LAWYERS' IDEAL PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE PREFERENCES

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1. Introduction

»Every judgment of an individual is limited by his or her type, and every manner of consideration is relative.«

*C. G. Jung, Reflections, Dreams, Memories*

As in the event of every other human activity, law seems to be nothing but a reflection of the operation of the human mind in a certain manner. Such reflection demonstrates how a person's (subject's) state of mind is projected on a certain object – certain area of activity. Consequently, in order to learn what a certain object is, or how it appears, we must study psychological characteristics of persons who deal with such, i.e. who create and apply it. Even if today law, the subject of this study, is formally to meet democratic standards and be comprehensible by ordinary people, the reality is different. One cannot overlook the fact that, given the conditions of complexity of the modern human society and the modern division of labor, contemporary law is complex to an extent that it is predominantly created and applied by professionals – lawyers. Thus, by studying some typical traits of persons who professionally deal with law, by discovering some typical cognitive functions of such persons, it seems that we can also learn something about the law itself.

Furthermore, by indicating typical characteristics of certain areas of law, it seems that we are able to indicate some ideal preferences that persons that are engaged in such have or should have. Moreover, when some specific characteristics are emphasized as typical, and if as such they have been proved historically as important for the well-functioning of a legal field, then such can be called preferred or even ideal. Thus, in this article, I am trying to indicate those preferences in lawyer’s psychological types that make them good lawyers generally, and also specifically regarding their special area of interest within law.
Not only in the area of psychology but also in other (especially social) sciences, the results of abstraction and generalization of certain facts and circumstances are often called types, and the discipline dealing with such typology. My interest in this article is in psychological typology and, within it, in a special theoretical approach to psychological types that was initially made by Carl G. Jung, who had typified specific common characteristics within a general population, and which was subsequently developed by his followers. From such general psychological typology I am indicating those type preferences that seem to be ideal for a well-functioning of lawyers and the law itself.

In this endeavor I am not so much interested in carrying out a psychometric research and analysis by means of locating and testing individual lawyers' types, but more in establishing some basic ideal or theoretical preferences for special types of persons who professionally deal with law. Needless to emphasize that such special types of legal professions have traditionally been known in the society as distinct legal professionals (such as, e.g., the judge, attorney, and law professor). Since these traditional legal occupations with all their characteristics have existed the society for centuries, there is no special risk if we designate typical preferences of such types as ideal type preferences for such professions.

As already mentioned social development has required a division of work that created many new professions, institutions, procedures, and their practice produced ideal criteria for their best operation. Therefore, in order for such practice to be continued in the best manner as possible the mentioned ideal criteria have to be met. Undoubtedly, as it was already indicated at the beginning, the general or predominant characteristics of a certain social activity are nothing but reflections (or projections) that are produced by those who are daily engaged in shaping the basics of such activity – either as individuals or members of the society. In the same manner as lawyers' psyches are structured according to specific types, so law as a special social discipline is structured in accordance with the corresponding types.
Such criteria of quality performance are very much related to psychological preferences of persons and create possibilities for them to become good professionals, in this aspect well-performing lawyers in terms of the general standards that have been traditionally established in the legal profession, and which still serve the same purpose. This is the reason why I took Jungian type theory as a departure for indicating ideal type preferences concerning the legal profession.

2. Jung/Myers Psychological Type Theory in a Nutshell

One of the greatest theories of psychological types ever was the one that was elaborated by Carl Gustav Jung in his Psychological Types.\(^1\) Jung's scientific opus was extremely vast stretching to areas that are completely irrelevant, even obscure, for law that otherwise emphasizes clarity, determinateness, externality, formality, systematic character, and rationality. However, the field of psychological types seems to be an area of Jung's intellectual heritage that could also be interesting for law and lawyers. It deals with healthy, well-balanced personalities. Thus Jung’s theory of psychological types served to me as a starting point for developing criteria for understanding ideal type preferences concerning different legal professions.

In this manner I used Jung's theory of psychological types in order to locate those type preferences that should be ideal for lawyers (1) in general, and (2) specifically concerning different areas of law. Beside my initial interest in indicating the ideal general type preferences of lawyers, as my second goal, I tried to indicate certain ideal typological predispositions of lawyers to deal with law in various manners. For example, I was interested in answering the question of why certain lawyers are more inclined to deal with legal theory,

\(^1\) See C. G. Jung, *Psychologische Typen* [Psychological Types], Patmost Verlag GmbH & Walter Verlag, Duesseldorf (1921, 1971).
whereas seeing legal practice as mostly empty, while other lawyers are much more satisfied when practicing the law viewing legal theory as needless (speculative) obscurity. However, having taken into consideration the fact that some lawyers more prefer being legal theorists than legal practitioners, I also wished to know from the typological point of view why there is even among legal theorists a difference between those who are more in favor of positive-law theories and those who rather support natural-law (or other non-positivist) legal theories.

Accordingly, in this article, I am interested in indicating certain ideal characteristics of lawyers' different predispositions in terms of psychological types, assuming that they are much more successful, and better show their potential, in “their” special field of work if in their daily work they are closer to their own (or “natural”) type. However, before I begin emphasizing such lawyers’ ideal type preferences from the basic psychological types, I should outline at least some introductory elements of Jung’s typological theory.

Initially, I should emphasize perhaps Jung’s most well-known concepts of extraversion and introversion. These two basic »attitudes« describe how psychic energy is divided in human beings, where we prefer to focus our attention, and what energizes us. The extravert and introvert attitudes are present in everyone to a varying degree. The extraverted attitude is motivated from the outside and is directed by external, objective factors, and relationships. In the case of an extravert, who gets energy from external elements, psychic energy flows outwards towards the world. Whereas in the case of an introvert, who mainly gets his or her energy from within and also withdraws energy from the world, e.g. from the world of ideas, his or her attitude is motivated from within and directed by inner, subjective facts. Those who prefer extraverting get their energy from the outer world of people, activities, and things. Extraverts usually seek interaction, enjoy groups, act or speak first and then think, expend energy, focus outwardly, are talkative, like variety and action, are
outgoing, think out loud, and enjoy discussing. Extraversion and introversion are mutually exclusive: if one forms the habitual conscious attitude, the other becomes unconscious and acts in a compensatory manner. Those who prefer introverting get their energy from their inner world of ideas, impressions, and thoughts. They usually like to be alone, enjoy one-on-one, think first and then speak or act, conserve energy, focus inwardly, are quiet, like to focus on one thing at a time, are reserved, think to themselves, and enjoy reflecting.

In addition to the two attitudes, Jung has introduced four functional types or four functions of the psyche to describe the character of the psyche. Jung posited four functions of the psyche and grouped them into two pairs of opposites. On one hand there are two rational or evaluative functions as they evaluate experience by helping us to make decisions: i.e. thinking and feeling. On the other hand there are two irrational or perceptive functions: sensation and intuition, as they do not evaluate but depend on acts of perception by referring to how we prefer to take in information.

Sensation tells us that something exists. Those who prefer sensing pay attention to information taken in directly through their five senses and focus on what is or what was. Sensors usually prefer facts, concrete information, are more interested in what is actual, pay attention to specifics, are practical and realistic, focus on the present, value common sense, and are pragmatic. Thinking tells us what it is. Those who prefer thinking make decisions in a logical and objective way. Thinkers are usually firm minded, analyze the problem, are objective, convinced by logic, are direct, value competence, decide with their head, value justice, can be seen as insensitive, are good at critiquing, and usually do not take things personally. Furthermore, feeling suggests that it is good or not. Those who prefer feeling

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5 Id., pp. 11, 26.
make decisions in a personal, values-oriented way. They usually are gentle-hearted, sympathize with your problem, are subjective, convinced by values, are tactful, value relationships, decide with their heart, value harmony, can be seen as overemotional, are good at appreciating, and usually take things personally.\textsuperscript{6} Finally, intuition suggests where it has come from or is going to. Those who prefer intuiting pay attention to their “sixth sense,” to hunches and insights, and they focus on what might be. Intuitives usually prefer insights, abstract information, are more interested in what is possible, focus on the big picture, are inspired and imaginative, focus on the future, value innovation, and are speculative.\textsuperscript{7}

An individual's innate conscious orientation will be towards one of these four directions. E.g. if thinking is one's superior or most differentiated function then feeling would be one's most undifferentiated or inferior function, or vice versa. At the same time, the remaining two functions are the so-called auxiliary functions, which serve the superior function.\textsuperscript{8} Every person has a preference for one of the other auxiliary function.

\textbf{Figure 1: Four Functions of the Psyche according to Jung}

\begin{figure}
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\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure1}
\caption{Four Functions of the Psyche according to Jung}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Id.}, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{8} C. G. Jung, From Psychological Types, \textit{op. cit., ibid.}
In accordance with such, Jung has combined the two attitudes with the four functions and created eight psychological types. These are the following: extravert thinkers⁹, introvert thinkers¹⁰, extravert feelers (e.g. chat show hosts, stars such as Frank Sinatra and Madonna)¹¹, introvert feelers (e.g. monks, nuns, musicians such as Chopin)¹², extravert sensators¹³, introvert sensators (e.g. connoisseurs, aesthetes)¹⁴, introvert intuitivers (e.g. mystics and poets as William Blake)¹⁵, and extravert intuitivers (such as PR people or adventurers)¹⁶. Locating a person’s type enables us to make a better sense of his or her world view and value system. The types describe personality and frequently determine the choice of vocation and, within such, based on the chosen profession, also the special area that the individual is inclined to focus in his or her career.

Jung was aware of the fact that in every person there predominates a certain mechanism of activity which, however, cannot get away of other mechanisms being present in the same person, although they might be completely opposite to the predominant one. Therefore, according to Jung, there are no clear types but the notion of ideal types only point to the predominant existence of the said mechanism in a person.¹⁷

His methodology of creating ideal psychological types proceeded from insights that he obtained while dealing with his patients. Furthermore, these insights were appropriately reflected through the study of some previous attempts in history at creating certain ideal types in different areas of human thought. For that reason he studied the works of Schiller, Schiller, Schiller.

⁹ They direct themselves and others according to fixed rules and principles since they are interested in reality, order and material facts. They could be scientists, who discover natural laws (as e.g. Charles Darwin), or economists who create theoretical formulations (as, e.g., Karl Marx). See M. Hyde & M. MacGuinness, Introducing Jung, Icon Books, Cambridge (1999), p. 82.
¹⁰ They formulate questions and seek to understand their own being. They usually neglect the world and dwell on their own ideas (e.g. philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein). Ibid.
¹¹ Id., p. 83.
¹² Ibid.
¹³ They tend to focus on external facts, are practical, hardheaded and accept the world as it is, such as builders, speculators. Some of them might be affable enjoyers of life such as Casanova. Ibid.
¹⁴ Id., p. 84.
¹⁵ Ibid.
¹⁶ Ibid.
¹⁷ C. G. Jung, Psychologische Typen, op. cit., p. 9.
Nietzsche, James and other great men.\textsuperscript{18} He finally analyzed all such previous attempts and tried to comprehend them through developing appropriate categories that resulted in his own theory of (ideal) psychological types.

Some of Jung’s followers went even further. In addition to Jung’s eight types, Isabel Myers and Katharine C. Briggs have invented sixteen psychological types and a special indicator (the Myers-Briggs Typology Indicator – hereinafter the MBTI), by which it is possible to locate certain types through psychometric measurement. What Myers and Briggs actually added to Jung’s scheme of types were two additional cognitive functions, namely „judgment“ and „perception“, which are allegedly indispensable for a better locating of the types.\textsuperscript{19} In their opinion the two additional preferences, judgment and perception, were needed in order to better address the so-called auxiliary cognitive function that was only implicitly discussed in Jung’s work. The judgement-perception preference shows a way of person’s life, his or her method of dealing with the world around. E.g. those who prefer perceiving tend to live in a spontaneous, flexible way, while those who prefer judging tend to live in an organized, planner way.\textsuperscript{20} Another result of Jung’s ignoring the auxiliary process is the distorted discription of the individual introvert types. For their extraversion the introvert types need the auxiliary function, which represents their outer personality, their communication with the world, and their means of taking action. The Jugement-Perception preference is also allegedly indispensable for ascertaining which process is dominant. Instead of Jung’s eight psychological types (introversion/extraversion x sensation/intuition/thinking/feeling), Myers and Briggs established 16 psychological types (introversion/extraversion x sensation/intuition/thinking/feeling + judgment/perception). For example, when the auxiliary

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} R. Baron, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 11.
process is taken into account, they split each of Jung’s types into two. Instead of merely the introverted thinker, there come introverted thinker with sensing and the introverted thinker with intuition as their auxiliary functions.\textsuperscript{21}

Although Jung had „tested“ his findings (merely) on his patients in the context of therapy, the MBTI indicator was created on the basis of a psychometric experiment that has widely been used for locating the types. In addition to Jung’s general scientific importance, this is one of the reasons why it is possible to establish that Jung’s psychological type theory has been appropriately tested and approved in practice by empirical research to deserve a scientific character. Thus, certain results of such empiric research, which are referred to in the continuation, have served to support the findings of this article, on the basis of which ideal type preferences generally in law, and in various legal professions, have been indicated. First, I have focused my research on those type preferences that seem to be general and ideal for all legal professions, as they seem to meet all the basic requirements for dealing with law. Second, I went further to indicate those additional type preferences that seem to be ideal concerning the different aspects of various legal professions. Below I begin with lawyers’ general ideal type preferences.

\section*{3. Thinking and Judging as Lawyers’ General Ideal Preferences}

\subsection*{3.1. Thinking and Law}

Stemming from the fact that the traditional role of law has been to provide security and stability concerning social relations, it is not difficult to establish that the main cognitive function to serve that purpose is thinking. Other traditional tenets of law have been rationality, logic, analysis, predictability, impartiality, evaluation etc. All these elements that are

\textsuperscript{21} I. Briggs Myers, P. B. Myers, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 17-24.
associated with law can be ascribed to thinking, which analyzes, categorizes, decides, evaluates, differentiates, integrates, synthesizes etc. The thinking function is not only typical of lawyers but lawyers are persons that, in dealing with law, apply it as their superior rational function. It was Weber in particular who defined the law as explicitly rational and systematic. According to him, this was the reason why the interests of the bourgeoisie to have secure and predictable goods traffic, and legal transactions thereof, led to great legal codifications. Weber emphasized that the lawyer is a professional whose activity is predominantly formal and logical.22

Therefore, it is not difficult to conclude that the function of thinking is the psychological function which is superior in persons who professionally deal with law, i.e. lawyers. It is thinking that enables them to approach the situation logically by analyzing (concrete) facts in an impersonal manner, and to seek objective truth that is independent of the personality and wishes of a thinker or anyone else, this imperative especially applying to judges.

Both rational cognitive functions (thinking and feeling) are functions or processes of making evaluation or judgement. In the framework of the thinking function basic conclusions are made on the basis of logical analysis with a focus on objectivity and detachment. Quenk has indicated the following five facets that are characteristic of thinking: (1) logic (in believing that using logical analysis is the best way to make decisions, and focusing on cause and effect, pros and cons); (2) reasonableness (by using sequential reasoning, fairness, impartiality in decision-making, being confident about objectives and decisions); (3) questioning (in asking questions to understand, clarify, acquire common ground, solve problems and find flaws in viewpoints); (4) critique (when using impersonal critiquing of ideas, situations, and procedures to arrive at truth and avoid the consequences of flawed ideas

and plans); (5) toughness (by standing firm on decisions that have been thoroughly considered and critiqued and wishing them to be implemented quickly and efficiently).

If in lawyers the thinking function is the most differentiated, their least differentiated function is certainly feeling (which, according to Jung, is also rational). It is the function that evaluates according to personal values, such as, e.g., affinity for one person over another because of his or her dress, smell, shoes, clothes, the ways they address people or speak to them, etc. Concerning the feeling function, the above-mentioned five facets that are typical of thinking (i.e. logic, reasonableness, questioning, critique, and toughness) can be juxtaposed with empathy, compassion, accommodation, acceptance, and tenderness. If by feeling we decide according to our subjective, i.e. personal, values, on the basis of thinking we decide by following our objective (impersonal) values, such as justice, fairness, and legal certainty. Yet lawyers are human beings and also possess feeling to a certain extent, which, however, is not (or should not be) the decisive criterion for their legal decision-making if they want to be bound by the values of predictability, neutrality, objectiveness, etc.

From the above-said we can establish that, given the fact that lawyers’ superior cognitive function is thinking with feeling being their inferior function, there also remain sensation and intuition to be their auxiliary functions. In this connection, a former Slovene Supreme Court judge has interestingly described the atmosphere in his professional environment by explaining that, unlike in the courtroom, in his free time he was also a “human being” with all his emotions and feeling. Thereby he meant that the lawyers’ profession does not allow for the world of emotions, which much more affect the feeling function than thinking, to prevail in a courtroom as the main standards or criteria for legal decision-making demand “cold” reason and clear thoughts. He confessed that while staying in

24 Ibid.
the courtroom he had to stick very much to the rational landscape of the lawyer’s world, but when he came out he was free and lucky to enjoy the life of emotions and feeling.\(^{25}\)

What is typical of modern law is the fact that its legal proceedings are highly formalized, which is reflected in very much detailed and systematically categorized rules of procedure. Moreover, substantive legal rules that are embodied in various codes of law are very abstract and general. A well-functioning legal system also tends to be systematic. All these elements, such as formality, abstractness, generality, and systematization, which are typical of modern law, are characteristic of a very much differentiated thinking function of the human psyche. However, having taken all this into consideration, one may ask oneself whether there is any place for feeling in the area of law, legal decision-making, and the professional life of lawyers, which as above-mentioned also is a rational function, but very much connected with and dependant on emotions and personal values. Certainly, law is not value-neutral, but also embraces certain values such as justice, fairness, legal certainty, predictability, equality, etc. This entails that in law there is also room for passion, fervor, and ambition seeking the fulfillment of these values. However, in a modern legal setting, even in relation to the values that have been accepted into formal legal rules and principles as legal values, the feeling function can only be a motivating factor behind some of these values, not a decisive criterion for the resolution of disputes concerning them. In such a manner, it is subordinate to the thinking function, whose main role is to resolve disputes by rational means, thus preventing usually very much emotionally affected parties from their resort to violent self-protection.

Nevertheless, one must not forget the role of the feeling function especially in those more informal settings that are complementary to formal legal proceedings. This particularly applies to the procedures of alternative dispute resolution (e.g. mediation, settlement, etc.).

is especially the informality of such procedures that give the feeling function its proper role, which is expressed in several dimensions of such a «dispute», in particular when it comes to mediation. In such an informal setting, which resembles more conversation than trial, there is room for the expression of personal values, even outbursts of emotions, which might contribute to a catharsis and in such a manner perhaps to the resolution of a dispute, which in some area of law (e.g. in family law) might be better means than a strictly legal resolution of a dispute. This especially applies to those areas in which existing social relations are preferred to be continued (i.e. family relations, business relations). Hence the important role of psychologists, social workers, various kinds of therapists, in alternative dispute resolution procedures as mediators who are not necessarily lawyers.  

In accordance with the above-said it seemed appropriate to create the following figure as regards the state of the superior, inferior, and auxiliary functions of the lawyer's psyche in terms of Jung’s psychological type theory.

Figure 2: The ”State” of the Lawyer’s Psyche according to Jungian Typology

**Thinking** (conscious) - *superior*

*auxiliary* - Intuition

Sensation - *auxiliary*

*Feeling* (unconscious) - *inferior*

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The above-mentioned theoretical (ideal) concepts have also found enough support in empirical research. According to the results of a MBTI test that was made in 1967 on the sample of more than 3,000 law students from seven prominent law schools in the US, 73.4% of the students turned to have thinking as their superior function (and only 26.6% feeling).\(^{(27)}\) A more recent MBTI test that was taken in 1997 among first year law students demonstrated that there were 78% of thinkers and 22% of feelers. According to the same 1997 study, among U.S. lawyers there were 67% thinkers to 33% feelers, and among U.S. judges, 68% thinkers to 32% feelers. Furthermore, according to another study from 2004, a vast majority of U.S. lawyers are thinkers (78%).\(^{(28)}\)

### 3.2. Further Characteristics of Lawyers’ Thinking

The predominance of rationality (i.e. thinking) is certainly not only characteristic of law, but also of other social activities. However, in order to find in the phenomenon of law some special characteristics which differentiate it from other social activities that also to a predominant extent use thinking as their primary function, a reference could be made to the classical distinction with regard to human reason between theoretical reason and practical reason, as two separate systems of thinking, which is as old as Aristotle.\(^{(29)}\)

It is well-known that, on the one hand, theoretical reason deals with questions such as reflection on facts seeking the reasons of their existence. It refers to the understanding of the

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\(^{(28)}\) See V. Randal, [http://academic.udayton.edu/legaled/online/study/mbti00a.htm#N_17](http://academic.udayton.edu/legaled/online/study/mbti00a.htm#N_17) (5. 1. 2010).

world around us by trying to find the truth, usually by experiment. Such issues are studied within predominantly natural sciencies and social sciencies, which make research into the reasons and consequences of certain more or less objectively perceived activities (the so-called natural and technical laws). In sociology there are measurements of a public opinion, in psychology psychometrics, in economy statistics and other calculations which are similar to the operation of natural and technical sciencies. Theoretical thinking is thus interested in finding the truth or confirming (at least the acceptatiliby of) certain hypoteses.  

On the other hand, law as a special social activity falls within the so-called normative or practical areas, which deal with imperitives. According to the mentioned classical distinction, such refers to practical rationality, which as its starting-point takes normative issues. These areas mainly refer to values when they evaluate and weigh reasons for a certain activity. It deals with alternatives to be selected as better (or more just) options. Such thinking can be called normative thinking.

Among most imporant social rules there are legal rules which are differentiated from natural laws and tehcnical laws that reflect the operation of natural forces, their relations, and their causes and effects. Social rules also differentiate from technical rules which determine the use of natural force by human beings in order to achieve certain effects, and thus regulate our relation with nature. However, social rules regulate human relations within a society and between human beings. They call for certain conduct, demand certain respect that depends on the will and consciousness of the members of a society. If such required conduct is disrespected, the society needs sanctions to be applied as a certain positive encouragement for people to obey social rules. Natural laws do not possess such sanctions and also do not need them becuase of their automatism of cause and effect.


31 Ibid.
However, law as a system of social norms is not the only human activity that deals with practical rationality (or practical thinking). There are also moral norms or morality, which has traditionally been an important activity that falls within the area of practical thinking. In this aspect, one possible distinction between these two activities can be made by using the famous Kant’s idea that law more refers to external matters of human life, while morality is more an internal issue of human beings.

In addition to moral norms, other social norms include customs, and even other seemingly less important social rules, such as rules of grammar, sports rules, general rules of conduct, etc. In comparison with such social rules, it is not difficult to establish that legal rules originate from a very much organized social structure that is supported by various (mainly state) institutions. Complexity and the level of organization is in the case of law and legal rules much higher than in the case of other social rules. For example, the operation of morality is much more spontaneous than the operation of legal rules and legal institutions. As today the global human society includes an interesting number of individuals it is becoming increasingly complex, which is also the reason why we also have an increasing number of social and also legal rules. Thus, it seems suitable to agree with MacCormick that law is also the so-called institutional normative order.\textsuperscript{32} It is certainly a product of the modern highly organized society that presupposes the existence of numerous institutions and (state) bodies that create and apply legal acts in order to resolve important social disputes. Such institutions are also a product of the historical, civilizational, and cultural development of the society.

A special feature of thinking that deals with law is also the fact that legal rules are predominately expressed in the form of (mostly written) language. This is the reason why the thinking (by means of logic, analysis, synthesis) that deals with law refers to special human intelligence for language,\textsuperscript{33} which is to some extent, e.g., different from the so-called

\textsuperscript{32} See N. MacCormick, Institutions of Law, Oxford University Press (2007).
mathematical-logical intelligence that deals with numbers.\textsuperscript{34} Moreover, legal language being a result of (rational) thinking is also quite different from the language of art when literature as its special form is concerned.\textsuperscript{35}

3.2. Judging and Law

As already mentioned, the judging-perceiving dichotomy was brought to psychological typology by Briggs and Myers. It demonstrates people’s attitude or their orientation to the outer world. While concerning such the perceiving function prefers flexibility and spontaneity using one of the perceiving processes (sensation or intuition), the judging function prefers decisiveness and closure using one of the judging processes (thinking or feeling). In this respect, Quenk has indicated the following facets that are characteristic of judging: (1) systematization (in liking orderliness and systematic methods at work, home, and in leisure activities; in valuing efficiency and advance preparation, and disliking surprises; and in enjoying the comfort of closure with making a decision); (2) planning (in liking to make long-range plans for the future, including social events; in feeling that things will not happen as they wish unless planned in advance); (3) early starting (in planning for a deadline by starting early and working steadily to completion; in disliking the stress of having to work at the last minute); (4) schedules (in liking the comfort and security of working with routine, established methods both at work and at home; in liking the predictability this gives their

\textsuperscript{34} In my classes there have always been a majority of law students who disliked mathematics.

\textsuperscript{35} A typical example of this is poetry, in which thinking has certainly some role, however, such is often subordinated to feeling.
lives); (5) methods (in organizing and developing detailed plans for a current task, listing and sequencing tasks and subtasks to accomplish the goal).36

For the above ideal concepts there is support in empirical research. According to the mentioned 1967 MBTI test, 57 % of the tested students turned to be judges to 43.0 % perceivers.37 Furthermore, following the above-mentioned 1997 MBTI test among first year law students there were 67 % of judgers and 33 % of perceivers. According to the same study, among U.S. lawyers there were 60 % judgers to 40 % perceivers (and among U.S. judges, 77 % judgers to 23 % perceivers). Furthermore, according to the 2004 study, the majority of U.S. lawyers are judgers (63 %).38

4. Lawyers’ Special Ideal Type Preferences

4.1. The Sensation-Intuition Dichotomy and Law

Having established that, according to Jungian typology, the function of the psyche that is predominantly engaged in the daily work of lawyers is thinking, and that their most inferior function is feeling, I will now turn to the role of the two auxiliary functions to demonstrate their influence on the superior function. How the auxiliary functions affect the understanding and shaping of law as a product of practical thinking? At this point, let me just repeat that sensation more refers to information that we receive through our five senses and is more oriented to the external world, while intuition, as our »six sense«, transmits to us the messages that we receive from our inner self. It focuses mainly on perceiving patterns and interrelationships. However, the fact that thinking is the superior function in the legal

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36 N. L Quenk, op. cit., p. 13. In relation to the perceiving function, Quenk has indicated the following facets: casualty, open-endedness, pressure promptedness, spontaneity, and emergency.
37 P. V. Miller, op. cit., ibid.
38 V. Randal, op. cit., ibid.
profession entails that thinking will dictate the goals, and sensation and intuition will only be
allowed to suggest suitable means for reaching them.

Quenk has indicated five facets of the sensing-intuition dichotomy. Sensation is
characterized by: (1) concreteness (in focusing on concrete, tangible, and literal perceptions,
communications, learning styles, world view, and values; in trusting what is verifiable by the
senses; and in being cautious about going beyond facts); (2) reality (by preferring what is useful, has
tangible benefits, and accords with common sense; and by valuing efficiency, cost-effectiveness,
comfort, and security); (3) practicality (in being more interested in applying ideas than in the ideas
themselves, in liking to work with know materials using practical, familiar methods; and in preferring
tangible rewards over risky opportunities for greater gain); (4) experimentalism (in trusting their own
interest and others’ experience as the criterion for truth and relevance; in learning best from direct
experience; and in focusing more on the past and present than the future); (5) tradition (in preferring
the continuity, security, and social affirmation provided by traditions, established institutions, and
familiar methods; and in being uncomfortable with unconventional departures from established
norms). 39

To the contrary, in the event of intuition the decisive criteria for such to be
distinguished from sensation are the following: (1) abstractness (in focusing on concepts and
abstract meanings of ideas and their interrelations; and in using symbols, metaphors, and
mental leaps to explain their interests and views); (2) imagination (in valuing possibilities
over tangibles and liking ingenuity for its own purpose; and in being resourceful in dealing
with new experiences and solving problems); (3) conceptuality (in liking knowledge for its
own sake and focusing on the concept, not its application; in enjoying complexity and implied
meanings over tangible details; and in liking to take risks for potential gains); (3) theory (by
seeing relevance beyond what is tangible and by trusting theory has having a reality of its
own; and by being future oriented and seeking patterns and interrelations among abstract

39 N. L. Quenk, op. cit., p. 10.
concepts); and (5) originality (in valuing uniqueness, inventiveness, and cleverness to put meaning into everyday activities; enjoying demonstrating their own originality; and believing that sameness detracts from meaning).\footnote{40}

When it comes to the influence of sensation on thinking, Jung referred to the traditional concept of \textit{ratio}, which entails that our thinking receives external information, analyses such in the framework of experimental logic by means of showing that certain things are causes for certain effects.\footnote{41} This is also the manner in which science operates and tries to prove its discoveries, and is also the language of analysis and argumentation in law that deals with rules and principles that are written in legal codes. Not only is it the language of contemporary legal rules, but also of rhetoric, reasoning and argumentation in judicial decisions, legal logic, and of commentaries on different legal codes and acts. Accordingly, it is the language of positive law and also, to an important part, of positive-law legal theories. Today this language as the language of instrumental rationality predominates in the legal discussion.

Beside \textit{ratio} Jung also mentioned what has traditionally been perceived as \textit{intelectus}. In this context he referred to intellectual intuition as a special type of thinking that obtains information from intuition.\footnote{42} We can point to the role of intuition in law by emphasizing the role of various hunches and insights in the process of legal decision-making.\footnote{43} Nevertheless, today this type of language is mostly reserved for more theoretical, even philosophical, reflections on the problem of legal rules, such as whether certain legal rules are just or fair in relation to various principles, and as a tool in reaching legal decisions when various insights,
also moral sentiments, help us come to a just decision for example when there is a need to fill a gap in the law. In terms of contemporary law, intellectual intuition is undoubtedly subordinate to the more predictable formal language of law. Such intellectual intuition can also be called creative intuition.

But this does not entail that in dealing with positive law there is no room for intuition. Quite the contrary, intuition also plays a very important role in more “instrumental” environments. The importance of intuition in law in general stems from the fact that law is mostly a “game” of language, which is composed of words, concepts, and symbols. In this respect, the role of intuition is to translate such abstract language into concrete reality in order that it becomes meaningful. Thus, it is indispensable for the understanding of legal language, which is full of concepts, abstractions, and generalizations. However, in contradistinction with the previously mentioned creative intuition the intuition that is used in positive-law contexts can be called instrumental intuition. Its role is to “navigate,” or direct, the lawyer-thinker through various abstract and general rules and principles of positive-law codes to his or her final legal decision.

Concerning the predominance of the impact of one or the other auxiliary function on thinking, I differentiate between the lawyer that is more inclined to positive (i.e. sensatory or empirical) law and the lawyer that is more inclined to non-positive (intuitive) law. The more positive-law-oriented lawyer-thinker is closer to the real world of facts, practical problems, and concrete relations. Here the prevailing thinking function receives information predominantly from the empiric world of sensation. In this context, instrumental intuition necessarily plays a subordinate role to the thinking-sensation combination.

Contrary to that, predominantly intuitively (in the creative way) oriented lawyer-thinker is to an important extent remote from the concrete world of facts but is closer to his or

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her internal world and ideas. A lawyer's or judge's creative intuitive function as the auxiliary functions that carries hunches from the internal being to (rational) thinking is in particular important for the using of internal or intuitive dimensions of law, such as the sense of morality, legal sense, the sense of justice, the sense of legal certainty, the sense of social-legal issues such as equality etc. In the framework of legal decision-making, especially when it comes to hard cases such that the text is unclear, includes gaps, and there are several solutions to the problem – the mentioned dimension of intuitive thinking is very important.

From the above-said it seems that the sensation-intuition dichotomy concerning law and lawyers is not that important than the previously mentioned thinking-feeling and judging-perceiving dichotomies. This follows from the fact that in the event of law neither intuition nor sensation stands out as an absolute type preference as it was the case of thinking. Actually, both preferences are indispensable for quality dealing with law.

A lawyer learns positive law, including legal rules and legal principles that are incorporated in legal regulations, through his or her senses, thus such world of positive law is for him or her part of the world of facts that encompass him or her. It is the external reality that in the process of legal interpretation and deciding the lawyer must evaluate by means of the evaluative function that is represented in him or her by thinking. Certainly it is impossible to exclude from thinking other parts of the lawyer’s personality, which might have a certain impact on his or her evaluative activity. It is particularly positive law, being a starting-point for his or her work, which also represents limitation to his or her evaluation. At this point it is clear that the less the legal standards that the judge must compulsory consider in his or her adjudication are envisaged in advance (i.e. more or less precisely determined in the legal texts

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of codes or case law), the more he or she is free in making decisions, which makes his or her personality an important factor in decision-making. Regardless of whether there are gaps in the law, a lawyer’s instrumental intuition is an integral part of his or her functioning in the framework of positive law since without such the understanding or recognition of legal concepts when they are faced with facts of cases would be very much minimized.

Given the fact that by its form positive law represents certain objectification of prevailing social interests at a certain time and place, which can only be amended within a certain procedure that is envisaged in advance, this certainly brings security to disputable social relations. Positive law that plays an important role of a mediator between people, thus, represents a certain compromise or common denominator that is determined in some act or case. Creative intuition, in this aspect the “subjective law” of every interpreter or judge that decides on a certain case, is in this sense only a supplement to the positive law. In this context, positive law would be a form, while intuitively perceived law somewhat substantive or material supplement to the positive law, especially when it comes to various gaps in the law. However, intuitive or theoretical (non-positive) law (e.g. certain senses of justice, morality, legal sense in general, the sense of legal certainty, the sense of other legal and social values) can also play the role of a supervisor over positive law.

Also, the above-mentions positions are supported by the results of empirical research. In relation to the sensation-intuition dichotomy, generally there is a slight advantage in favor of intuition. Intuitive lawyers are more oriented to abstraction, symbols, and theory, while sensory lawyers are more practical and fact-oriented. According to the previously cited 1967 MBTI test, among law students there were 59 % of intuitives to 41 % of sensors. In contradistinction with that, in the case of a comparable sample of the tested members of urban police, almost 80 % turned to be sensors (to only 20 % intuitives). This can be explained by the fact that, although both professions deal with the law, “real” lawyers deal more with
words and the language, while police officers are more engaged in concrete situations and
actions.\textsuperscript{46} Moreover, the 1997 MBTI test demonstrated 52\% of intuitives to 48\% of sensors.
Furthermore, among lawyers the same test showed 59\% of intuitives to 41\% of sensors
(however, among judges, only 41\% of intuitives to 59\% of sensors).\textsuperscript{47} Furthermore, Daicoff
claims that 57\% of all lawyers tend to be intuitive.\textsuperscript{48}

However, this comparison cannot serve as the basis for a general claim that when it
comes to law, in terms of the auxiliary functions, intuition is more important than sensation.
While in academic environments the subtleties of intuition, in the form of critical thinking,
imagination, new theories etc., are very much emphasized legal practice is more focused on
the “tough” way of thinking with its strong emphasis on the thinking-empirical (or sensory)
dimension of the finding of facts and their more or less easy subordination to rules. This at
least applies in the event of clear cases, which in legal practice certainly predominate.

Finally, the above-mentioned findings and ideas are presented below in a table that
demonstrates several aspects of the classification of lawyers in various legal professions
according to their sensation-intuition dichotomy.

\begin{table}[h]
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\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Table 1: Classification of Lawyers in Various Legal Professions According to the Sensation-Intuition Dichotomy} \\
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\end{table}

\textsuperscript{46} See, I. Briggs Myers, P. Myers, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{47} V. Randal, \textit{op. cit., ibid.}
\textsuperscript{48} S. Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself, American Psychological Association (2004).
4.2. The Extraversion-Introversion Dichotomy and Law

One of the most important Jung's psychological discoveries was differentiation between extraversion and introversion. The extravert is more oriented to an external environment, toward the outer world of people and objects, while the introvert to an internal environment, toward inner world of experiences and ideas.49

Quenk has determined five different criteria that are typical for the extraversion-introversion dichotomy. Extraverts are more (1) initiating, which entails that they tend to act as social facilitators at social gatherings. They like to introduce people, connect those with similar interests, plan and direct gatherings. They are also very much (2) expressive, in easily telling others their thoughts and feelings, in making their interests known and readily confiding to others, and in being seen as easy to get to know. Furthermore, extraverts tend to be (3) gregarious, which means that they enjoy being with others and belonging to groups.

49 C. G. Jung, From Psychological Types, op. cit., ibid.
They also tend to have many acquaintances and friends and not make a sharp distinction between friends and acquaintances. Another characteristic of extraverts is that they are (4) active, in such that they like direct involvement in active environments, and learn best by doing, listening, observing, and speaking rather than by reading and writing. Finally, they tend to be (5) enthusiastic in that they are talkative and lively, enjoying dynamic flow of energy in conversations; and in liking being the center of attention and sharing who they are by telling stories.\(^{50}\)

In contradistinction with that, introverts are more (1) receiving such that they prefer to be introduced at social gatherings, dislike small talk, prefer in-depth discussions of important issues with one or two people. Also, introverts tend to be (2) contained. They like to share their thoughts and feelings with a small and select few, are hard to get to know because their reactions are mostly internal. Moreover, they are more (3) intimate, by having a limited circle of close, trusted friends, preferring to talk one-on-one to people they know well; making a sharp distinction between intimate friends and casual acquaintances. Introverts tend to also be (4) reflective, such that they like visual, intellectual, and mental engagement, learning best by reading and writing rather than by listening and speaking. They are also more (5) quiet so that they seem to be reserved and quiet but often have rich internal responses to what is going on. As they may have difficulty in describing their inner experience in words, they may not prefer speaking about them.\(^{51}\)

When it comes to the extraversion-introversion dilemma, it seems that the areas of law and legal professions, as most other professions as well, are broad enough to include both attitudes of people on different positions in such. According to Jung, extraverted thinkers generally include scientists (of mostly natural sciences) and economists (who create theoretical formulae). They direct themselves and others in view of fixed rules and principles.

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\(^{50}\) N. L. Quenk, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 12.

\(^{51}\) \textit{Ibid.}\n
based upon reality, order, and material facts. In this context, Jung particularly referred to Darwin and Marx.\(^{52}\) To be honest, a great deal of modern law encompasses the so-called positive law, which in its sensory and empirical aspect is well described as a product of extraverted thinking. Moreover, in that view the law is considered to be a social activity which is intended for the resolution of practical social disputes. Although in accordance with such criteria law to an important extent seems to be a product of extravert thinking, this certainly does not say that law cannot be dealt with introvertedly and that there is no place for introverts in law.\(^{53}\)

However, as already mentioned, in comparison with other disciplines and sciences within the extraverted-thinking group, what separates law and lawyers from other extraverted thinkers is: (1) their special consideration of language (in its narrow sense as the system of letters, words, and sentences), with their language intelligence being mostly focused on logical and analytical perspectives (that has traditionally been called as *ratio*), and, to some extent, (2) their special consideration of normativity (especially justice – what has traditionally been considered, in its non-positivistic sense, as a subject-matter of intellect).

Pascal has interestingly described a situation where several types of personalities attended a dinner that had been organized by a lady. Among them there was a talented attorney (practising lawyer), who represented the extraverted thinker – with the auxiliary functions of sensation (more developed in him) and intuition (less developed in him). What was typical of him was his great interest in externity, regulations, and facts. Furthermore, it was special of him that he memorized many laws and their rules, which he could quite skillfully use in the framework of thinking when dealing with the problems of his clients. His thinking was characterized by combining events and facts, searching for causes and effects, in

\(^{52}\) C. G. Jung, *From Psychological Types*, *op. cit.*, *ibid.*

\(^{53}\) I will return to that idea in the continuation where I will be explaining the ideal classification of lawyers in various legal professions according to the extraversion-introversion dichotomy.
which he could successfully conceal the existence of certain information. All in all, he was a master of practical thinking.\textsuperscript{54}

The other possibility of the thinking function in this aspect is the introverted thinker, who is more typical of philosophers (Jung mentioned Wittgenstein).\textsuperscript{55} Philosophers ask questions and try to understand their own existence. In such they neglect the external world and manage to „live“ on their own ideas. Such a type can also be the case as regards law when more theoretical legal areas are at issue, for example: theory of law, philosophy of law, or sociology of law. Thus, the above-mentioned dinner was also attended by a distinguished scholar, an introverted thinker, who was discussing Presocratic philosophy as the main force behind Alexander the Great’s conquests. In such he used his auxiliary functions of intuition (in developing a certain philosophic ideas) and sensation (by describing pure historical events and facts).\textsuperscript{56}

Certainly, there can be differences among lawyers as extraverted thinkers, as well as among introverted thinkers. Extraverted legal professions are more typical of legal practice – as attorneys, prosecutors, judges etc. The most typical extraverted thinker is an attorney. Sometimes their superior function of the psyche can even be sensation, and thinking their first auxiliary function.\textsuperscript{57} Among such the most extraverted are certainly the so-called litigators as those who represent clients at court trials. They are brilliant in controlling the external situation of a courtroom. More introverted among attorneys are the so-called researchers and writers, who in their offices in law firms (i.e. in a much more introverted environment than a courtroom) write legal memoranda, in the context of which they study various laws,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[55] C. G. Jung, From Psychological Types, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{ibid}.
\item[56] E. Pascal, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 39.
\item[57] See R. Baron, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 83-84.
\end{footnotes}
commentaries, and also theoretical materials, and write legal papers. Such legal memoranda serve their colleagues – litigators as the (introverted) basis for (extraverted) litigation.\textsuperscript{58}  

It seems that a judge is the least extraverted profession in legal practice. In his or her resolution of disputes he or she must often be much more „scholarly“ oriented than attorneys, as he or she also needs to study various theoretical treaties, in order to learn (and improve the knowledge of) tradition, history, rationale, and other „logic“ that is usually behind a certain law that is to be applied. While attorneys in particular listen to their (extraverted) clients’ interests, in addition to legal texts judges to a greater extent than attorneys must listen to their internal (or introverted) legal sense and the sense of justice. However, there is also a number of extraverted judges, who are more successful in conducting trials than introverted judges. Introverted judges tend to be more scholarly oriented: they either are perfect legal writers of (theoretical) legal treaties, commentaries on certain laws, or beside their main profession they are also engaged in teaching as law professors. However, in general judges still act in the framework of legal practice, so the main framework of their environment is extraverted thinking, which in one way or another mainly deals with positive law. Furthermore, the work environment of lower court judges is more extraverted (i.e. public hearings and trials; less time for studying cases in their offices) than the work environment of superior court judges, which is more introverted (i.e. deciding in panels; more time for studying cases in their offices).

In legal academia, the general environment is generally theoretical, which means introverted. Although in such a milieu the starting point of introverted thinking is generally some existing legal text, a legal theorist often evaluates such in view of certain (internal) ideas, values, and concepts such as fairness, justice, equality, legal certainty, consistency, coherence etc. However, also in legal academia, there is room for extraversion. Those who are

\textsuperscript{58} Modern, especially North American, law firms have taken this difference into consideration very seriously. Such distinction between more extraverted and introverted profiles would in general apply to prosecutors as well.
more extraverted are better teachers than introverts as they better get along with the extraverted environment such as a lecture room. Extraverts among legal theorists are also better organizers than introverts, better fund raising people, and better in keeping contacts with their colleagues than introverts. In contradistinction with that, introvert legal professors tend to be better researchers, writers, and scholars.

When law students are concerned, more extraverted students would prefer oral exams to written ones, and vice versa. In general legal academic environment is more theoretical than legal practice so it is a better “natural” environment for introverted intuitive thinkers than legal practice, in which extraverted sensatory thinkers can catch up their introverted counterparts.\(^{59}\)

In connection with theory, Jung cautioned against the danger in the event of a thinker who is very much intuitively oriented as his theories could be too much speculative, somewhat in the air, if they are not firmly grounded on facts.\(^{60}\) However, in the event of a factually (or empirically) oriented scientist, there is a danger that, given all the facts that he or she deals with, there would be too little abstraction, which means that even if we can see in front of us numerous trees (facts) there is still the possibility that we are missing the concept or idea of a forest. Thereby Jung meant that both aspects of thinking (i.e. facts and theories) must be taken into consideration properly, and that theory and practice indeed need each other inseparably.

Generally, as already indicated, it seems that the law, when it is seen from its practical aspect, is predominantly engaged in resolving disputes that relate to the external sphere of people’s life. Thus, law is in particular a practical activity for which what is typical is people's

\(^{59}\) V. Randal, *op. cit., ibid.*

\(^{60}\) The same was, however, although in different words, asserted by Kant when explaining that if concepts (or theories) without facts are empty so are facts without concepts (or theories) blind. According to Schneider, the same meaning as experiment has for natural sciences, example has for »spiritual« sciences. E. Schneider, *Logik für Juristen* [Logic for Lawyers], Die Grundlagen der Denklehre und der Rechtsanwendung, Verlag Franz Valhen, München (1991), p. 39.
extraverted orientation, since in the case of social disputes, legal rules, and legal procedures, the person's psychic energy flows outward to the external world of facts that the lawyer defines and evaluates on the basis of legal rules, in which his or her main auxiliary psychic function is sensation, as the ability of perception of (external) facts and (external) legal rules. But, as in the event of any thinking, at least to some extent, what matters for the lawyer is also his or her intuition that plays a (subordinate) role in relation to thinking and sensation. Nevertheless, it helps the lawyer find creative (or just) solutions that must again be submitted to a “rational experiment”\(^\text{61}\) that is carried out by the thinking and sensation functions. This entails that even for an intuitively reached decision the judge must provide (thought out) reasons that are presented in the reasoning of a decision, which are submitted to the (external) public for evaluation.

The general framework of legal practice is, again, extraverted thinking-sensation activity. However, one can deal with law also theoretically in the sense of a theoretical analysis of legal practice, development of new legal theories, or even when he or she discusses law in terms of legal philosophy. In such a situation, the lawyer who thinks theoretically would think in particular as an introvert, which means that the current of energy flows into his or her internal world when he or she evaluates facts and develop new theoretical approaches. In such activity, the more he or she leaves behind the facts the less he or she is dependent on his or her sensatory (empirical) function, by using his or her intuition that makes possible certain insights which, however, must still be exposed to empirical reality if one is to come to a productive idea or concept.

As I have established previously, concerning lawyers’ attitude in general there is also not much difference between introversion and extraversion. Introverted lawyers, who are

more interested in ideas and concepts, are frequently found in legal academia or in research-oriented positions in legal practice (e.g. as corporate lawyers, judges at superior courts), whereas extraverted lawyers, who are better in action, more often appear in legal practice as litigating attorneys or judges of lower courts. This is also supported by empirical research. So the above-mentioned MBTI test in 1967 demonstrated 55.2 % of extraverted law students to 44.8 introverted law students, and the 1997 test demonstrated 51 % extraverts to 49 introverted law students. Following the same study extraverted lawyers were in minority as there were 43% of extraverts to 57% of introverts. Also, Daicoff claimed that U.S. lawyers are slightly more likely to be introverts than extroverts. However, in the event of judges there were 56% of extraverts to 44% of introverts.

Also, Daicoff claimed that U.S. lawyers are slightly more likely to be introverts than extroverts. However, in the event of judges there were 56% of extraverts to 44% of introverts.

In relation to the extraversion-introversion dichotomy, concerning lawyers and the law I complete this article by the following table, in which I classify lawyers in various legal professions according to their extraversion-introversion preferences.

Table 2: Classification of Lawyers in Various Legal Professions According to the Extraversion-Introversion Dichotomy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGAL PRACTICE</th>
<th>EXTRAVERSION</th>
<th>INTROVERSION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• litigating attorneys</td>
<td>• researching &amp; writing</td>
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62 V. Randal, op. cit. ibid.
63 S. Daicoff, op. cit. ibid.
64 V. Randal, op. cit. ibid.
5. Conclusion

Jung himself asserted that locating a (psychological) type is extremely difficult. This is so at least for two reasons. Firstly, individual types are differentiated between themselves according to some merely predominantly, not absolutely, present criteria. This entails that there are no sharp lines between them, no pure categories, which sometimes causes problems because it is usually much easier when we deal with pure types. Secondly, a person who is locating a type often tries to compensate for his or her onesidedness, which might question the objectivity of his or her endeavor.65 However, these potential difficulties should not diminish the benefit that was achieved from his discovery for understanding people’s lives.

In order to draw some conclusions from the above paragraphs, let me repeat the main thesis of this article which, in terms of psychological typology, emphasizes thinking and judging, rather than feeling and perceiving, as the predominant cognitive functions that are (to be) used in the legal world. Concerning such, thinking and judging are importantly connected in that, in another aspect, judging (rather than perceiving) only demonstrates that the dominant function in a personality is a rational and evaluative function, rather than an irrational and perceptive. In the context of law this certainly applies to the fact that thinking is

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65 C. G. Jung, From Psychological Types, op. cit., ibid.
the dominant and as such the generally preferred cognitive function (and feeling the inferior cognitive function). In terms of the auxiliary and tertiary cognitive functions, extraversion, introversion, sensation, and intuition are special preferences to the extent that they are important in different aspects of various legal professions. Their role is to explain how thinking can be different in view of different contexts of various legal professions.

Thus, in relation to legal practice thinking is more extraverted than introverted, the latter more applying to legal theory. Moreover, one of important preoccupation of legal practice is dealing with facts, so such law is more practically oriented with the involvement of sensation as its main auxiliary function. However, law is about a language that consists of many concepts that as symbols must appropriately be translated into meaningful reality. From such follows the importance of intuition as the next auxiliary function. But the closer are we to the real (i.e. practical) world of legal life, the clearer legal concepts or symbols need to be in order to be appropriately applied, so it is sensation as the empirical function which (at least in clear cases) gives the thinking function the necessary material for its decision-making, more than intuition which as creative and imaginative function is important in unclear or difficult cases.

Finally, why is to know all that psychological-typological material important for the legal world? Or what is that this article likes to communicate to the legal audience? There are particularly two things.

The first one comes from Jung’s typological theory that claims that psychological types are inborn, which means that through their lives individuals cannot significantly change their typology. This can also be a reason why Jung’s theory is often called a biological theory. Luckily, in reality no types are pure so certain adaptations are possible. Thus, knowing one’s “true” type, and here I refer to the types that seem to be relevant for lawyers, would help individuals to direct their personal life and professional careers. This especially applies to law
students who are at the beginning of their careers, and those legal professionals who would like to make some changes in their existing careers.

Secondly, and lastly, such a study in ideal preferences concerning psychological typology in the area of law that has been made by a lawyer can surely help psychologists who are not lawyers, to better organize and evaluate the results of their psychometric research