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The "Realization of the Due-Measure" as Structural Principle in Plato's Statesman

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A first reading of the Statesman can lead one to the view that the dialogue has little if any structure. One asks oneself why, in order to answer the question as to how statesmanship is to be defined, all possible forms of knowledge have to be ordered, why it is so laboriously established that statesmanship is about the care and protection of humankind and to what end a myth about the various epochs of world history has to be recounted. Even an exact explanation of the art of weaving seems to be necessary until finally all the activities in a state (polis) are ordered and the task of the statesman as the creator of this order becomes clear.

Decisive is, however, that the Stranger, who in his discussion with the younger Socrates, brings up these issues, addresses the many digressions as being themselves a problem of the investigation. In two distinctive lines of thought he reflects, firstly, on how an appropriate and measured approach can be characterised which relates to all human activity (283b1-285c3), and secondly, that the appropriateness of the length or brevity of the investigation always depends upon the purpose of the investigation itself (285c4-287a7). I want to take up precisely these reflections about the general problem of the appropriateness of human activity and the special problem of the goal of a platonic dialogue to discuss the following questions:

1. What is meant by the Stranger when he asserts that certain activities necessarily lend themselves to being oriented to "the realization of the due-measure"? I.e., what does Plato
mean by the measure _pros ten tou metriou genesin_ (284c1,d6)?

2. To what end does Plato lead a discussion in which concepts are defined?

3. What value do the results of the first two questions have for an understanding of the concrete discussion process in the _Statesman_? To what extent do these results determine the structure and ordering of the dialogue?

1. The necessity of measuring in relation to the realization of the due-measure.

Exactly in the middle of the dialogue Plato distinguishes between two kinds of art of measuring (metretike, 283b1-285c3): There is one group of technai, i.e., 'activities which can be carried out only with specialist skills' (M.H.) "which measure amounts, lengths, breadths and speeds" in relation to their opposites (i.e., their respective opposites. M.H.), while another group comprises all those technai which measure in relation to the appropriate (the due-measure), the fitting, the necessary and everything belonging in the middle between two extremes" (... _pros to metrion kai to prepon kai ton kairon kai to deon kai panth' hoposa eis to meson apokisthe ton eschathon_, 284e3-8).

This means that the first art of measurement defines, for example, a large dimension with respect to its 'opposite', in this case with respect to something smaller (283d11-e1). The possibility of defining a dimension in the first art of measurement is, therefore, dependent on the definition of its respective opposite, while the second art of measurement orients itself towards an optimum or an optimal state.
Problematic is now, above all, what is meant by such an orientation toward an optimum? How can one recognize the appropriate, the respectively fitting and necessary and make use of these as a criterion and yardstick? This difficulty is considerably increased through a further formulation about the second art of measurement. Plato does not only speak about an orientation towards a due-measure⁴ as if this were to be understood as a self-contained concept, on the contrary he speaks rather in an exact formulation of a "measuring in the realization of the due-measure" (pros ten tou metriou genesin, 284c1 d6; cf. 283d8,9). This can, however, only mean that this "due-measure" as a desired optimum cannot exist independently but must rather firstly be realized. We are, thus, confronted with the profoundly paradoxical situation in which precisely that criterion onto which all human activity should be orientated clearly only becomes visible within this activity itself.

Moreover, for Plato, the orientation towards the realization of the due-measure is an indispensable prerequisite of all technai, without which "they and all their works" could not exist (284a5-7): "Thus if measure in this second sense exists (i.e., the measuring in the realization of the due-measure, M.H.), so do the arts (i.e., the technai⁵, M.H.); and conversely, if there are arts, then there is this second kind of measurement. To deny either is to deny both." (284d6-8). The technai are only technai and enable the creation of objects of value and beauty when they orientate themselves towards the due-measure, and the due-measure for its part only comes into being through the orientation of the technai towards it. The realization of a techne and the act of measuring in the relation to the realization of the due-measure
are, therefore, mutually dependant; the one is not possible without the other.

What then does this necessity of measuring in relation to the realization of the due-measure mean? One can surely only measure with an independently existing yardstick from which a measurement can be read when an object is laid against it, and not with the help of something which must first come into being. A clue to the solution of this problem can perhaps be found in Plato's detailed treatment of the art of weaving. This is without doubt a techne and must, therefore, for Plato orientate itself towards the realization of the due-measure. That this is indeed the case becomes clear at one point in the text. Weaving is, according to their final definition, explained as that art which "produces a piece of woven cloth through the straight interweaving of warp and woof" (283a5-6). Something comes into being here and that which has come into being is clearly only fitting and appropriate (the due-measure) when it results from a process of straight weaving (euthuplookia).

The due-measure does not necessarily have to be measured according to an abstract yardstick, but according to that which is appropriate to the object in question, or to what everybody would understand as right and fitting⁶. To stay with this example, how is a straight act of weaving and through this an even piece of woven cloth possible? Anyone who has tried to weave will understand the difficulty in realizing this 'straightness'. Is an orientation toward an 'idea of straightness' of any use here?

In order to weave one must have some kind of concept of 'straightness' if the straightness of the result is not to be a
matter of luck. The difficulty is that a layperson who possesses merely a concept of straightness still cannot actually weave straight. It is also necessary to know that weft and wool must be ordered exactly parallel to themselves and at right-angles to each other, whereby the same tension in both is decisive. Moreover, it should be taken into account that the art of weaving clearly belongs to those branches of knowledge which "although" as Plato says in the Philebus in respect to the art of the dialectician "not difficult to describe, they are extremely difficult to put into practice" (16c1,2). This means that in addition to the general knowledge of straightness and the special knowledge of the methods of weaving, the expert also possesses the knowledge of how to put these into practice, which he can have acquired only through training and practice. In the Statesman this necessary practice is specifically discussed in the context of the defining of concepts (286a7-b2). This enables us to formulate the thesis that Plato wants to point out the interconnection between all these prerequisites of a techne in his discussion about the act of measuring in relation to the realization of the due-measure: He who is able to orientate himself toward a measure like straightness or an idea of exactness could be a long way off from being able to put this knowledge into practice. However, he who orientates himself towards the realization of the due-measure must from the outset take into consideration the relationship to practice and the concrete process of development and realization, and is compelled to refer to the respective expert knowledge and expert skills. The 'act of measuring in relation to the realization of the due-measure' brings all of this, in my view, into the shortest
possible formulation. With this formulation it becomes clear that the due-measure - like straightness in the example of weaving - can be thought of abstractly, but for they who want to produce something it is decisive that this due-measure comes into being. Thus they orientate themselves towards a realization of the due-measure or "towards the necessary nature of the realization process "(kata ten tes geneseos anankaion usian, 283d8,9)" - i.e., towards the activity of its production - and not towards the due-measure itself. The realization of the due-measure alone implies the necessary but extremely difficult relationship to practice. This applies not only to the example of weaving, but also to the technē of statesmanship. This is indicated right at the end of the dialogue analogously to the art of weaving with its concept of straightness (euthuploōkia, 311b7-11). Likewise this applies to the art of philosophical discussion and the technē of defining concepts: we must be able to put theoretical knowledge into practice.

2. The purpose of a dialectical definition of ideas
After his general address about the necessity of measuring in relation to the realization of the due-measure, which relates indiscriminately to all technai or skilled activities, the Stranger adds a further address which now concerns itself more closely with that area of activity which is carried out in the dialogue itself: the search for concepts like that of the statesman "and every preoccupation with such logoi" (285c4-6).

The astonishing result of this short section (285c4-287a7) is that the laborious defining of the statesman has not been undertaken for its own sake, but rather because of the need to
become better dialecticians in every area (heneka ... tou peri panta dialektikoterois gignesthai, 285d5,6; cf.286e3ff.). This can only mean that his main concern here is pedagogical. Mitchell Miller has already made a plausible case for the view that in the person of the younger Socrates a certain rashness and methodical haste of some of the younger members of the Academy is being criticized here. More generally one could say that here in the foreground stands the attempt to lead the younger of those taking part in the dialogue to the Dialectic as that science which forms the building blocks of platonic philosophical knowledge. In the Sophist the Stranger had made clear to the young Theaitetos that the "dialectical understanding" (dialektike episteme) does not describe a specific knowledge content but an ability which comes to fruition in a particular practice, i.e., "in the correct passage through the logoi" (253b10) and in "division according to the forms" (253d1): "He who is capable of this ", says the Stranger, will be able to "distinguish" ideas "satisfactorily" (253d5-9). With this it seems to me that what here in the Statesman is meant by "becoming better dialecticians" is the acquisition of the ability of "dialectical understanding".

How then is this ability to be conveyed? From the example of weaving we could see that a theoretical and a practical aspect must come together: the conveying of a describable weaving technique must be linked with its corresponding practice, and it is these two aspects which the Stranger wants to impart to the younger Socrates through the training program. When, in attempting to define the many kinds of the nurture of herds (agelaiotrophike) he immediately divides off animals from humans in order to get to the nature of statecraft (262a3,4), he
receives his first lesson about the nature of the Dialectic: the sought concept should not simply be "chopped off" (leptourgein) as a small part of a mass of other concepts which have not themselves been defined, but on the contrary the safest attempts at definition go "through the middle" (dia meson), since the ultimate goal is in differentiating a well-defined structure of ideas (262a8-c1). The aim is not a division like that of some Greek ethnocentrics who see "Greeks and Barbarians" as two "parts" (mere) of humanity, but rather a separation of types and kinds cleanly from each other (262c3-263b11).

In addition to this theoretical aspect of the dialectical understanding, the young Socrates has received his second lesson in the accurate defining of the art of weaving, since just as the statesman in the whole discussion has been defined with the overriding aim of creating better dialecticians in every area (285d5-7), so this defining process can only work when it has been carried out on something "lesser" (286a7-b2, cf.278a5-e11). Of course, if our whole area of concern had been the art of weaving (285d8,9) a short definition would have been perfectly adequate (283b1-3) along with the pointing out of a picture or example of a piece of woven cloth "without the need further explanation" (choris logou). However, as far as more abstract activity than this is concerned, such as that of the statesman or any non-physical (ta asomata) labour, there is no example at which one can point. "Only through the logos", i.e., explanation, can anything be made clear, "therefore, it is necessary" says the Stranger "to make sure that one is capable of giving and demonstrating an explanation for each activity" (logon ... dounai kai dexasthai). Exactly this is easier to practice in the case
of those activities for which examples can be seen, as would have been the case with weaving (285d8-286b2). We can see now that for the Dialectic and the "becoming better dialecticians" the theory of subject specific methods and the practice of acquiring these methods must necessarily come together, if the realization of the due-measure is to come about in a definition.

If we now try to summarize the two parts of the reflection about the length and brevity of the conversations we can, from my point of view, justify the following conclusions: It is the case for all technai that they can only really be carried out with specialist knowledge when they orientate themselves towards the realization of the due-measure. While we could grasp this realization of the due-measure in the example of the art of weaving as the realization of straightness, the art of philosophical discussion aims at the improving of the dialectical skills of those taking part in the dialogue. It is important to note that the due-measure must be specifically defined for each techne. So, as the Stranger emphasizes several times, in the case of a definition the 'straightest' way is normally not appropriate9 (the due-measure). What alone matters is the most exact and comprehensive dialectical definition of a concept, even, as the Stranger himself once says, when in particular cases it is difficult to comprehend how this theoretical method is to be put into practice (263a2-b11). Due-measure, for the Dialectic, can also mean "going round in circles" as the Stranger notes in conclusion (286e5). It is only important that the "assembled become better dialecticians and more imaginitive in clarification of being through dialogue" (287a2-4).

However, when in this central digression about the
Due-Measure in general and this case of the Dialectic in particular, the Stranger expressly claims (287a7) that the previous discussion was in no way too long or too short, but rather that it was necessary and appropriate in all its parts and represented a suitable introduction to the dialectical process, then the interpreter is challenged to read the dialogue in such a way as to understand it in its Due-Measure\(^\text{10}\). That can only mean, in its function as training in the practice of the dialectical process. This brings me to my third question: To what extent does the dialogue reveal an appropriate, i.e., a dialectical procedural definition of the statesman?

3. The appropriate dialectical definition of the statesman

At the beginning of Sophist it was pointed out that the titles (onomata) sophist, statesman and philosopher as such are very well known, but that it is unclear whether a special idea (genos, 217a) corresponds to each of these names, and whether each of these stands for a particular "job" or activity (ergon, 218c). According to Aristotle the relationship of these three terms to each other and the differences from each other would be characterized by their common genus proximum and their differentiae specificae. Plato goes along with this inasmuch as he tries to find as general a description as possible which includes the three aforementioned terms: that is the concept of techne or - what to Plato seems synonymous\(^\text{11}\) - the term episteme. Just as when in the Sophist agreement is reached in a first step that the Sophist is in possession of a techne, i.e., of particular expert knowledge (221c,d), so it is stressed in the Statesman that the statesman is "one who knows" or better an
"expert" (epistemon, 258b).

The concept of the statesman should, therefore, be defined by differentiating out a structure of ideas proceeding from the more general concept of episteme, through which, finally, the sought-for term will be recognized in its own individual character. Dialectical understanding happens correspondingly as a process of delimitation: the presupposed concept of the episteme is divided with reference to the concept of the statesman, whereupon it is then asked, under which of the resulting parts should statecraft be subsumed. This is then divided anew in the same way until the sought concept is differentiated from all those concepts to which it has some kind of relationship, since these can be also subsumed under the overarching concept (episteme).

The Stranger had already introduced this procedure at the beginning of the Sophist with the help of his definition of the angler (Soph. 218e-221c; cf. diag.1, left column). The diairetical definition of the angler which is developed as one piece without any reflective insertions consists, despite this apparent seamlessness, of three parts. These I have marked in diagram 1 with respective different numbers. These parts of the diairesis are distinguished with respect to the changing criterion, which determines the respective divisions: The diairesis cited under number 1. distinguishes "all technai" (219a8) until the art of hunting - under which the angler can be subsumed - is clearly divided off from all other human activities which need specialist knowledge and skills. Under number 2. this art of hunting is specified with regard to its objects, and fishing is differentiated finally under number 3. in terms of the
various tools, or the specific ways in which fish are hunted.

It is interesting that exactly this division into three, upon which, as already mentioned, no comment is specifically made, seems to determine the total structure of the Statesman with its three varying criteria for division: the politike praxis (311b8) is, firstly, in its division from other technai or epistemai, defined as generally as possible, secondly, it is divided off with regard to its objects and, thirdly, divided off with respect to its specific form. We can with this - at least as a first attempt - reconstruct a coherent diairesis analogous to the definition of the angler (Diag.1, right column). The parallel between the definition of the angler and that of the statesman, regarding parts one and two, is very clear, whereas the parallel to the third part becomes problematic.

The Stranger points out again and again that in this last part - as in the case of the art of angling - the specific form of the art of statesmanship should be brought into the discussion\(^{12}\), but here it is much more difficult to continue the diairetical definition than in the Sophist. It is true that a successful attempt is made in the first part to distinguish statecraft from "the many protecting technai" and in the second part to make clear that it is about the care of people, as the Stranger finally summarizes (267d6-11), but the statesman as a "herdsman of humans" analogous to the shepherd is by no means "perfectly" (267d1) or "exactly" (268c7) enough represented. While the shepherd, in one person, is the feeder, the doctor, the midwife and musician of the herd, in the case of humans these tasks are carried out by many different people. Since these "co-providers" (suntrophos, 267e5) also claim to be in the same
way responsible for the care of the polis, and inasmuch as they argue\textsuperscript{13} with the true politician about the title of statesman, the former must be conceptually separated off from the latter (267e-268c).

The inadequacy of the previous dialectical definition leads the Stranger to the view that "we must begin all over again from another starting point and travel by another road" (Skemp 268d5,6): "It is necessary to use a large part of a comprehensive myth and then - as in what has preceded (being itself diairetical, M.H.) - take it apart bit by bit, until we finally reach that which is sought" (268d8-e2). The myth is here meant to be seen as a pedagogical help. It is fitting to the younger age of Socrates (268e4-6). It can, firstly, make it clear to him to what extent the first two parts of the diairesis are insufficient, and secondly, it can form the basis for a more exact definition of the statesman. With this the first goal is achieved through the well-known differentiation of two world-orders. Here it is shown that the previously defined shepherd of humans can, if need be, take over a function which corresponds to that of a god from whom all government originates (274e10\textsuperscript{aff.}). This function is, however, not appropriate to our present epoch, which after the departure of god from the leadership role compels the world, and all its elements, to rule itself (274a3-b1, d2-e1). So we can now see that the idea of "herdsmanship" must be differentiated in a new manner. Therefore it becomes possible, secondly, to continue the diairetical defining of the statesman from the point we reached before: the art of nurturing herds (275c9-d2 = 1.-222 in diag.1). The statesman can now be understood as someone who, as a human,
voluntarily takes on the caring for a 'herd' of willing bipeds (276c11-e13).

For the structure of the dialogue, for the programme of an appropriate definition of concepts and for the purpose of making those involved in the discussion better dialecticians the myth fulfills two functions: it allows, on the one hand, the correction of various mistakes originating from the first two parts of the the diairesis and with that, on the other hand, their continuation. At the same time the myth itself yields new problems, which the Stranger draws out against the over-hasty satisfaction of the young Socrates: while the younger Socrates sees the defining of the statesman as having been "accomplished" (277a1,2), the Stranger points out that for this to happen would need the agreement of both parties in the discussion (277a3,4). He cannot help thinking that the "wonderful collection of myths" has failed in its attempt to reach the due-measure of the discussion and so has become much too long and imprecise. The terminology of the Stranger here seems to anticipate the problem discussed later about the art of measuring and the requirement of an orientation towards the realization of the due-measure.\textsuperscript{14} Although the myth has satisfactorily marked out the 'outline' of the statesman, it still lacks 'clarity' (enargeia, 277b6-c3). He comes, therefore, to the following conclusion: "Rather than through painting or an other handicraft it is fitting," (that is the concept here which relates to the due-measure\textsuperscript{15} "to elucidate everything living through speech and explanation to those who are capable of comprehending it, and for those who are not, to do the same using a practical, 'hands-on' approach" (277c3-6). For the dialectician - what the young Socrates still needs to become -
the myth is too imprecise; precision and clarity can only be achieved through the logos.

Although we have learnt something about the statesman, it has hitherto been "as if in a dream" (277d3), so that we must now "recognize through a techne the care of those in the polis, so that a waking-knowledge instead of a dreaming-knowledge grows in us" (ten ton kata polin therapeian techne gnorizein, hina hupar ant' oneiratos hemin gignetai, 278e9,10). When the Stranger here speaks of the necessity of recognizing the statesman "through a techne", i.e., through the procedure of a specialist, then this has for me a two-fold meaning. In the direct context of this sentence 'recognition' through a techne is connected to the use of a paradigm - here it is that of the art of weaving - and becomes necessary in order to get to know the constitutive elements in the complex area of statecraft first of all in the easier and more comprehensible area of the art of weaving. Just as children must learn to identify (diaisthanesthai, 277e6,7) the 'letters' - the stoicheia which can be also understood as 'elements' - "in the shortest and easiest of syllables" and then have to learn how to apply their knowledge to other things and have to recognize the same elements also in bigger syllables, so in general terms, a realization of a paradigm can be spoken of, "when the same thing is correctly introduced in various combinations" (278c3-5).

So, says the Stranger, the task is, on the one hand, to see "the nature of the whole paradigm" - i.e., the nature of statecraft - "in a smaller and different paradigm which is a part of the whole" and on the other hand, "to apply to the paradigm of the king which is the greatest a 'lesser one of the same
eidos" (278e4,8). The "same eidos", the same 'idea' or the same constitutive elements: the Stranger clearly assumes here an eidetic identity between the art of weaving and the nature of statecraft, which corresponds to the relationship between simple and complex syllables. "The same eidos" is then found in the concept of "interweaving", since this describes the centre of political practice.\textsuperscript{16}

To recognize through techne means here to identify, in this way, the constitutive elements of statecraft through the use of a paradigm. Yet in the further context, above all with regard to the overarching aim of becoming better dialecticians (285d4-7, 287a3,4), the connection between techne and recognition - that is for me the second meaning of this formulation - refers to the specific procedure and method which is necessary to define statecraft: The 'identifying' of eide or "ideas" is for Plato quite clearly the task of the dialectic\textsuperscript{17}, so that a "recognition through techne", here called for by the Stranger, is probably also aimed at the application of the diairetic procedure. Therefore, when it is necessary to recognize the elements of the art of weaving in order to identify the same elements also in the case of the more complex art of statesmanship then, these elements can only be identified through the diairetic process. The Stranger himself later points out that the exact defining of the art of weaving should, above all, serve training and practice (285d8-286b3). That which should be practiced is the giving and revealing of a logos (286a4, cf. 277c4), and this happens in relation to the art of weaving through the application of the diairetic procedure.

The problem with the last part of the dialogue, where the
example of the art of weaving is brought into the concluding definition of statecraft, is that, although we recognize the constitutive elements of both technai analogously, the process of defining the statesman manages in no way to bring out the same diairetic clarity as in the case of the art of weaving. The Stranger points out this difficulty right at the outset of his concluding definition when he claims that, in the case of statecraft it is very "difficult to divide" causes and 'contributory-causes' "into two parts" corresponding to the art of weaving (287b10). The reason for this, so he says, should become clear as a result of the following investigation.

Mitchell Miller has put a lot of effort into reconstructing the procedure which is here delineated by the Stranger and, through his work on this, he finally became convinced of a "new mode of diairesis". Yet, in my view, the following investigation shows that the proposed difficulty can be understood in a much simpler way. The younger Socrates has already learnt at the beginning of the dialogue that the dialectician is best advised to divide "through the middle" in such a way that each of the two resulting divisions represents a particular eidos (262a8-c1). It is exactly this that is difficult now: even when the "contributory-causes" are exactly definable the Stranger hesitates, in my view, to grasp the many other activities to be seen in the polis with the concept of the 'cause itself'. With this slaves, businessmen, rhetoricians, judges would be defined in the same way, which seems to be impossible; even the sophists are only "conjurers" and "imitators", but, in no way the reason for political order. The Stranger, therefore, proposes to divide "in accordance with the
members" (Kata mele ... dihairometha, 287c3). That means, as I see it, that each technē should be 'cut-off' from the mass of technai in the polis, piece by piece, as if they were a living organism, until, finally, only statecraft is left.

We can, therefore, diairetically divide, but we always have to leave one side undefined. In this way we can reconstruct through a reduction of the complexity shown in the text - a diairesis analogous to the defining of the art of weaving (as shown in the second diagram). I describe the undefined side simply as "the other (i.e., technai)".

The diairesis which comes into being through this - provided that we can apply this terminus technicus to the described division process - comprises the whole of the last part of the investigation (287a7-311c8). All the individual debates, according to my thesis, have their necessary function in the development of this scheme and in the definition of the form of true statecraft. So we need the long debate about the necessary expert knowledge of the true statesman (292b-301a), because we can understand in this way the distinguishing of those who rule with a more precisely defined 'political' technē or episteme, from those who only imitate this knowledge.

I am of the view that through the complete diairesis represented in the two diagrams we gain an order in the dialogue in which "the realization of the due-measure" as the structural principle of the art of leading a discussion is expressed. It is to be hoped that through the practicing of defining concepts not only the younger Socrates, but we too have become better dialecticians.

(Translated from the German by Michael Jordan)
NOTES

1 Much of what is written here is the result of my discussions with Mischa von Perger whom I would like to thank. I would also like to express my thanks to Michael Jordan for translating the paper. In the German version of the paper with the title "'Das Werden des Angemessenen' als Strukturprinzip von Platons Staatsmann', 'das Angemessene' (the appropriate, fitting, suitable) corresponds more closely to the Greek to metrion. 'Das Angemessene' has rooted in itself 'messen' (measure) which is important for an understanding of the text. I have taken Skemp's translation of the 'due-measure' as the best compromise (J.B.Skemp, Plato's Statesman, 2nd edition Bristol 1987).

2 From the beginning of the Statesman 257a1 until the beginning of the metretike discussion 283b1 there are exactly 26.2 pages according to Stephanus' pagination, and from their end 285c3 until the end of the dialogue 311c8 there are just as many again. This 'externality' which, of course, varies in hand-written and original texts, could be read as a clue to the special meaning of this passage. Similarly conspicuous is the placing of the so-called philosophers-digression in the middle of the Theaitetos (172c-177c), where it seems to have no relevance in that context (the exact middle is concerned with a discussion about "the need to become similar to God" in 176a-c: 34.2 pages (Stephanus) until the beginning and 34.2 until the end!).

tachutetias according to J.Burnet and hand-written text named by him (T); A.Dis writes pachutetias according to B. This seems to me to be a little improbable as the "width" does not express anything new to the previously-mentioned 3 dimensions of the room. The "speeds" should be understood in correspondence with the kairos in 284e6.

cf. 283e3.11, 284a2.8, e6-8, 286c8 ff.

ekeina in 284d7 has to refer to the technai inside the two contrasting parts of the construction (cf. homoios, hama), since touto in 284d6.7 fits perfectly with meizon te ... kai ellatton metreisthai.

This corresponds to the breadth of meaning of to metrion which can be interpreted as the moderate; "not too much and not too little" is the due-measure, and depends always on its respective object - like the large amount of poison which is given to Socrates in the Phaidon (117b). Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.


cf. the critique of the euthus in relation to the discussion in 262b2, 275d1, 276c8, 283b1, 285a6 and 286e6.

If this succeeds then all those interpretations of the Statesman based on the belief that because of its apparent lack of any conception it can only be understood as a "parody" of the dialectical process become invalid. Cf. V. Tejera, "Plato's Politicus, an eleatic sophist on politics", in: Philosophy and Social Criticism 5 (1978), pp.83-125, and H.R. Scodel, Diaeresis and Myth in Plato's Statesman, Göttingen 1987.

cf., for example, Rep. IV 438d1-10, Thrt. 146c7-d2 as well as Stt. 258b6-10 relating to Soph. 219a8 ff, and also St. 258d4,5 in relation to St. 258c6,7 and e4.

cf. the use of tropos in 275a4.8, 276e4, 284b1, 297a3, 306a2, 309b7.

cf. in respect to the "argument" 268c2,3, 279a3, 289c5,6 and 290b8; relating also 268a1.6 and 281b7.

cf. 277a6: para kairon, a7: pleio kai meizo tou deontos, b5: meizoni tou deontos, c5: mallon prepei with 284e5-8.

cf. 284e5-8.

cf. 305e4, 306a1.2, 308e2, 309b7, e10, 310e8.9, 311a1, b7, c2.4,5. For the meaning of the 'mixing of temperaments' as the task of the politician cf. H.J. Krümer, Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles. Zum Wesen und zur Geschichte der platonischen Ontologie, Heidelberg 1959, pp.146-177.

cf. Soph. 253d1-9, where the same expression is used in relation to the recognition of ideas as is used here for the identification of syllables: hikanos diaisthanasthai.


cf. 289c8-d1 in relation to 287c7-289c3.
| The art of angling as example | politike  
| amphilautike | the art of statesmanship  
| Soph. 218a-221c | Statesman 258b-311c |

<table>
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<th>1. all technai (219a8)</th>
<th>1. all epistemei (258b6, c5)</th>
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<td>11 poietike</td>
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<th>2. geneses toinos henaika (261b1)</th>
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<td>21 soulless</td>
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<tr>
<td>22222</td>
<td>= pezonimikon</td>
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<td>basilike/politike = anthroponimike</td>
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<td>angling</td>
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</table>
The art of weaving as example
huphantike
Stateum 279a7-283a9

1. all we make has one of two aims:
doing art. or having some
protection

2. himatourgike = huphantike
(the art of producing clothes)

31 sumaitiual contributory
causes
(tool producing arts)

32 altia
the cause itself

31 sumaitial contributory
causes
(287c7-289c3):
rew materials
tools
vessels
carriages
defences
amusements
nourishment
(tame animals)

32 ruling without law:
-tyranny
-oligarchy
-democracy

31 sumaitial contributory
causes
(slaves, merchants, etc.;
289c6-290c2):
the ignorant,
imitators, party
supporters, sophists
(291a8-303d3)

32 the others

3. the arts (technai) in the polis (287b6)

321 the fuller's art

322 wool-working

321 ruling with
law:
-kingship
-aristocracy

322 the art which
controls the others, knows
the due measure of them
and interweaves them
(305d1)

321 separation

322 combination

3221 of those who
have abilities
from those
without
(308b5-309a7)

3222 of the courageous
as 'warp'

3221 of the wool
warp

32211 of the wool
warp

32221 of the courage,
as 'woof'

32222 of the
woof

32212 of the
woof

322212 of the
woof

= huphantike
the art of weaving

"the one and whole task" of true statecraft: to weave and
stretch together prudence and courage in the individuals and
the prudent and the courageous in the polis and to give to the
developing "product of weaving" (huphantike) all the tasks of
the ruler (310e7-311b6).
"This we call the perfection of the product of weaving in
political practice: the realization of an ethos which is
interwoven by straight interweaving (euthuplokia) of
courageous and prudent man, when the art of kings draws
together from these a common life through concord and
friendship ..." (311b7 ff.).
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