
Matthew E Feinberg, Georgetown University Law Center

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I. INTRODUCTION

“[D]eath is different . . . .” [FN1] It is this principle that establishes the death penalty as one of the most controversial topics in legal history, even when implemented only for the most heinous criminal acts. [FN2] In fact, “[n]o aspect of modern penal law is subjected to more efforts to influence public attitudes or to more intense litigation than the death penalty.” [FN3] Over its long history, capital punishment has changed in many ways as a result of this litigation and continues to spark controversy at the very mention of its existence. [FN4]

This Comment will address the newest controversy in capital litigation: The possibility of undue pain and suffering caused to a defendant executed by lethal injection. Central to this emerging issue is a Supreme Court case, Hill v. McDonough, [FN5] and a Maryland case, Evans v. State. [FN6] Hill became the foundation for capital challenges based on the unconstitutionality of the method of execution. [FN7] Although the court has yet to render a decision in Evans, this case could forever affect Maryland's capital punishment structure, and potentially abolish the death penalty in Maryland.

As no decision on a controversial issue of law can be reached without a firm grasp of the history of that issue, this Comment will begin with an examination of the history of capital punishment both in this country, [FN8] and in Maryland. [FN9] This examination will include a commentary on the history of challenges to the capital punishment structure and the landmark cases that shaped the death penalty in this country. [FN10] It will also address lethal injection, the specific method of execution currently used in a majority of states, and how a defendant dies by this form of capital punishment. [FN11] This method has come under significant fire of late based on the potential for botched or failed executions, [FN12] as well as the ban on physician-assisted executions. [FN13]

Having established the process by which the death penalty reached its current status, this Comment will then discuss and analyze [FN14] the main question facing capital punishment in Maryland: Does Maryland's capital punishment procedure constitute cruel and unusual punishment? [FN15] This Comment will then address the aforementioned landmark case, Hill v. McDonough, [FN16] the U.S. Supreme Court case that opened the door
for constitutional challenges to the death penalty based on the cruel and unusual nature of a state's method of execution. [FN17] This Comment also reviews Evans v. State, [FN18] the Maryland case that could change the face of capital punishment in this state and potentially outlaw the death penalty under state law. [FN19]

Finally, this Comment will address the likely future of capital punishment in this country. [FN20] Based on the analysis of four main constitutional concerns facing Maryland’s death penalty system, this Comment also proposes solutions for the problems facing capital punishment in Maryland. [FN21] This Comment calls for change. It seeks abolition of Maryland’s death penalty based on the cruel and unusual nature of its capital punishment structure or a long-term moratorium *81 on executions until a fair, consistent, and reliable method and process for executions can be established. [FN22]

II. THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

A. Capital Punishment in the United States

1. An Early History

The death penalty has been consistently used as a form of punishment in this country since the early colonial period. [FN23] Since this country's first execution in 1608, [FN24] more than 15,000 individuals have been executed [FN25]—not only for murder, but also for lesser crimes, such as rape or counterfeiting. [FN26] “Through most of the nation's history, the proposition that authorities had the legal and moral right to take the lives of those who committed serious crimes was taken for granted by the bulk of the citizenry.” [FN27]

Although opposition to the death penalty was visible beginning after the Revolutionary War, [FN28] it was not until the mid-1960s that the death penalty came under considerable fire. [FN29] Prior to that time, courts heard two types of capital cases: appeals from prisoners based on violations of their constitutional rights before or during their respective trials [FN30] and appeals based on certain barbaric methods of execution [FN31]—being cruel and unusual forms of punishment. [FN32] It was not until a pair of law review articles was published in 1961 that a formidable assault against the death penalty was initiated. [FN33]

The first article, authored by Gerald Gottlieb, asserted that executions may “on a sufficient factual showing, be found violative of the Eighth Amendment, since death . . . may . . . with good reason be alleged to be ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment and within the reach of the Eighth Amendment . . . .” [FN34] Later that year, Walter Oberer published a second article that called into question what he considered a “procedural flaw” in capital cases. [FN35] Oberer challenged procedures where jurors with moral oppositions to the death penalty were excluded from capital juries. [FN36] This trend could potentially establish juries “inclined toward guilty verdicts.” [FN37]

The assault on the death penalty continued in the United States Supreme Court, where Justice Arthur Goldberg stated, in a dissenting opinion in Rudolph v. Alabama, [FN38] that the Court would possibly be open to hearing arguments against the constitutionality of the death penalty, such as those proposed by Gottlieb and Oberer. [FN39] The Goldberg dissent, which questioned whether “the imposition of the death penalty . . . violate[s] ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of [our] maturing society,’ or ‘standards of decency *83 more or less universally’” acknowledged, [FN40] served as a signal that a change was on the horizon. [FN41]
Fueled by Goldberg’s dissent in Rudolph, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF), one of the primary groups engaged in the national abolitionist movement at that time, [FN42] initiated a two-pronged attack on the death penalty. [FN43] First, the LDF brought to light the racial discrimination present in death sentencing. [FN44] African-American defendants were much more likely to be convicted if their victims were white. [FN45] The second prong of the attack focused on certain trial procedures in capital cases. [FN46] The LDF primarily attacked: “(1) the exclusion of [jurors morally opposed to the death penalty]; (2) the simultaneous determination of guilt and sentence in a single trial; and (3) the lack of precise standards to guide juries in deciding whether to condemn a defendant to death.” [FN47] The Supreme Court heard arguments on the abolitionists’ procedural claims in 1971. In McGautha v. California, [FN48] the Court rejected these arguments and upheld, as constitutional, both the lack of guidelines for jury deliberations and unitary trials where guilt and sentence were decided in the same proceeding. [FN49] Although the arguments failed, shortly thereafter, the abolitionist movement gained a monumental decision in Furman v. Georgia. [FN50]

Two months after its decisions in McGautha, the Court announced that, in Furman, it would examine whether the then-current administration of the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment. [FN51]

*84 2. Furman v. Georgia

In Furman, two defendants were sentenced to the death penalty after being convicted of rape. [FN52] A third defendant was convicted of murder and likewise, sentenced to death. [FN53] The Supreme Court granted certiorari in each case to specifically address the question of “whether the imposition and execution of the death penalty constitute cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. [FN54] Historically, the Court’s decisions established that the sentence of death “is not cruel, unless the manner of execution can be said to be inhuman and barbarous.” [FN55] The Court also reiterated what had been established previously: the perception of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment may change “as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.” [FN56] The Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” [FN57]

Under these premises, the Court examined the state of the death penalty based on the current perceptions of moral justice, [FN58] and decided that a method of punishment could be perceived as cruel and unusual if it discriminated against certain individuals or if such a punishment was imposed under a procedure that could be affected by personal prejudice. [FN59] Based on studies done throughout the country that suggested that the death penalty was imposed more often on African-American defendants, the Court suggested that the death penalty was imposed in a discriminatory fashion. [FN60] The Court further found that legislatures, in enacting death penalty statutes, had failed to adequately define capital crimes or to establish a set of guidelines for juries such that an equitable decision could be reached in regards to the ultimate penalty. [FN61] The Court stated that, although the death penalty itself is not cruel and unusual punishment, “the vice . . . [is] in the process by which it is inflicted.” [FN62] In other words, “the death penalty, like lightning, will strike some, but not others, in a way that defies rational explanation.” [FN63] In sum, Justice Douglas stated, quoting Warden Lewis E. Lawes of Sing Sing Prison, that “no punishment could be invented with so many inherent defects” as the death penalty. [FN64] In so finding, Justice Douglas cited the unequal imposition of the death penalty to the rich and the poor—it is “the powerless . . . who are executed”—to support his decision. [FN65] Four other justices—Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall—joined Douglas in holding that the death penalty was “cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” [FN66]
With that decision, the Furman Court officially outlawed capital punishment in the United States under the then-current method of administration. [FN67] The death sentences of more than six hundred death row inmates were immediately commuted to life imprisonment. [FN68] The decision of the Supreme Court, however, was far from wholly conclusive. [FN69] In fact, the Court did not find that capital punishment, in and of itself, was unconstitutional. [FN70] The decision allowed states to implement the death penalty under procedures that were not considered cruel or unusual punishment. [FN71] In September 1973, just a year after the Furman decision, California reinstated the death penalty under a new statute, although no inmates were actually executed there until 1992. [FN72]

*86 Following Furman, public support of the death penalty grew to some of its highest levels since the mid-1950s. [FN73] In fact, approximately two-thirds of the country supported the reinstitution of capital punishment. [FN74] A majority of states began implementing new capital punishment structures, [FN75] and in 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court reexamined the use of the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia [FN76] and Woodson v. North Carolina. [FN77] Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, having taken the bench in 1975 to replace Justice William Douglas, appeared to be the swing vote that would determine the future of the death penalty. [FN78] Before Gregg, Justice Stevens had never issued a ruling on the death penalty, therefore his decision was unpredictable. [FN79]


Both Gregg and Woodson arose out of the states' efforts to reinstate the death penalty under a statute that would pass constitutional muster. [FN80] In Gregg, which was the lead decision of cases [FN81] from three states-- Georgia, Florida, and Texas--the Supreme Court examined “guided discretion statutes.” [FN82] Woodson became the lead case of two cases [FN83] that challenged state laws which required mandatory death sentences for certain crimes.

In Gregg, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery and murder and was sentenced to death under Georgia's new, post-Furman, death penalty statute. [FN84] The trial was held in two phases--guilt and penalty. [FN85] During the guilt phase, the trial judge submitted the case to the jury under both felony-murder and non-felony-murder charges. [FN86] The robbery charges were submitted to the jury under armed robbery and robbery by intimidation, a lesser crime. [FN87] Despite being instructed on the issue of self-defense, the jury found the defendant guilty on two counts of armed robbery and two counts of murder. [FN88] During the penalty phase, the judge instructed the jury that they could recommend either capital punishment or life in prison for each count. [FN89] The judge also presented, in accordance with the new statute, several aggravating and mitigating factors which could influence the jury's decision. [FN90] After deliberation, the jury recommended the death penalty on all four counts. [FN91]

On appeal, the Supreme Court took the case to decide whether Georgia's new death penalty statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. [FN92] Having previously stated that the death penalty is not, in and of itself, cruel and unusual, [FN93] the Court based its decision on the implementation of bifurcated trials, the increase in jury guidance for capital trials, and the availability of prompt appellate review of capital sentences. [FN94] Because the statute provided sufficient protection against potential ignorance, misunderstanding, or bias by the jury and a checks and balances system in appellate courts, the Court held that the death penalty, as applied by the Georgia statute was neither cruel, nor unusual punishment. [FN95] The Court also rejected the petitioner's primary argument that societal views of decency forbid capital punishment, pointing to the legislative response to Furman and a general national support for the
death penalty. [FN96] By a 7-2 vote, the death penalty returned to the United States. [FN97]

*88 In Woodson v. North Carolina, [FN98] the two defendants, James Woodson and Luby Waxton, and two others, committed the armed robbery of a convenience store. [FN99] The store clerk was killed during the robbery, and an innocent bystander was severely injured. [FN100] Throughout the trial, Woodson maintained his innocence on the murder charges. [FN101] The facts of the case suggested that Woodson's involvement in the robbery consisted of driving the getaway car and some preparatory tasks. [FN102] After a guilty verdict was returned by the jury, both defendants were sentenced under North Carolina's death penalty statute, which made the death penalty mandatory for all first-degree murder convictions. [FN103] The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether mandatory death sentences were constitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. [FN104]

The Court reasoned that a mandatory imposition of the death penalty was unconstitutional because it “depart[ed] markedly from contemporary standards respecting the imposition of the punishment of death and thus [could not] be applied consistently . . . ‘within the limits of civilized standards.’” [FN105] Furthermore, the Court found that the statute failed to establish “unbridled jury discretion” as required by Furman v. Georgia or “particularized consideration” by the jury of mitigating factors, such as the character and record of the accused. [FN106] Having found the North Carolina statute to be a violation of both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court set aside the mandatory death sentence statute. [FN107]

4. Post-Gregg Modifications to Capital Punishment

The Court's decisions in Gregg and Woodson prompted intense scrutiny of the death penalty. Over time, the Supreme Court has tightened and loosened the restraints on capital sentencing, eventually resulting in the death penalty as it stands today. The significant *89 Supreme Court decisions that have shaped today's capital punishment scheme include outlawing the death penalty for “lesser crimes” such as rape [FN108] and the expansion of the admissibility of character evidence of the accused. [FN109] These decisions increased a defendant's due process rights, therefore strengthening a defendant's ability to protect him or herself from a capital conviction. [FN110] The reinstitution of the death penalty reawakened the abolitionist movement in the United States, and beginning in the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court was deluged with capital challenges for various reasons. [FN111]

The abolitionist movement, post-Gregg, resulted in significant structural changes to the way capital punishment was carried out in this country. Abolitionists successfully narrowed the scope of the death penalty over time through Supreme Court decisions that prevented the execution of insane defendants, [FN112] minors under the age of sixteen, [FN113] and the profoundly mentally retarded. [FN114]

The controversy surrounding capital punishment continued both inside the Supreme Court and outside in the general public. In Callins v. Collins, [FN115] the struggle culminated in Justice Harry Blackmun abandoning the decision-making process altogether. [FN116] In a landmark dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun stated:

From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. . . . I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. . . . The problem is that the inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill some defendants, a *90 system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and reliable sentences of death required by the Constitution. [FN117]
B. Capital Punishment in Maryland

After the Supreme Court ruling in Furman v. Georgia, the Court of Appeals of Maryland deemed capital punishment unconstitutional except in those circumstances where the death penalty is mandatory. [FN118] The Maryland legislature, in response to the Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision, established a mandatory death sentence for some, specifically-defined first-degree murders. [FN119] After the Supreme Court announced its decision in Woodson v. North Carolina, [FN120] the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled mandatory death sentences unconstitutional. [FN121] As a result, the legislature revised Maryland's capital punishment statute by constructing a law intended to conform to the laws established by the Supreme Court. [FN122] The new statute established bifurcated trials, mandatory appellate review, and the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in each capital trial. [FN123]

In 1994, Maryland's death penalty statute was amended to state that lethal injection shall be the method of execution for all defendants sentenced to the death penalty after March 25, 1994. [FN124] Prior to this date, inmates had been executed in the gas chamber. Those inmates condemned prior to March 25, 1994, had the choice of execution by lethal gas or by lethal injection. [FN125] Lethal injection would be utilized for all defendants sentenced after the amendment, as is the prevalent method throughout the rest of the country. [FN126]

*91 In 2000, an Illinois death penalty case sparked national debate over the death penalty, and the controversy extended to Maryland. [FN127] In 2002, then-Governor Parris N. Glendening, troubled that all nine Maryland death row inmates were of African-American descent, ordered all executions be halted for one year pending public and legislative review of a University of Maryland study (to be released later that year) on the effect of race on the capital punishment system in the United States. [FN128] The study thoroughly examined “suggestions . . . that the imposition of the death penalty in Maryland [was] influenced by factors such as race and the particular legal jurisdiction where the homicide occurred.” [FN129] The study provided empirical data suggesting that African-American defendants were significantly more likely to be given the death penalty than Caucasian defendants who committed the same crimes. [FN130] Likewise, the death penalty is implemented in cases where African-American defendants kill Caucasian victims more often than any other racial relationship. [FN131] The study further suggested that legal jurisdiction plays a part in the imposition of the sentence of death. [FN132] The study showed that a prosecutor's decision to charge a death-eligible homicide as a capital offense is significantly different in different jurisdictions of Maryland. [FN133] Based on those results, “clearly the jurisdiction where the homicide occurs matters and matters a great deal.” [FN134]

Less than a year later, despite the information released in the study, newly-elected governor Robert Ehrlich ended the moratorium, and executions resumed in the state without modification of the death penalty statute or procedure. [FN135]

*92 Shortly after the study was released, Maryland's Attorney General, J. Joseph Curran, called for an end to capital punishment in Maryland, citing the possibility of the wrongful execution of an innocent defendant. [FN136] Governor Ehrlich, however, promised to veto any bill seeking a moratorium or the abolition of Maryland's death penalty. [FN137] Ehrlich's threats were unnecessary, however, as bills to abolish the death penalty and to extend Glendening's moratorium both failed on the state senate floor. [FN138]

The debate over the death penalty reached a head on December 19, 2006, when the Court of Appeals of Maryland halted all executions in the state, “ruling that procedures for putting prisoners to death were never submitted for the public review required by law.” [FN139] The court made this decision in Evans v. State, [FN140]
where Vernon Lee Evans, Jr., along with two other plaintiffs, filed a motion to vacate their respective death sentences based on the state's violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). [FN141] The Court found that the protocol dictating the manner in which lethal injection is carried out in Maryland was a “regulation” under the Maryland APA. [FN142] Because the protocol was not submitted for public and legislative review, it was a violation of the APA, and therefore “ineffective.” [FN143] The decision merely postpones executions in the state until the legislature can review the issue, and either “submit the execution protocols to the scrutiny of a joint legislative committee and schedule a public hearing on the issue” or, although unlikely, “exempt the execution procedures from that review process.” [FN144]

As it currently stands, Maryland's death penalty exists under the 2002 version of the Maryland Code Annotated. [FN145] On February 21, 2007, both the Maryland Senate and the House of Delegates *93 considered testimony from current Governor Martin O'Malley and several prominent pro- and anti-death penalty groups on a bill to repeal the death penalty permanently. [FN146] Although the bill failed at committee, [FN147] the controversy remains, and the death penalty continues to stand on “shaky ground.” [FN148] When a new abolition bill inevitably comes before the Maryland General Assembly in the future, the legislature will have to examine the current capital punishment structure, which includes three main areas of controversy: the crime, the case, and the killer cocktail.

1. The Crime

As stated previously, in Maryland, the only crimes punishable by death are those that fall within the category of first-degree murder. [FN149] This trend is consistent with a majority of the country's current practices. [FN150] Some states, however, continue to implement the death penalty for crimes not resulting in death, but that trend is an *94 exception to current capital punishment standards. [FN151] For a murder to qualify as first-degree murder in Maryland, a murder must be “a deliberate, premeditated, and willful killing, . . . committed by lying in wait, . . . committed by poison, . . . or [a murder] committed in the perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate” certain crimes. [FN152]

2. The Case

If a defendant is charged with a first-degree murder in Maryland, and the state chooses to seek the death penalty, certain criteria must be met before a death sentence can be imposed. [FN153] First, the defendant must be a principal in the first degree, [FN154] or, in the case of the murder of a law enforcement officer, a principal in the second degree [FN155] who meets certain aggravating factors. [FN156] In addition, at least thirty days before trial, the state must give the defendant notice both of its intention to seek the death penalty and of the aggravating circumstances upon which the state will rely. [FN157]

If a defendant is convicted of first-degree murder, and if the state gave sufficient notice to the defendant that the death penalty would be sought, a separate sentencing trial must be held to “determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death.” [FN158] This *95 sentencing hearing must be held before a jury--either the same jury that convicted the defendant or a jury specifically empanelled for the purposes of the proceeding. [FN159] A defendant may, conversely, waive his jury rights for the sentencing proceeding. [FN160]

To condemn a defendant to death, the court or jury must determine whether any of the statutory aggravating [FN161] or mitigating [FN162] factors exist. If the jury does not find that any aggravating circumstances exist, a death sentence cannot be imposed. [FN163] If one or more aggravating circumstances exist, the jury will then determine whether any mitigating circumstances preclude imposition of a death sentence. [FN164] After weigh-
ing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the jury will recommend a sentence for the defendant. A death sentence may only be imposed by a unanimous jury. [FN165] Should a jury decide the evidence does not warrant a death sentence, or if the state has failed to meet the procedural requirements of the statute, a sentence of life imprisonment, without the possibility of parole, is imposed. [FN166] If a jury returns a death sentence for a defendant, both the conviction and the sentence will be appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland automatically [FN167] in order to "ensure[] the integrity of capital justice." [FN168] Defendants may petition for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court to seek further appellate review.

*96 3. The Killer Cocktail

a. Procedure

Maryland's current method of execution, like a majority of states, is by lethal injection. [FN169] It was originally thought that lethal injection was the most humane way of ending a condemned inmate's life. [FN170] The medical certainty that extreme pain was felt by prisoners when executed by electrocution or the gas chamber was alleviated by the system that closely resembled a "medical procedure." [FN171] Such a trend followed a historical pattern. “[New] methods of execution have become popular because they are seen as more humane than any of the other available alternatives; those methods are often replaced, however, after the public realizes that they are not as humane as they seem.” [FN172]

Execution by lethal injection involves an intravenous dose of three separate chemicals in succession, [FN173] each believed to be individually fatal in the proper doses. [FN174] Although the chemicals used may differ from state to state, generally, the lethal injection regimen will include an anesthetic, a paralytic, and a drug that stops the heart. [FN175] In Maryland, the three drugs used during the lethal injection process are sodium pentothal, pancuronium bromide (also known as Pavulon), and potassium chloride. [FN176]

i. Drug #1- sodium pentothal

Sodium pentothal, or a similar anesthetic, is the first drug used in the lethal injection process. [FN177] Sodium pentothal is “a short-acting barbiturate that is ordinarily used . . . in . . . anesthesia to render a surgical patient unconscious for mere minutes.” [FN178] The charge against the use of this drug is that, because of the short-acting nature *97 of the chemical, the drug may not sedate the defendant for the entire execution. [FN179]

ii. Drug #2- pancuronium bromide

Pancuronium bromide, sometimes referred to as Pavulon, is a paralytic drug used during some surgeries to paralyze the body and, in most states, during the lethal injection process. [FN180] If a significant dosage is injected, the drug can paralyze the lungs and diaphragm, thereby stopping a person's breathing. [FN181] The use of Pavulon during the lethal injection process is intended to paralyze the body so that the defendant stops breathing to the point of clinical death before the third drug is injected to stop the heart. [FN182]

Many challenges to capital punishment have arisen out of the use of Pavulon in the execution cocktail. [FN183] These challenges are based on allegations that the combination of the drug with some other substances, including some sodium-based sedatives (such as sodium pentothal), causes respiratory arrest before a loss of consciousness. [FN184] The possible result of such an occurrence would be that the defendant feels significant pain while paralyzed. [FN185] In other words, the defendant could feel intense pain but appear calm, “masking any potential problems with the execution.” [FN186]
iii. Drug #3- potassium chloride

Potassium chloride is the third drug utilized in the execution process. [FN187] The drug is used to stop the heart and complete the execution. [FN188] A saline fluid is then passed through the defendant's veins for ten seconds. [FN189] When an electrocardiogram (EKG) monitor shows there is no heart activity, a physician pronounces the defendant dead, and the execution is complete. [FN190]

*98 b. The doctor's conflict

Physicians have been witnessing executions since the first execution by electrocution occurred in 1890. [FN191] Since 1982, however, with the dawn of the lethal injection era, the moral and ethical implications of medical participation in executions have created significant controversy. [FN192] The controversy surrounds the Hippocratic Oath, taken by all doctors: “First, do no harm.” [FN193] Assisting in an execution is a direct violation of this central tenet of physician care. [FN194] As an American Medical Association (AMA) executive vice president has stated, “When the healing hand becomes the hand inflicting the wound, the world is turned inside out.” [FN195]

The ramifications of keeping doctors out of the execution chamber can be equally troubling, however. In 1984, a “mishandled execution” caused an inmate to suffer for ten minutes after the injection, allegedly because no physician was present to administer the drugs correctly. [FN196] Arguments by proponents of physician supervision involve the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. [FN197] Under their argument, the presence of medical professionals is necessary to ensure that the execution procedures do not risk violation of the Eighth Amendment by allowing unqualified professionals to assist in the execution process. [FN198]

A majority of states either require or permit the presence of a physician during executions. [FN199] Although the extent of requisite participation varies by state, generally, physicians are required to attend the execution only to pronounce death. [FN200] In Maryland, nursing assistants, paramedics, correctional officers, and prison officials complete the injection procedure. [FN201] A physician is present for the sole purpose of pronouncing death. [FN202] Medical experts have testified that Maryland’s procedure for lethal injection places the execution in the hands of “unqualified and poorly trained” individuals, some of whom “[do not] even comprehend their individual responsibilities.” [FN203] If nothing else, such opinions by medical experts raise the question of whether Maryland’s current method of capital punishment could result in cruel and unusual punishment for an inmate in the execution chamber.

4. The Question

a. Does Maryland’s capital punishment procedure constitute cruel and unusual punishment?

The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution bans the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. [FN204] Although the Constitution does not establish boundaries for what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme Court has set guidelines against which punishments, such as the death penalty, can be scrutinized. [FN205]

The Supreme Court has stated that to successfully challenge a punishment accepted at common law, a defendant must show that it violates current standards of decency in the community. [FN206] The defendant must present evidence that shows a national consensus against the punishment, not the absence of a national consensus supporting it. [FN207] The Court has often applied its general rule in death penalty cases, most notably
in Furman v. Georgia [FN208] and Gregg v. Georgia. [FN209] Eventually, the Court sculpted a standard test in Gregg. [FN210]

The Court established in Gregg that a punishment is cruel and unusual if it “involve[s] the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” [FN211] A punishment may also be considered cruel and unusual if it “is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” [FN212] In other words, for a punishment to be deemed constitutional, it cannot meet either of the two prongs of Gregg. [FN213] Recently, several states’ capital punishment structures have been challenged under this rule. [FN214] One such case was Hill v. McDonough, [FN215] where a defendant challenged the method of his execution on Eighth Amendment grounds. [FN216] The Court’s landmark decision in Hill opened the door for challenges to the lethal injection practice throughout the country.

i. Hill v. McDonough

In 1982, Clarence Hill, along with an accomplice, robbed a bank at gunpoint. [FN217] The police arrived at the scene of the crime during the robbery and apprehended Hill’s accomplice, Cliff Jackson. [FN218] In the confusion surrounding the crime scene, Hill was able to approach, from behind, two police officers who were handcuffing Jackson. [FN219] Hill shot both officers—killing one and wounding the other. [FN220] Hill engaged in a shoot-out with the other officers, and suffered several gunshot wounds before being arrested. [FN221] Hill was charged with first-degree murder, among other charges, and was convicted and sentenced to death under Florida’s death penalty statute. [FN222] On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida vacated Hill’s death sentence due to errors in the jury selection process and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. [FN223] On remand, a new jury sentenced Hill to death again. [FN224] This time, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the trial court ruling, and Hill was transferred to death row. [FN225]

On appeal, Hill challenged his death sentence on several fronts, including an unsuccessful habeas corpus petition. [FN226] In Hill’s last effort to stay his execution, just four days prior to the date for which his execution was scheduled, [FN227] he filed an action in federal district court, under the federal civil rights statute. [FN228] Under this statute, Hill claimed that the method by which he was to be executed violated the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments. [FN229] Hill argued that the three drugs used in lethal injection procedures could cause severe pain: first, that the anesthetic used was insufficient to render the administration of the second and third drugs painless; [FN230] and, second, “that he could remain conscious and suffer severe pain as [the second drug] paralyzed his lungs and body [while the third drug] caused muscle cramping and a fatal heart attack.” [FN231] The district court dismissed the action, claiming that Hill had filed a “successive” habeas corpus appeal, which is prohibited by federal law. [FN232] The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, [FN233] but the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Hill’s final appeal constituted a successive habeas corpus claim or a separate action under § 1983. [FN234] Finding Hill’s appeal valid, the Court remanded the case for a decision in the U.S. district court. [FN235] The Supreme Court, however, refused to comment on the merits of Hill’s arguments. [FN236]

Hill’s claim failed in the U.S. district court. [FN237] The court found Hill’s claim that the lethal injection process posed a risk of excruciating, unnecessary pain was meritless based on a full evidentiary hearing. [FN238] Hill was executed in Florida’s death chamber on September 20, 2006, by lethal injection. [FN239] Although in the end, Hill’s arguments failed to save his life, his case opened the door for other defendants to challenge lethal injection in other parts of the country. One such case, the case of Vernon Lee Evans, Jr., has developed in Maryland.
ii. Evans v. State

In 1983, Evans entered into an agreement with Anthony Grandison whereby Evans would be paid $9,000 to perform a “contract killing” of two witnesses who were scheduled to testify against Grandison in a narcotics case in federal court. [FN240] After murdering two individuals, one of whom was a witness and one an innocent bystander, Evans was arrested and initially charged with witness tampering and violations of the victims' civil rights. [FN241] Shortly thereafter, both Evans and Grandison were charged with two counts of first-degree murder, and one count each of conspiracy to commit murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. [FN242] Evans was sentenced to life in prison, plus an additional ten years on the witness tampering and civil rights charges, then moved the federal court to dismiss his murder indictment, arguing double jeopardy. [FN243] The trial court denied the motion, and Evans was sentenced to death on the first-degree murder charges. [FN244] The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court decision, and Evans appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court denied Evans' petition for certiorari. [FN245]

Evans filed suit for post-conviction relief, and the circuit court vacated the death sentence. [FN246] The case was removed to the Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore County, and Evans was again sentenced to death. [FN247] Again, Evans appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, but that court affirmed the lower court's *103 decision. [FN248] Evans appealed to the Supreme Court, but certiorari was denied yet again. [FN249] Thereafter, Evans sought post-conviction relief several times in federal court, but the court denied each of his petitions. [FN250]

After the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Hill, Evans filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which mirrored Hill's claims. [FN251] In his suit, Evans alleges that Maryland's lethal injection procedure, which is significantly similar to the challenged procedure from Florida (and other states who utilize lethal injection), poses a risk of causing excessive pain to Evans, and therefore, violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. [FN252]

The district court has not yet rendered a decision in Evans's § 1983 action, although the analysis will likely resemble that which was set forth in Gregg v. Georgia: [FN253] whether the punishment “involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” [FN254] and whether the punishment is “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” [FN255]

b. Does Maryland's method of execution involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain?

Maryland's method of lethal injection will be considered cruel and unusual if it involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain [FN256] or the “risk of unnecessary pain, violence, and mutilation.” [FN257] The arguments asserting Maryland's lethal injection practice is violative of the Eighth Amendment include: (a) the claim that the sedative used to anesthetize the condemned inmate wears off prior to death, therefore subjecting the inmate to severe pain during the *104 execution; [FN258] (b) witness accounts of inmates suffering through excruciating executions over an extended period of time; [FN259] (c) mistakes by the injection team which could botch an execution and cause unnecessary pain to the inmate; [FN260] and, (d) the assertion that the drug Pavulon, used in Maryland's execution practice, has been banned from use on animals because of the severe pain it inflicts. [FN261]

Although the original intent of the lethal injection process was to “cause death rapidly and without pain,” [FN262] contemporary thought, however, acknowledges the fact that not all executions by lethal injection are painless. [FN263] In fact, “it's harder to execute someone painlessly than would seem likely.” [FN264]
i. The sedative used to anesthetize the condemned inmate wears off prior to death

The latest trend in arguments made in opposition of Maryland's death penalty practice is that the sedative wears off prior to the prisoner's death. [FN265] The problem with this argument is based on the uncertainty of the inmate's physical condition resulting from the combination of drugs used in the execution. [FN266] Because Pavulon is used to paralyze the body, it is difficult to discern the physical state of the inmate, who is unable to move or register pain due to the paralytic. [FN267] The inmate's body remains calm, although he or she has full sensory perception as the lethal drugs pump into his or her body, stopping the heart. [FN268] It is commonly held by medical professionals that were the sedative to wear off prior to death, the inmate would feel excruciating pain as the final drug was injected. [FN269] In such circumstances, the pain felt by the inmate would likely amount to a level considered unnecessary and wanton by society's standards.

ii. Witness accounts show that inmates sometimes suffer through excruciating executions over an extended period of time

Arguments are also made against the lethal injection process based on eye-witness accounts of executions. [FN270] Dorian Hall, a social worker in Ohio's public defender's office, witnessed the lethal injection of Joseph Lewis Clark in 2006. [FN271] Her testimony is at the root of Vernon Lee Evans's challenge to Maryland's lethal injection process. [FN272] Hall testified that after the three drugs were injected into Clark, his legs moved, he raised his head, and he told the execution team that the process was not working. [FN273] The execution team then pulled a curtain in order to shield witnesses from viewing the process once it was clear the first execution attempt had failed. [FN274] Hall then testified that, although the curtain prevented her from seeing the execution, she heard Clark issue “loud, intense guttural moans and groans, as if [he] was in agony.” [FN275] The execution took a total of ninety minutes, far beyond the intended duration of an execution. [FN276] This testimony serves as a first-hand account of the possible unnecessary and wanton pain suffered by condemned inmates during their execution. [FN277]

iii. Mistakes by the injection team can cause botched executions which lead to unnecessary pain for the inmate

The most controversial argument in lethal injection litigation involves the use of Pavulon creating a risk of excruciating pain for the inmate if the injection cocktail is not perfectly administered. [FN278] The risk of a botched injection, and therefore a high risk of potential pain for the inmate, increases if the execution is administered by poorly trained individuals. [FN279] This issue has been brought to the district court in Maryland through Evans's suit. [FN280] During trial, members of Maryland's execution team testified about their understanding of their roles during an execution. [FN281] One corrections officer on the execution team, whose only medical training is limited to basic first-aid courses offered to prison guards, testified that his main responsibility is to regulate the flow of the intravenous (IV) lines during the injection. [FN282] This officer also testified that he was unaware of several critical procedures in the injection process, the failure of any of which could cause a botched execution. [FN283] A second execution team member, who actually administers the injections, testified that he had no experience with IV medications prior to joining Maryland's execution team. [FN284] After the testimony was presented, doctors, testifying as experts, stated that knowledge and understanding of the “lethal injection procedure . . . [was] lacking among execution team members.” [FN285] Such inexperience on the execution team presents a great risk that the initial anesthetic could fail, “leaving [a condemned prisoner] conscious when the heart-stopping chemical enters his system--but paralyzed and unable to signal his distress.” [FN286]
Evans's execution poses an even higher risk of pain, given Evans's almost-daily injection of heroine over decades of drug addiction during his life. [FN287] The state of Evans's veins calls for a more precise injection made through a central vein in Evans's chest, rather than the standard injection through a vein in the arm. [FN288] Such a procedure would need to be performed by a trained medical professional to ensure success. [FN289] As medical professionals are unable to perform executions under the Hypocratic Oath, [FN290] the risk of a botched execution, causing unnecessary and wanton pain during Evans's execution, is considerable. [FN291]

iv. Pavulon has been banned from use on animals because of the severe pain it inflicts

In 2000, a panel of veterinarians created by the American Veterinary Medical Association stated, in a report on animal euthanasia, that the use of Pavulon, either by itself or in combination with certain anesthetics, can “cause respiratory arrest before loss of consciousness, so the animal may perceive pain and distress after it is immobilized.” [FN292] Furthermore, veterinarians have testified that the use of Pavulon could cause a patient to be “aware of the need to breathe, the inability to do so and the terrifying experience of suffocation.” [FN293] The fact that the use of Pavulon has been outlawed against animals has not affected the lethal injection process, as it is still used in most states today. [FN294]

Based on the evidence, there is a strong basis to argue that Maryland's death penalty system is in violation of the Eighth Amendment due to the risk of unnecessary and wanton pain the procedure could cause. [FN295] Maryland continues to utilize Pavulon, a drug proven to cause excruciating pain for animals, in its execution cocktail. [FN296] Even if Pavulon could be administered painlessly, as long as Maryland employs unqualified and poorly trained individuals on its execution team, the very real threat of a botched execution will be a paramount risk. [FN297] Even if administered correctly, the sedative used to anesthetize an inmate could wear off, causing an inmate extreme pain without the ability to alert their agony to the execution team. [FN298] Finally, witness testimony has provided that the same execution procedure (including the exact drug cocktail used in Maryland) has caused extreme pain to inmates in the past. [FN299] The evidence suggests that Maryland's death penalty procedure carries a heavy risk of causing unnecessary and wanton pain to an inmate, even when performed correctly; this risk is violative of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments.

c. Is Maryland's method of execution disproportionate to the severity of the crime?

The second prong of the Gregg test, whether a punishment is disproportionate to the severity of the crime, can be difficult to analyze. [FN300] Each crime-punishment relationship must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis given that such an analysis is so fact-specific. [FN301] As the Court's model for evaluating punishments only requires that one of the two prongs of the Gregg test be met to deem a punishment unconstitutional, Maryland's capital punishment structure must still be considered unconstitutional because the lethal injection process presents a risk (or actuality) of unnecessary or wanton infliction of pain. [FN302] Given the picture painted by the totality of the evidence, a considerable risk of severe pain to a condemned inmate exists, and therefore, under the protections of the Eighth Amendment, the death penalty should be outlawed in Maryland until such time that a painless, less risky procedure can be perfected.

III. THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

As dictated by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the death penalty is on hiatus in the state pending legislative and possible public review of the system. [FN303] Although this moratorium is a power move by the judicial
branch to correct the wrongs of the Maryland death penalty system, it falls short of the goal, expressed by Justice Blackmun in Callins v. Collins: [FN304] To create a system that “deliver[s] the fair, consistent, and reliable sentence[] of death required by the Constitution.” [FN305]

A. Can Maryland Supply a Fair, Consistent and Reliable Sentence of Death?

The fact remains that Maryland's death penalty system is not a fair, consistent, and reliable punishment. Studies done by the University of Maryland provide evidence that defendants who kill whites are *109 more likely to receive a death sentence than killers of non-whites. [FN306] The jurisdiction in which the crime was committed is also a factor. [FN307] More defendants are charged with and convicted of capital crimes in Baltimore County than in any other county in Maryland despite the fact that other counties have higher rates of “death-eligible” cases. [FN308] In recent years, Maryland's death penalty cases have been driven more by politics than by the reality of the crimes committed. [FN309] As it stands, the Maryland system presents the possibility of human error resulting in a wrongful execution. [FN310] At a press conference in 2003, then-Attorney General J. Joseph Curran called for an end to Maryland's death penalty, citing “an intolerable risk of killing an innocent person” and two cases where Maryland inmates were exonerated from capital convictions through DNA evidence. [FN311] In that press conference, Curran also called for a revision of Maryland's death penalty statute. [FN312] Other state officials have called the Maryland death penalty system “a mess.” [FN313] Despite these calls for change, there has been no significant revision made to the death penalty statute since that date. [FN314] In fact, prominent anti-death penalty advocates have charged that “[a]ll three branches of government in Maryland are refusing to deal with” the problems presented by the study. [FN315]

Throughout the United States, the problem persists. A majority of states utilize the same lethal injection procedures, but few states have implemented changes, despite growing pressure from the nation's *110 court system. [FN316] In fact, one of Maryland's own administrative judges has called the current system “‘legally ineffective’ because [it was] not created with public input.” [FN317] The moratorium implemented by the Court of Appeals of Maryland is a start, but it fails to prompt the necessary changes that could lessen the risk of excruciating pain for executed prisoners. [FN318]

IV. CONCLUSION

“Amnesty International defines torture as an extreme physical and mental assault on a person who has been rendered defenseless.” [FN319] It is this torture which the U.S. Constitution aims to prevent. As dictated by Furman v. Georgia [FN320] and Gregg v. Georgia, [FN321] the Constitution prevents cruel and unusual punishments which involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. As laid out previously, Maryland's method of execution creates the extreme risk of such pain, and is therefore unconstitutional.

Recent challenges to the death penalty argue that the anesthetic used in a majority of executions can wear off prior to death. Eye-witness accounts provide evidence that often, executions have not been completed painlessly, even when procedures are presumably completed in conformance with protocol. The lack of experience and training of Maryland's execution team produces a risk of botched executions. Finally, the drug cocktail is so powerful that it has been banned for use on animals due to the intense pain it inflicts. Each of these four concerns present a significant risk of excruciating pain for the inmate. The culmination of this evidence leads to one conclusion: In its present state, Maryland's capital punishment procedure is no more than the kind of torture condemned by Amnesty International and other human rights groups across the globe, and the kind forbidden by
the U.S. Constitution.

The debate over the whether to abolish capital punishment in Maryland will come to fruition as dictated by the moratorium implemented by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Because such a *111 controversial issue must be decided based on the current state of public opinion, as dictated by Gregg v. Georgia [FN322] and by Maryland’s Administrative Procedure Act, capital punishment in Maryland remains in limbo. If a majority of the public returns a general favoritism for capital punishment, a long-term, open-ended moratorium should be implemented until such time that the legislature approves a bill establishing a fair, consistent, and reliable sentence of death approved by the public. Should the public return a general disfavor for capital punishment, Maryland should take a leadership role in this country and outlaw capital punishment, securing the protections of the Eighth Amendment for condemned prisoners in Maryland.


[FN6]. As of January 4, 2008, an opinion has not been rendered in Evans. Mr. Evans's suit was filed in the U.S. District Court in Baltimore City under Chief Judge Benson Legg.


[FN8]. See infra Part II.A.

[FN9]. See infra Part II.B.

[FN10]. See infra Part II.A.


[FN13]. See infra Part II.B.3.b.

[FN14]. See infra Part II.B.4.


[FN17]. See infra Part II.B.4.a.i.
[FN18]. See supra note 6.

[FN19]. See infra Part II.B.4.a.ii.

[FN20]. See infra Part III.

[FN21]. See infra Part IV.

[FN22]. See infra Part IV.


[FN24]. In 1608, Captain George Kendall was the first person to be executed in what would become the United States. Id.

[FN25]. According to the Death Penalty Information Center [hereinafter DPIC], available online at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org, 15,585 people were executed between the first execution in 1608 and December 13, 2006. See DPIC, Searchable Database of Executions, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2007); DPIC, Executions in the United States, 1608-1976, By State, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=1110 (last visited Mar. 12, 2007). These figures are compiled from a historical record known as the Espy file. DPIC, Executions in the United States, 1608-1976, By State, supra. This information is admittedly incomplete, however, as at least one individual researcher has determined that additional executions occurred during this time period and were not recorded in the Espy file. Id.

[FN26]. Haines, supra note 23, at 7.

[FN27]. Id.

[FN28]. Id.

[FN29]. See id. at 23-26.

[FN30]. Id. at 24.

[FN31]. Id. The “mechanical aspects” of executions challenged during this time included burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, and second electrocutions after a botched first attempt. Id.; see also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 460-61 (1947).


[FN33]. Id. at 26.


[FN35]. Haines, supra note 23, at 26; see also Walter E. Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punishment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 Tex. L. Rev. 545, 547-48
Haines, supra note 23, at 26; see also Oberer, supra note 35, at 547-48. Oberer argues that the common prosecutor practice of “death qualification,” the act of excluding jurors who state during voir dire examination that they have a moral opposition to the death penalty, “stack[s] the deck against the defendant’s claim that he was not guilty.” Haines, supra note 23, at 26.

Haines, supra note 23, at 26; see also Oberer, supra note 35, at 545.


Id.; see also Haines, supra note 23, at 26.

Rudolph, 375 U.S. at 890 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).

Haines, supra note 23, at 27.

Id. at 15.

Id. at 27.

Id.

Id.

Id. at 28.


Id. at 221. This case arose from two separate cases, People v. McGautha, 452 P.2d 650 (Cal. 1969), and State v. Crampton, 248 N.E.2d 614 (Ohio 1969). See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. at 185.


Four death penalty cases were originally consolidated in Furman. Besides Furman, the other cases included in the decision were Jackson v. Georgia, 171 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1969), and Branch v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. 1969). Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813 (1972), one of the original cases consolidated in Furman, was dismissed when the California Supreme Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional in early 1972. Documentary History, supra note 34, at 140.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).

Id.

Id.

Id. at 241 (citing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)) (arguing hanging constituted an inhuman and barbarous method of execution and that death by electrocution did not).
[FN56]. Id. at 241-42 (Douglas, J., concurring).

[FN57]. Id. at 242 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).

[FN58]. Id. at 241-42 (Douglas, J., concurring).

[FN59]. Id. at 242-45.

[FN60]. Id. at 249.

[FN61]. Id.

[FN62]. Id. at 247-48.


[FN64]. Furman, 408 U.S. at 251 (Douglas, J., concurring).

[FN65]. Id.

[FN66]. Id. at 239-40 (per curiam).

[FN67]. Documentary History, supra note 34, at 141.

[FN68]. Id.

[FN69]. Id.

[FN70]. Id.

[FN71]. Id.

[FN72]. Id. at 141 n.1. The long drought between reinstitution of the death penalty and the first execution in California under the new statute is likely due to the long appeals process mandatory in capital cases. California Revives the Death Penalty, Time, Apr. 27, 1992, at 15. The presence of several liberal judges on California's Supreme Court also contributed to the delay. When those judges were removed from office, the door was opened for executions to resume. Associated Press, Bird Produces Negative Image in Campaign, Pollster Finds, L.A. Times, May 23, 1986, at 36.

[FN73]. Documentary History, supra note 34, at 160.

[FN74]. Id.

[FN75]. Id. at 148.


[FN78]. Haines, supra note 23, at 52.
[FN79]. Id.

[FN80]. Documentary History, supra note 34, at 161-62.

[FN81]. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), were reviewed at the same time, as those three states had adopted similar statutes which alleviated the procedural concerns that led to the decision in Furman. Each of these statutes created bifurcated trials, where guilt and sentencing were tried in different proceedings. Mandatory appellate review of all death sentences was also included. Finally, the statutes included factors to consider in the jury decision, designed to help juries adequately weigh the crime with aggravating and mitigating factors. Documentary History, supra note 34, at 161-62.

[FN82]. Documentary History, supra note 34, at 161.

[FN83]. Woodson v. South Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), was decided alongside Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977), as both states had enacted statutes that required the death penalty for certain crimes. Documentary History, supra note 34, at 161.

[FN84]. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158.

[FN85]. Id.

[FN86]. Id. at 160.

[FN87]. Id.

[FN88]. Id.

[FN89]. Id.

[FN90]. Id. at 161.

[FN91]. Id.

[FN92]. Id. at 162.

[FN93]. See id. at 177-78.

[FN94]. Id. at 196-207.

[FN95]. Id. at 207.

[FN96]. Id. at 179.

[FN97]. Haines, supra note 23, at 52.


[FN99]. Id. at 282-83.

[FN100]. Id. at 283.
[FN101]. Id. at 284.

[FN102]. Id. at 283.


[FN104]. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 284-85.

[FN105]. Id. at 301 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).

[FN106]. Id. at 302-03.

[FN107]. Id. at 305.


[FN110]. Documentary History, supra note 34, at 195.

[FN111]. Haines, supra note 23, at 73-79.


[FN113]. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988), first established that defendants who committed their crimes before they reached the age of sixteen could not be executed. In Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Court held that the death penalty could be imposed on defendants who committed crimes at the age of sixteen or seventeen.


[FN116]. Id. at 1145-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

[FN117]. Id.


[FN122]. Nichols, supra note 119, at 877.


[FN130]. Id. at 21, 43 fig.2.

[FN131]. Id. at 22-23, 45 fig.4.

[FN132]. Id. at 28-31.

[FN133]. Id. at 29-30.

[FN134]. Id. at 31.


[FN136]. Sarah Koenig, Attorney General Calls for Abolition of Md. Death Penalty; Curran Says Threat of Executing Innocent People Is Too Great, Balt. Sun, Jan. 31, 2003, at 6B.

[FN137]. Id.

[FN138]. See Stephanie Desmon, Death Penalty Freeze Rejected, Balt. Sun, Mar. 19, 2003, at 1B.


[FN141]. Id. at 271, 914 A.2d at 33-34.

[FN142]. Id. at 346, 914 A.2d at 78. The Maryland APA requires public and legislative review for those proced-
ures deemed “regulations.” McMenamin, supra note 139.

[FN143]. Evans, 396 Md. at 349-50, 914 A.2d at 80-81; see also McMenamin, supra note 139.

[FN144]. McMenamin, supra note 139.


[FN148]. Id.

[FN149]. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 2-201(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2002). In Maryland, a murder is in the first degree if it is:
   (1) a deliberate, premeditated, and willful killing;
   (2) committed by lying in wait;
   (3) committed by poison; or
   (4) committed in the perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate:
      (i) arson in the first degree;
      (ii) burning a barn, stable, tobacco house, warehouse, or other outbuilding ...;
      (iii) burglary in the first, second, or third degree;
      (iv) carjacking or armed carjacking;
      (v) escape in the first degree from a State correctional facility or a local correctional facility;
      (vi) kidnapping ...;
      (vii) mayhem;
      (viii) rape;
      (ix) robbery ...;
      (x) sexual offense in the first or second degree;
      (xi) sodomy; or
      (xii) a violation of [the Criminal Article] concerning destructive devices.

   Id. § 2-201(a).


[FN151]. Of the thirty-seven states which currently implement the death penalty, eleven have extended the scope of capital offenses to lesser crimes than first degree murder. In some states, crimes such as treason (Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia and Louisiana), trainwrecking (California), perjury causing execution (California) or death (Idaho), drug trafficking (Florida), sexual battery (Florida) or sexual assault (Montana), felony murder (Florida), aircraft hijacking (Georgia and Mississippi), aggravated kidnapping (Idaho, Kentucky and South Dakota), and aggravated rape of a minor (Louisiana) are punishable by death. See id.

[FN152]. Crim. Law § 2-201(a). The State may seek the death penalty for a defendant who commits a murder in the perpetration of (or attempt to perpetrate) first degree arson, the burning of a building (not a dwelling) which contains cattle, horses, grain, hay, tobacco or goods, burglary, carjacking, prison escape, kidnapping, mayhem,
rape, robbery, first degree sexual offense, sodomy, or certain explosive-device crimes. Id. § 2-201(a)(4).


[FN155]. A principal in the second degree is “one who helped the perpetrator at the time of the crime.” Id.

[FN156]. Crim. Law § 2-202(a)(2)(ii). For the state to seek the death penalty against a principal in the second degree of a murder of a law enforcement officer, the defendant must “[h]ave willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation intended the death of the law enforcement officer; ... [h]ave been a major participant in the murder; and [h]ave been actually present at the time and place of the murder.” Id.

[FN157]. Id. § 2-202(a)(1).

[FN158]. Id. § 2-303(b).

[FN159]. Id. § 2-303(c). A new jury will only be empanelled if:
   (i) the defendant was convicted based on a guilty plea;
   (ii) the defendant was convicted after a trial by a court sitting without a jury;
   (iii) the court, for good cause, discharged the jury that convicted the defendant; or
   (iv) a court of competent jurisdiction remanded the case for resentencing following a review of the original sentence of death.
   Id. § 2-303(c)(2).

[FN160]. See id. § 2-303(c)(3).

[FN161]. See id. § 2-303(g).

[FN162]. See id. § 2-303(h).

[FN163]. See id. § 2-303(g)(2).

[FN164]. See id. § 2-303(h)(2). If the combination of aggravating circumstances is outweighed by the combination of mitigating circumstances, a death sentence may not be imposed. See id. § 2-303(i)(1)-(2).

[FN165]. Id. § 2-303(i)(3).

[FN166]. See id. § 2-303(j).

[FN167]. Md. R. 8-306(c)(1).


[FN169]. See Crim. Law § 2-303(l); see also DPIC, Methods of Execution, supra note 125.

[FN171]. Ewart, supra note 126, at 1166.

[FN172]. Id. at 1191.


[FN174]. Id. at 338, 914 A.2d at 73.

[FN175]. See Ewart, supra note 126, at 1168-69, 1175.

[FN176]. Evans, 396 Md. at 337-38, 914 A.2d at 73.

[FN177]. See id. at 338, 914 A.2d at 73.


[FN179]. Id. at 544.

[FN180]. See Ewart, supra note 126, at 1183.

[FN181]. Id.

[FN182]. Id.

[FN183]. Id. at 1184.

[FN184]. Id.

[FN185]. See id. at 1184-86.

[FN186]. Id. at 1189.


[FN188]. Id. at 338, 914 A.2d at 73.

[FN189]. Id. at 338, 914 A.2d at 73-74.

[FN190]. Id. at 338, 914 A.2d at 74.

[FN191]. Documentary History, supra note 34, at 283.

[FN192]. Id.

[FN193]. Id. at 284.

[FN194]. See id.

[FN195]. Id.(quoting AMA executive vice president James Todd, M.D.)

[FN197]. Id.

[FN198]. Id.

[FN199]. Id. at 264.

[FN200]. Id. at 265.

[FN201]. Jennifer McMenamin, Lethal Practice: In Maryland and Across the Nation, the Role of Physicians in Executions has Become an Issue Among Medical Professionals and the Courts, Balt. Sun, Oct. 22, 2006, at 1C.

[FN202]. Id.

[FN203]. Id.

[FN204]. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

[FN205]. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.


[FN207]. Id.

[FN208]. See supra notes 52-66 and accompanying text.

[FN209]. See supra notes 84-97 and accompanying text.


[FN211]. Id. at 173 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392-93 (1972)).

[FN212]. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).

[FN213]. Id.


[FN216]. Id. at 2100.


[FN218]. Id.

[FN219]. Id.

[FN220]. Id.
[FN221]. Id.

[FN222]. Id.

[FN223]. Id.

[FN224]. Hill v. Florida, 513 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 1987).

[FN225]. Id. at 179.

[FN226]. Hill v. Florida, 485 U.S. 993 (1988). Hill petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari after his second death sentence. Id. The petition was denied. Id. Hill then filed for habeas corpus relief, but was again denied by the Supreme Court of Florida. Hill v. Dugger, 556 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1990). His appeal was reopened in 1994 after another habeas corpus petition was filed in federal court, and partially granted. Hill filed a petition to reopen his appeal to have the Florida Supreme Court review the issues presented at the habeas corpus proceeding, but any error was found to be harmless, and Hill remained on death row. See generally Hill v. Florida, 643 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1994). Hill appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, but again, that Court denied certiorari. Hill v. Florida, 516 U.S. 872 (1995).


   Every person who, under color of any statute, ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....

[FN229]. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. at 2097.

[FN230]. Id. at 2100.

[FN231]. Id.

[FN232]. Id. at 2097.

[FN233]. In re Hill, 437 F.3d 1080 (11th Cir. 2006).

[FN234]. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. at 2097-98.

[FN235]. Id. at 2104.

[FN236]. Id.


[FN238]. Id. at *4; see also Sims v. Florida, 754 So. 2d 657, 668 (Fla. 2000) (addressing contentions that current execution procedures provide inadequate protection from pain).


[FN241]. Id. at 495, 499 A.2d at 1265.

[FN242]. Id.

[FN243]. Id.

[FN244]. Id. at 494-95, 499 A.2d 1264-65.


[FN247]. Id.

[FN248]. Id. at 666, 637 A.2d at 120.


[FN251]. Gibson & McMenamin, supra note 7.

[FN252]. Id.

[FN253]. See supra notes 210-213 and accompanying text.


[FN255]. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).

[FN256]. Id. (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 392-93).


[FN258]. Ewart, supra note 126, at 1159.

[FN259]. See, e.g., McMenamin, supra note 214.

[FN260]. Jennifer McMenamin, Uncertainty on Execution Team, Balt. Sun, Sept. 21, 2006, at 1B.
[FN261]. Ewart, supra note 126, at 1184.

[FN262]. Id. at 1167.

[FN263]. Id.

[FN264]. Id. (quoting American Morning: Last-Minute Energy Funding: P.R. Ploy?; California Execution Delayed Due to Ethical Dilemma (CNN television broadcast Feb. 21, 2006)).

[FN265]. Id. at 1159.

[FN266]. Id. at 1159-60.

[FN267]. Id.

[FN268]. Id. at 1159, 1167.


[FN270]. McMenamin, supra note 214.

[FN271]. Id.

[FN272]. Id.

[FN273]. Id.

[FN274]. Id.

[FN275]. Id.

[FN276]. Id.

[FN277]. Id.


[FN279]. See McMenamin, supra note 260.

[FN280]. Id.

[FN281]. Id.

[FN282]. Id.

[FN283]. See id. The officer specifically testified that he

[D]id not know what it means to run an IV line at a slow drip, that he would not be able to tell whether the saline solution was flowing too quickly and that he did not know whether an IV line can “go bad” if fluids
are injected too quickly.
    Id.

[FN284]. Id.

[FN285]. Id.

[FN286]. Id.

[FN287]. Id.

[FN288]. See id.

[FN289]. Id.


[FN291]. Gibson & McMenamin, supra note 7.

[FN292]. Ewart, supra note 126, at 1184.


[FN294]. Ewart, supra note 126, at 1184.

[FN295]. See Levy, supra note 196; cf. supra notes 265-294 and accompanying text.

[FN296]. See supra notes 292-294 and accompanying text.

[FN297]. See supra notes 278-291 and accompanying text.

[FN298]. See supra notes 265-269 and accompanying text.

[FN299]. See supra notes 270-277 and accompanying text.


[FN302]. Cf. supra notes 265-294 and accompanying text.

[FN303]. McMenamin, supra note 139.


[FN305]. See id. at 1146.

[FN306]. Hanes & Koenig, supra note 135.
[FN307]. Md. Attorney General to Call for End to Executions; Curran to Outline Stance at News Conference Today, Balt. Sun, Jan. 30, 2003, at 4B.

[FN308]. Empirical Analysis, supra note 129, at fig.9. Baltimore County prosecutors seek the death penalty almost three times as much as prosecutors in neighboring Baltimore City, despite having only a quarter of Baltimore City's death eligible cases. Id. at fig.5. Courts in Baltimore County have also returned death sentences almost four times as much as those in Baltimore City. Id.

[FN309]. Hanes & Koenig, supra note 135.

[FN310]. Koenig, supra note 136.

[FN311]. Id.

[FN312]. Id.

[FN313]. Ivan Penn, Sniper Trial Renews Death Penalty Talk; Legislators Are Vowing Push to Clarify, Improve Maryland's Statutes; 'It Should Have Been Tried Here'; Decision to Prosecute in Va. Angers Lawmakers, Points to Ambiguities, Balt. Sun, Oct. 14, 2003, at 1B.


[FN315]. See id.

[FN316]. Gail Gibson, Lethal Injection Lacks Protocols; Executions Halted for Courts' Questions, Balt. Sun, July 8, 2006, at 1A.

[FN317]. Id.

[FN318]. Andrew A. Green & Justin Fenton, On Eve of Session, Democrats Vow End to Confrontation; Death Penalty, Health Care Reform Seen as Key Issues; Lawmakers Start Today; General Assembly, Balt. Sun, Jan. 10, 2007, at 1B.


[FN322]. Id. at 173.

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