Article
The Discretionary Effect of CEOs and Board Chairs on Corporate Governance Structures
Journal of Empirical Finance
Document Type
Article
Language
eng
Format of Original
11 p.
Publication Date
3-1-2013
Publisher
Elsevier
Disciplines
Abstract
In this study we analyze the effect of latent managerial characteristics on corporate governance. We find that CEO and board chair fixed effects explain a significant portion of the variation in board size, board independence, and CEO-chair duality even after controlling for several firm characteristics and firm fixed effects. The effect of CEOs on corporate governance practices is attributable mainly to executives who simultaneously hold the position of CEO and board chair in the same firm. Our results do not show a decline in CEO discretionary influence on corporate governance after the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and stock exchange governance regulations.
Citation Information
Matteo P. Arena and Marcus V. Braga-Alves. "The Discretionary Effect of CEOs and Board Chairs on Corporate Governance Structures" Journal of Empirical Finance (2013) ISSN: 0927-5398 Available at: http://works.bepress.com/matteo_arena/22/
Accepted version. Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol. 21 (March 2013): 121-131. DOI.
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Empirical Finance. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol. 21 (March 2013): 121-131. DOI.