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Waiting for the Wrecking Ball: Skid Row in Postindustrial Philadelphia

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February 3, 1976, marked the death of Philadelphia Skid Row. Until this day, all that was left of this century-old neighborhood of itinerant, impoverished single men located immediately north of Philadelphia’s Central Business District was the Darien Hotel, a two-story building with 135 rooms, each of which was barely big enough for a single bed and a chair. Now social workers cleared out the last of the men from their $1.50-a-night “cages” in the final preparations for demolition. The Darien’s demise, following the fate of nineteen flophouse hotels and various other Skid Row institutions before it, also marked the culmination of a twenty-four-year concerted effort by the local Philadelphia civic and business community to replace Skid Row with new buildings, commercial areas, and the Vine Street Expressway. This effort did not, however, seek only the redevelopment of blighted Skid Row space; it also sought to rehabilitate what was seen as the pervasive social blight of Skid Row.

This article examines the demise of Philadelphia’s Skid Row district, and particularly the role of the business community in advocating for and implementing a rehabilitation program for Skid Row.
residents that complemented the destruction of their physical environs. The business community’s unusual foray into the human side of economic development represents the shifting of its historical interest in Skid Row as a source of unskilled labor to Skid Row as real estate strategically located for downtown redevelopment and expansion. The ensuing social and spatial conflicts render Skid Row a case study in how urban environments become the “meeting place of these two struggles” in the process of economic change. Specifically, this article will show how changing economic conditions led to a collaboration between business and social welfare interests that, within the framework of urban renewal, transformed an urban neighborhood and, more generally, the place of homelessness in the city.

THE MAKING OF PHILADELPHIA SKID ROW

The economic and social desolation widely associated with Skid Row and homelessness belies a time when both the area and its residents were integral to the American industrial economy. In the second half of the nineteenth century, America’s transformation from an agrarian to an industrialized nation led to economic and social changes that swelled the numbers of unattached, migratory laborers. The men who performed such work or who associated with these laborers became known as homeless, and this homelessness carried features of both industry and poverty. As a way of life, it was largely defined by American industry’s demands for large numbers of casual, unskilled laborers willing to do hard, temporary work in such fields as manufacturing, construction, railroads, mining, and farm labor. This employment, however, was typically sporadic and resulted in a standard of living that rarely exceeded subsistence level for an extended period.

This emerging population of homeless laborers was but one part of the large urban migration that was brought on by the newfound economic opportunity present in industrializing cities. Once in the city, homeless men concentrated in districts that became known generically by such terms as “main stems” or “hobohemias,” enclaves that were the spatial extension of the relationship between the homeless
laborers and the new industrial order. These districts typically formed in older, deteriorating areas at the edge of the Central Business District (CBD). Common geographical features of these areas included, first, access to work and transportation—they would usually be located near railroad hubs, seaports, industry, and temporary labor opportunities—and, second, access to amenities that suited the tastes and means of a poor, male population—inexpensive living accommodations, bars, restaurants, and “working class” entertainment such as burlesque shows and, later, movies. In *The Hobo*, one of the best-known accounts of such an area, sociologist Nels Anderson described how the characteristics of the homeless population shaped Chicago’s “Hobohemia”:

[The hoboes’] concentration has created an isolated cultural area—Hobohemia. Here characteristic institutions have risen—cheap hotels, lodging-houses, flops, eating joints, outfitting shops, employment agencies, missions, radical bookstores, welfare agencies, economic and political institutions—to minister to the needs, physical and spiritual, of the homeless man. This massing of detached and migratory men upon a small area has created an environment in which gamblers, dope vendors, bootleggers, and pickpockets can live and thrive.6

Like Chicago, but on a more modest scale, in the late nineteenth century Philadelphia also saw its homeless population predominate, both socially and economically, in a particular district, here located north of Market Street and east of Broad Street, centered around Eighth Street between Vine and Arch Streets. This area was formerly a neighborhood of affluent residents who, in the period following the Civil War, left their large houses and moved west to outskirts of the city. These residents took advantage of a growing network of streetcars and railways that made living farther away from the CBD more practical, and in their wake came businesses and industrial establishments.7 As the socioeconomic status of the area’s new residents dropped, the stately residences were subdivided into apartments and converted into rooming houses, the area’s hotels lowered the quality of their accommodations, and cheap lodging houses opened to provide even more economical quarters.8 Solidifying this area’s association with the homeless population, the 1880s marked the establishment of
such charity organizations as the Sunday Breakfast Association and the Wayfarers’ Lodge. In the course of this transformation, the area became known as the Old Tenderloin, with the reputation as a center for vice as well as for homeless men.

Economically and morally, the Old Tenderloin served the homeless population at cross-purposes. Economically, this area provided access to work and proximity to the CBD, to railway yards, and to industry, underscoring this group’s affiliation with the new industrial economy. The city’s homeless population, prior to locating in the Old Tenderloin, was formerly scattered among the more general poor population in the Lombard-Southwark-Moyamensing slum, located southeast of the CBD. In contrast, their move to the Old Tenderloin now placed them within a larger rooming house area that housed young, single men and women from more middle-class backgrounds who migrated to the city for white-collar jobs in retail, clerical, and accounting work. The unmistakable class distinctions between these two migrant groups notwithstanding, both settled in the same area for primarily the same reasons: nearby jobs, be they labor or white collar, and inexpensive housing, be it lodging houses for the homeless laborer or rooming houses for the white-collar worker.

Morally, homeless men became associated with vice in the Old Tenderloin, and this added to their reputation as a population that was socially deviant and averse to work. Typical of this contemporary attitude toward Philadelphia’s homeless is a quote by sociologist Franklin Fretz, who in a study of Philadelphia’s “furnished room district,” described the Old Tenderloin’s cheap lodging houses furnishing a bed at from five to thirty cents a night and patronized mostly by unmarried foreigners and vagrants. The moral influences in any of these houses is vicious. An observer declares that there is no doubt that a large proportion of the more serious crimes of the city is to be traced directly to the shiftless loafers in the cheap lodging houses.

Harvey Zorbaugh, in his Chicago community study The Gold Coast and the Slum, delivered a similar assessment of the homeless population:
This population of homeless men of the causal laborer or hobo type brings with it a high degree of personal and social disorganization. . . . His economic insufficiency and his mobility are constant problems to the mission, the police, and the welfare agency. He is not a part of the larger community, often he is at war with it.  

Alice Solenberger, in her book *One Thousand Homeless Men* also comments on what she saw as the objectionable lifestyle of the homeless population in Chicago, which she stated was characterized primarily by economic dependency. Although she displayed a sensitivity to structural factors affecting homelessness, which set her apart from her contemporaries, she also emphasized the homeless man’s complicity in his own financial woes, pointing out that “lack of employment with a very large proportion of them is only a symptom, and treating the symptom will not cure the disease.”

Such an approach toward homelessness, emphasizing normative values such as maintaining work, remaining economically self-sufficient, and keeping attachments to community and family, was the basis from which many charitable agencies ostensibly sought to help the homeless population. Despite the more professionalized demeanor of charitable agencies in the 1900s, the response to homeless men continued to emphasize the work ethic and ignored structural insights made in the context of the emerging fields of sociology and social work. Receiving assistance in many of the publicly and charitably run lodging houses was subject to restrictive rules, required demonstrations of one’s willingness to work, and often led to measures that were more punitive than therapeutic.

These early efforts at rehabilitating the homeless population through developing a stronger work ethic, though widely discussed, never succeeded on a large scale. One major reason for this was that the work already done by this group was necessary to the needs of the political economy of that time. Despite publicly embracing policy that considered homeless men as a deviant population, Philadelphia took a hands-off attitude toward reforming the Old Tenderloin and its inhabitants, partly in recognition of the functional economic value they represented. Furthermore, and in contrast to this moralizing charity and its middle- and upper-class proponents, charitable organizations of
working-class origins also ministered to the homeless population, basing their assistance on a shared common vulnerability to the volatile demand for industrial labor. After the mid-1920s, the declining demand for the casual, migratory labor reduced job opportunities and increased economic hardship among the homeless population. Being habitually homeless became an additional liability as the Great Depression subsequently hit and millions of newly unemployed and destitute men also became homeless in the 1930s. This situation eased only at the onset of World War II, when the war effort offered employment to all who were able to work. After the war, prolonged economic prosperity expanded work opportunities elsewhere and this, along with increased veterans benefits and an expanded social welfare system, continued the trend of reducing the number of young men who would once have taken up life as itinerant laborers. Those who remained were, as a group, older, more disabled, and less attached to the labor force than their predecessors.

The demand for itinerant labor never returned in the decades following World War II, and as a result greater emphasis was placed on the homeless population’s social isolation, aversion toward structured responsibility, and opposition to conventional status orientations. The labor niche that they once occupied was no longer there to serve as a prop against images of drunken men, squalid flophouses, and panhandlers. The term “derelict” joined older terms of vagrant, hobo, and bum, and more clearly defined homeless men as failures, threats, and objects of fascination. While the homeless population was always judged to a large extent by their moral failings, their work was also able to support urban districts that catered to their unique needs. In the absence of a viable economic function, the districts in which homeless men congregated contracted and took on a perversely exotic appeal for both tourists and sociologists who, in the midst of any large city, were able to “enter a country where the accepted principles of social interaction do not apply.” In recognition of these social, structural, and demographic changes, urban concentrations of homeless men in Philadelphia and elsewhere became, in the early 1950s, known as Skid Row.
PHILADELPHIA’S SKID ROW

The Health and Welfare Council’s (HWC) 1952 report What about Philadelphia’s Skid Row? first brought the term Skid Row into local usage to describe what was formerly known as the Old Tenderloin. The HWC was a human services planning organization that represented a broad coalition of Philadelphia area social service and charitable agencies and saw its mission both to point out problems with existing human services and to act as a forum for coordinating the responses of social agencies to community problems. In bringing the area that it renamed Skid Row to the attention of Philadelphia’s business and civic community, the HWC report cast it as a problem with implications for the redevelopment of Philadelphia’s troubled CBD and outlined the need for a broad response that took into account both development and social service concerns.

In contrast to the moral terms with which charitable agencies had traditionally framed their intentions of helping the homeless population, the HWC’s report outlined its concerns with Skid Row in economic and aesthetic terms. The report’s opening paragraph ironically noted how, upon coming off the Benjamin Franklin Bridge,

when a traveler sees a tree-filled square with hundreds of men reclining on park benches or lined up for soup and salvation across the street, then he has arrived in Philadelphia, the City of Brotherly Love. The traveler passes on down a broad new concrete highway [Vine Street], keeping a watchful eye for any man who might stagger across in front of the car.27

This “blighted neighborhood,” where

ancient buildings huddle together like the men themselves, housing a miscellany of cheap restaurants, bars, movie theaters, pawn shops, Gospel-Rescue Missions, and a broken down assortment of structures labeled “Hotels,”

was also the refuge for so-called blighted lives.28 The report described poverty, alcohol use, and economic dependency upon welfare and charity as the salient features of the Skid Row population, which it
estimated to consist of approximately 3,000 men—predominantly over fifty years old and white. The report also pointed out the considerable expense of these “blighted lives,” estimating that in 1951 about 1,000 Skid Row men collected about $640,000 in welfare benefits and incurred additional costs from resources Skid Row received from public services, charitable organizations, and panhandling. In addition, law enforcement costs were particularly expensive; the two police stations in the vicinity were among the busiest in the city. In 1950, the relatively small Skid Row area accounted for 8,000 arrests—approximately one-third of all arrests in Philadelphia—mostly for alcohol- and panhandling-related offenses.29

When this report came out, its characterization of Skid Row as a collection of dilapidated buildings and economically marginal men could have stood as a metaphor for Philadelphia’s decline from its industrial heyday. While the decades following World War II represented a period of enormous national growth in industry and manufacturing, this was a time when big northeast and midwest cities such as Philadelphia, erstwhile industrial stalwarts, experienced a steady out-migration of jobs, population, and businesses.30 The increasing prominence of the automobile, combined with the city’s deteriorating infrastructure, obsolete industrial buildings, and high real estate costs left Philadelphia at a disadvantage in competing with the surrounding suburbs for population and private investment,31 and, as typified in the changes that occurred on Skid Row, “the ‘solutions’ of one era slowly but surely became the problems of the next.”32

The term blight was widely used in reference to these physical “problems” of the old era. In response to perceptions of large areas of Philadelphia, including Skid Row, as being physically blighted, Philadelphia commissioned two new agencies in 1948, the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority (PRA) and the City Planning Commission, to cooperatively develop and implement plans to physically renew the city. One of the key components to this strategy was urban renewal, a federal program, created as part of the National Housing Act of 1949, that made federal funds available to cities for demolishing old and dilapidated areas of the cities and then making the land available for development to more modern uses. Urban renewal became a means to “physically transform Philadelphia from a city characteristic of the
industrial era to one characteristic of the corporate era” through replacing physical structures, building transportation infrastructure, and altering land use patterns.  

Skid Row not only epitomized the obsolescence of the industrial city, its location also placed it at odds with two main thrusts of redevelopment initiatives. Skid Row’s southern boundary backed up to the venerable tourist sites of Independence Hall and the Liberty Bell. As such it stood contrary to one goal pursued through urban renewal: making these sites, and the CBD in general, more appealing to tourists and visitors. This meant not only upgrading the historic area’s physical appearance but also changing the socioeconomic character of the population living in and around the CBD from predominantly working class, poor, and minority to white and upper middle class. By 1952, when the HWC issued its report, these sites were the centerpiece for a federal project to build a historic mall. At the same time, the area around it, including the southern part of Skid Row, was targeted for upscale housing and commercial construction as part of the “Old City” urban renewal area, the first of nine “blighted” areas that Philadelphia certified as eligible for urban renewal projects. 

Skid Row’s eastern boundary placed it at the foot of the Benjamin Franklin Bridge. With the proliferation of the automobile, this bridge was a major gateway into the city, and a starting place for a proposed expressway that would stretch over Vine Street to the Schuylkill River as it relieved badly congested roads in the CBD. Traffic congestion was seen as a major impediment to the CBD’s economic revitalization. The proposed Vine Street Expressway was designed to anchor an expressway system that was, in the 1950s, one of the primary tactics planners used in their attempts to “cause social and economic life to flourish in the decongested downtown.”

Vine Street represented the heart of the twenty-five square blocks that made up Skid Row. At its peak in the early 1950s, Skid Row had twenty-two hotels and flophouses, eight evangelical Christian missions, twenty-two bars, one state liquor store, and three theaters. Other businesses found on “the Row” included restaurants that served cheap food in plentiful helpings, secondhand clothing stores, temporary employment agencies, blood banks, pawn shops, a barber college, and five storefront fortunetellers. In addition, Franklin Square, a
park on the eastern edge of Skid Row and at the foot of the Ben Franklin Bridge, was also known as “Bum’s Park” because of its popularity as a hangout for Skid Row residents. The HWC report, while not alone in calling Skid Row a blighted area, also took the more unusual move of characterizing Skid Row’s residents in terms of blight. Particularly illustrative of how the report mixed social and spatial meanings is its conclusion that “it seems inconceivable that the public will be able to stand the sight of a beautiful park with Independence Hall at one end and utter dependency at the other.” Skid Row’s demographics, with its disproportionate numbers of old and disabled residents, as well as its economic marginalization, made for a compelling association between physical and social deterioration. Such an association also implied that Skid Row’s residents, like its physical structures, could be rehabilitated.

Having cast blight in human terms, the HWC report focused on outlining measures that would simultaneously rehabilitate and physically relocate the homeless men from their self-exile on Skid Row in a “systematic, intelligent and humane approach [that considered] first, protection to the community; and second, . . . the needs of homeless men.” The report’s recommendations centered on creating a public agency and a network of shelter and rehabilitation services, who would use “trained and experienced personnel” to professionally assess and provide services to homeless men. But in contrast to the rehabilitation of past eras, which stressed work and strengthening moral character, rehabilitation now involved an array of professionalized services focusing not only on work but also on various pathologies. Rehabilitation now included such services as psychology, psychiatry, social work, alcohol treatment, and vocational training. The combination of these services would form a psychosocial intervention program. The goal of such a program was twofold: an alternative to the housing and alcohol on Skid Row and an alternative to what was perceived as a problematic Skid Row lifestyle. Ideally it would simultaneously facilitate the homeless man’s spatial and social reintegration into mainstream society.

In 1955, the HWC funded a demonstration project by the Pennsylvania Prison Society (PPS), a social service agency working with men
during and following incarceration, in what was intended as “a practical starting point to the many broad-gauged recommendations the [HWC] study contains.” The ensuing “Homeless Men Project” targeted men from Skid Row who were released from the municipal House of Correction after serving time for habitual drunkenness and vagrancy offenses. The project provided these men with a combination of limited financial assistance, casework, and social services as the means for rehabilitating the Skid Row lifestyle and for physical relocation away from Skid Row. The project provided a prototype for a systematic intervention program for homeless men, and it showed the feasibility of coordinating intensive social services, mostly provided by other agencies, in assisting these men. The PPS report also, however, underscored problems with this approach, including the project’s selective nature (it rejected two-thirds of the referrals sent to it) and recidivism, as many of the project’s clients eventually reverted to Skid Row and a lifestyle that was characteristic of the area.43

When the Greater Philadelphia Movement (GPM), a coalition of local business leaders, organized a Skid Row Study Committee in 1956, it signaled that Skid Row now had also drawn the attention of the business community. The GPM formed in 1948 as a coalition of top executives from 100 prestigious Philadelphia-based firms. With the slogan “The trouble with Philadelphia is us,” the GPM set about to make Philadelphia more livable and a better place to conduct business through working on a variety of progrowth and reform measures.44 The GPM demonstrated their influence in Philadelphia politics and planning with its instrumental role in the Philadelphia political reform movement that restructured city government and ousted the Republican machine from City Hall in 1951. The GPM took the lead in coordinating private sector participation in the local urban renewal initiatives and other development projects.45 The GPM’s involvement in Skid Row fit in well with the group’s particular interests in CBD revitalization and lobbying for new highway construction.46

The GPM’s work on Skid Row became more urgent in 1958 when the PRA designated the northern part of the Old City urban renewal area as the Independence Mall Redevelopment Project and added the Franklin area as an additional renewal site. The Unit 4 portion of the
Independence Mall project and the Franklin area together covered almost all of Skid Row. The Independence Mall Redevelopment Project sought to encourage the development of office and commercial buildings including administrative headquarters for large corporations, wholesalers and other users desiring space near the heart of the city, but not in the most expensive locations close to City Hall,

whereas the Franklin area, ranging from Vine Street north to Spring Garden Street and from Sixth Street west to Ninth Street, was planned for light industrial uses that could benefit directly from access to the proposed Vine Street Expressway.47 Echoes of the HWC report could be heard in assertions that together Independence Mall–Franklin would

obliterate and transform a large part of the Old Tenderloin district still remaining, wiping out slums and opening up wide areas for commercial and industrial development,

and would ensure that

a stately mall, providing an avenue from Independence Hall to the Benjamin Franklin Bridge Plaza will not run between blocks of rundown buildings but will be bounded on both sides by redeveloped areas and modern structures.48

In introducing the Independence Mall–Franklin Project, the PRA cited the GPM’s ongoing work with Skid Row and the prospects for “a bold new approach to the problems of Center City decay, blight and deteriorating existence by hard-pressed people.” In working with the GPA on the “human side” of redeveloping Skid Row, the PRA freely noted the unusual nature of this foray into social, rather than physical, redevelopment.49 However, the GPM’s initial report in 1958, “What to Do Before Skid Row Is Demolished,” provided an economic rationale for its and the PRA’s concern with the Skid Row man by casting this issue as critical to the success of the proposed redevelopment projects. Specifically, the report brought up concerns that
when the State Mall connects with Franklin Square, men of Skid Row will wander into the Mall. Some of them will undoubtedly molest and panhandle from the visitors who have come to Philadelphia to see the historical sites on Chestnut Street.

It also brought up concerns that Skid Row will affect the city more generally because, first,

the mere physical rebuilding of the [Independence Mall–Franklin Redevelopment] area will not, of itself, eliminate Skid Row. The development of a number of new Skid Rows, elsewhere in Philadelphia, is likely unless a community plan, involving a wide range of public and private agencies, is developed to achieve sound relocation for the people of Skid Row.

And second,

site clearance, scheduled without reference to the “human side” of the problem could increase panhandling and vagrancy in Philadelphia’s downtown commercial area, increase the commission of lesser crimes, and, if undertaken in wintertime, cause deaths by exposure.

Thus, it was the Skid Row man, as well as the Skid Row area, that was perceived as the purveyor of blight.

Thus, there was a fear of the homeless man’s potential to remain a problem to Philadelphia redevelopment even after the physical Skid Row was gone. On the basis of this fear, the GPM report advocated a program of further studying the wants and needs of Skid Row residents, with the goal of ultimately establishing a “Diagnostic and Distribution Center.” This center would combine assessing and rehabilitating the homeless man with the goal of assisting with his relocation to points throughout the city and elsewhere. The architect of the GPM’s response to Skid Row, Yale sociologist Earl Rubington, recognized that the homeless man has traditionally been resistant to rehabilitation efforts to the point where, according to Howard Bahr, the costliest rehabilitation programs were hardly better than no program at all. According to Rubington, the challenge of designing an effective program toward the homeless man’s relocation and
rehabilitation was in making such a program germane to the perceived needs and wants of the homeless man, a determination that was challenging because

the paradox is that relocation of Skid Row residents requires that it offer real improvements in housing and living standards to a group of homeless men who appear not to have any interest in those standards in the first place.53

Instead of forcing the Skid Row residents to accept commonly held standards, Rubington proposed “examining different groups of men on Skid Row and learning what their standards are.”54

In 1959, the PRA, through a $39,000 urban renewal grant, provided the GPM and Temple University with the funding to conduct a survey of Skid Row residents to look at their lifestyles, their housing preferences, and their feelings on relocation.55 The study surveyed 2,249 of an estimated 2,857 men staying in the Skid Row area, with its findings meant to “provide the factual basis for an effective relocation program, and . . . to provide the basis of a community approach to prevent the formation of future Skid Rows” 56 Among the findings culled from a comprehensive questionnaire, the study estimated that approximately 35 percent of this population were “pathological or uncontrolled drinkers,” roughly the same proportion (one-third of the population) were employed at least part-time, and another third were unable to work owing to disability.57 Of this population, 16 percent received either public assistance (that is, “welfare”) or “old age assistance” and two-thirds reported an annual income of under $2,000 in 1959 (compared with 28 percent of all U.S. males).58 Of the 55 percent of Skid Row residents who either worked or looked for work at the time of the survey, over three-quarters of these persons did so in unskilled labor or service jobs.59 Finally, although the men were considered homeless, fewer than 5 percent, on the night before the Temple University survey, failed to secure some type of indoor sleeping accommodation.60

Based on these findings, the report deemed social and economic “dependency” and alcoholism to be serious problems on Skid Row and ones that would have implications for any process that would displace the Skid Row population. The report supported the GPM’s call
for a program of relocation with rehabilitation, concluding that the goal of dispersing the Skid Row population throughout the citywide population after providing them with extensive rehabilitation was the best means to eliminate Skid Row as a social and physical entity. The report also acknowledged Skid Row’s function as a place containing cheap means for subsistence and made particular note of the fact that Skid Row housing, with its low-cost flophouses and missions, was not present anywhere else in the city.61

The implementation of a “diagnostic and distribution center” such as the one the GPM proposed, specializing in the identification and subsequent treatment of problems presented by the relocating Skid Row men, came about in 1963 when the nonprofit Diagnostic and Relocation Center (DRC) was opened. Supported primarily by federal funding administered by the PRA, and supplemented by additional municipal and state funding, the DRC engaged in “action-oriented research” that simultaneously involved relocating, rehabilitating, and researching Skid Row residents.62 Such a “rehabilitative relocation” model addressed the Skid Row resident’s personal pathologies and laid out a concrete plan toward three objectives. These objectives were, first, clearing people out of Skid Row to allow for demolition of the area’s structures; second, improving the Skid Row resident’s life; and, third, avoiding the displacement of Skid Row’s geographical characteristics into other parts of the city.63 With these objectives in mind, DRC designed its program to convince the Skid Row resident of the inherent benefits to him of relocation. It did this by actively reaching out to the Skid Row community and coordinating their participation in a process that included medical and psychosocial evaluations, social service referrals, and vocational or substance abuse services.

A steadily shrinking set of alternatives also helped persuade Skid Row’s residents to enlist the assistance of DRC, as urban renewal now led to the actual tearing down of Skid Row. Skid Row held steady in population from 3,000 persons in 1952 to 2,857 in 1960. But Skid Row’s decline became more pronounced with the implementation of urban renewal projects in the area, as lodging opportunities on Skid Row decreased from twenty-two flophouses in 1952 to thirteen flophouses (and 1,561 beds) at the time the DRC opened in 1963.64 In 1965, Unit 4 of the Independence Mall Urban Renewal Area, an $11.4
million project, cleared the four square blocks, between 7th, 9th, Race, and Vine Streets, that were the heart of Skid Row. One hundred forty-four structures were razed and replaced by the Metropolitan Hospital, the administrative offices of the Philadelphia Police Department, the Pennsylvania College of Podiatric Medicine, and the Vine Street Expressway right of way. As demolition continued, the Skid Row population stood at 800 in 1969; in 1975, the population was down to 300, and in 1976, the Darien Hotel was torn down to signify the end of Philadelphia Skid Row.

Ultimately, the goal was to relocate the client to another part of the city and into, depending on the client’s preferences and resources, a rooming house, an apartment, a nursing home, or in some instances, to hospitalization or alcohol rehabilitation programs. DRC could place many of the elderly or disabled Skid Row residents, especially those on a fixed income, in facilities that provided improved housing and a level of care unavailable on Skid Row. DRC helped others use the relocation money provided by the State Department of Transportation, and whatever personal resources the residents may have had, to move to rooms for rent and deteriorated hotels in mostly white ethnic, working-class sections of the city. A large number of Skid Row residents, however, just left without availing themselves of any assistance, and many of them presumably continued to live a transient lifestyle elsewhere.

**AFTER THE WRECKING BALL: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

Philadelphia was but one of many cities whose skid row area was reported to be in decline during the 1960s. In 1967, Bahr was the first to call widespread attention to this decline, speculating that the causes of this trend were urban renewal, welfare agency interventions, and general economic prosperity. Other subsequent works supported Bahr’s findings and posited that an additional reason for Skid Row’s decline was the loss of its function as a source of temporary, unskilled labor. In 1980, Barrett Lee, using census data, confirmed the population decline of most cities’ traditional skid row areas:
Sometime near the start of the period [1950-1970], as the metropolitan population as a whole began to deconcentrate, a decline in the economic role fulfilled by casual laborers stimulated a downward trend in membership that was to be felt most acutely by the larger, lower status skid row neighborhoods. These areas provided almost perfect targets for urban renewal, given their lack of economic function, their negative reputations, and the powerlessness of their residents.  

Research on Philadelphia’s Skid Row, however, runs contrary to Lee’s analysis, in that urban renewal did not move into a depopulating area. Since 1952, proponents of Skid Row clearance described the area as declining and blighted. But the Skid Row population, by the accounts available, held steady throughout the period of preparations for urban renewal and only declined owing to the implementation of the renewal projects from 1963 to 1976. Research also indicates that perceived pathologies such as alcoholism and disability, though prominent, were limited to a minority of Skid Row residents and that the main means of support for Philadelphia’s and other cities’ skid row residents were not welfare benefits but retirement pensions and wages from irregular, temporary labor stints. This income, while usually meager, kept most of the homeless population lodged in private accommodations on a given night. Skid Row was perhaps not as large as the turn-of-the-century Old Tenderloin, but neither did it appear to be dying a natural death.

The size of Skid Row did not change until the local political economy took an active interest in Skid Row land whose location was ever closer to an expanding and more image-conscious CBD. In a manner far more deliberate than was found in any other city, Philadelphia’s local economic interests not only helped broker the spatial redevelopment of this area but also took a leadership role in planning the social rehabilitation of its residents. This participation by business in the latter aspect of Philadelphia Skid Row redevelopment can largely be attributed to four dynamics: a political reform movement that led to the adoption of a new city charter and a determination to physically revitalize Philadelphia in the early 1950s; a social welfare initiative that framed the Skid Row “problem” in terms of both economic and human concerns; the presence of a strong, influential coalition of business leaders who were committed to implementing urban reform; and
the availability of funds from the federal urban renewal program to finance large-scale revitalization projects. What resulted was a confidence on the part of the local business leadership in its ability to succeed where decades of charity efforts had failed—to integrate the homeless man and the Skid Row space into mainstream society for the good of the entire city.

Skid Row was but one relatively small component of Philadelphia’s much more extensive and nationally acclaimed urban renewal initiative. Several features of Skid Row’s renewal, however, make it stand out. First, because of its visible location and its notorious denizens, Skid Row attracted a collaboration of local economic and social welfare forces that mirrored the federal urban renewal program’s approach of revitalizing cities with both of these interests in mind. Second, under the leadership of the business community, Skid Row, of all Philadelphia urban renewal sites, had the most extensive relocation and rehabilitation program. Third, while input from the homeless population was collected through surveys, no faction of the Skid Row population ever advocated this rehabilitation and relocation program. Fourth, the Skid Row community’s passive response to the demolition of their environment stood in contrast to the neighborhood resistance that marked many other urban renewal projects in Philadelphia and in other cities.

Characterizing the nature of Skid Row’s problem in terms of social as well as physical blight led to a policy response that was consistent with the ambivalent mixture of fear and sympathy that has been traditionally shown toward the homeless population and their urban habitat. Philadelphia, in the manner of New York City, Chicago, and Minneapolis, became the site of a major research effort, funded through urban renewal grants, which highlighted the pathologies associated with homelessness, especially alcoholism, as responsible for the blighted Skid Row environment. This reinforced, on one hand, popular reactions of sympathy in response to perceptions of the homeless man’s miserable existence, his human weakness, and his roots in often respectable origins—generating a demand for some type of human intervention to accompany the physical destruction of his environment. On the other hand, this research also legitimated the homeless population’s pariah status and the fiercely negative community
reactions to the prospect of Skid Row relocating to another area of the
city, reactions that necessitated a process whereby the Skid Row resi-
dents would be dispersed throughout the city.  
As Lee and Bahr pointed out, urban renewal was a key factor in the
disappearance of skid row areas in numerous cities. Many of these cit-
ies also expressed intentions to provide rehabilitation with their skid row relocation programs, but no other such effort involved the busi-
ness community or was implemented as systematically as it was in
Philadelphia. Of the cities that did not submit their skid row areas to
urban renewal, many of them nonetheless saw these areas redeveloped
under various public-private ventures, and while these programs typi-
cally made some provisions for relocating the displaced homeless
population, nowhere was there any serious attempt at rehabilitation.  
Like virtually all other cities, Philadelphia, while in the process of
destroying Skid Row and scattering its residents, all but ignored Skid
Row’s historical function as an inexpensive refuge for the economi-
cally and socially down and out. Skid Row’s position as a buffer zone
that separated a population, widely held as deviant, from the rest of
the city became harder to maintain as other uses, particularly transporta-
tion and tourism, encroached upon this area. Optimistic assessments
of economic prosperity ascertained these areas as obsolete. Since one
of the primary goals of Skid Row’s planned demise was for this
socially undesirable area not to arise elsewhere, no provisions were
made to replace the skid row’s unique supply of often squalid but
cheap housing, known as single-room-occupancy (SRO) housing.
Questions concerning the resurrection of Skid Row soon proved
moot. A new set of dynamics, driven in part by the continuing effects
of postindustrial transition, brought on the rise of contemporary
homelessness and ended any further speculation about the future fate
of Skid Row. Starting in the late 1970s, homeless persons, known as
“bag ladies” and “vent men,” started appearing in Philadelphia’s CBD
in increasing numbers.
How many former Skid Row denizens there were among these
“new” homeless is unclear, but following this vanguard came a more
diverse group than was ever assembled on Skid Row—younger, more
racially mixed, and featuring substantial numbers of women and chil-
dren. The causes of this homeless presence are much debated, ranging
from the classic focus on individual deficits to more structural explanations seldom found in contemporary Skid Row accounts.

This presence of homeless persons residing in public areas in the CBD would have been inconceivable during the Skid Row era. In examining this recent onslaught of homeless persons, one strikingly common theme that has emerged in the spate of related research is the connection between the absence of Skid Row, both as a neighborhood and as a supply of cheap housing, and this spatial reconfiguration of contemporary homelessness.83 Hoch and Slayton, in their description of the disappearance of SRO housing in Chicago, describe consequences in which,

no longer able to use the resources of the SRO hotels, the homeless rely instead on service providers, charities, and public institutions for income, benefits, and care. Meanwhile, the most deprived spend their days on the streets in neighborhoods and public spaces where their poverty, illness, and unkempt physical appearance make them a public eyesore subject to the gaze and judgment of the more prosperous passers-by. Their visible vulnerability inspires both compassion and contempt, creating the moral foundations for the social problem of the 1980’s—the “new” homeless.84

Similarly, homelessness in Philadelphia’s CBD has led to the city now spending over $30 million annually to contain this problem, whereas, during the Skid Row era, it could boast of spending no municipal funds on any program exclusively targeting the homeless population.

Future research may mull over similarities in spatial and social conflicts on Skid Row and with respect to contemporary homelessness—as local responses to homelessness still appear to be predicated on the struggle over space in the CBD and an ambivalence between charity and social control.85 In the meantime, this examination into the demise of Philadelphia Skid Row has shown a process in which economic objectives and business interests, concerned with the spatial transformation of a blighted area, became the catalyst of a deliberate effort at the social transformation of a deviant subculture. This carries two important implications: first, the need to frame the issue of homelessness in the context of its place both in the political economy and in the more general society, and, second, the need to examine how
homelessness becomes defined and what ends are served in the policy that emerges.

Twenty years after its demise, Skid Row represents a layer in the sediment of Philadelphia’s past. All of Skid Row’s hotels, bars, and other trademark structures are gone, replaced by parking lots and the commercial and municipal buildings described earlier. Respectable parks and buildings surround Independence Mall. The spatial and social blight that so concerned civic and business leaders in the 1950s and 1960s is now barely, if at all, remembered by the thousands of motorists who cut across the CBD on the Vine Street Expressway atop land that once accommodated the life and times of the homeless population.

Vestiges of the past, however, still remain. On the corner of Vine and 12th Streets is a homeless shelter. Known by its street address, 1209 Vine Street sits on the north side of the Vine Street Expressway, which acts as a six-lane concrete barrier between the shelter and the CBD. Half a mile north of there, near the intersection of Broad Street and Ridge Avenue and a little north of the former Skid Row boundaries, are several large shelters, some smaller homeless service agencies, and a large drop-in center that was relocated several years ago from its former location in the CBD. Such a reconcentration of homeless services offers stark visual support for research findings that suggest “homelessness remains a spatially concentrated phenomenon.” Furthermore, it belies the vision of a past generation’s business community that set about eliminating Philadelphia’s Skid Row and reintegrating the former residents into the larger community for the good of the entire city.

NOTES

1. The account of the Darien Hotel is taken from personal communication with Joe Ferry, who was involved with the relocation of the hotel residents, and from newspaper accounts in the Philadelphia Bulletin, July 21, 1975, and January 23, 1976 (Temple University Urban Archives).

3. References to the homeless population in this article will use masculine pronouns in recognition of its overwhelmingly male composition.

4. The term homeless, throughout most of American history up to the late 1970s, not so much referred to the lack of living quarters (though a minority of the homeless population always found themselves forced to sleep “in the rough”), but rather described a person’s lack of any fixed association to family or place.


9. These two institutions provide contrasting examples of charitable approaches taken to homeless men during this era. The Sunday Breakfast Association provided the homeless with food and shelter along with an evangelizing Christianity. The Wayfarers’ Lodge, on the other hand, took a more “scientific” approach that included mandatory “work tests,” usually a stint of chopping wood, as a means for the homeless man to prove himself “deserving” of the food and shelter that was offered. See Kenneth Kusmer, “The Underclass in Historical Perspective: Tramps and Vagrants in Urban America, 1870-1930,” in Rick Beard, ed., On Being Homeless: Historical Perspectives (New York, 1987), 28; Blumberg et al., Liquor and Poverty, 30-1, 45, 50.


11. These rooming houses were usually large houses that were subdivided into numerous smaller, apartment-type dwellings (Fretz, The Furnished Room Problem, 42-8). See Harvey W. Zorbaugh, The Gold Coast and the Slum: A Sociological Study of Chicago’s Near North Side (Chicago, 1929), 105-28, and Hoch and Slayton, New Homeless and Old, 46-53, for similar accounts of how Chicago’s Hobohemia grew both spatially and economically, alongside one of the city’s main rooming house districts.

12. Fretz, The Furnished Room Problem, 60.


19. Hoch and Slayton, New Homeless and Old, 62-3; Blumberg et al., Liquor and Poverty, 48-9; Schneider “Skid Row as an Urban Neighborhood,” 169-71.


28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 3-5. Skid Row was highly segregated, and the black counterparts to the Skid Row man presumably lived among the black sections of Philadelphia (Blumberg et al., Liquor and Poverty, 138-9). There was no identified black Skid Row in Philadelphia, and blacks were undoubtedly discouraged from using Skid Row facilities as the result of prejudice. In contrast, other cities such as Chicago featured segregation on Skid Row that dated back to the industrial era, with hotels and other accommodations available just for blacks (Hoch and Slayton, New Homeless and Old, 29-32). A well-known and detailed study of the disproportionately high incarceration rates on Skid Row is James P. Spradley, You Owe Yourself a Drunk: An Ethnography of Urban Nomads (Boston, 1970). For additional details of arrests and incarcerations on Philadelphia Skid Row, see Leonard Blumberg, Thomas E. Shipley, and Irving Shandler, Skid Row and Its Alternatives (Philadelphia, 1973), 60-75.


34. Ibid., 209.


38. Missions are institutions, peculiar to Skid Row, which would provide homeless indigent persons meals and overnight shelter after subjecting the homeless man to a mandatory sermon with the implicit encouragement to profess a conversion to Christianity. For a more detailed description of this and other Skid Row institutions, see Wallace, *Skid Row as a Way of Life*; William McSheehy, *Skid Row* (Cambridge, MA, 1979); James F. Rooney “Organizational Success through Program Failure: Skid Row Rescue Missions,” *Social Forces* 58 (1980): 904-24.


41. Ibid., 10.


45. Kleniewski, “From Industrial City to Corporate City,” 213-14.


51. Ibid., 18.


54. Ibid., 13.


57. Ibid., 144, 52, 91. These proportions are not mutually exclusive.
58. Ibid., 75, 79.
59. Ibid., 62.
60. Ibid., 14.
61. Ibid., 191-200; Blumberg et al., *Skid Row and Its Alternatives*, 7.
62. Research on Philadelphia Skid Row, conducted in conjunction with the Diagnostic and Relocation Center (hereafter, DRC), introduced the concept of “skid row–like people,” who were characterized primarily by alcoholism and poverty and who posed the latent threat of concentrating in a particular area and creating (or re-creating) another physical skid row environment. See ibid., and Blumberg et al., *Liquor and Poverty*, for greater detail on “skid row–like” people.
63. The term “rehabilitative relocation” comes from Blumberg et al., *Skid Row and Its Alternatives*, 12, to describe DRC’s services; I apply this term to DRC’s overall service structure. See also Irving W. Shandler and Thomas E. Shipley, “New Focus for an Old Problem: Philadelphia’s Response to Homelessness,” *Alcohol Health and Research World* 2, no. 3 (1987): 54-7.
64. In contrast to the twenty-two hotels that the HWC report (1952) lists, the Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections counted, at Skid Row’s peak, forty-six flophouses in their files, but no further information was available. The subsequent report on sleeping accommodations is from *Philadelphia Bulletin*, March 26, 1962 (Temple University Urban Archives). The censuses have both been previously mentioned in this article.
71. As previously stated, HWC estimated the Skid Row population at 3,000 in 1952 and Blumberg et al., *Men on Skid Row*, estimated it at over 2,800 in 1960.
73. Bartelt, “Renewing Center City,” 80.
75. See Caplow, “The Sociologist and the Homeless Man,” regarding Skid Row’s characteristically passive response to the outside world. See Herbert Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (New York, 1962), 281-304, for an account of a Boston neighborhood’s inability to organize resistance to the redevelopment of their community. Several factors that Gans mentions, including the slow pace of the demolition plans and the disbelief that their neighborhood would actually be demolished, have parallels with the responses of the Skid Row resident.
76. For an account of neighborhood resistance and community empowerment in Philadelphia, see Peter Marris and Martin Rein, *Dilemmas of Social Reform: Poverty and Community Action in the United States* (New York, 1967), 94-119. Another Philadelphia confrontation, where neighborhood groups united to successfully block the proposed Crosstown Expressway, is also notable both for its contrast to Skid Row in the quality of community response and for the similarity of this project to the Vine Street Expressway project that was eventually built across


78. See Philadelphia Bulletin, December 7, 1969; December 8, 1969; and December 9, 1969 (Temple University Urban Archives), and Hodos, After Urban Renewal, 24, for community reaction to a leaked highway department memo that considered relocating Skid Row to a South Philadelphia neighborhood.

79. Chicago is one example where an ambitious project was proposed to replace demolished skid row housing with housing in a controlled, community-like setting. This project encountered political opposition from communities unwilling have this housing in their neighborhoods, and it quietly died from a lack of support (Hoch and Slayton, New Homeless and Old, 118-22; McSheehy, Skid Row, 89-92).


81. This is consistent with a more general pattern in skid row areas as described in ibid., 73-82.


84. Hoch and Slayton, Homeless New and Old, 198.
