Justice And Resentment In Hume, Reid, And SmithJournal of Scottish Philosophy (2008)
Adam Smith and Thomas Reid follow Joseph Butler's lead in discussing the moral significance of resentment in great detail. David Hume does not. For Smith and Reid, resentment reveals shortcomings in Hume's attempt to ground justice solely in terms of self-interest and public utility. This can be seen most clearly in Reid's critique ofHume's response to the sensible knave. Reid argues that Hume's appeal to our integrity can have force only ifHume concedes that there are elements of justice that are grounded in neither self-interest nor public utility.
Citation InformationMichael Pritchard. "Justice And Resentment In Hume, Reid, And Smith" Journal of Scottish Philosophy Vol. 6 Iss. 1 (2008) p. 59 - 70
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/michael-pritchard/27/