Skip to main content
Unpublished Paper
Epistemological-Scientific Realism and the Onto-Relationship of Inferentially Justified and Non-Inferentially Justified Beliefs
(2014)
  • Max Lewis Edward Andrews, University of Edinburgh
Abstract

The traditional concept of knowledge is a justified true belief. The bulk of contemporary epistemology has focused primarily on that task of justification. Truth seems to be a quite obvious criterion—does the belief in question correspond to reality? My contention is that the aspect of ontology is far too separated from epistemology. This onto-relationship of between reality and beliefs require the epistemic method of epistemological realism. This is not to diminish the task of justification. I will then discuss the role of inference from the onto-relationships of free invention and discovery and whether it is best suited for a foundationalist or coherentist model within a theistic context.

Keywords
  • epistemology,
  • scientific realism,
  • philosophy,
  • anti-realism,
  • empiricism,
  • positivism,
  • theism,
  • ontology
Publication Date
2014
Citation Information
Max Lewis Edward Andrews. "Epistemological-Scientific Realism and the Onto-Relationship of Inferentially Justified and Non-Inferentially Justified Beliefs" (2014)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/max_andrews/4/