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Article
Labor-Antitrust: The Problems of Connell and a Remedy that Follows Naturally
Duke Law Journal (1980)
  • Michael J. Cozzillio
  • Joseph T. Casey
Abstract
Since the passage of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has struggled to formulate a test governing labor's exemption from the antitrust laws. Resolution of this issue has required the Court to reconcile two competing and at times diametrically opposed congressional directives without subordinating one to the other. On one hand, the antitrust laws are designed primarily to insure that economic power is diffused among competitors. It is generally believed that the public will benefit, in terms of lower prices and better products, from increased competition in the production and marketing of goods and services and from decreased concentration of capital and other economic resources. The federal labor laws, on the other-hand, encourage economic concentration by recognizing and protecting the rights of employees to organize within appropriate units and to bargain collectively regarding their wages, hours, and other working conditions. The principal theory underlying the labor laws, as embodied in the National Labor Relations Act, is that peaceful settlement of labor-management disputes can be achieved through the mediatory influence of collective bargaining.
Keywords
  • labor law,
  • antitrust law
Publication Date
1980
Citation Information
Michael J. Cozzillio and Joseph T. Casey. "Labor-Antitrust: The Problems of Connell and a Remedy that Follows Naturally" Duke Law Journal Vol. 1980 Iss. 2 (1980) p. 235
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/michael_cozzillio/8/