A New Actor or Passer-By? The Political Economy of Turkey's Engagement with Africa

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Despite its Ottoman past in the continent, Turkey did not show a serious interest in African affairs until recently. However, since 1998 there has been a revival in Turkey’s involvement in developing relations with Africa. This was a passive attempt initially, but after 2005, it became an offensive one that culminated in the first Turkey–Africa Summit in 2008 and booming economic relations. Despite much rhetoric on humanitarian issues, Turkey’s opening to Africa is driven by two factors: Turkey’s need to diversify its economic relations in a new global political economy and its re-orientation in global politics. In the current situation, Turkey–Africa relations are still fragile and the future of the relations depends much on Turkey’s domestic political developments and interest from the African side.

Introduction

Turkish foreign policy today is far more proactive and multidimensional than probably at any time in the history of the republic. Nothing captures this better than Turkey’s recent involvement in Africa. In the Turkish political agenda, Africa did not feature much until recently. Turkey announced 2005 as ‘the year of Africa’, and hosted the first ever Turkey–Africa Cooperation Summit from 18 to 21 August 2008 in Istanbul with the participation of representatives from 50 African countries. Again, in July 2008, Turkey’s then Foreign Minister Ali Babacan declared that Africa has a special importance to Turkey within the context of new foreign policy, thus it is opening 15 new embassies in Africa in the next few years. Since then, a re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy toward Africa has taken shape and become steadily more visible publicly as well.

This paper seeks to portray Turkey’s new engagement with Africa in terms of economic and political developments. Although Turks have a relatively long history of involvement in Africa, the new engagement is an offensive one that bore fruit in a very short time in terms of economic indicators. Indeed, Ankara’s first interest in developing serious relations with Africa dates back to 1998; however, this has become more evident only after the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) assumed power in 2002. The Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s
continued efforts to develop relations with neglected areas in Turkey’s foreign relations. Until 10 years ago, Africa was known in Turkey by TV images of hunger, poverty and conflicts. Today, Africa in Turkey is not regarded as a continent of hunger and poverty, but of hope and a possible partner to cooperate and develop economic and political relations.

To outline this dramatic change, this paper aims to develop three basic arguments. Firstly, a general outline of historical relations between Turkey and Africa will be outlined dating back to the latest period of the Ottoman State. These historical ties will constitute the psychological and perceptual background of relations while indicating the historically constructed and distinguished approach of Turkey to North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Although recent Turkish interest in Africa is equally directed to both Africa, a perceptual and even strategic difference in approaching both is still persistent.

Secondly, locating Turkey’s opening to Africa within the overall Turkish diplomacy requires a short account of the new Turkish foreign policy and its theoretical underpinnings. This is also important to understand why Turkey is interested in Africa now and the viability and sustainability of the African dimension in Turkish diplomacy. Turkey’s own new-found perception in international affairs that it could play a constructive role in both regional and global affairs would be vital in understanding current Turkey. Ideational and self-perceptual reasons sometimes may be more important than available material reasons in an emerging foreign policy. In that sense, it is argued that a newly developing multidimensional foreign policy is the driving force behind Turkey’s outreach to Africa.

Finally, an effort is made to summarize the recent economic cooperation established between Turkey and African countries as well as to present an overview of Turkey’s trade and investment relations both with the continent as a whole and with key countries. Once this picture is established, I analyse the nature and scope of Turkey–Africa relations and investigate whether this is a short-term process driven by the economic needs of Turkey and the changing international environment or these relations may lead to any long-term cooperation.

This paper argues that historically having no colonial background coupled with an intention to cooperate and collaborate, not to exploit, may pave the way for opening a new era in Turkey–Africa relations. Furthermore, the changing geographical perception of Africa in Turkey at societal and governmental level may accelerate this process. However, the lack of knowledge and domestic political (in-)stability in Turkey will define the sustainability of relations in the near future.

**Historical Legacy: Asset or Burden?**

In order for a better analysis of Turkey’s historical relations with Africa, a geographical–conceptual approach is necessary. One can speak of two distinct conceptions about Africa based on a geographical divide in Turkey: North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Both conceptions have been shaped in the Turkish psyche by historical developments mainly from the Ottoman background. This articulated itself in classical Turkish foreign policy toward the continent. Historically, Turkey has had
relatively strong relations with North Africa as it was part of the Ottoman State dating back to the 15th–16th century. With regard to Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey’s relatively little historical relations are a recent development, mostly dating back to the 19th century.

North Africa is not a distant geographical area in the conception of Turkish society. This is accounted for by two reasons. First, Muslim populations of North African states and their close historical connection with the Ottoman past have created an understanding that North Africa is part of the Turkish periphery. Developing political and economic relations with North Africa has never been questioned but seen as an essential part of diversifying Turkish foreign policy. Second, North Africa is considered part of a broader Middle East—an area that Turkish society feels very close to.  

Sub-Saharan Africa as a geographical area has always been considered as a far away land, full of problems, hunger, disease and civil wars. These were the basic elements that defined the Turkish conception of Sub-Saharan Africa. Although Turkey had comparatively important relations with the area through its Ottoman past, this history did not receive any attention from academia or policymaking circles. Since the official celebrations of 700 years of the establishment of the Ottoman State in 1999, researchers have paid more attention to the neglected areas of the Ottoman past such as its relations with Africa. However, the persistent negative image of Sub-Saharan Africa did not change until the recent work of both the AKP government and civil society organizations. It is important to note here that when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Ethiopia and South Africa in March 2005, being the first prime minister visiting officially a state below the equator in the republican era, many Turkish columnists, retired diplomats and the mainstream media raised critical voices about wasting Turkey’s limited energy in vain. However, such a conception of Sub-Saharan Africa seems to be changing with the works of government and civil society organizations in the last few years.

Bearing these two Africa concepts in mind, one can divide Turkey’s relations with Africa into three periods. The first period covers the Ottoman State’s relations with Africa until the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, during which Ottomans had considerable relations with Africa. The years from 1923 to 1998 can be seen as the second period where Turkish–African relations were at the lowest level, if not existing at all. After 1998, with the acceptance of the Africa Action Plan, there has been a gradual revival in Turkey’s interest in Africa reaching a peak level after 2005.  

With regard to the first period, the Ottoman Empire had considerable relations with North Africa—aided by the fact that African states such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria were totally or partially subject to Ottoman rule. The Ottomans also played an important role in preventing Spanish incursions in North Africa as they sent their emissaries when needed. In Sub-Saharan Africa, too, some African countries were partially part of the Ottoman State, such as Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and even Niger and Chad. During the wave of colonialism, the Ottoman State was active in Eastern Africa to balance the Portuguese penetration. In northern Sub-Saharan Africa, the Ottomans were also part of the balance of power system having friendship and alliance with the Kanem Burnu Empire prevailing in today’s Northern Nigeria, Niger and Chad. The Kanem Burnu Empire even signed a
defence pact in 1575 with the Ottoman Empire during the time of Sultan Murad III, upon which the Sultan sent military equipment and trainers to Kanem Burnu.7

In 1894, after the first mosque was built in Lagos, the Ottoman State sent a special emissary to Nigeria conferring the staff of office, the decoration of the Order of Medjidie as well as the title of Bey, a higher civilian rank in the Ottoman Empire to the leader of the Southern Nigeria Moslem Community, Mohammed Shitta Bey. The Shitta Bey family is a large family and has presently several members playing an important role in the social and political life in Nigeria.8

In Southern Africa, Ottomans had a diplomatic representation since 1861. The appointment of the first honorary consul-general in Cape Town, P. E. de Roubaix, on 18 February 1861 was followed by a series of honorary consul-general appointments in the following years until the first Turkish diplomat, Mehmet Remzi Bey, stationed in South Africa on 21 April 1914, who passed away on 14 February 1916 and was buried in Braamfontein, South Africa.9

Adding a religious dimension to the relations, the Ottoman State also sent imams to the Muslims of the Cape of Good Hope (now in South Africa) in 1863, via honorary consul-general de Roubaix, upon the request of the Muslim Community. As the area was a British colony, the Governor of Cape of Good Hope sent the petition of the Muslims to the Queen detailing the situations of Muslims and their request. The matter was referred to H. E. Muzawras, the Ottoman ambassador to London. He conveyed this to the Ottoman Sultan—caliphate of the time—and an order was issued from the Sultan’s Palace that a scholar be sent to South Africa. With the arrival of Abu Bakr Effendi, a strong bridge was built between the Muslims of the Cape of Good Hope and Turkey due to his contribution to South Africa. As a sign of this, the Muslims of South Africa had actively participated in the Hijaz railway construction campaigns. They had raised funds and collected at least 366,551 pounds between 1900 and 1907.10 After the donations the Ottoman State distributed more than 200 medals in gold, silver and nickel to those who contributed.11 In the past, some members of the Effendi family were involved in politics and played an active role in South African society. Currently, the Effendi surname identifies a well-known family in South Africa. Some of his progeny went back to Turkey; others immigrated to Canada, New Zealand and Australia.12

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey–Africa relations reached their lowest level. This is accounted for by several reasons such as domestic consideration of both sides and colonialism. However, Turkey started to attach importance to Africa slowly during the cold war years. Turkey developed relations with North African states economically and politically. However, these relations were shaped by the conditions of the cold war bipolarity thus were sometimes at odds with the historical public sentiment toward the continent. For example, Turkey’s position on Algerian independence in 1956, when Turkey voted against the independence in the UN General Assembly,13 is still remembered as a historical ‘failure’ in that sense. Turkey’s relations with North African countries has developed, albeit in a limited way, especially since the 1970s as part of Turkey’s efforts to diversify its economic and political relations, but Sub-Saharan Africa never gained a position of special importance within the Turkish foreign policy of the time. Nevertheless, Turkey played
a relatively minor role in the independence of Namibia and Zimbabwe. Similarly, when Ghana became independent in 1957, Turkey recognized Ghana and opened a resident embassy at a later stage. With the decolonization process in Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Turkey recognized all newly independent countries, established diplomatic relations and opened resident embassies in some of them.\textsuperscript{14} Turkey opened the first official mission, the Turkish Consulate General in Lagos, in 1956.\textsuperscript{15} It tried its best to establish and develop economic, cultural and political ties, in particular, with black African countries. In that sense, several strides were made in the late 1960s and 1970s. However, this was not based on a long-term relationship and Turkey was not really seriously involved in African affairs.

Exemplifying the nature of Turkey’s relations with Africa until 1998, the experience of a Turkish diplomat who served in Africa in the 1960s and 1990s is very explanatory and therefore deserves to be quoted here at length:

Permit me to share also with you some interesting experiences of mine at the time of my two assignments in African Countries as a young diplomat in Ghana in the middle year of 1960s and as Ambassador in Nigeria during the first half of 1990s.

First, Ghana, as a new independent country wanting to diversify its trade approached Turkish Embassy to import Tobacco. We informed the Ministry. But we were not able to receive any response. The Israel Embassy’s trade attaché proposed to do joint trade to Ghana and elsewhere in Africa. We were not able to give any answer to that proposal as well.

Just before I left Ankara to take up my duty to Nigeria in 1990, the first meeting of Joint Economic Commission was held in Ankara. The second meeting had to be held in Nigeria. But, it was not possible to organize this meeting during 5 years I served there. There was a standing invitation to our Foreign Minister to visit Lagos. I tried to do my best for the realization of this visit. I was not able make it possible too. Among the decisions of 1st Joint Economic Commission there was cooperation on energy matters and possible import by Turkey Nigerian oil and liquidified natural gas. I tried to get the view of the Government on this matter—Surprisingly I had a reply. It was as follows; ‘Turkey is in negotiation with neighboring countries and was not interested with Nigerian oil and gas.’\textsuperscript{16}

When the decolonization process started in Africa, Turkey missed the opportunity to develop permanent political, economic and commercial relations with Africa even though it had designed an opening plan in the 1970s as part of an attempt to diversify its foreign policy when Turkey was undergoing difficult times with its Western allies due to the Cyprus issue. It could be seen partly as a result of other issues persisting in Turkish policy of the time, however, the main reason was certainly the lack of Turkey’s interest and of knowledge and strategy about how/what to do about Africa. Turkish opening to Africa has come only in the late 1990s with the Africa Action Plan adopted in 1998. This opening has been taken very seriously especially by the AKP government.
since 2002 and supported by various civil society organizations in Turkey. What is
different and unique in this new orientation of Turkish foreign policy is that it aims to
overcome geographically two Africa concepts and create a new and united image of
Africa in Turkish society. Underlying this point, when Africa is debated, neither special
treatment to North Africa nor a (mostly imaginative) negative image of Sub-Saharan
Africa persists. Turkey seems to be (re-)discovering Africa as a whole while business-
men and politicians are busy developing strong connections with Africa.17

Why Africa? Understanding the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy

It is commonplace to argue that Turkey had started to change not in 2002, but some 20
years earlier, in the 1980s. It was with Turgut Özal that Turkey began to change its
orientation towards greater openness to the outside world especially at the economic
level.18 Özal saw for Turkey more opportunities than threats and the most important
opportunities were economic. He also altered the national role conception and foreign
policy orientation of Turkey while serving as a main referent to current AKP policies.19

A comparison between Özal’s foreign policy and the AKP’s foreign policy indicates
the main differences between the two, despite some convergence such as the
importance of developing closer economic relations with the world. Özal’s foreign
policy perspective, first, was ‘functionalist’ in that it emphasized primarily the
importance of the advancement of economic relations.20 Second, it was very much
utilitarian in the sense that it perceived Turkey’s relations with other regions as part of
Turkey’s interest in advancing its relations with the West. Therefore, the metaphor of
a ‘bridge’ between the East and the West was quite dominant in Özal’s approach.21

However, the AKP has developed a new regional vision originating mostly from
historical and cultural depth. The new engagement has been dynamic and proactive as
well as Ankara-centric, meaning that it should not only be an extension of Turkey’s
relations with the West.22 In this context, it is not surprising that Turkey’s role as a
‘bridge’ is questioned as such a role symbolizes passivity and dilutes Turkey’s central
position in global politics.23 The AKP’s vision also includes more institutionalized
regional engagement24 and aspires to play a more independent role in foreign affairs.25
In a nutshell, the AKP foreign policy has been more sophisticated in its style and
discourses than Özal’s opening, and is likely to have a long-term impact; hence,
requires an in-depth analysis to comprehend Turkey’s current Africa policy.

The students of Turkish foreign policy since 2002 point to one key person as the
brain behind the foreign policy of the AKP governments: Ahmet Davutoğlu. He was a
foreign policy advisor (2003–2009) to Prime Minister Erdoğan and since May 2009
appointed as foreign minister. In order to locate the Turkish opening to Africa within
a broader context, it is imperative to understand the Strategic Depth of Davutoğlu,
which became the guidance for Turkish foreign policy, as articulated in his writings.26
He has exerted huge influence on foreign policymaking at both theoretical and
practical levels; thus, he is considered to be the main architect behind Turkey’s new
foreign policy orientation. Perhaps an indication of this can be seen in an analysis of
The Economist, which argued that ‘dealing with Turkish foreign policy means dealing
with Mr Davutoğlu.’27
Here, the *Strategic Depth* will not be discussed in detail rather a speech of Davutoğlu; a general conceptual picture of Turkish foreign policy will be outlined. According to him, there are three methodological and six operative principles of Turkish foreign policy today. First, methodology is a ‘visionary approach, not a crisis oriented approach.’ Because of the characteristic of the cold war, Turkey’s options were limited as it was part of the Western bloc. Now, Turkey seems to be ‘implementing a vision-oriented foreign policy’. The second methodological principle is ‘a consistent, systematic framework’ that guides Turkey in foreign affairs. This means that Turkey’s involvement or relations with one area should not be seen as a contrast to others. Therefore, Turkey’s endeavour to develop political and economic relations with the Middle East, Asia and Africa is not an alternative to its European vocation and its strong intention to be a member of the European Union (EU). Davutoğlu argues that there is one approach behind this new policy of Turkey and all complement and support each other. The third methodological principle is ‘to have a new style, in the sense of political rhetoric, tools and instrument’. This is called ‘soft power’, which is new in Turkish foreign policy. While Turkey is using today more soft power than hard power, it has not ignored its military potential as it consistently develops it based on new technological advancements.

With regard to operational principles, first, Davutoğlu emphasizes ‘the balance between security and freedom’. He argues that ‘if you ignore security for freedom you will have anger and chaos. If you ignore freedom for security, you will have an authoritarian, autocratic society.’ This principle has been very important for consolidation of Turkish domestic politics and entrance negotiations for the EU. The second principle is ‘zero problems with our neighbours’. As a result of this, Turkey has developed economic and political relations with all neighbouring countries and signed high-level consultation agreements with Syria and Iraq. Turkey signed a protocol with Armenia and now has better relations with Greece, Russia and Georgia. The third operative principle is to have ‘proactive peace diplomacy, not only with neighbours, but with all the regions’. Turkey’s active involvement in the Iraqi–Syrian dispute in 2010, facilitation of Syria–Israeli peace efforts before the Israeli offensive in Gaza in 2009 and its active diplomacy to prevent a conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008 are a few examples as a result of this principle. Similarly, Turkish activities for Sunni–Shiite reconciliation in Iraq, domestic reconciliation in Lebanon and reconciliation negotiations between Serbia and Bosnia are from Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood, however, the recent official requests for Turkish mediation from different parts of the world like Somalia and Philippines indicates the possible future involvement of Turkey in global affairs.

The fourth principle is to have ‘compatible global relations’. As the international system is no longer bipolar, Turkey considers any good relations with any regions as distinct as with the EU. This is where Turkey’s opening to Africa finds its place in the new foreign policy formulation. From this perspective, Turkey sees its relations with Africa not as a temporary venture; rather it is part of its re-orientation in a changing global political economy. ‘Active involvement in all global and international issues, in all international organizations’ is cited as the fifth operational principle that also explains the involvement of Turkey in Africa and other continents. In 2009, Turkey...
was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and also is a member of the G20. Similarly, Turkey holds observer status both in the African Union and the Arab League, and wants ‘to be a part of the Pacific Forum’. Along with these involvements, Turkey will open ‘new embassies in Africa and in Latin America’. The last principle, Davutoğlu argues, is try to ‘work hard on all of these fronts’ without creating an issue of changing axis and ‘to defend regional and global peace’.40

These principles are important for understanding the theoretical background of Turkey’s new involvement in Africa and its new re-orientation within global politics. However, there is another document that may be seen as a road map in managing Turkey’s opening to Africa since 1998, which needs to be outlined here. In 1998, Turkey adopted a policy document titled ‘Opening up to Africa Policy’. As outlined above, this was part of expanding Turkey’s foreign policy options with different regions and continents, initiated by then Foreign Minister Ismail Cem. In this framework, Turkey hoped to further develop its political, economic and cultural ties with African countries in the forthcoming period. The document outlined policy recommendations. It comprises several areas such as developing diplomatic relations and improving political, economic and cultural cooperation.41 In the diplomatic area, it was suggested to upgrade the level of diplomatic representation in Africa and it was decided to open three new embassies. This was an important step as during the 1990s three embassies were closed down due to economic reasons (Ghana, Somalia and Tanzania). Another measure in this field was accreditation of ambassadors directly from Ankara to some African countries. According to this, Turkish ambassadors would be sent to African capitals as special emissaries in order to develop bilateral relations.42

As political measures, some concrete steps were proposed, such as (i) organization of high-level visits from African countries; (ii) establishment of political consultation mechanisms; (iii) intensification of contacts with African countries within international organizations; (iv) reciprocal inter-parliamentary visits; (v) visits of Turkish delegations to various African countries; and (vi) contribution to various UN technical and humanitarian assistance programmes.43

Economic measures were the central part of the document and listed the following proposals: (i) conclusion of Agreements of Trade, Technical, Economic and Scientific Cooperation, Prevention of Double Taxation and Mutual Promotion and Protection of investments in order to complete the legal framework of economic and trade relations; (ii) invitation of technical ministers from Africa such as Ministers of Trade, Industry, Health, Agriculture and Education in order to determine possible areas of cooperation, and invitation of African Ministers of Trade to Izmir International Fair; (iii) organization of short-term training programmes for African experts in the fields of health, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, mining, water management, free zones, etc. and sending Turkish experts to Africa in the same sectors; (iv) creation of a special technical assistance fund to be used only for Africa; (v) realization of Turkey’s membership in the African Development Bank and the African Exports and Imports Bank as an indication of Turkey’s political will and Turkish contractors’ involvement in the projects financed by them; and (vi) exchange of visits by businessmen and creation of Joint Business Councils or Chambers of Commerce.44
To improve cultural cooperation and interaction in the field of education, it was proposed to increase contacts between universities. The invitation of African scholars to various international conferences and festivals was also listed. Cooperation in military training, Turkish contribution to the UN peacekeeping activities and invitation of Africans for military exercises in Turkey were considered important along with the creation of an Institute of African Studies in order to enlighten the Turkish public and to better understand Africa.45

As can be seen, the document was very clear in detailing the policy of Turkey in Africa. However, domestic political reasons and the lack of political will and logistics prevented Turkey from realizing its opening to Africa in earlier years. With the AKP, a new synergy has been created in Turkish foreign policy with regard to Africa, changing the discourse on Turkey–Africa relations.

Turkey in Africa: Anatomy of a Soft Power Engagement

In fact, Turkish opening to Africa has been an intensive attempt to revitalize relations from the Turkish side in several ways. On the one hand, Turkey has increased its financial aid to Africa both through international agencies and its own official aid and cooperation agency. On the other hand, Turkey announced 2005 as ‘the year of Africa’, hosted the first Turkey–Africa Summit in Istanbul in 2008 and opened 15 new embassies since then, increasing the total number of Turkish resident embassies to 27 in Africa. In their discourse on the opening to Africa, Turkish officials have usually emphasized increasing trade relations with Africa and economic development. However, Africa has only showed a recent interest in developing relations with Turkey. The scope of the relations may be categorized in three sections, ranging from humanitarianism to economy and African reaction. The response from the African side, by and large, has been a mixture of confusion and hope. Whether such an African interest and Turkish eagerness may converge in future is an important issue that will define the future of Turkey’s opening to Africa.

Aid, Humanitarianism and Politics

In the last decade, aid has been one of the strong foreign policy elements in Turkey’s overall foreign policy in general and its Africa policy in particular. It has been part of its soft power strategy. The official Turkish aid agency, Turkish International Development and Cooperation Agency (TIKA), currently operates in Africa through three offices located in Addis Ababa, Khartoum and Dakar as part of Turkey’s development aid to Africa. TIKA was initially established to help the transition of the states in Central Asia, Caucasus and the Balkans. However, after 2003, it transformed into a more global aid agency and expanded its area of operation. One of the regions that this expansion showed itself has been Africa.46 Through these offices, Turkey has a strong will to widen cooperation with Africa and currently out of its three regional offices it implements projects in 37 African countries.47 Turkey has also promised to provide technical assistance to African countries through TIKA. It would also strive to open an affiliate office in other African countries to further cement cooperation.
with Africa on the basis of several priorities. President Gül argued that Turkey attempts to build relations with Africa by taking ‘health, education, agriculture, environment, infrastructure and capacity-building’ as strategic areas to take action.48

Besides the activities of TİKA, Turkey has also utilized international organizations to provide aid to Africa. For example, through the World Health Organization, World Food Programme (WFP) and the Red Crescent, Turkey has donated 7.5 million USD to various African countries to assist them to cope with the negative effect of drought and other natural disasters. In 2008, Turkey allocated 3.5 million USD as humanitarian aid through the WFP,49 while in 2009, it made a modest donation of 0.5 million USD to the African Union budget.50 In a similar vein in 2007, Turkey for the first time hosted a summit of the Least Developed Countries (LDC) in Istanbul, 33 of which are in Africa out of 49. In this summit, Turkey committed 20 million USD development aid for their use. To show Turkey’s seriousness and commitment to development of the LDC members, Ankara also hosted the fourth conference on Least Developed Countries in the first half of 2011.51

Turkey’s increased humanitarian involvement and leadership in Africa really became prominent when the drought and famine situation became worse in East Africa. On 19 August 2011, Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Somalia, arguably the worst affected country from famine and drought, to draw international attention to the country’s deadly situation. He became the first leader from outside Africa to visit Somalia in nearly two decades. Erdoğan took his wife, daughter and an entourage consisting of cabinet members and their families with him to Somalia, and visited refugee camps and hospitals to witness the devastation caused by the severe drought. Erdoğan also brought the issue to the UN General Assembly meeting in September 2011 and called on the international community for a continued approach to find a long-lasting solution. Turkey has also opened an embassy in Mogadishu to show its seriousness and took several measures to help Somalia improve its infrastructure, which included digging wells to improve water supply, building a major hospital, six field hospitals and a highway from Mogadishu Airport to the city centre, as well as facilities for waste management to clean up Mogadishu’s rubbish-strewn streets.52 The Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ) will also build houses and schools in the famine-hit country in the near future. Whether Turkish involvement in Somalia will bring any peace and stability is yet to be seen, but it clearly showed Turkey as ‘a new humanitarian power’ in Africa.53 It has also indicated that Turkish involvement is likely to increase and even turn to focus more on political aspects of the problems.

In the last several years, Africa has been experiencing a trend to forge new partnerships or renew existing ones with several countries as conglomerate economic and political entities or individually. Such strategic partnerships entered enforcement under ACP–EU and in the form of cooperation with individual countries such as China, Japan, Brazil and India. The Turkey–Africa partnership may be seen as the latest strategic link in a similar vain. The first Turkey–Africa Cooperation Summit was held under the theme ‘Solidarity and Partnership for a Common Future’ from 18 to 21 August 2008, in Istanbul. The summit was considered by many as a success in terms of Turkey–Africa economic relations. It has achieved several concrete results including a decision that the next summit is to be held in an African country in 2013.54
The summit brought together the leaders and representatives from 50 member states of the African Union with the absence of Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique. The AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping, representatives of some 11 international organizations and hundreds from business communities were also present. The summit concluded by adopting two documents: ‘The Istanbul Declaration’ and ‘Turkey–Africa Partnership Framework Document’, which were prepared by senior experts and ministers. The framework document reads:

Acknowledging the critical role that Trade and Investment should play within the framework of this partnership as agents of development [...] and we pledge to create a favourable legal and stimulating business environment for economic cooperation as a central pillar of the Africa–Turkey Partnership.55

The immediate objective of the summit was two-fold. First, as part of Turkey’s serious effort to expand ties and increase trade volume with the African continent, it has been a venue where Turkey wanted to prove its seriousness. It seems that Turkey convinced African leaders, as a joint decision was announced at the end of the summit that the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and the Union of African Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Agriculture and Professions (UACCIAP) are to cooperate to establish the Turkish–African Chamber for furthering commercial relations.56 Turkey’s second immediate aim was to gain the support of African nations in its bid to be a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2009–10. Apparently, Turkey was successful in this goal as the Turkish President Gül confidently spoke that African countries fully supported Turkey’s candidacy during the summit57 and the result of the election in September 2008 held by the UN General Assembly indicated that Turkey received 151 votes.58

Trade and Institutional Cooperation

Nothing can summarize the remarkable change of Turkey–Africa relations better than the increasing trade and institutional cooperation between the two. The year 2005 was a turning point in Turkey’s relations with Africa. Turkey obtained observer status in the African Union in 2005, which declared it a strategic partner in January 2008. In May 2008, Turkey joined the African Development Bank and has strengthened its relations with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in East Africa and the Economic Community of West African States.59 The Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK) has established eight Business Councils as part of Ankara’s attempts to increase business activities with Africa. Turkish Business Councils are operating in Ethiopia, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, South Africa, Sudan and Tunisia. To accelerate these relations further, in 2008, Turkey opened 15 new embassies in Africa, in addition to the 12 it already had on the continent, more than doubling the density of its diplomatic representation in Africa. In 2009 alone, Turkey appointed eight new ambassadors responsible for opening embassies in their designated countries and starting to work as soon as possible.60 By December 2011, legal
procedures had been completed for opening six more embassies and once all of them are completed, Turkey will have 33 embassies in Africa.

While these developments at the political and institutional level are important, Turkish opening to Africa is underwritten by soaring bilateral trade. Turkey’s trade volume with African countries was only 5.4 billion USD in 2003, and it increased more than two-fold exceeding 16 billion USD in 2008 and despite the economic crisis it did not lose its pace by numbering around 16 billion USD in 2009 (Table 1). Yet, considering Turkey’s total trade volume with the rest of the world, the current trade volume with African countries is not significant. Turkey’s target is to increase trade volume with Africa to around 30 billion USD; however, given the situation of the global economic crisis since 2009 it may not be possible to reach that target soon.

According to the business organization the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), which is very active in Turkey’s Africa relations through its Turkey–Africa business meetings in Turkey, African countries are mostly demanding furniture, apparels, durable house products, home textiles, processed food, packaging devices, iron–steel, electrical devices and construction materials; while Turkey is mostly buying oil, raw materials, gold and minerals from Africa. To diversify the nature of relations and urge investment in Africa by Turkish businessmen, Rizanur Meral, the chairman of TUSKON, has frequently underlined the importance of investing in African countries by pointing out that there are significant potentials in investing especially ‘in dwelling and construction industries in Africa’. The current nature of the relations is not exhaustive and the potential of cooperation is yet to be explored. For example, there are signs that African nations are interested in Turkey’s agricultural expertise. During the Istanbul summit of the Union of African Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Agriculture, and Professions (UACCIAP), President Mohamed El Masry noted that the causes of Africa’s current food crisis were not well understood in many Western nations; but as Turkey’s agriculture sector had experience in raising food under adverse conditions, cooperation utilizing Turkish agricultural expertise could prove invaluable.

Table 1 Turkey’s Trade with Africa (1997–2009)

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Source: Turkish PM, the Undersecretary of Foreign Trade website, <http://www.dtm.gov.tr> (20 May 2010).
Since 2005, there have been quite a few prominent meetings between Turkey and African nations. These meetings have taken place both at the ministerial and private sector levels and have become so common that arguably Turkey’s ‘historical ties with Africa are being revived’.\textsuperscript{63} However, Turkey’s keen interest in Africa seems to be going beyond establishing only historical ties. Turkey is interested in bringing Africa to the international attention and indicated its help for this purpose.\textsuperscript{64} When President Gül visited Kenya and Tanzania in February 2009, he pointed out that all but two African countries\textsuperscript{65} had supported Turkey’s candidacy in 2008 for a two-year, non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, thus ‘the Turkish Republic will be the spokesman for Africa at the UN. It will support Africa on all of its issues.’\textsuperscript{66} Such solidarity expressions have been very frequent since the 2008 Turkey–Africa Summit in the speeches of Turkish leaders. For example, in a statement President Gül once again made clear that ‘everyone should show an undivided interest in Africa without losing time. [In that sense] Turkey indicates its responsibility towards Africa.’\textsuperscript{67}

In general, Turkey’s approach to developing trade with African nations seems to differ from that of a number of nations seeking business opportunities on the continent, whose overriding interests are Africa’s oil resources. As a mid-sized nation with a developing economy, Turkey carries none of the free market capitalist baggage aimed at securing the best deal at any cost that Africans so resent. By concentrating on lower profile development issues such as agriculture, arguably Turkish initiatives carry the promise of affecting genuine change in the lives of masses of Africans.\textsuperscript{68}

In both the literature and society, there is a general assumption that what lies behind the new interest in emerging states in Africa is energy resources. This cannot be rejected outright as it is documented well in other places.\textsuperscript{69} In the case of Turkey, this has been refuted by many Turkish officials arguing that Turkey’s interest is based on ‘to exchange competencies and technologies with Africa’.\textsuperscript{70} More recently, the president of the Africa–Turkey Chamber of Commerce, Rifat Hisarciklioglu, has dispelled the notion that Turkey is coming to Africa in search of raw materials: ‘we are not coming to Africa for raw materials and in search of a supermarket; we are interested in lending our manufacturing expertise to Africa.’\textsuperscript{71}

**African Reactions: Cautious but Curious**

As mentioned, African reactions to Turkey’s initiative have so far been a mixture of mild expectation and confusion. Following China and India, the question of why Turkey has shown what some consider an unexpected interest in the continent still does not have a clear answer for its African partners. Nevertheless, the fact that Turkey does not have a colonial background on the continent and an emphasis on equal partnership is welcomed and has created optimism about the future.\textsuperscript{72}

The lack of interest from Sub-Saharan Africa to develop relations with Turkey was very dominant and has hindered the economic development until recently (Tables 2 and 3) compared to North Africa’s trade with Turkey (Table 4). This trend seems to be changing due to the increasing economic potential of Turkey since 2002 in global affairs. Since 1998, Turkey has shown a keen interest to sign a Free Trade Agreement with the South African Custom Union (SACU), but there has been reluctance
especially on the part of South Africa, the biggest economy of the SACU. Perhaps as a sign of the recognition of Turkey’s new status, in May 2009 for the first time the South African Department of Trade and Industry announced a study into the potential for a free trade deal between the SACU and Turkey.\textsuperscript{73}

In recent years, African business, too, in Turkey has made serious inroads especially in the financial sector. For example, South African Standard Bank has been active in Turkey since 1999 and bought a Turkish broker dealer in 2002. However, the major development occurred in 2007 when Standard Bank bought a majority stake in Turkish investment banking and brokerage firm Dundas Unlu with an initial 67 per cent shareholding. With a new name, Standard Unlu, Standard Bank is expected to substantially develop its business and possibly with further investment in banking services in Turkey.\textsuperscript{74}

As it is shown in Table 3, African exports to Turkey have also been on the rise since 2002 especially from key countries in the continent. The amount of increase is noteworthy in the case of South Africa, which jumped from 212 million USD in 2002 to 1503 million USD in 2008. A similar jump can also be observed in the volume of exports from Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia and others to Turkey.

\textbf{Table 2} Turkey’s Imports from Selected Sub-Saharan Countries (1997–2009)

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Source: Turkish PM, the Undersecretary of Customs, <http://www.gumruk.gov.tr> (14 August 2010).
Table 3 Turkey’s Trade with Selected North African Countries (1997–2009)

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<th>Tunisia (Exports)</th>
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Source: Turkish PM, the Undersecretary of Customs, <http://www.gumruk.gov.tr> (14 August 2010).

Table 4 Turkey’s Exports to Selected Sub-Saharan Countries (1997–2009)

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<th>Sudan (Exports)</th>
<th>Kenya (Exports)</th>
<th>Angola (Exports)</th>
<th>Mauritania (Exports)</th>
<th>Niger (Exports)</th>
<th>Senegal (Exports)</th>
<th>Gambia (Exports)</th>
<th>Guinea (Exports)</th>
<th>Sierra Leone (Exports)</th>
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<th>Ghana (Exports)</th>
<th>Togo (Exports)</th>
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Source: Turkish PM, the Undersecretary of Customs, <http://www.gumruk.gov.tr> (14 August 2010).
The change on the African side is best illustrated in the weaponry dimension of Turkey–Africa relations. Turkey has had a long-time interest in buying the Rooivalk attack helicopters for the Turkish army. Since the 1990s, Turkey knocked on the doors of South African officials with its request, but was rebuffed by then President Nelson Mandela’s administration due to the Kurdish issue. Relations were further exacerbated by Mandela’s refusal to accept the Atatürk Peace Prize in 1992 and the imposition of an arms embargo on Turkey by South Africa in 1995. However, the country’s policies toward Turkey have changed under Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made the first visit by a Turkish head of government to South Africa in March 2005, and in August 2008, former South African Deputy-President Phumzile Mlambo-Nguka was among the 50 heads of state at the first Turkey–Africa Summit in Istanbul. Apparently since June 2006, a Turkish bid for Rooivalk was viewed by South African officials with a positive prospect of selling it to Turkey as South African Minister of Public Enterprises Alec Erwin announced in a press conference to promote the Rooivalk that ‘there would be a high level of sharing in transfer of technology [with Turkey] … that applies to any program we are involved in with Turkey, not only the Rooivalk.’

What Future for Turkey–Africa Relations?

Behind much of the lofty political rhetoric about humanitarian aid and economic development, Turkey’s Africa policy is driven by a long-term orientation of Turkey in international politics and can be understood within this context. Turkey seems to be following a foreign policy that may eventually lead to diversifying its economic allies. For example, Turkey is interested in reducing economic dependence on traditional European and Russian trading partners by efforts such as opening to Africa. Turkey has understood that the world has changed profoundly and new allies, strategic calculations and planning are not a necessity but a must in the new global economy.

The case in point here is the EU process. For more than half a century, Turkey has been trying to become a member of the EU. This has been the backbone of Turkish foreign policy since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 through Westernization and modernization. However, since French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Markel took office, a strong rejection of Turkey to be member of the EU is voiced more loudly. Turkish disappointment with regard to the EU accession did not create a static anti-European (and anti-EU) feeling among the public, but led Turkey to diversify its foreign political and economic relations with other parts of the world: Africa, Latin America, Far East, Asia and the Middle East. In Ankara there is an understanding that the more Turkey involves itself in global politics and increases its standing in international affairs, the more easy Turkey’s accession into the EU will be. Nevertheless, almost all Turkish leaders, from president to foreign minister, have denied that there is a shift in Turkish foreign policy from the West to the East; but they emphasized that Turkey’s relations with other regions is neither a substitute for Turkey–EU relations nor a change of direction. In a broader perspective, Turkey’s opening to Africa is part of
Turkey's domestic societal and state-level reconstruction in a changing international economy. While the emerging multidimensional foreign policy has provided the theoretical basis of opening to Africa, increasing Turkish involvement in Africa at political and economic levels represents a smooth convergence of both governmental and business policies.\textsuperscript{79} It is interesting to note here that after the global economic crisis in 2009, Turkey's opening to Africa has gained more importance in terms of opening up new markets as a way to decrease the influence of global economic meltdown.\textsuperscript{80}

Turkey has no colonial background in Africa but has cultural and religious ties dating back to the Ottoman period. This is an advantage for Turkey. However, a coherent and serious Turkish opening up strategy and a receptive African response should consider the following points, which may define the nature and speed of future relations between the two. First of all, the most pressing issue between Turkey and Africa is the lack of information on both sides about each other. Three strategies could be implemented: (i) promote exchange students for studying in and about each other. This will bridge the societal and informational gap. (ii) Exchange academics between universities. Especially in Southern Africa, there is a lack of expertise on the Middle East and Turkey, while the same is true for Turkey about Africa. Creating an African chair for African professors in one (or more) of the Turkish universities whose education is in English could be a good start. This might lead to an institute in the long run. (iii) Cooperation between African and Turkish think tanks for organizing joint conferences and publications on both sides on Turkish and African issues would create awareness equally important on both sides.\textsuperscript{81}

Conclusion

It is a well-known fact that until recently, modern Turkey never paid attention to African affairs\textsuperscript{82} and Africa is known in Turkey only through the TV images of hunger, poverty, AIDS and all the other negative elements. Partly because of this, there is hardly any credible information about Africa not only in academia but also in government circles. As an academic subject, Africa has long been taught only within the larger context of world political history, and it was almost impossible to find an expert on the continent or a basic textbook or article. However, over the past decade and a half, Turkish policymakers have carefully shaped an African dimension to Turkey's foreign policy that is increasingly involved in a dizzying range of sectors from trade to transport, health to humanitarian aid.

Turkey's opening to Africa is a result of both Turkey's domestic transformation and a change in the global political economy. Turkey's domestic transformation has challenged the traditional Turkish partners in the economy and aimed at diversifying its trade alternatives in line with the change in the global political economy power configuration. Change in the international system led countries to define their own interest in a newly emerging system. Turkey's response to such changes has been to define a multidimensional foreign policy and develop economic and political relations with not only immediate neighbours but also other regions and continents.
Turkey’s Africa opening is part and parcel of this new redefinition of Turkish foreign policy.

The recent global economic crisis has also contributed to this redefinition in the African context by accelerating the process, as it has generated major damage in Turkey’s traditional export markets, Europe and the USA, forcing Turkish companies to look further afield. Put boldly, a major Turkish newspaper, Hurriyet, did not hesitate to run an article titled ‘Africa as a Savior for Turkish Firms’ arguing that ‘many Turkish companies including small and medium-sized enterprises, or SMEs, are choosing to head toward Africa, tying their hopes to this new market’.83

In the future, whether the global and domestic developments will bring any change both in the nature and speed of Turkey–Africa relations is yet to be seen. However, redefinition of Africa both at conceptual and political levels in Turkish foreign policy represents a novelty. Yet, there is still a long way to go to develop relations further and deeper especially in the political field, while economic relations are dominating the relations for the time being.

Notes
[8] Ibid., p. 110.
[12] Ibid.
[14] Ibid., op. cit., p. 110.
[16] Ibid., p. 118.


[21] Ibid., p. 182; Aras and Gorener, op. cit., p. 80.


[23] Altunisik, op. cit., p. 188.


[29] Ibid., p. 6.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., p. 7.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid., p. 8.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid., p. 11.

[37] Ibid., p. 12.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., p. 13.

[41] The content of the document is based on Hazar, op. cit., pp. 111–113.

[42] Hazar, op. cit., p. 112.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid., p. 113.


[48] Ibid.

[65] Reportedly these two countries were South Africa and Mozambique.
[68] Daly, op. cit.
[71] Ibid.
[79] See Daly, op. cit.
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