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William Marty Martin, *DePaul University*
Hugh Long, *Tulane University of Louisiana*



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	Organization	DePaul University
	Address	Chicago, IL, U.S.A.
	Email	martym@depaul.edu

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Abstract	Socially responsible investing identifies the fiduciary duty and liability for financial advisors serving individual and institutional clients when consulting in the SRI space. This article first discusses the role of a fiduciary emerging from both a legal and an ethical basis. Further, the special aspects of maintaining fiduciary duty and minimizing fiduciary liability are described as they relate to SRI. A number of recommendations are discussed: legal, ethical, and practice. This study argues that prudence focuses more on the process of decisions rather than their outcomes, as measured exclusively by rate of return.
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Socially Responsible Investing: Is Your Fiduciary Duty at Risk?

William Martin

ABSTRACT. Socially responsible investing identifies the fiduciary duty and liability for financial advisors serving individual and institutional clients when consulting in the SRI space. This article first discusses the role of a fiduciary emerging from both a legal and an ethical basis. Further, the special aspects of maintaining fiduciary duty and minimizing fiduciary liability are described as they relate to SRI. A number of recommendations are discussed: legal, ethical, and practice. This study argues that prudence focuses more on the process of decisions rather than their outcomes, as measured exclusively by rate of return.

KEY WORDS: advisor, fiduciary, fiduciary duty, fiduciary liability, investment advisor, socially responsible investing, ethical investing

Socially responsible investing (SRI) draws criticism from another fronts ranging from the violation of central tenets of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) (Markowitz, 1952) to a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of various stakeholders. Focusing on fiduciary duty, critics assert that to invest in SRI creates undue exposure to fiduciary liability because of many factors including violations of MPT, perceptions, and actual data that SRI financial performance is less than other investments, that the process of SRI investing is incompatible with other ways of investing, and that conflicts of interest arise that are unique to SRI.

The financial advisor landscape is radically changing with an increasing diversity of practitioners ranging from stockbrokers to certified financial planners (CFPs) and even an emerging group of professionals who identify themselves as wealth managers. These financial advisors are being compensated in a variety of ways including but not limited to compensation only, fee only, and assets under management. There is also an emerging area

of practice focusing on socially responsible investing. SRI financial advisors offer their individual and institutional clients to invest beyond the single bottom-line and invest in assets that are designed to increase in financial value as well as benefit society in some fashion.

In the last few years, media attention has focused on corporate scandals in financial services, including mutual fund companies and other investment management organizations. For instance, UBS' global reputation was tarnished based upon allegations of the international private banking division "...helping a billionaire client evade taxes" (Simonian, 2008, p. 1). Even Societe Generale, the famed French bank, "...accused management of transforming the bank into a casino" (Bennhold, 2008, p. 11) based upon the trading debacles that occurred at the bank. As a result, in some nations like the United States, legislators passed bills like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to provide greater assurance to shareholders that boards, officers, and other agents of publicly traded companies will be held accountable for their conduct and any breaches in their duties and responsibilities. In addition to legislation seeking to inject professional accountability and public trust into the inner workings of companies, innovations in benefits along with the convergence of health and wealth products like Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) and an increasing reliance upon Voluntary Employee Benefits Associations (VEBAs) to fund health plans as in the case of the United Auto Workers and Big Three automakers are all advancing the role of the fiduciary. At the same time, this increase in corporate scandals has resulted in a growing demand for socially responsible investments (SRI; Boasson et al., 2004).

According to *2007 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United States* published by the

88 Social Investment Forum, "...SRI is thriving in the
 89 United States, growing at a faster pace than the
 90 broader universe of all investments under profes-
 91 sional management" (p. 3). The increase in SRI rose
 92 from \$639 billion in 1995 to \$2.71 trillion in 2007 –
 93 a 324% gain (SIF, 2007). The \$1.9 trillion in insti-
 94 tutional assets was up 27% from 2006 (SIF, 2007).
 95 Also, the number of socially screened funds
 96 increased from 55 in 1995 to 260 in 2007 (SIF,
 97 2007). Clearly, SRI is here to stay among all types of
 98 investors from retail to institutional.

99 It also appears that these corporate scandals are
 100 calling into question the fiduciary responsibility of
 101 financial advisors (Gibson, 2006). On March 30,
 102 2007, The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
 103 Columbia Circuit ruled that the Securities and
 104 Exchange Commission (SEC) exceeded its authority
 105 in granting a 2005 disclosure exemption to brokers
 106 who provide investment advice that is incidental to
 107 their business, but who nonetheless are paid a special
 108 fee for the advice. This effectively eliminated the
 109 broker exemption created by that SEC rule. Brokers
 110 are also considered fiduciaries under the Employ-
 111 ment Retirement Investment and Security Act
 112 (ERISA) when they provide investment advice for
 113 retirement plans. This court ruling and the inter-
 114 pretation that brokers are considered to be fiducia-
 115 ries broadens the base of financial professionals who
 116 are considered to be fiduciaries.

117 Additionally, empirical research studies are
 118 calling into question the objectivity of financial
 119 advisors' ability to assess risk tolerance (Roszkowski
 120 and Grable, 2005). Furthermore, it has been argued
 121 that the ability to assess risk from a behavioral,
 122 attitudinal, and value point of view represents a
 123 fiduciary obligations for financial advisors (Davey,
 124 2004). Boasson et al. (2004) further assert that it
 125 "...is the fiduciary duty of the investment managers
 126 to maximize returns at a reasonable level of risk for
 127 their clients" (p. 56) and the financial well-being of
 128 clients is in part dependent upon financial advisors.
 129 Financial advisors are operating increasingly under a
 130 microscope, and must take to heart their fiduciary
 131 responsibility.

132 Fiduciary liability is challenging in and of itself.
 133 But acting in a prudent fashion which is one of
 134 the hallmark elements of fiduciary duty may be
 135 even more vexing for those financial advisors who
 136 offer advice and counsel on socially responsible

investments (SRI). This study will focus upon the 137
 interrelationships between fiduciary duty and SRI 138
 and builds upon the extant literature in this domain 139
 (Boasson et al., 2004). 140

This study will define the role of a fiduciary, trace 141
 the historical development of a fiduciary, describe 142
 fiduciary duties, and critically examine the nuances 143
 of being a fiduciary as it relates to socially responsible 144
 investing. It will highlight several recommendations 145
 for financial advisors to consider when acting in the 146
 role of a fiduciary for clients who pursue socially 147
 responsible investments. 148

This study builds upon the foundation established 149
 by Young (2007) in which he writes about the 150
 underlying moral constructs of fiduciary duty with 151
 regard to decision making. Also, Young (2007) 152
 writes, "[T]he challenge for business ethics is not so 153
 much enunciating the unyielding call of moral per- 154
 fection but rather providing practical wisdom rele- 155
 vant to the needs of business decision-makers" (p. 156
 1). The business decision makers addressed in this 157
 study are financial advisors realizing the impact that 158
 they have on the lives of their clients both institu- 159
 tional and retail. 160

The role of a fiduciary? 161

A fiduciary is governed by legal rules, ethical 162
 guidelines, and behavioral standards. There are var- 163
 ious definitions of a fiduciary emerging from such 164
 ethical codes as *Investment Management Consulting* 165
Association's Code of Professional Responsibility and 166
Standards of Practice and the *Certified Financial Planning* 167
Board's Code of Ethics and Professional Responsibility 168
 and such statutes as the Employment Retirement 169
 Income Security Act (ERISA). ERISA defines a 170
 fiduciary as follows: 171

Many of the actions involved in operating a plan make 172
 that person or entity performing them a fiduciary. 173
 Using discretion in administering and managing a plan 174
 or controlling the plan's assets makes that person a 175
 fiduciary to the extent of that discretion or control. 176
 Thus, fiduciary status is based on the *functions performed* 177
for the plan, not just a person's title. (Department of 178
 Labor, 2004, p. 1) 179

It is essential that these core functions be identified 180
 to provide guidance for financial advisors. 181

182 To date, there is no definitive source document
 183 which outlines the specific functions and duties of
 184 financial advisors. However, the *Standards of Practice*
 185 promulgated by The Investment Management
 186 Consulting Association and a recent study by
 187 Rattiner (2005) provide guidance on the many of
 188 the core duties of a financial advisor. Rattiner (2005)
 189 quotes Don Trone, AIF[®], of the Center for Fidu-
 190 ciary Studies, to identify five situations in which a
 191 financial planner might act as a fiduciary. This could
 192 logically be extended to an financial advisor:
 193 (1) “when the planner has discretion over a clients
 194 assets; (2) when the client is dependent on the
 195 planner’s advice; (3) when the planner is providing a
 196 client with comprehensive and continuous invest-
 197 ment advice; (4) when the planner is providing an
 198 ERISA client with investment advice, and is
 199 receiving a fee; and (5) when the planner is a
 200 registered investment adviser” (Rattiner, 2005,
 201 pp. 39–40). These situations are more inclusive and
 202 broader than the ERISA definition and include
 203 those situations in which financial advisors work
 204 with individual clients.

205 **The historical development of fiduciary duty**

206 The current definition of a fiduciary, fiduciary duty,
 207 fiduciary liability, and prudence can be traced along
 208 two paths that began as far back as the Oath of
 209 Hippocrates. The two paths described in this study
 210 are the ethical basis and the legal/regulatory basis.
 211 Young (2007) traces the moral origins back to par-
 212 able of the good shepherd who is a “...fiduciary, an
 213 agent of the owner of the sheep who is responsible
 214 for the well-being of the flock” (p. 2). This meta-
 215 phor is extended in this study to include the
 216 investment professionals as the good shepherd and
 217 the flock as retail and institutional investors.

218 *Ethical basis*

219 The use of the term fiduciary dates back to David
 220 Hume’s book 3 of *A Treatise of Human Nature* in the
 221 section “Of Obligations of Promises” published in
 222 1739. Political economic scholars have referred to
 223 this section as Hume’s fiduciary theory of money
 224 (Winnerland, 2001). In this treatise, Hume sets forth

the need for some type of legal and/or ethical 225
 instrument to restrain human behavior, as illustrated 226
 by this passage from *A Treatise of Human Nature*: “It 227
 follows, that fidelity is no natural virtue, and that 228
 promises have no force, antecedent to human 229
 convention” (Hume, 1978, p. 518). 230

Fiduciary duty is not limited to financial advisors, 231
 but is part and parcel of what it means to be a member 232
 of any profession, from law to accounting to medi- 233
 cine. Darwish (2006) describes this duty from an 234
 ethical frame of reference in which the key issue is the 235
 “trade-off between client interest and self-interest” 236
 (p. 32). Olson (2003) argues that fiduciaries should 237
 act “in the sole interest of the beneficiaries” (p. xvii). 238
 Other commentators have noted that “the nature of 239
 the fiduciary relationship is such that it is impossible 240
 for one to act as a fiduciary for multiple parties where 241
 the interests of those parties are (or are likely to be) in 242
 conflict” (Marcoux, 2005, p. 4). This sentiment was 243
 echoed by Beardsen (2001) as illustrated in a case 244
 study of financial planners which found “...both 245
 planners indicated they felt conflicts when working 246
 with friends or relatives, and this conflict had a 247
 negative impact upon the ability to provide high 248
 quality professional services” (p. 27). 249

Legal/regulatory basis 250

The early legal origins of fiduciary duty are to be 251
 found in English common law, and particularly the 252
 common law of trusts. The concept of the Prudent 253
 Man Rule arose from the landmark legal case *Harvard*
v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446(1830) in 1830. This 254
 case turned on the question of whether trustees could 255
 invest in assets in stocks rather than government 256
 securities. The court ruled that trustees could invest 257
 not only in stocks, but also in those assets that met the 258
 unique needs and circumstances of the institution, so 259
 long as such trustees act in a prudent fashion. The 260
 court ruled that trustees should: 261
 262

observe how men of prudence, discretion, and intel- 263
 ligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to 264
 speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition 265
 of their funds, considering the probable income as well 266
 as the probable safety of the capital to be invested. 267
 268

In 1942, the Model Prudent Man Investment Act 269
 was adopted by the American Bankers Association 270

271 and later adopted by most states. The tension
 272 between conduct and performance continued until
 273 the passage of ERISA in 1974. It settled the debate:
 274 “the principle that conduct of the fiduciary and not
 275 investment performance should determine whether
 276 a fiduciary was to be considered prudent” (Boone,
 277 2004, p. 19) became the law.

278 ERISA also changed the terminology from the
 279 Prudent Man Rule to “The Prudent Expert Rule.”
 280 Under ERISA Section 404(a)(1)B, fiduciaries are
 281 required to act “with the care, skill, prudence, and
 282 diligence under the circumstances prevailing that a
 283 prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar
 284 with such matters would use in the conduct of an
 285 enterprise of like character with like aims.” Pru-
 286 dence has been defined as focusing “on the process
 287 for making fiduciary decisions” (Department of
 288 Labor, 2004, p. 2). Again, the concept of a fiduciary
 289 is based more upon decision-making processes rather
 290 than the outcomes.

291 Hofman et al. (2007) discovered in an empirical
 292 study of 286 participants that the issue-contingent
 293 model of ethical decision making in organizations is
 294 applicable to SRI decision making. Young (2007)
 295 writes that a fiduciary “...is expected to assume new
 296 decision-making habits and reflective capacities that
 297 transcend selfishness” (p. 4). Given the recent credit
 298 crunch, subprime housing debacle, and even, oil
 299 speculators, the words of Young (2007) ring true in a
 300 more pronounced fashion.

301 There are two other noteworthy statutes at the
 302 federal level: the Uniform Prudent Investor Act
 303 (UPIA) and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
 304 The 1994 Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA),
 305 which has now been adopted in 40 states, holds that
 306 trustees should carry out the following responsibili-
 307 ties.

- 308 1. A trustee shall invest and manage trust assets
 309 as a prudent investor would, by considering
 310 the purposes, terms, distributions, require-
 311 ments, and other circumstances of the trust.
 312 In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall
 313 exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.
- 314 2. A trustee’s investment and management deci-
 315 sions respecting individual assets must be
 316 evaluated not in isolation, but in the context
 317 of the trust portfolio as a whole and as part
 318 of an overall investment strategy, have risk

and return objectives reasonably suited to the 319
 trust. 320

The UPIA primarily addresses the fiduciary 322
 responsibilities of trustees, but understanding their 323
 fiduciary duty has implications for financial advisors. 324

The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 does not 325
 explicitly state that advisors owe a fiduciary duty to 326
 their clients. However, this duty was expanded 327
 when the Supreme Court ruled in *SEC v. Capital* 328
Gains Research Bureau, Inc. that the investment 329
 adviser serves as a *fiduciary* to its clients, though the 330
 term never appears in the act. Given the ethical and 331
 legal/regulatory basis of fiduciary duty, it is at this 332
 juncture that fiduciary duty and fiduciary liability 333
 will be further described. 334

Fiduciary duties/liabilities 335

Failing to meet fiduciary duty may result in exposure 336
 to liability. Accordingly, financial advisors must be 337
 keenly aware of the nature of fiduciary duty in order 338
 to provide optimal service for their clients in a way 339
 that places the interests of their clients first while 340
 simultaneously minimizing risk to the financial 341
 advisor. Fiduciary duty cuts both ways. First, failure 342
 to consider maximizing shareholder return regardless 343
 of the ethical and moral nature of the investments fits 344
 within the definition of fiduciary liability. Second, 345
 “...fiduciary duty to consider human rights, either 346
 present or emergent, its enforcement will depend on 347
 a mixture of laws and norms. In the post-regulatory 348
 world of the new governance, the question is less” 349
 (Williams and Conley, 2005, p. 104). This second 350
 view of fiduciary duty reflects “the post-regulatory 351
 world of new governance” (Williams and Conley, 352
 2005, p. 104). 353

Nature of fiduciary duty 354

The ethical and legal/regulatory basis of fiduciary 355
 duty has been previously established. The second 356
 basis of fiduciary duty draws upon religion based 357
 upon scripture and doctrine. The third basis of 358
 fiduciary duty springs from professional duties. The 359
 religious and professional basis will be described 360
 below. 361

362	<i>Religious basis</i>	extends to personal liability (Department of Labor, 2004). Documentation is vitally important to establish a record of enacting one's fiduciary duty and can serve as a defense if one's fiduciary duty is challenged.	405
363	The Judeo-Christian tradition highlights the scrip-		406
364	tural and doctrinal basis of fiduciary duty (Young,		407
365	2007). Furthermore, it has been suggested that		408
366	"...each fiduciary undertaking asserts a moral		409
367	authority higher than self-interests of the appointed		
368	fiduciary" (Young, 2007, p. 4). Schwarz et al.	Donald Trone of the Foundation for Fiduciary	410
369	(2007) postulate that certain Jewish principles can be	Studies (FFS) defines fiduciary liability as follows:	411
370	used to develop a Jewish mutual fund.		
371	<i>Professional basis</i>		
372	Fiduciary duty arises out of professional duties,	Fiduciary liability is not determined by investment	412
373	which are one of the hallmarks of a profession, as	performance, but rather by whether prudent practices	413
374	noted by Darr (2005) below:	were followed. It's not whether you win or lose, it's	414
375		how you play the game. A fiduciary demonstrates	415
376	Professions are bound by the law but have a higher	prudence by the process through which investment	416
377	calling, one that includes numerous positive duties	decisions are managed, rather than by showing the	417
378	to patients [clients] and society and to one another." (p. 7)	investment products and techniques are chosen be-	418
379		cause they were labeled as 'prudent.' (Trone and	419
380	Positive duties are a hallmark of any profession. Fear	Allbright, 1996, p. 8)	420
381	of fiduciary liability is laudable. However, profes-		421
382	sionals need to go beyond simply attempting to	Liability, particularly if personal, can increase	422
383	avoid direct harm and seek to promote the best	anxiety and fear. Investment professionals and	423
384	interest of others.	trustees are not immune (Merme, 2004). Merme	424
385	Moreover, financial advisors should concern	describes this as the fear factor and demonstrates its	425
386	themselves not solely with the performance of spe-	relationship to short-termism:	426
387	cific investments, but with the process and practices		
388	utilized in the relationship with the client. This	The fear factor for trustees, warned not to endanger	427
389	sentiment is reflected by experts who assert:	the financial returns of the portfolios they are entrusted	428
390		with, reinforces the industry's short-term financial	429
391	Liability of the fiduciary is determined by whether	benchmarking of performance. (Merme, 2004, p. 11)	430
392	prudent investment practices are followed, not by		
393	investment performance. Prudence is demonstrated by	This perspective is not novel and dates back to 1970,	431
394	the process through which investment decisions are	when Milton Friedman stated that profit maximiza-	432
395	made, not by performance. (Ober, 2005, p. 50)	tion was the sole goal of corporate executives.	433
396		However, Klaasen and Gay (2003) tell financial	434
397	<i>Nature of fiduciary liability</i>	advisors not to be overly fearful of exposure to	435
398	All fiduciaries are held to a standard of accountability	fiduciary liability even when recommending socially	436
399	if they are to carry out their duties and responsibil-	responsible investments:	437
400	ities in an expected fashion. For instance, as it relates		
401	to pension funds and investing, it is clear that	Experienced SRI advisors know it is possible to build	438
402	financial advisors will increase their liability exposure	diversified portfolios from the wide variety of SRI	439
403	if they fail to document "the process used to carry	mutual funds, and to tailor them to each individual	440
404	out their fiduciary responsibilities" (Department of	investor's financial and moral goals. They know the	441
405	Labor, 2004, p. 3). The nature of this particular type	performance of SRI portfolios is comparable to that of	442
406	of fiduciary liability as it relates to ERISA plans	non-SRI portfolios. And they know there is no need	443
407		for any special conflict of interest – moral interests, in	444
408		particular – between the SRI client and her advisor. In	445
409		short, the most common reasons for refusing to pursue	446
410		SRI are mistaken, and the fiduciary duties of an	447
411		investment advisor may be met with socially respon-	448
412		sible investments. (Klaasen and Gay, 2003, p. 49)	449
413			
414		Financial advisors should be reminded of the	450
415		Yerkes-Dodson curve. It states that the relationship	451

452 between distress and performance, including cogni- 494
 453 tive functioning, is not linear, but curvilinear. If 495
 454 distress reaches a point beyond a certain level, then 496
 455 performance declines (Seaward, 2004). This affects
 456 the quality of decision making, which will also affect
 457 the ability to act in a prudent manner.

458 There are a few nuances when a financial advisor is 497
 459 working with pension and endowment funds and/or 498
 460 serving on fiduciary committees of such funds. It has 499
 461 been clearly established that the board of directors 500
 462 has ultimate, but not complete, responsibility for 501
 463 the management of such a fund (Olson, 2003). One 502
 464 researcher has concluded that socially responsible 503
 465 investing should not be the focal area of concern; 504
 466 rather, it should be the selection criteria and 505
 467 accountability of pension fund trustees (Sethi, 2005). 506
 468 Sethi (2005) also argues that traditional investment 507
 469 practices favor a short-term performance focus rather 508
 470 than a long-term focus, particularly as it relates to 509
 471 pension funds. Statman (2006) asserts that institutional 510
 472 investors may be under greater pressure to maximize 511
 473 returns due to the governance structure and fiduciary 512
 474 laws related to governance, including the Sarbanes- 513
 475 Oxley Act of 2002. Olson (2003) recommends that 514
 476 pension and/or endowment funds may invest in socially 515
 477 responsible investing, but advises such funds to use an 516
 478 imputed income method for recognizing income. 517

479 **SRI and fiduciary duty: are the two**
 480 **inherently incompatible?**

481 Two fundamental concerns face financial advisors 520
 482 who seek to maintain their fiduciary duty and invest 521
 483 in socially responsible investing on behalf of clients. 522
 484 The first concern relates to performance, which 523
 485 encompasses the risk/return relationship. The sec- 524
 486 ond concern relates to diversification. Both concerns 525
 487 can be allayed. 526

488 *Performance*

489 The central struggle facing all fiduciaries is “assessing 527
 490 return versus risk, not just risk itself” (Rattiner, 528
 491 2005, p. 42). In assessing risk versus return, the issue 529
 492 of trading off performance for other perceived client 530
 493 returns should not haunt the financial advisor. Ober 531

(2005) cautions against making the case that specific 494
 investments are inherently risky in terms of fiduciary 495
 liability: 496

Even conservative and traditional investments may not 497
 measure up if a sound process is missing, while 498
 aggressive and unconventional investments that are 499
 arrived at by a sound process can meet the standard. 500
 (Ober, 2005, p. 50) 501
 502

On the contrary, SRI critics in leading investment 503
 textbooks argue that socially responsible investing 504
 results in “a cost in the form of a lower reward- 505
 to-variability on the resultant constrained, optimal 506
 portfolio” (Bodie et al., 2005, p. 246). But financial 507
 experts are beginning to focus more on the risk of 508
 the total portfolio rather than a single asset class 509
 (Boone and Lubitz, 2004) based upon the tenets 510
 of Modern Portfolio Theory. As such, Modern 511
 Portfolio Theory is a cornerstone of UPIA. 512

The empirical evidence on the relative perfor- 513
 mance of socially responsible investing in comparison 514
 to conventional investing is not definitive. However, 515
 Statman (2000) discovered that social mutual funds 516
 perform no better or worse than conventional mutual 517
 funds. These findings were replicated by Bauer et al. 518
 (2002). 519

The performance of any investment can be based 520
 upon exceeding an absolute metric or a comparable 521
 metric. Waring and Siegel (2006) criticize the grow- 522
 ing absolute-return investing trend, which argues that 523
 benchmarks do not matter. Benchmarks clearly have a 524
 role to play. This is similar to the cliché – compare 525
 apples to apples and oranges to oranges. Accordingly, 526
 the selection of the most appropriate benchmark is a 527
 key decision for any financial advisor. In essence, it 528
 can be reasonably argued that clients may prefer to 529
 focus on an absolute return, but relativity is key when 530
 assessing the performance of a particular investment, 531
 including socially responsible investments. The art is 532
 to prudently select a benchmark. Kuenzi (2003), 533
 citing the work of Bailey et al. (1990), as well as Bailey 534
 (1992), argues that an appropriate benchmark has the 535
 following characteristics: (1) “unambiguous, (2) 536
 investible, (3) measurable, (4) appropriate, (5) reflect- 537
 ive of current investment opinions, and (6) specified 538
 in advance” (Kuenzi, 2003, p. 47). 539

In the SRI space, there are a number of appropri- 540
 ate benchmarks, including the Domini 400 Social 541

542 Index (DS 400 Index), the Calvert Social Index, and
 543 the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. In a recent study,
 544 it was found that the DS 400 Index outperformed the
 545 S & P 500 Index from May 1990 to April 2004,
 546 although there were significant tracking errors
 547 (Statman, 2006). Statman (2006) offers two recom-
 548 mendations to address tracking errors: implement the
 549 best-in-class method and utilize optimization tools.

550 In Europe, there is a reported increase in the
 551 number of private bankers who are advising their
 552 clients on socially responsible investing. They con-
 553 sider the extra-financial investment criteria while at
 554 the same time remembering that: "Socially respon-
 555 sible investing is as reliant for its success on good
 556 performance as are other investment styles" (Koh,
 557 2006, p. 1). In short, triple bottom-line investing
 558 does not ignore rate of return as a performance
 559 measure, but includes other measures that are
 560 important to serving the interests of clients.

561 Russoe and Schoemaker (2002) illustrate the
 562 central role of framing in the decision-making pro-
 563 cess. Framing has clear implications with respect to
 564 selecting appropriate SRI performance benchmarks,
 565 as well as determining if one is abdicating fiduciary
 566 duty when working with clients who choose to
 567 invest in SRI:

568 Frames also influence our thinking through the yard-
 569 sticks and reference points they lead us to adopt. How
 570 you measure your success or progress, for example,
 571 depends on your frame...Whatever yardsticks we use
 572 to measure performance, most contain a reference
 573 point or marker that distinguishes good from poor
 574 performance. Although reference points are often
 575 numerical, like a sales target or rate of return, they need
 576 not be. After all, not everything that is important can be
 577 measured. (Russoe and Schoemaker, 2002, p. 27)

578 Bossoe et al. (2004) argue based upon an empirical
 579 investigation of faith-based mutual funds that
 580 "...investment managers may incorporate moral/
 581 ethical components into their investment decisions
 582 without unduly shortchanging their clients for
 583 whom they have fiduciary duties" (p. 64).

584 *Diversification*

585 Beyond selecting an appropriate benchmark and
 586 framing, diversification is a tried and true method of

587 managing investment risk. Bello (2005) discovered
 588 that "the effect of diversification on investment
 589 performance is no different" (Bello, 2005, p. 1)
 590 when comparing a sample of socially responsible
 591 stock mutual funds with a randomly selected sample
 592 of conventional mutual funds. Bello (2005) catego-
 593 rized performance using three distinct metrics: (1)
 594 portfolio beta; (2) degree of portfolio diversification;
 595 and (3) risk-adjusted investment performance. This
 596 empirical finding contradicts the work of Rudd
 597 (1981), who asserts that performance is compro-
 598 mised with any constraint imposed upon a portfolio.
 599 Brinson et al. (1991) found that about 95% of a
 600 portfolio's variability is attributed to asset allocation,
 601 not on the selection of individual securities. More-
 602 over, Fridson (2006) argues that "the problem with
 603 SRI does not involve material underdiversification
 604 in securities holdings" (Fridson, 2006, p. 77). As
 605 such, the effect of SRI screening strategies should be
 606 minimal with regard to compromising diversifica-
 607 tion. Not only should the effect be minimal, but also
 608 it was empirically demonstrated by one researcher
 609 that "...the benefits of diversification can accrue to
 610 both traditional indexing investors who include
 611 social funds as part of their portfolio strategy, and to
 612 social investors who include some traditional
 613 funds or an index fund as part of their portfolios"
 614 (Hickman et al., 1999, p. 77).

615 It is generally recognized that diversification is one
 616 way of establishing prudence (Department of Labor,
 617 2004). Some financial advisors fear that there are an
 618 insufficient number and heterogeneity of SRI assets
 619 in order to benefit from diversification, but this
 620 concern is unfounded. Morningstar Premium lists
 621 260 socially conscious mutual funds, classified into
 622 the following categories: large value, large growth,
 623 mid-cap blend, moderate allocation, small growth,
 624 world stock, large blend, mid-cap growth, conser-
 625 vative allocation, small blend, small value, interme-
 626 diate term bond, foreign large blend, and short-term
 627 bond. Of those 260 socially conscious funds, 15
 628 earned Morningstar's five-star rating. Morningstar
 629 also lists four socially responsible index funds.

630 Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that socially
 631 responsible investing and fiduciary duty are not
 632 incompatible. In fact, this argument was put forth by
 633 Klaasen and Gay (2003) and further put forth by
 634 Trone et al. (1996), who highlighted the role of
 635 advisors and fiduciary duty as follows: "Simply stated,

636 the role is to set policy, to select appropriate money
637 managers (including mutual funds), and to monitor
638 results” (Trone et al., 1996, p. 2). Prudent SRI
639 practices are based upon an investment policy state-
640 ment (IPS), the selection of competent money
641 managers, and the monitoring of performance against
642 a valid benchmark rather than absolute return.

643 In short, financial advisors should adopt a
644 disciplined approach when consulting with clients,
645 focusing more on the core processes and key practices
646 of investment management consulting rather than
647 paying too much attention to absolute returns.
648 Financial advisors should remind themselves that the
649 outcomes of the work performed by professionals can
650 rarely be controlled and guaranteed. The nature of
651 professional work involves science, art, judgment,
652 discretion, and decision making under conditions of
653 uncertainty, risk, and perhaps even chaos.

654 In summary, based upon the evidence presented it
655 can be argued that SRI is not incompatible with
656 maintaining one’s fiduciary duty. In fact, it can even
657 be asserted that it is yet another way to demonstrate
658 fiduciary duty. Also, even though SRI may violate
659 the theoretical constructs of MPT, the empirical
660 evidence is clear that SRI does not defacto result in
661 lower financial performance. Moreover, one study
662 found that SRI can even benefit a diversification
663 strategy as explained by MPT (Hickman et al.,
664 1999). A major theme throughout this study is that
665 fiduciary duty arises out of attending to the invest-
666 ment process rather than narrowly focusing on
667 financial return which is a factor that can be influ-
668 enced but not controlled unlike process which is
669 under the direct control of financial professionals and
670 board members. It is the process that ought to be the
671 focus of fiduciary duty not the returns. Accordingly,
672 the remainder of this study attempts to highlight the
673 key recommendations for SRI financial advisors to
674 focus upon in order for them to better serve in their
675 roles as fiduciaries.

676 **Recommendations for financial advisors**
677 **acting as fiduciaries when working**
678 **with SRI clients**

679 These specific recommendations will be organized
680 into three distinct but related themes: legal, ethical,
681 and practice.

Legal recommendations 682

683 Attention to legal compliance is the minimum for
684 financial advisors seeking to fully embrace their
685 fiduciary duties and responsibilities. Attending
686 to legal/regulatory requirements necessitates that
687 financial advisors also let their individual and insti-
688 tutional clients know about the laws and regulations
689 that govern the profession and that seek to protect
690 investors. In essence, transparency is a laudable goal
691 for financial advisors.

692 Young (2007) establishes the legal basis of a
693 fiduciary from the perspective of corporate directors
694 but these tenets hold equally true for financial
695 advisors as evidenced by the following legal duties
696 imposed upon a fiduciary.

697 Roughly speaking, a fiduciary is ordered by the law to
698 act with self-restraint, with a view toward the advan-
699 tage and interests of others. In this sense, the law im-
700 poses a duty on the person acting as a fiduciary. The
701 fiduciary is “other regarding.” The duty of a fiduciary
702 is to act with a view towards the well-being of others
703 and not of self is divided into two areas of responsi-
704 bility. The law speaks of ‘duty of loyalty’ and of ‘duty
705 of care.’ (Young, 2007, p. 2)

706 Beyond these two affirmative duties which are groun-
707 ded in the law, financial advisors are advised to seriously
708 consider the ethical recommendations that follow.

Ethical recommendations 709

710 One of the best set of recommendations for financial
711 advisors to adopt is based upon *A Handbook for*
712 *Investment Fiduciaries* (2003–2005) published by The
713 Center for Fiduciary Studies, which operates in
714 association with the University of Pittsburgh, Joseph
715 M. Katz Graduate School of Business, Center for
716 Executive Education. The center also offers execu-
717 tive education and testing for those financial advisors
718 who desire to earn the Accredited Investment
719 Fiduciary (AIF) designation and the Accredited
720 Investment Fiduciary Auditor (AIFA) designation.
721 The handbook was published to address these issues
722 among investment professionals:

723 The Handbook will serve as a foundation for prudent
724 investment fiduciary practices. It provides investment

725 fiduciaries with an organized process for making
 726 informed and consistent decisions. Fiduciaries must,
 727 however, exercise professional judgment when
 728 applying the Practices; consulting legal counsel and
 729 other authorities when appropriate. (Center for
 730 Fiduciary Studies, 2003–2005, p. 3)
 731

732 The handbook outlines 27 practices, seven
 733 Uniform Fiduciary Standards of Care, and a Five-
 734 Step Investment Management Process. These
 735 recommendations will focus upon the seven Uni-
 736 form Fiduciary Standards of Care and a Five-Step
 737 Investment Management Process as a set of recom-
 738 mendations, with a particular focus on socially
 739 responsible investing.

740 As can be seen in Table I, the seven Uniform
 741 Fiduciary Standards of Care are meant to guide the
 742 role of the fiduciary. These seven Standards are based
 743 upon three statutes: ERISA, UPIA, and MPERS
 744 (Uniform Management of Public Employee
 745 Retirement Systems). Related to these seven Stan-
 746 dards is the Five-Step Investment Management
 747 Process, shown in Table II. This recommended
 748 process provides the road map for financial
 749 advisors acting in fiduciary capacities to demonstrate
 750 prudence.

TABLE I

Uniform fiduciary standards of care

-
1. Know standards, laws, and trust provisions
 2. Diversify assets to specific risk/return profile of client
 3. Prepare investment policy statement
 4. Use “prudent experts” (money managers) and document due diligence
 5. Control and account for investment expenses
 6. Monitor the activities of “prudent experts”
 7. Avoid conflicts of interest and prohibited transactions
-

Source: Center for fiduciary studies (2003–2005).

TABLE II

Five-step investment management process

-
1. Step 1: Analyze current position
 2. Step 2: Diversify–allocate portfolio
 3. Step 3: Formalize investment policy
 4. Step 4: Implement policy
 5. Step 5: Monitor and supervise
-

Source: Center for fiduciary studies (2003–2005).

Among the 27 practices, the handbook lists four 751
 items that warrant the attention of financial advisors. 752

- Practice No. 3.5: The investment policy state- 753
 ment defines monitoring criteria for investment 754
 options and service vendors. 755
- Practice No. 3.7: The investment policy 756
 statement defines appropriately structured 757
 socially responsible investment strategies (when 758
 applicable). 759
- Practice No. 5.1: Periodic reports compare 760
 investment performance against an appropriate 761
 index, peer group, and IPS objectives. 762
- Practice No. 5.3: Control procedures are in 763
 place to periodically review policies for best exe- 764
 cution, soft dollars, and proxy voting. 765
 766

In the end, financial advisors who follow these 27 767
 practices, seven Uniform Fiduciary Standards of 768
 Care, the Five-Step Investment Management Pro- 769
 cess, and understand their role as a fiduciary based 770
 upon the law, ethics, and codes of conduct should be 771
 in a better position to sleep well at night. They do 772
 not need to be overly concerned about forgoing 773
 their fiduciary duty and exposing themselves to 774
 fiduciary liability. 775

Another area of practice that deserves focused 776
 attention are Investment Policy Statements (IPS), 777
 which are a useful documented process of clarifying 778
 expectations and monitoring progress toward 779
 meeting specific expectations. The importance of an 780
 IPS cannot be underestimated. Yeske and Buie 781
 (2006) present a four-quadrant integral framework 782
 along with a six-step process to formulate policies 783
 designed to “embody the client’s core values and 784
 goals as well as best practices of the profession” 785
 (Yeske and Buie, 2006, p. 51). The four quadrants 786
 are: individual/interior; individual/exterior; collective/ 787
 interior; and collective/exterior. The consideration 788
 of SRI preferences and values of clients would fall into 789
 the individual/interior quadrant, which is described 790
 below: 791

Who are you inside, your intentions, and how you feel 792
 about things, including attitudes toward spending and 793
 saving, personal risk tolerance, and your vision of the 794
 ‘good life.’ (Yeske and Buie, 2006, p. 51) 795

The six-step process to formulate policies consists of 796
 the following six steps: (1) discovery; (2) identify 797

798 planning areas and related principles; (3) combine
799 client goals/attitudes with planning principles; (4)
800 test policies and develop specific recommendations;
801 (5) test policies with clients, and (6) periodic review
802 and update (Yeske and Buie, 2006). This model and
803 accompanying process are applicable to SRI.

804 *Client engagement recommendations*

805 Increasingly, institutional investors like pension
806 funds and colleges and universities are adopting SRI
807 guidelines.

808 **Conclusion**

809 Socially responsible investing is slowly become
810 increasingly mainstream. This makes it even more
811 critical to establish the fiduciary duties of financial
812 advisors to their clients. On a global level, the profit
813 maximization goal of investors is being challenged.
814 For some clients, profit maximization may be just
815 one goal to seek in combination with other goals and
816 interests. One commentator fully captured the spirit
817 of this view in reviewing his career as an investment
818 professional:

819 We can succeed as a profession only by placing client
820 interests above all else. Investment management is
821 about service and integrity. We cannot forget either.
822 (Carr, 2005, p. 79)
823

824 SRI financial advisors and their clients deserve to
825 experience the highest quality of service and
826 expertise, as captured by one of the respondents
827 to the IMCA Monitor Editorial Board survey on
828 ethical practices:

829 Trust is built initially by taking time to understand
830 what is important to clients and by showing them the
831 processes behind portfolio management. By revealing
832 the strategies used to help them accomplish their goals,
833 we build the trust further. Ultimately, the trust is
834 solidified by giving the client realistic expectations and
835 executing the processes as described. (IMCA Monitor,
836 2005, p. 17)
837

838 The title of this article – *Socially Responsible*
839 *Investing: Is Your Fiduciary Duty at Risk?* – is a critical
840 question for all financial advisors and the clients

whom they serve. The evidence presented in this 841
study would conclude that your fiduciary duty is not 842
risk. This article seeks to respond to the challenge set 843
forth by Young as illustrated below: 844

The challenge for business ethics is not so much 845
enunciating the unyielding call of moral perfection but 846
rather providing practical wisdom relevant to the 847
needs of business decision-makers. (Young, 2007, p. 1) 848
849

Financial advisors who specialize in socially 850
responsible investing do not have to provide less 851
service or act in a fashion that demonstrates less 852
integrity. However, such advisers should inform 853
prospective clients of this specialty and spell out any 854
inherent risks as matter of fair disclosure and fully 855
inform the client. Socially responsible investing, 856
investment management consulting, prudence, and 857
fiduciary responsibility can interact well together. 858
The task is not easy. But neither is it impossible. 859

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