Peru's Ollanta Humala: The Rise and Limits of a Left-Wing Political Outsider

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THE RISE AND LIMITS OF A LEFT-WING
POLITICAL OUTSIDER

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Introduction

In the debate over the Latin American left, two inter-related themes have predominated: (1) the origins of the left and (2) the differences among types of left-wing leaders, parties, and movements. A crucial distinction among left-wing forces is whether they emerge where party systems have collapsed and voters have overwhelmingly rejected the political class. A second key issue is whether voters embrace candidates who challenge the policies and ideas associated with neoliberalism and the Washington consensus. A final distinction concerns the degree to which left-wing leaders, parties and movements are prepared to submit themselves to the constitutional and democratic rules of the game.

In Peru, the election campaign of 2006 was perturbed by the unexpected rise of radical nationalist candidate Ollanta Humala. Despite winning a 31 percent plurality of the vote in the first round, however, Humala lost in the runoff, by a margin of 47 to 53 percent, to Alan García Pérez of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, or APRA). Not only did Peru failed to elect a left-wing president; it was the only country in the Andes that voted for a leader from within the established party system. This paper analyzes the origin and nature of Humala’s candidacy, assesses the degree to which his campaign reflected the weakness of the party system, and determines whether his candidacy reflected a repudiation of neoliberal policies and discontent with the state of democracy or the performance of elected governments.
I argue that Humala was a political outsider: this was his greatest asset, and his most important limitation. Outsiders challenge the party system by running, not as candidates for established political parties, but as independents or as leaders of more or less ephemeral or even disposable electoral vehicles. They attack traditional politicians, portraying them as self-serving elites, and present themselves, by contrast, as non-partisan alternatives, free from association with the corruption and intrigue endemic within the nation’s public institutions. Finally, political outsiders appeal to disaffected and disorganized voters who lack strong partisan attachments.

Since outsiders are most likely to win when the party system collapses, they often govern in the absence of strong mechanisms of horizontal accountability. Indeed, the rise of outsiders is both a symptom and a source of the weakness of checks and balances within presidential systems, especially where the rule of law is weak. Since the early 1990s, Peru has been governed by a succession of political outsiders: Ricardo Belmont was elected mayor of Lima in 1989; Alberto Fujimori was elected president in 1990, 1995, and, in disputed elections, in 2000; and Alejandro Toledo was elected president in 2001. Although their ideological positions spanned the ideological spectrum—from the left (Humala) to the centre (Alejandro Toledo and Ricardo Belmont) to the right (Fujimori)—none ran on traditional party tickets.

The proliferation of independent candidates and the collapse of the party system took a heavy toll on Peruvian democracy. Fujimori exploited a severe

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1 Although independents candidates have become commonplace since the early 1990s, there are precedents for the election of political outsiders throughout the 20th century, such as Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro (1930-1933).
economic and political crisis in the early 1990s to attack Peru’s party system and construct an authoritarian regime. After his regime collapsed in 2000, and following a brief interim government, Alejandro Toledo was elected in 2001. Toledo maintained the market friendly policies that Fujimori had adopted, and he governed more democratically, but he was also politically inept and barely survived to the end of his term. Given this history, the 2006 election was closely watched. Would the party system recover from its collapse in the 1990s? Would the macroeconomic model adopted by Fujimori and continued by Toledo be retained? And, would Peru find a way to reconcile democratic stability and growth?

Notwithstanding substantial economic growth under Toledo, the rise of Humala demonstrated the vulnerability of the party system to assault by outsiders, exposed discontent with the economic status quo, and revealed the fragility of post-Fujimori Peruvian democracy. Yet campaign dynamics and election rules worked against Humala and, in the decisive second round, voters in Lima opted for García’s promise of “responsible change” because it offered an alternative to the status quo that threatened neither democratic nor macroeconomic stability. Peru did not join Latin America’s “left turns,” but many of the same forces that contributed to the success of left-wing candidates elsewhere were clearly at work there too—starting with the inability of the right to capitalize on successes, and attenuate the weaknesses, of the neoliberal model.
Macroeconomic Stability and Political Right’s Lost Opportunity

Given favorable economic conditions, the political right should have sailed into victory in the general election in Peru in 2006. For the better part of 2005, it looked like this would happen. Peru had registered sustained and rapid growth in the period leading up to the election in 2006. Gross domestic production (GDP) increased by 6.7% in 2005; 4.8% in 2004; 4% in 2003; and 4.9% in 2002. The economy was projected to grow by 5.6% in 2006, and 5% in 2007. This represented the longest sustained period of economic growth in Peru’s contemporary history. As a result, Peru was on the cusp of returning to the level of prosperity it achieved in the mid-1970s prior to the “lost decade” of the 1980s. Much of the growth was driven by private sector investments and impressive export performance. Peru’s exports rose from a value of $7.7 billion in 2002 to $16.9 billion in 2005. Export performance was due both to favorable international commodity prices as well as the maturation of large investments in natural resources, especially mining and natural gas. Peru experienced a major export boom in the agricultural sector, placing the agro-export sector at the cusp of a “takeoff” similar to Chile in the 1980s. The growth was concentrated in a corridor along the western coast, in parts of the northern highlands, and in the jungle where the gas reserves were located.

Peru’s impressive growth rate was accompanied by macroeconomic stability. The change in the consumer price index was 1.5% in 2002, 2.5% in 2003, 2.5% in 2004, 2.2% in 2005, and 2.1% in 2006. 2

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2003, 3.5% in 2004 and 1.5% in 2005. Substantial international reserves were accumulated. As of April 2006, net international reserves (NIRs) reached US$14,603 million. This was partly explained by variations in the price of gold and currencies, but Peru’s Central Reserve Bank, an independent body, deserves credit for preserving monetary stability. Peru also enjoyed the benefits of a competent economic team in the Ministry of Finance and the office of the Prime Minister. Economic authorities demonstrated a firm commitment to implementing prudent economic policies in the context of a challenging political and social environment. In particular, the government targeted the fiscal deficit for reduction. The public sector deficit was reduced as a percent of GDP, and revenues were boosted by tax reforms. The external current account deficit fell due to commodity export growth. Private capital inflows remained strong, particularly foreign direct investment in the natural resource sector. With a lower debt to GDP ratio, Peru no longer needed the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The conservative right had an appealing candidate, Lourdes Flores Nano of Unidad Nacional (which grouped the Partido Popular Cristiano, or PPC, with Rafael Rey Rey’s Renovacion Nacional and Luis Castañeda Lossio’s Solidaridad Nacional), the financial backing of big business, and the political support of the palace of government and all its technocrats. A long-time leader of the PPC, the main pillar of the UN alliance, Flores was a smart, hard-working candidate, who enjoyed popularity outside the affluent districts of Lima, the historic stronghold of the PPC. Yet her popularity in the provinces and shantytowns was almost entirely due to her personal appeal rather than to organized party-society
linkages. In 2001 Flores Nano had been the frontrunner, but her candidacy fizzled out during the course of the campaign and she failed to win enough support to enter the presidential runoff election. Following this setback, Flores worked hard to win a broader base of support not only in Lima, but also throughout Peru. Polls indicated that she had substantial appeal among female voters, voters of all ages, and especially youth.

Flores ran a “hyper personal campaign” (Cameron 2006, February 9) based on character and the need to restore trust and hope in politics; she emphasized closeness to people, and sought direct personal contact and dialogue with voters. She also emphasized her work habits, integrity, and ability to listen, but she mistakenly believed that issues would not drive the campaign. Yet her entourage formed a human barrier blocking her personal appeal. When she walked through shantytowns she was mobbed not by local residents, organizers, or grassroots leaders, but by a retinue of supporters, which typically included congressional candidates and middle class youth who could be overheard snickering about shabby housing and dirty people. One of her candidates told me she got so covered in dust in these walks that she had to take her clothes off in her garden before entering her house (Cameron 2006, January 21).

Flores was irked by the fact that Valentín Paniagua also ran in the election, dividing the right-wing vote. The former interim president of Peru (2000-1) led a liberal, centrist coalition called the Frente de Centro (or, Centrist Front). The Frente de Centro was primarily an alliance between Paniagua’s party, Acción Popular, (Popular Action, or AP), and Alberto Andrade’s municipal movement, Somos Peru (We are Peru). The PPC and AP have formed both governing and
opposition coalitions in the past, but there were doctrinal differences between them. Whereas the PPC had a clear right-of-center orientation and strong links to business, AP never saw itself as a right-wing party nor considered itself a political vehicle of the entrepreneurial elite. Nevertheless, Paniagua could win enough votes to hurt Flores’ chances, but not enough to be a serious contender himself. *Unidad Nacional* leaders were aware that the *Frente de Centro* could be a spoiler, but by September 2005 Flores had locked up around 30 percent of voter intentions (Paniagua stood at around 15 percent, neck-to-neck with Alan García’s APRA).³ It appeared the election was Flores’ to lose.

García represented an organized political party with a mass following. The fortunes of the party had suffered following the debacle of the first García administration (1985-1990). Yet García was confident that he could win Peruvians back to APRA: “The Peruvian people like to flirt with other candidates,” he said, “but in the end they always return to their true love, the APRA” (Cameron 2006, February 23b). His strategy was to portray Flores as the candidate of business. This was a tricky strategy. Voters over 30 years old remembered how García’s term (1985-1990) ended in hyperinflation, economic collapse, and insecurity. García rekindled these bitter memories by selecting retired admiral Luis Giampietri, who was implicated in the prison massacre in El Frontón in 1986, as one of his vice presidential candidates.

Nonetheless, García did not have to win over the entire country at once. His main goal was to make it to the second round. He had bested Flores in 2001,

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and had come close to winning the runoff against Alejandro Toledo. Flores felt confident she could beat García, however. A critical strength of her candidacy was her remarkably low negative ratings. Few voters said they would never vote for her, which meant that she always picked up more votes when voters were asked how they would vote in a runoff when paired against the other candidates. Almost every poll had her winning in any eventual runoff. Moreover, with the economy in good shape, the Flores camp tended to underestimate the degree of dissatisfaction with the status quo. Neither García nor Paniagua were proposing radical changes to the economic policy program of the government. Even so, by mid-2005, pollsters detected that voters were searching for a candidate for the protest vote, especially in the provinces.4

A Candidate of the Multitude

As disaffected voters cast around for an alternative to Flores and García, speculation centered initially on former president Alberto Fujimori. This intensified when Fujimori traveled from exile in Japan to Chile where he began to make preparations to return to Peru to run.5 An outcry by Chilean socialist candidate Michelle Bachelet hastened Fujimori’s detention, however, and deflated the hopes of his followers. Fujimori’s arrival in the region did not result in a big spike in support for his party Si Cumple among voters. Part of the reason was the unexpected rise of Ollanta Humala and his Peruvian Nationalist Party (or Partido Nacionalista Peruano), which began to attract Si Cumple votes outside

5 On the legacy of Fujimori, see Carrión, ed. (2006).
Lima. The first serious discussion of the candidacy of Ollanta Humala began in mid-October. Pundits noticed Ollanta Humala's rising support in the polls. It began to look like Humala might capture the antisystemic vote, especially since his support appeared to reside mainly outside Lima, in the Southern highlands. Analysts Carlos Tafur and Alvarez Rodrich were the first to speculate that the second electoral round might be between Flores and Humala.⁶

Like Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and Lucio Gutiérrez of Ecuador, Humala launched his political career by leading an unsuccessful military rebellion. That earned him bona fide anti-system status. By mid-November 2005, it was clear that Ollanta Humala was gathering momentum.⁷ A couple of polls suggested that Humala was winning over disaffected voters who might otherwise have been inclined to support Fujimori. Although he was barely out of the single digits nationally, in the southern and central highlands his support reached around 20 percent. Humala took first place in a number of highland regions (Arequipa, Ayacucho, Cusco, Huanuco, Puno and Tacna) and in every case except Arequipa this growth primarily came at the expense of Si Cumple. By the end of November, Ollanta Humala was tied with García and Paniagua for second place in Lima. He had begun to eat into support for Flores among the poorest voters. Suddenly, the election was up for grabs.

Humala proved capable of inspiring spontaneous demonstrations of popular support, and his oratory moved crowds to thunderous applause and cries

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of enthusiasm. He drew support from the same electorate that once supported the left. In the 1980s Peru’s democratic left routinely won substantial representation in congress and municipalities. Its base was strongest in the south and central highlands and in the shantytowns of the major cities. In the 1990s, with the rise of Fujimori, political parties of all stripes lost their claim on the allegiance of these voters who, in unprecedented numbers, threw their support behind so-called “independent” candidates. Most voters saw themselves as independent and overwhelmingly reject party attachments; 60 percent located themselves in the center of the political spectrum. That said, the voters who defined themselves as on the left or center left—about 40 percent of the electorate—had tended to vote either for the left or APRA in the 1980s, and in the 1990s they were captured by Fujimori. These same voters now turned to Humala. Moreover, Humala was the only presidential candidate who a vast majority of the voters regarded as being on the left. Voters had difficulty locating García on a left-right continuum. As many voters saw him as a candidate of the right as a candidate of the left, though, of course, García shifted to the left in the course of the campaign in response to the rise of Humala.

Pundits had trouble deciding how to label Humala. For columnist Mirko Lauer, Humala represented a mix of left-wing, nationalist, and authoritarian ideas, along with a commitment to ethnic autonomy, not unlike Chávez.8 Carlos Tapia, an analyst who became a supporter of Humala, aptly described the candidate’s thinking as a sort of “neovelasquismo” or return to the discourse of

the reformist military officers who governed Peru in the 1970s (and who were admired by Chávez). Humala may not have emerged organically from Peru’s left-wing movements and parties, but his candidacy had the effect of challenging the consensus around the neoliberal economic model (Balbi 2006). Little by little, during the course of the campaign, this center-right common sense view that it was necessary to maintain continuity in macroeconomic policy began to change. Partly this was a reflection of the fact that Flores was the most active and visible candidate on the campaign trail for most of 2005. She set the tone for the election at the outset because she was the first to start campaigning; the tone changed, however, when Humala entered the fray.

The neoliberal model was vulnerable to attack, not because of slow growth, but due to the perception that some people were doing well while others—in particular, the impoverished southern and central highlands—were being left behind. Even without a plan to promote long-term development in the highlands, the right should have been able to capitalize on the growth in the coast to build support for the neoliberal, export-oriented economic model. Fujimori did this successfully during his tenure in office. He targeted spending on the south, thereby building an electoral coalition outside of Lima. Toledo won with the support of the south in 2001, and then lost it by failing to deliver the same kinds of goods and services during his administration.

From August 2005 to mid-January 2006, Humala’s popularity grew from 7 to 28 percent in the polls (Cameron 2006). Such volatility suggested

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disenchantment with the existing party system. Humala’s own party, the Partido Nacionalista Peruano (Peruvian Nationalist Party, or PNP), was not properly registered in time for the elections so he was forced to find another party label. He entered into negotiations with the Unión Por el Perú (Union for Peru or UPP), the party founded by Javier Pérez de Cuellar to oppose Fujimori in 1995. The UPP was registered but lacked a leader. Humala appeared to be a tough anti-corruption crusader who could capitalize on widespread disapproval of public institutions, especially the president, parties, congress, and the courts. He threatened to investigate corruption by incumbent Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), whose approval ratings hovered between 8 and 14 percent from mid-2003 to 2005 (Cameron 2006).

Humala was unwittingly aided in his anti-corruption crusade by the media, which daily denounced the congress as a grotesque house of horrors, full of nepotism and influence peddling. César Hildebrandt aired an exposé of sitting members of congress for the ruling Peru Posible (Possible Peru, or PP) party. Gerardo Saavedra (the legislator who, in an unforgettable Freudian slip, swore his oath of office to “God and money [la plata]” rather than “God and the homeland [la patria]”) was exposed as a nepotist, while another, Victor Valdez, was a confessed bigamist (Cameron 2006, 14 January). Leaving aside illicit earnings, the average income of a member of congress was almost 20 times the average per capita income. Peru’s judiciary was held in even lower regard. At the time of the election, roughly 70 percent of all prisoners had not been sentenced, and most had to wait 4 to 5 years for a sentence. A public official elected using illegal vote-buying methods was not be sentenced until his term in office expired.
According to media reports, judges could be influenced by as little as 20 to 30 soles (34 soles = $10 US). Normally, however, it cost more like $5,000 to have a case dismissed, or as much as $20,000 if important people were involved.\(^\text{10}\)

Humala’s promise to clean house resonated among voters, but his own coalition was a mess. Infighting over spots on the list of congressional candidates was so intense it led to a bogus assassination plot and the seizure of party locales. Once the deadline to register presidential candidates was past, and Humala was officially registered as presidential candidate for the UPP, he demanded that all members of the congressional slate supporting him step down. The request fell like cold water on incumbent members of congress. Michael Martínez of UPP was furious, saying that he had opened the door to Humala who paid back the favor by throwing him out of his own house.

There was also frustration with how undemocratically new candidates were selected. On January 17, rank-and-file groups seized the locale of the PNP and denounced that a “dedocracia” (rule of those who make appointments) had been installed within the party. Roughly 200 activists from 18 provincial bases occupied the locale to protest the imposition of candidates by the leadership. Many of the candidates imposed “a dedo” (by finger) had not won internal elections and many were unknown to the rank-and-file. In some cases candidate were selected because to bring notoriety to the party, like Juvenal Silva, president of the Cienciano soccer club, or Zenaida Uribe, former volleyball star.

In the list of pre-candidates posted on the UPP website, friends of the inner circle were rewarded. Some candidates did not live in the provinces where they ran. One was an entrepreneur who has lent Humala a truck his campaign; another a friend of Carlos Torres Caro, vice presidential candidate and a key operative within the party, from his Catholic University days. Some activists denounced the practice of accepting payments for a position on the list (the so called “cupos”), though they offered no evidence to support this. Daniel Abugattás, who was in charge of reviewing the curricula of the precandidates, claimed that the discontent arose from the fact that candidates were selected at different times in the interior of the country, and in some cases there were parallel processes resulting in too many candidates coming forward (Cameron 2006, January 20). Whatever the case may be, chaos reigned.

Clamor for Renovation

The chaos within UPP did not stop other candidates from jumping on the renovation bandwagon. Flores proposed a number of new faces for congress and asked established leaders to step aside. She insisted that there was a clamor for renovation and asked important incumbents to give up their seats to new leaders (Cameron 2006, January 14). The hope was that by turning against highly visible politicians who may have been seen as part of a reviled political class, Flores could accomplish two goals: clips the wings of potentially difficult fellow-travelers, and make herself appear less beholden to the established political elite. Had Vargas Llosa done the same in 1990—that is, had he forced leaders from AP and PPC to step aside—he might have done better (Cameron 1992: 232-239). As
Vargas Llosa discovered, such alliances can bring both internal problems and compromise the reputation of a leader who would otherwise be seen as independent.

Xavier Barrón, who was first elected in 1978, and a self-styled advocate for seniors, was the first to accede to Flores’ demand, but he did so ungraciously. He noted that other parties were running traditional candidates—like Alberto Andrade, vice presidential candidate with Valetin Paniagua, who Barrón called “more traditional than the Flor de la Canela in Lima” (a traditional waltz) (Cameron 2006, January 10). Nevertheless, Barrón ultimately stepped down and was followed by José Barba Caballero. Barba Caballero had served five terms. He too complained that the policy of renovation was a mistake. The most reticent to step down was Rafael Rey Rey, the leader of Renovación, but he ultimately agreed to run for the Andean Parliament. In spite of high-publicity renewal, Flores surrounded herself with insiders: her number two candidate for congress was Javier Bedoya de Vivanco, son of the founder of the PPC and brother of Luis Bedoya, who was sentenced to jail for accepting money from Vladimiro Montesinos, Fujimori’s corrupt intelligence chief. One of her two vice presidential candidates was Arturo Woodman, a prominent businessman who propitiated meetings between Dionisio Romero, head of the Romero economic group, and Montesinos. Other members of her congressional slate had questionable links to the Fujimori government and to Montesinos.

Flores was by no means the only political leader to jump on the no-reelection bandwagon. Andrade, a leader of Somos Perú and a key ally of Valentin Paniagua’s Frente de Centro, made the argument that AP should allow
no incumbents to run. This was easy for Andrade to say, since he had no incumbents in his slate (Andrade’s Somos Peru did not contest the 2001 election). Prominent AP leaders pushed back, saying that their party had chosen candidates through an internal process and that it was not the business of party leaders to impose their will after the fact. Rafael Belaúnde, who briefly assumed leadership of Perú Posible, indicated that he wanted to sweep the slate clean. Belaúnde, son of the former president, was seen as an honest and capable person. But there was one problem with his campaign to clean house in Perú Posible: He himself had only just joined the party as leader, in a move that was widely seen as opportunistic, and it placed him in no position to assert total control.

Leaders of APRA enjoyed distinguishing themselves from the other contenders by stressing that their candidates were selected through an internal democratic process. They questioned the idea of total renovation of candidates, and argued that it violated the law of political parties to change candidates once they have already been duly selected. Notwithstanding the gloating, APRA was embroiled in a dispute of its own over invited candidates. García argued for placing invited candidates at the top of the party lists, which was important because in Peru’s preferential voting system the top ranked candidates have a better chance of getting elected. Incumbent members have expressed unhappiness with this proposal, but there was little they could do.
Humala’s Achilles’ Heal

Humala’s candidacy revived memories of the internal conflict and reopen a debate over human rights and the military. In addition to allegations that Humala supported a futile and bloody military uprising led by his brother, Antauro, in January of 2005, credible accusations were made that in 1992 Humala was “Captain Carlos,” a military commander who operated a counter-insurgency base responsible for documented cases of torture and disappearances. Witnesses from Madre Mía in Alto Huallaga said Humala had been known to them as “Captain Carlos,” and that he had been abusive. In one case a merchant, Zonia Luis Cristóbal, accused Humala of humiliating mistreatment of her family, the looting of her shop by troops at his command. Another accusation came from Teresa Ávila, sister-in-law of Benigno Sullca Castro and sister of Natividad Ávila Rivera, who were detained, tortured, and killed by soldiers in the Madre Mía base in June 1992. The allegations were muddied by the fact that there were at least three military commanders known by the nom de guerre “Capitán Carlos” in Alto Huallaga. However, the newspaper La República cited a confidential document that confirmed that Ollanta Humala was ‘Capitán Carlos Gonzales’, chief of the counter-insurgency base in Madre Mía en 1992.11

Allegations against Humala were overstated by some of the media. Testimony by villagers from Madre Mía who were interviewed by “Panorama” was distorted to falsely implicate Humala. While the villagers denounced various crimes and abuses they at no point identified Humala as the author of these  

11 For a review of the allegations and evidence available at the time, see Jorge Bazo E. (2006, 6 February).
In an insolent tone, the Minister said, in effect, there was nothing to

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12 Caretas, February 16, 2006, pp. 14-17. All quotes of the Minister of Defense are from this source.
investigate, and only Humala could answer the charges against him. He even said that the army did not use operative pseudonyms or keep lists of such names. As a retired army general, Rengifo’s words were interpreted as the worst form of esprit de corps. Worse still, he accused human rights NGOs—such as the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (the National Human Rights Council)—of waging a “war on the Ministry of Defense.”

According to Bernales, Humala figured out that he could close ranks with the military, which did not want to expose itself to closer scrutiny of its human rights record in Alto Huallaga in 1992. Any revelations concerning Captain Carlos would require some acknowledgement of responsibility of the armed forces. The position of the armed forces was that, as Renfigo put it in Caretas, “excesses occur in any war. But these excesses have to be taken individually.” In other words, there was no policy of systematic abuses. The Truth Commission got it wrong: “I reject it profoundly,” said Renfigo, “because it says there was a policy of systematic violation of human rights during the war against terrorism.” By closing ranks with the military, Humala passed the buck; he counted on esprit de corp prevailing over democratic accountability. Humala’s strategy had a more sinister side too. According to Fernando Rospiglioni, a knowledgeable analyst of the Peruvian armed forces who served as Minister of the Interior under Toledo, Humala insinuated that individuals who accused him of violating human rights were associated with the Shining Path. For example, he said: “It seems to me unfair that the truth is told only half way and that there is no investigation of how who were these people who were supposedly victims of violence. Who were they
in these years of war with the Shining Path?” (quoted in Cameron 2006, February 19).

Humala insisted that he was just a patriotic soldier who followed orders. Political blame should fall on the politicians who sent the military to fight a war without a clear political strategy. Thus, in obvious allusion to Alan García, he charged that “those most responsible were some candidates to the presidency who took the decision to abandon he emergency zones as a state, and hand them over to the armed forces. These politicians sent soldiers to fight where they did not know what to do” (quoted in Cameron 2006, February 19). This turned deflected the allegations against him by turning the issue into a complaint by a patriotic soldier against bad politicians. The strategy seemed to work. It fit with something palpable in the thinking of Humala’s support based, and helped explain his “Teflon,” namely, the view that excesses were committed on both sides of the conflict, so that nobody was free of guilt. The issue then became not whether abuses were committed, but whether the individual in question was acting patriotically.

In early February a national (rural and urban) APOYO poll commissioned by the newspaper *El Comercio* found that the candidacy of Humala, which had reached as high as 32 percent in the polls in early January, was stalled at around 25 percent. Flores sustained a strong 10 percent point lead over Humala, while García flat-lined with about 17 percent support. Humala was not destroyed by the allegations that he committed human rights abuses in Madre Mia in 1992. Notwithstanding the seriousness of the denunciations, the support for Humala dropped by only 2 points between the two polls. Only 9 percent of those who were
interviewed had not heard the allegations against Humala. 41 percent said they thought the accusations were true, while 28 percent thought they were false, and 22 percent did not answer the question.13

**The Race for Second Place**

In the final weeks of the campaign, García stepped up the pressure on Flores. He may have suspected he would have little chance of winning in a runoff against Flores. The best chance for both García was to eliminate Flores from contention in the first round. Luis Benavente, director of the Grupo de Opinión de la Universidad de Lima, predicted that the final stretch of the campaign would involve “negative campaigns” against Flores. On cue, posters and fliers began to appear that presented Flores as the candidate of the Banco de Credito. UN spokespersons drew parallels with the efforts to tarnish the reputation of Mario Vargas Llosa in 1990, stressing his links with bankers and the wealthy. In dramatic language, Mercedes Cabanillas said: “We don’t want a Trojan horse with a woman’s skirt hiding entrepreneurs within its womb” (Cameron 2006, February 23b).

Lourdes Flores complained that such attacks were part of a “dirty war” against her. “APRA,” García responded, “has nothing to do with this [dirty war] for one reason: I say directly that UN represents the right, that it carries within its womb representatives of the bankers...this does not have to be done using a black campaign or with posters” (Cameron 2006, March 7) Daily newspaper Correo reported that APRA strategists were looking at a second round with

13 For a discussion see Cameron (2006, February 12).
Humala. Jorge del Castillo, García’s right hand man, said: “I see Lourdes falls 5 percent in a recent poll and García rises 4 percent. In five polls the tendency of Alan García is to rise, and that of Flores is to fall. I am sure we are going into the second round. Until recently, I thought it was with Lourdes. Now I put that in doubt.”

By mid-March it was clear that Flores was slipping to second place, possibly third. Her over-cautious strategy was to resist mud slinging and avoid major mistakes. But she failed to give a face to popular frustration with the conditions of everyday life for the majority. In an interview with Flores on the popular television show “Dos Dedos de Frente” Augusto Alvarez Rodrich and Juan Carlos Tafur hammered at her lack of an emotional connection with the electorate. One of the points they made was that Flores had not reacted to the attacks against her, even vile personal attacks. She chose to take the high road and to run a campaign based on optimism and a renewal of hope. The weakness of such a strategy is that it did not allow her to tap into popular sentiment of outrage against the status quo. When first lady Eliane Karp attacked Flores for not knowing what it is like to give birth in the unsafe and unsanitary conditions in which indigenous women live, Flores had the opportunity to attack the frivolity, inefficacy, and indifference of the Toledo government (See Cameron 2006, March 28). By so doing, she allowed Humala and García to monopolize the outrage against Toledo.

The Outcome of the First Round

The results of the first round were remarkable in a number of respects. The presidential results placed Humala first, with 30.6 percent and Flores and García nearly tied with about one quarter of the vote. In the end, García barely won over Flores by the narrowest of margins, 24.3 to 23.8 percent (or 62,500 votes).\textsuperscript{15} At the congressional level, \textit{Peru Posible} was all but wiped out. From 35 seats it fell to 2. No party of the left passed the 4 percent threshold necessary to hold a seat in congress. The UN won the same representation as before: 17 seats. Moreover, in its haste to jump on the renovation bandwagon, it lost its most effective legislators. The UPP did better than many expected: it won a 45 seat plurality (though the party immediately began to divide). With 36 seats APRA, however, was the pivotal party. It was the only party that could govern by cutting deals with the left (UPP) or right (UN), or by playing the two off against each other.

In analyzing the vote, some analysts suggested a correlation with levels of poverty. Broadly speaking, this was true but the distribution of poverty, measured in terms of levels of human development, matched the vote for Humala only imperfectly (see Table 1). Thus, for example, Humala did best in the poorest departments like Huancavelica, Puno and Ayacucho, but also in Arequipa, Tacna, and Madre de Dios. On the other hand, he did not do so well in certain poor departments like Cajamarca or Pasco. There was a rough correspondence between poverty and the vote for Humala, but it weaker than one might expect.

\textsuperscript{15} Election results are available in Fernando Tuesta’s weblog: 
Table 1
Electoral Results in Peru (2001, 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPARTMENT</th>
<th>2001 (%)</th>
<th>2006 (%)</th>
<th>UNDP HDI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 ROUND</td>
<td>2 ROUND</td>
<td>1 ROUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callao</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacna</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ica</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arcquipa</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moquegua</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambayeque</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumbes</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Libertad</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madre de Dios</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junin</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancash</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ucayali</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasco</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Martin</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piura</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loreto</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puno</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cajamarca</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cusco</td>
<td>56.4</td>
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<td>Huanuco</td>
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<td>41.8</td>
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<td>Apurimac</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huancavelica</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Política: Blog de Fernando Tuesta* [See: http://dia.pucp.edu.pe/proyectos/fernandotuesta].

Nor was there an obvious relationship between changes in poverty and the vote for Humala. Humala did well in places where poverty declined (like Tacna and Madre de Dios) as well as in places here it has remained unchanged (Huancavelica and Huanuco). Analyst Pedro Francke concluded was that there
was more to the vote for Humala than poverty. “Poverty is combined with marginalization but also with an element of ethnic identification. It is striking how similar the results are with those obtained by Alejandro Toledo in 2001” (quoted in Cameron 2006, April 21). This is indeed true. At the same time, Toledo did best in places like Cusco and Puno, but he also did well in places like Loreto and Ancash where Humala did not do so well. Toledo did better in Lima, Cajamarca, and Lambayeque; Humala did better in Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurimac.

**Lima Up for Grabs**

The second round of the election was all about Lima. The first round was an example of how campaigns matter. The front-running candidate, Lourdes Flores, lost her lead and ultimately fail to place in a runoff as a result of her inability to respond to campaign dynamics such as the rise of an outsider candidate, Ollanta Humala, and the polarization that produced. Alan García proved more adept at exploiting the rise of Humala, offering himself as a better opponent to challenge Humala in the second round. The second round was an example of when campaign activity is of limited importance. As soon as it became clear that Flores was out of contention, the bulk of her vote went to García. In spatial terms, the reason was obvious: García was located near the median voter, while Humala was closer to the left. Most of Flores’ voters were in the center of the right of the spectrum. In geographical terms, García held the north while Humala took the south, and in the north-south cleavage that divides Peru, Lima is more like Trujillo than Puno.
As a consequence, the polls showed very little movement in the candidates’ support for most of May. Even the debate between García and Humala had little effect, despite the fact that Humala arrived late, stopped at a bodega to buy mineral water, which created a mob scene with the media, and then appeared on stage in casual clothes, and insisted, against the rules, on planting a Peruvian flag on his podium. The debate may not have changed many minds, but it clearly revealed the differences between the candidates. García opened the debate calling for a social democracy based on liberty, tolerance, and the respect for the separation of powers, and he dismissing the need for a constituent assembly. Humala said Peru’s democracy did not represent the people or serve national interests, but rather economically powerful groups and transnationalized interests. He said that governability must be based on social peace, and this requires attending to the needs of the poor (Cameron 2006, May 21).

According to APOYO, García hovered around 55 percent; Humala around 45 percent (Cameron 2006, June 1). The campaign was dirty rather than polarized, with constant “counter-campaign” activity, a bout of violence in Cusco and bitter personal attacks between the candidates. Humala sought to dislodge García by attacking his credibility while García cast Humala as a dangerous and violent threat to Peru’s stability.

The Chávez Boomerang

Humala’s candidacy suffered a boomerang blow fired by Alan García via Hugo Chávez. Although it is unclear how much the row over Chávez mattered, it clearly showed who was the more experienced candidate. Humala never denied his
connection to Chávez. He traveled to Venezuela to be seen with Chávez at the inauguration of the new national assembly. It has been alleged that he also took money from Chávez for his campaign, but this has not been proven. Chávez took an active interest in the campaign in Peru, and, in the first round, pronounced Flores to be the candidate of the oligarchy and the US. Flores complained about Humala traveling to Venezuela and receiving the blessing of Chávez, and Humala responded that Flores, who had traveled to the United States, was the candidate preferred by the US. These mutual recriminations did not play a particularly large role in the first round of the election.

In the second round, García did everything possible to pick a fight with Hugo Chávez, and, in the end, Chávez could not resist responding. The enmity between the two leaders goes back a long way. Accion Democratica (AD) is APRA's counterpart in Venezuela. Hugo Chávez led a coup attempt against the AD government of President Carlos Andres Pérez in 1992. García and Andres Perez are compadres. García launched a series of verbal torpedoes at Chávez. First, he attacked Chávez for pulling out of the Andean Community. Then he called Chávez “anti-Bolivarian.” “This is the second time in Latin American history that a Venezuelan government has broken the unity that the Liberator Simon Bolivar sought for our Andean republics” he said. According to García, Chávez was following the footsteps of the dictator José Antonio Páez who separated Venezuela from the “Gran Colombia” in the 19th century. The tomb of
the Liberator Simon Bolivar in Santa Martha “must be suffering certain
commotions at this moment.”\textsuperscript{16}

Chávez did not respond, so García renewed his attack. “It hurts me that
Venezuela proposes to abandon the Andean Community when it was a
Venezuelan, the Liberator Simon Bolivar, who called for a union of Andean
republics.” He then noted that Chávez “is not only killing Bolivar, he is causing
his country to go backward economically.”\textsuperscript{17} Still, there was no response from
Chávez. Another opening was created when Evo Morales criticized Peru’s
negotiation of a free trade agreement, calling outgoing President Alejandro
Toledo a “traitor.” García responded by criticizing the “grave error” of Chávez
and his “pupils” in the rest of South America, including Evo Morales and Ollanta
Humala, for undermining the Andean Community. He called Morales' comments
“feverish.” He then attacked Humala for putatively trying to avoid a debate. “If
he does not want to debate, it would be simpler to debate with the person who
inspires and leads him” said García in allusion to Chávez.\textsuperscript{18}

Finally, Chávez blasted back. “We will not have relations with a president
of this nature, with a thief, a cardsharp. Imagine in one of these summits, he
might come and steal my money!” Chávez compared García with Carlos Andres

\textsuperscript{16} Quoted in Cameron (2006, April 29). See “Alan García tachó a Hugo Chávez de
‘antibolivariano’”, Radio Cooperativa (Chile), April 20, 2006. Available at:
icias/site/artic/20060420/pags/20060420175854.html Archived at:
http://weblogs.elearning.ubc.ca/peru/archives/026175.php

\textsuperscript{17} Enrique Patriau, Feliciano Gutiérrez and Liubomir Fernández, “Alan García propone a
Humala sostener debate descentralizado,” La Republica, April 22, 2006. Archived at:
http://weblogs.elearning.ubc.ca/peru/archives/026175.php

\textsuperscript{18} “García: Morales busca evadir conflictos internos de Bolivia” RPP Noticias lunes, April
24, 2006. Available at: http://www.rpp.com.pe/detalle_36672.html#%23%23 Archived
at: http://weblogs.elearning.ubc.ca/peru/archives/026175.php
Pérez. “It would be a curse for this robber to return. Look what happened when Carlos Andres Pérez returned. He [García] is the Carlos Andres Pérez of Peru.” Chávez went on to exhort Humala to win. “God free Peru from a bandit such as this president,” he said of García. The attacks by Chávez gave García a chance to play victim while shifting the media spotlight off Humala. “I reject in the name of the Peruvian people the permanent interference of this person, Hugo Chávez, in the politics of Peru and I think he is doing a lot of damage to his protégé Ollanta Humala” said García. He then pointed out the hypocrisy of not wanting countries like Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia to trade with other nations while Venezuela’s biggest customer is the United States. He said Venezuela sells $40 billion dollars in petroleum to the US, and has 17,000 gas pumps in its northern neighbor. “With what moral authority, after selling all his petroleum to the US, does he come to tell us: you are traitors if you trade with the US.”

Concerning the accusations of corruption, García said: “He responds in the only way that a primitive being like he knows how. Insulting and treating me in the worst manner.” It took Ollanta Humala the better part of a week to find a good response to the statements by Hugo Chávez. “Leave our thieves alone” he said to Chávez. “We will take care of our own thieves.”

21 “Humala a Chávez: ‘Nosotros nos ocupamos de nuestros ladrones,’” Agenciaperu.com, May 2, 2006. Available at:
delivered in the moment Chávez made his remarks, García would have had more difficulty earning political capital off the event.

García won by a margin sufficient to prevent credible allegations of fraud, and Humala accepted the result almost immediately. But there was, naturally, anger in the south. For the first time in Peru’s recent democratic history, Cusco was on the losing side of a national election. The election also demonstrated the electoral weight of Lima. Although the preferred candidate of Limeños lost, Lima was the final arbiter of the runoff.

**Conclusion: Right vs Wrong Lefts?**

According to conventional wisdom, there are two lefts in Latin America, one social democratic and the other populist\(^{22}\)—or, as Jorge Castañeda (2006) put it, a “right left” and a “wrong left.” In light of the dispute with Chávez, for example, Castañeda noted that while García’s APRA party, clearly “springs from the great Latin American populist tradition,” it was possible that “Chávez’s unabashed meddling in the Peruvian elections may have so alienated Alan García that he actually becomes a European-style social democrat.” As a causal argument, this is unconvincing. Even if we leave aside the fact that García provoked and benefited from Chávez’s interference in the Peruvian election, the idea that the dispute would have a lasting effect on García’s political orientation is ludicrous.

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\(^{22}\) Propagators of this conventional wisdom include Andres Oppenheimer, Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Enrique Krauze, Jorge Castañeda, and Condoleezza Rice, and *The Economist*. Variations on this theme appear in the work of Panizza (2005) and Schamis (2006). Critics include Arditi (forthcoming); Cameron (2007; 2006, June 21); Cleary (2006); and French (2008).
The two lefts argument obscures a more complicated story. First, it would be a mistake to assume that the election of García signaled broad support for the orthodox economic model that has been in place in Peru since the 1990s. Had satisfaction with the economy been greater, the most likely beneficiary would have been Lourdes Flores Nano of the conservative Unidad Nacional alliance. Second, although most voters chose moderate options, fully one third of the electorate sought to cast a protest vote. Humala was able to tap into disaffection with the status quo because he an outsider—someone who was not a member of the established political system. García won support as the best candidate to stop Humala. Finally, the election outcome reflected both campaign dynamics and electoral rules. Humala would have won the presidency under a plurality system. He lost the runoff election because many voters saw García as the lesser of two evils; although García was the first choice of fewer voters, he ably exploited both campaign opportunities and the logic of ballotage.

The election did not pit a populist against a social democrat. It pitted the leader of an established populist machine against a populist outsider. Although both were populists, they differed in core constituency, level of organization, and experience. Whereas García was a consummate insider at the helm of an institutionalized party, Humala was a political neophyte who appealed to disorganized and excluded voters who rejected established political class. When Humala’s insurgent campaign grew so successful that it threatened the interests of moderate voters, APRA tacked to the right to occupy the middle ground. Paradoxically, the rise of disorganized-outsider populism contributed to the victory of institutionalized-insider populism.
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http://weblogs.elearning.ubc.ca/peru/archives/027452.php


