state power means asking for trouble.

"Optimistic observers argue, however, that this concern is overblown. It is precisely the burdens and responsibilities that come with democratic politics, they claim, that will tame Hamas. After all, as the Carnegie Endowment’s Marina Ottaway wrote last summer, ‘There is ample evidence that political process forces any party, regardless of ideology, to moderate its position if it wants to attract voters in large numbers.’ ... Instead of being concerned about Hamas’ new role, the optimists contend, outsiders should actually welcome it as the most likely catalyst for moving the group’s focus from radical rejectionist to mainstream politics.”

A "comparative analysis suggests skepticism is in order about whether the conditions are ripe for Hamas to be co-opted by its political participation or if instead Hamas will simply use political participation as another vehicle for pursuing its alarming core objectives."

The analysis of analogies "in the modern history of the Muslim Middle East ... where the governments have been challenged by Islamist movements" suggests:

- "In Turkey, the Islamists have been co-opted successfully, but based on "a secular public culture for more than eight decades and democratic institutions for more than five," and state and military "has set clear limits on political behavior."

- "Jordan presents a model of successful Islamist co-optation (although less so of democracy)," but this is based on political integration of Islamists over six decades and the fact that their political wing occupies only "an average of a third of the seats in parliament."

- In Egypt political integration of Islamist moderates was possible only after they separated from radicals, based on "repression and political exclusion."

- Lebanon’s Hezbollah "maintains the most powerful militia in the country, with control of a virtually autonomous area in southern Lebanon and a global terrorist reach that has often served Iranian purposes. ... Joining the government did not prevent Hezbollah from undertaking a serious cross-border attack on Israel in late November 2005, nor has its ideological platform or political demeanor shown signs of moderation."

"Some observers detect signs that Hamas is already evolving in a moderate direction. They point to its very willingness to engage in elections and enter the Palestinian Legislative Council, an institution born from the Oslo peace process, which the group has long rejected; its acceptance of a temporary truce (tahdiya) with Israel; its expressed willingness to consider a longer cease-fire (hudna) should Israeli withdraw to its 1967 borders; and various statements by Hamas leaders that exhibit flexibility."

"There is ... overwhelming evidence pointing in the opposite direction. For example, Mahmoud al-Zahar, the group’s leading figure, gave a series of interviews in the run-up to the parliamentary elections in which he explained that the group sees no connection between the elections and the Oslo process -- which is dead anyway -- and that any cease-fire along the 1967 borders would not come with a recognition of Israel or relations with it, but would be merely a step in the continued struggle. ‘Some Israelis think that when we talk of the West Bank and Gaza it means we have given up our historic war,’ Zahar told an Israeli newspaper in late October. ‘This is not the case.’ As for Hamas’ stance on democracy, Zahar’s words have been equally discouraging: he proclaimed, ‘We will join the Legislative Council with our weapons in our hands,’ later adding, ‘In the Islamist Palestinian state, every citizen will be required to act in accordance with the codes of Islamic religious law’ -- not exactly a Western vision of how democracy should function."

Figure 3: Refuting possible objections against the inference rule on top of the map that is copied from Figure 2 (for printing reasons).
The further analysis of Herzog’s argumentation shows that he does not see a need to defend the reason of his argument (“Hamas is an Islamist movement that propagates violence”); however, it seems to be necessary for him to defend what I reconstructed as his inference rule. His strategy at this point is to formulate possible objections against this inference rule, and to refute these objections by further arguments (Figure 3). This refutation again leads him to a reformulation of his original argument, and a refinement that explicates what he thinks the international community should do (Figure 4).
Mapping Herzog’s argument in this way reveals that there are two potential weaknesses an opponent could criticize. First, the argument that is reconstructed as a “complete induction” in Figure 4—although a valid one—is not necessarily a sound one. What can be criticized is the inference through participation is not a given, but rather depends on the existence of certain conditions in the local political context.

Therefore (ArgScheme: complete induction AU=Herzog)

what is true for Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon regarding conditions of successful co-optation is always true

leads to

those conditions are

- the existence of a strong, healthy, and relatively free political system into which the Islamists can be absorbed;
- a balance of power tilted against the Islamists that forces them to play by moderate rules;
- and sufficient time for co-optation to take effect.

Therefore (ArgScheme: modus ponens AU=Herzog)

if one looks closely at the case of Hamas, hardly any of these potentially moderating factors are present.

 leads to

these conditions can either be created from the inside or based on influence from the outside

Therefore (ArgScheme: disjunctive syllogism AU=Herzog)

outside actors should try to use their influence to create the proper incentives and disincentives for Hamas’ future behavior, such as renouncing violence, disarming, and recognizing Israel’s right to exist.

by means of

- giving or neglecting legitimacy
- investing or not investing political and financial capital
- removing or not removing Hamas from international terrorist lists

"Palestinian political, security, and other institutions are a chaotic mess, and the pragmatic political center, represented by Fatah, is in complete disarray. Hamas is launching its political career in the legislative and executive branches without having disarmed and is quite possibly stronger than the rest of the state apparatus."

"In Turkey, the Islamists have been co-opted successfully, but based on "a secular public culture for more than eight decades and democratic institutions for more than five," and state and military "has set clear limits on political behavior."

"Jordan presents a model of successful Islamist co-optation (although less so of democracy)," but this is based on political integration of Islamists over six decades and the fact that their political wing occupies only "an average of a third of the seats in parliament."

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Lebanon’s Hezbollah "maintains the most powerful militia in the country, with control of a virtually autonomous area in southern Lebanon and a global terrorist reach that has often served Iranian purposes. ... Joining the government did not prevent Hezbollah from undertaking a serious cross-border attack on Israel in late November 2005, nor has its ideological platform or political demeanor shown signs of moderation."

Figure 4: Herzog’s refinement and extension of his central argument (cf. Figure 2). The conclusion at the top left is what he calls “the most important lesson” that he draws from his detailed “comparative analysis” that is mentioned in Figure 3, and here copied as the reason for this argument.
ence rule. A set of only four examples cannot exclude the possibility that the situation is different in this case. Second, while the inference rule in the disjunctive syllogism in the left corner at the bottom is convincing—there are only two possibilities to create those conditions, either from the inside or from the outside—there should be some further support for the reason in this argument. It is possible that Hamas itself creates the conditions that are listed in the middle of Figure 4, or that they are at least interested in forming the political stability which is central for those conditions.

Hroub’s article, by contrast, focuses on only one central argument (Figure 5). The longest part of his article consists of a detailed analysis of the documents that are mentioned in what I recon-
struct as his main reason (top right corner in Figure 5). In this chapter, I present only his analysis of the first of these documents which contains a discussion of an alternative reading of this text (Figure 6). Similar to Herzog, also Hroub feels a need to defend his central inference rule by considering, and rejecting, a possible objection (Figure 5).

A critic of Hroub’s argumentation could highlight, first, that his attempt to refute the objection against this inference rule—all these documents might be part of “a ploy to gain power by concealing true agendas”—only repeats what he says in his central reason; his refutation does not provide anything new. Second, it could be questioned whether his central inference rule is really true. The situation is here similar to Herzog’s complete induction, and it might indeed have been better to reconstruct this argument in the form of a complete induction: The fact, that some documents indicate a shift in Hamas’s position, does not necessarily imply that there is indeed such a shift.
Discussion

This chapter pursued two different objectives. Based on my proposal to define “framing” more precisely according to the distinction of boundary setting, meaning construction, and sensemaking, the first objective was to answer the question whether these three processes represent different forms of framing that could exist independently of each other, or different aspects of one and the same process. The second objective was to show that Logical Argument Mapping (LAM) can be used as a method for two connected purposes: on the one hand, as a graphical means to represent the inferential structure within those webs of mutually supporting beliefs that form the foundation of sensemaking processes as they occur in any communication and interac-

Figure 6: Hroub’s discussion of references to violence and Islam in Hamas’ 2005 “Electoral Platform for Change and Reform.” In the complete map, this part of his argumentation supports the “reason” in Figure 5 (top right corner).
tion and, on the other, as a tool to cope with the problem of missing frame-neutrality on the analyst’s side—that is, the problem that any analysis of framing mechanisms is itself constrained by the analyst’s webs of beliefs, values, and attitudes.

Regarding the first objective we have to keep in mind that sensemaking itself, as mentioned above, cannot be visible because it is defined here as a cognitive process. What is visible, however, are the semiotic processes of boundary setting and meaning construction. Both the articles whose argumentations I reconstructed in Figures 2 to 6 demonstrate how authors set boundaries around an issue and how they construct the meaning of what is within these boundaries. Since it is impossible to imagine that both these semiotic processes of framing could take place independently of corresponding cognitive processes, it is clear that boundary setting and meaning construction on the one hand and sensemaking on the other cannot be different forms of framing that could exist independently of each other. Both are different aspects—internal versus external—of the same process. To distinguish them, however, is important because it is possible that we deliberately frame an issue semiotically in a way that does not mirror exactly our sensemaking. A mediator, for example, might decide to set boundaries and construct meaning in a way that represents only parts of her or his sensemaking of a situation in order to move negotiations into a certain direction. In this case, semiotic framing represents only a section of what happens cognitively.

The distinction between boundary setting and meaning construction, on the other side, is also important, and with regard to this distinction it is indeed adequate to talk about different forms of framing because both processes can occur independently of each other. If we look at the maps that represent Herzog’s and Hroub’s argumentations, we can see that they differ with regard to both. Regarding the boundaries by which they define their subject, the main difference is that Hroub includes in his boundaries a thorough analysis of documents produced by Hamas in the years 2005 and 2006, while we find within Herzog’s boundaries a detailed comparison of the Hamas case with the cooptation of Islamists in other countries, and the formulation of “conditions” that must be fulfilled for successful cooptation. It is also important that only within Herzog’s boundaries we find things like the quotes from interviews with Mahmoud al-Zahar, “the group’s leading figure,” which would contradict Hroub’s point that there is an evolution in Hamas’s thinking (Figure 3). All this shows that both authors try to set the agenda of the discussion by setting the boundaries around the issue in very specific ways.

Looking at these examples we can say that boundary setting is not only a mechanism of exclusion and inclusion, but also a process through which something like a “center of gravity” gets defined. While Hroub’s considerations center around an “evolution” of Hamas that should be supported from the outside, Herzog’s main point is to get things into the right order: first creating the conditions, then cooptation.
Although it seems easy to create by means of boundary setting simply two different “worlds” without any connection, it is interesting and important that both authors are discussing issues—at the “margins” of their “worlds,” so to speak—that could form something like a “common ground.” There is an area that is within the boundaries of both approaches. However, crucial with regard to these areas is the observation that what looks like parts of a common ground is sharply divided by means of the second form of framing that must be distinguished here: meaning construction. Both authors, for example, talk about Hamas’s 1988 charter. But while Herzog frames this document as representing an “ideology ... which remains operative to this day,” Hroub stresses that the charter was “drawn up less than a year after the movement was established in direct response to the outbreak of the first intifada and when its raison d’être was armed resistance to the occupation” (p. 7). Similarly, Herzog does not neglect the existence of “various statements by Hamas leaders that exhibit flexibility,” and he acknowledges at some point that these could be read as signs of “evolution”; but the meaning he constructs for those signs is determined by the immediately following hint at “overwhelming evidence pointing in the opposite direction” (Figure 3, right side).

The fact that all this can be read from the maps in Figures 2 to 6 demonstrates—with regard to the second objective of this chapter—that Logical Argument Mapping can indeed be used as a method to represent and analyze the framing processes of stakeholders. The inferential structure of mutually supporting beliefs becomes visible in the structure of the respective LAM maps. But what about the problem of missing frame-neutrality on the analyst’s side? At this point, I can only refer to my own personal experience of constructing these maps. What is represented in the maps above is the result of a kind of dialectical process of going back and forth between the texts and their graphical reconstruction. Especially Herzog’s article, whose structure is more complex than Hroub’s, required several rounds of restructuring and refinement.

The important point is, however, that the process of revising and refining the maps was guided by the normative standard of logical validity. This standard worked as a stimulus to develop only complete arguments. It motivated in particular the addition of those inference rules that are necessary to transform the arguments of the texts into logically valid arguments. This again provoked a critical reflection on the acceptability of the reasons and inference rules independently of each other; a search for further arguments in the texts in cases where the acceptability of one of these was not immediately evident; a breaking-down of more complex text passages into more fine-grained argumentative structures; a more substantial reflection on the texts’ structure, including a distinction between central elements and those ideas that seem to be only marginally important; ongoing attempts to simplify this structure; and the identification of those weaknesses of the argumentations that I mentioned in my textual analysis.

While it is clear that my own processes of “making sense” of what the authors wrote is still lim-
ited by my own web of beliefs, values, and attitudes, the experience of being challenged by the
normative standard of logical validity undoubtedly promoted a course of action in my analysis
that comes closer to frame neutrality than it would have been possible without using Logical Ar-
gument Mapping.

Nevertheless, there are some limitations of this approach. The first one is obviously that the
method can only be applied when people are indeed arguing for their positions, when they pro-
vide reasons for their claims and justify what they propose. Especially in verbal interaction, the
amount of these components of communication is often pretty small, unfortunately. A second
limitation concerns the argumentative quality of the material we try to analyze. Experience
shows that if a text is simply badly written so that it is not even clear what exactly its conclusion
is supposed to be, then a reconstruction by means of Logical Argument Mapping can only pro-
vide a hypothesis about what was intended. Anyway, as in any scientific debate, every analysis of
framing processes by means of Logical Argument Mapping should be scrutinized by a critical
community of researchers.

**Conclusion**

The main objective of this chapter was to present Logical Argument Mapping (LAM) as a meth-
"od to analyze framing processes; a method that is especially designed to cope, first, with the
problem that the cognitive side of framing, sensemaking, confronts us with the need to reflect on
entire systems of mutually supporting beliefs, values, and attitudes and, second, to cope with the
fact that there is no frame-neutrality, that is: the analyst of framing processes has to deal with the
fundamental problem that her or his work is determined by the very same mechanisms of fram-
ing that she or he tries to analyze.

With regard to the first problem, using LAM means that we are able to visualize the inferential
structure between those assumptions and references to facts that are essential for a position;
LAM opens up a space in which webs of mutually supporting beliefs can be represented, studied,
criticized, and supported by further arguments. And with regard to the problem of missing frame-neutrality, Logical Argument Mapping establishes a standard of argumentation that is—at
least regarding its formal structure—独立 of personal judgments and points of view. The
normative standard of logical validity guides us in reconstructing everything we need—including
a stakeholder’s implicit assumptions—to represent a position as a consistent position, and that
means: as strong as possible.

The main advantage of using Logical Argument Mapping as an analytical tool might be that it
stimulates self-reflexivity and self-criticism. We have to see as a whole how somebody frames
an issue, and what her or his implicit assumptions are, and we have to try very consciously to
meet the standard of consistency in reconstructing a position, in order to be able to improve our own perception of what is going on.

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