Article
Rules Versus Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Common Law
Cato Journal
(1985)
Abstract
In this paper it is argued that it is possible to have a policy- neutral common law. This claim is elucidated by contrasting rule-oriented and balancing approaches to law in the context of negligence and strict tort liability. Finally, it is suggested that the rise of the administrative state is at least partly responsible for the decline in legal rules.
Keywords
- negligence,
- strict liability,
- certainty,
- institutional efficiency,
- Posner
Disciplines
Publication Date
Winter 1985
Citation Information
Mario J Rizzo. "Rules Versus Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Common Law" Cato Journal Vol. 4 Iss. 3 (1985) p. 865 - 884 ISSN: 0273-3072 Available at: http://works.bepress.com/mario_rizzo/56/