This article examines the recent decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Miceli-Riggins v Attorney General of Canada as an example of the approach which the Canadian courts are taking to the interpretation of s. 15 of the Charter of Rights (in the area of social benefits) following the Supreme Court’s recent attempts to ‘restate’ that law in a series of cases. It argued that, whatever the intention of the Supreme Court, the restatement of the law has created general confusion in the lower courts and tribunals. In addition, in cases concerning social benefits, the Court’s statements, in cases such as Withler and Gosselin, that in the context of larger benefits schemes ‘[p]erfect correspondence is not required’ between a benefits program and the actual needs and circumstances of the claimant group have led to a situation where the lower courts feel that they do not need to engage seriously with an analysis of discrimination where the case involves complex benefit schemes.