POLITICAL SUCCESSION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN EMERGING

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POLITICAL SUCCESSION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES; LESSONS FROM GHANA AND NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Central to the discussion in this paper is the issue of political succession in a global world where emphasis is for countries to adapt a liberal democratic framework if they are to attain positive recognition in the international community. Authoritarian regimes are therefore requested to open up the political space and also to adopt the free market ideology. The level of development of productive forces in the developing economies serves as constraint as they are not in a position to participate effectively in the global market. Constrained by the lack of investment capital and technology, they are under the strict surveillance of Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) to keep their economies afloat under conditions that have obvious implications for political and economic development of the economies. Drawing from the Experiences in Ghana and Nigeria, the paper highlighted some contradictions inherent in towing the line of BWIs. The condition for gaining support from BWIs is inimical to growth and development in these countries. Sustained development requires strong state intervention, a position rejected by BWIs. Evidence from Ghana’s experience confirms the position of this paper that a liberal democratic framework may not likely guarantee sustainable development in Africa and other emerging democracies.

Keywords: Political succession, sustainable development, electoral process

INTRODUCTION

The democratic experience in Nigeria in the last decade cannot be adjudged as positive when compared to Ghana. The political elite in Nigeria specifically leaders of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) cite the transfer of power from Chief Olusegun Obasanjo to Umaru Yar‘Adua in May 2007 after
serving two terms as the democratically elected President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in May 1999 as evidence of democratic consolidation in the country. The April 2007 election that ushered in Umaru Yar’Adua as President was discredited both nationally and internationally as anything but free and fair. The International Republican Institute (IRI) said “the election fell below the standard set by Nigerian elections and international standards witnessed by IRI around the World” (Tenuche, 2009). Compromised electoral processes resulting in prolonged civil litigations as in Nigeria and violent political conflicts as occurred in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Iran is becoming a permanent feature of emerging democracies. As the European Union rightly observed, “any administration founded on this fraud cannot have legitimacy” (Tenuche, 2009). Consolidation of political power becomes the main preoccupation of political leaders where the political processes that propel them to power are compromised.

Ghana on the other hand appears set on an impressive path as the country records an appreciable growth in human development indices (accessibility to improved water, sanitation and enhanced nutritional status). Arising from this, the country is presently considered as having attained medium human development. Other countries in this category include China, Turkey, Indonesia and South Africa among others. There is convincing evidence to indicate that the country is doing well in terms of meeting some of the millennium development goals by 2015. The MDG’s which are a set of tangibly quantifiable human development indices seek to create an environment at the national and global levels that is conducive for improved living conditions and specifically to address issues that include eradicating extreme poverty in its many dimensions – i.e. hunger and diseases, empowerment of women, promoting gender equality, opening access to education, environmental sustainability, reducing child mortality and improving maternal health. This progress is often attributed to Ghana’s uninterrupted democratic rule which is now canvassed as a model for other African States to emulate.

Only recently, the ruling party suffered a defeat in a national election adjudged locally and internationally as free and fair and gracefully bowed out of power by handing over the reigns of government to the opposition. This is the second time (first in 2000 and second in 2006) a ruling party lost election to the opposition in that country; a clear evidence that democracy is becoming consolidated and entrenched here. Linked with the latter are the entrenchment of a transparent electoral system that enhances participation and inclusiveness and such values as good governance, honest leadership and
commitment to appreciable management of relations among ethnic and religious groups for ensuring harmony, peace, security and development.

Despite these positive developments in Ghana, that country is far from attaining the status of a developed market economy that is self-propelling. The highly industrialised economies of the world today are so classified because of the level of industrialisation in those economies. For such societies, more than 24% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) arose from the industrial sector of which at least 60% was in manufacturing with at least 10% of the population engaged in that sector (Sutcliffe, 1971).

When Ghana adopted the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in April, 1983, the IMF/World Bank lauded the success of the programme in the country because the GDP recorded a positive growth which was a reversal of the negative growth that characterised the pre-SAP period. Ghana presently is still classified among the low-income developing economies with a weak manufacturing base that contends with widespread poverty among inhabitants. The country is yet to join the ranks of emerging developing economies like South Korea, India, Brazil and Malaysia among others.

Of interest to this paper is an examination of those factors and forces that can be said to account for the successful consolidation of democracy in Ghana as evidenced in the transitioning from the “praetorian cycle” of military rule (or broken-back state) in the immediate post-Nkrumah era characterised by unstable regimes of coups, counter-coups and instability, to initially semi-democratic but stable rule under Jerry Rawlings and later to a populist and fully functioning democratic rule.

The pertinent question to ask however is has the positive succession process recorded in Ghana translated into economic growth that is sustainable? Specifically, the paper proposes to interrogate

- The causal linkage between democratic civilian rule as canvassed by the Bretton Wood Institutions (BWI) and positive human development indices.
- Investigate the management of the hydra-headed monster called corruption which has been identified as a limiting factor to development in Africa.
- discuss the role of transparent and strong leadership as an important element in governance processes,
- arising from all the above, to interrogate the capability and preparedness of Ghana and Nigeria to join the league of the world top economies in the not too distant future, and finally,
answer the question posed by Luckham (1998) has democratic rule in Ghana been able to resolve the inevitable conflict between creating a genuine base of popular support, effective governance, process and engendering sustainable development within the constraints imposed by external donors and Bretton Woods Institution (BWIs).

No doubt, the relationship between a stable democratic regime and sustainable development is a chicken and egg one. It is not always clear which one comes before the other or is the ideal order of precedence. Lead discourses on the necessity for democratic rule posit that democracy is required to propel development, i.e. The notion about the developmental state propagated by Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere and the popular diction “seek ye first the political kingdom, and others will follow”.

There has also been a strong position on the need to attain development irrespective of the political context in place since the ultimate goal of community living is to uplift the standard of human living. The political context for attaining this goal may not necessarily be democratic, but authoritarian. From the Machiavellian perspective, therefore, the preservation of the state takes precedence over all other considerations and thus must be attained at all costs and by any means. This brings to the fore the preferred role and character of the state required to propel development.

While the lead organs of capitalism, the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), i.e. the World Bank and the International monetary Fund (IMF) as strong advocates of the neo-liberal states canvass for weak states and a strong private sector as desirable to propel development, other schools of thought (Cited in Mkandawire, 1999:30), canvass for strong states as a requirement for development.

The method of data collection is essentially secondary. These include consultation of basic texts on the theory of the state from the view points of Marxian and Neo-liberal perspectives. A number of significant changes occurred in Ghana during the reign of Jerry Rawlings. These changes had several implications for the governance processes in the country in subsequent years. The role of the military in democratic transition becomes an area of interest to the study and as such, texts of relevance in this area were consulted. The internet is of immense use to the paper to provide basic information on the economic indices and other specific data on areas of interest to the study, i.e. the electoral processes, corruption and human development indices. Relevant texts on Ghana under Jerry Rawlings were also widely used.
THE CHARACTER AND ROLE OF THE STATE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT; SOME CONCEPTIONAL CLARIFICATION

The liberal conception of the State largely derived from the modernisation theory gives preference to a weak State that is removed from all but a minimal role in the national economy. Under this condition, the State is expected to intervene only in the management of the social contradictions inherent in the political system while the private sector is at the driving seat of the development of the economy. This definition of course suits liberal economies where capitalism holds sway and the private sector takes the lead in the economy while the critical role assigned to the State is to protect private capital. According to this school of thought, “the State has neither the management capability to run the economy nor any legitimate authority to do so. Indeed, far from benefiting society, State planning, State ownership of industries, State-initiated social programmes, State regulation of wages and economic policy should be avoided because they inevitably undermine entrepreneurial activity, diminish individual freedoms and lead to the inefficient use of resources. In sum the best government is considered to be the least government” (World Development Reports, 1997). Arising from this therefore, the current slogan of globalisation, encourage the private sector to control the key sectors of the economy while the State provides protection and generally regulate the affairs of the State, thus creating the enabling environment for capital to thrive.

Continuing, the World Development Report clearly states that the “Markets and States should not be viewed as opposites, but as complementary, the State’s role being essential for putting in place the appropriate institutional foundations for markets”. The Report warns that, unless States can improve their “effectiveness” and invigorate public institutions, their prospects may be bleak. Increasing public strife, rampant corruption and the collapse of many States are likely to be the result” (The World Bank, 1997)

For Mkandawire (1999), this position is largely responsible for the strong criticism against nationalism and the developmental state coming in the post-independence era by western countries.
The effective State is now a familiar phrase of the preferred role of the State now sold to emerging economies as the desirable path to attain sustainable development. In reality, States are encouraged to establish strong institutions and processes designed at establishing effective roles and restraints fostering competition; and increasing “citizen’s” voice and partnership with the private sector. Arising from the failure of World Bank policies in the past when the weak State was strongly canvassed, there is a paradigm shift from the Bank for weak States to revert their position by investing in basic social services and infrastructure which hitherto was to be left in the hands of the private sector. In recent times, there is a strong call for States to address the hydra-headed issue of corruption, engender greater flow of information and transparency combined with participatory approaches to project implementation. This position signalled the Bank’s admission of the failure of the roll back of the State position and its recent support for an “effective State” which signalled the Bank’s move from its long running support for minimal government in favour of a new model based on an effective and vigorous State, within the framework of a capitalist economy.

The opposing position canvassed largely by the classical Marxist theory, and the Machiavellian School of thought advocate for a strong state which also takes the lead in economic development. Although the World Bank had before the recent volte-face in position refused to recognise the factor of the strong state as being responsible for the development of the newly industrialising economies of East Asian economies, especially Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. The Socialist States of Russia and China had always been strong advocates of strong States as the catalyst for development. The States controlled the economies and the success of the States in terms of economic development was attributed to state control and direction. The lead organs of capitalism could not recognise the Socialist States who were opposed to liberal democracy. However, the failure of the World Bank policies has now made it incumbent on the Bank to advocate ‘effective states’ for countries that embrace liberal democracy.

Furthermore, there are lead discourses from African scholars who are convinced of the need for strong Africa States to propel development. For Mkandawire (1999) the implication of this for Africa is that, while the World Bank and other instrument of capitalism frowned at authoritarian regimes, they conceded the need for State intervention but within the guiding principle of a liberalised economy directed from without. There is an inherent contradiction here in the sense that the character of the state in Africa differ from those of the states in the advanced capitalist
economies. The relative autonomy status of African States places on them the burden of addressing the contradictions that exist in their economies of which they are a part within a liberal democratic framework. The issue of stability in Africa becomes largely problematic. Any country that is therefore able to engender stability as Ghana has been able to demonstrate becomes a good laboratory for close examination.

DISCUSSIONS: THE CHARACTER OF THE STATE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT – THE GHANAIAN EXPERIENCE

Ghana in the Years before Rawlings

In post-colonial states, the indigenous bourgeois did not enjoy the leverage to provide a framework of law and the institutions which are essential for the development of capitalist relations of production as did their counterparts in Western societies.

The superstructure in the colony was a creation of the metropolitan bourgeois designed not only to replicate the super-structure for the state which it had the privilege of establishing in the metropolitan country, but also to create state apparatus through which it can exercise dominion over all the indigenous social classes in the colony. The post-colonial state was thus saddled with the burden of an over-developed super-structure. The colonial state was therefore equipped with a powerful bureaucratic – military apparatus – mechanism of government used to subordinate the native social classes. In addition, the military bureaucratic apparatus also assume a new and relatively autonomous economic role which is not the same as operates in the classical bourgeois state. “The State in the post-colonial society directly appropriates a very large part of the economic surplus and deploys it in bureaucratically directed economic activity in the name of promoting economic development” (Alavi, 1979). These were largely seen as being responsible for the large scale of corruption in African States.

Ghana has had a fair share of this experience. This is evidenced in the praetorian rule, (the civilian to military and back to civilian rule) in Ghana prior to the rule of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana already alluded to.
A peep into Ghana’s political history reveal that the state attained independence from the United Kingdom on 6th March 1957 and on July 1, 1960 asserted its complete autonomy from Britain and became known as the Republic of Ghana. Dr. Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah, a leading African Nationalist was the first Prime Minister and later the president of Ghana. As is the character of post-colonial States, Ghana inherited an over-developed bureaucratic structure complemented with a strong military structure. Nkrumah, a strong advocate of the developmental State canvassed for the strong State in the economy. His political party, the Convention People’s Party (CPP), also had a nationalist and even Pan-Africanist outlook unlike the ethnic based parties that characterised the initial parties in neighbouring Nigeria. At independence in 1957, Ghana when compared to most sub-Saharan countries was in a relatively prosperous financial situation. Its main export was Cocoa and the country had large reserves of gold. The developmentalist State under Nkrumah meant an increase in State activity and control in the economy. The CPP under Nkrumah leadership sought to and took control of the commanding heights of the economy. The Cocoa Marketing Board and the auxiliary companies which were the main foreign exchange earner for the country came under State control (Wikipedia, 2009a). As a foremost champion of African Unity, Nkrumah directed a lot of resources towards the liberation of other African States. At the end of his 9 years rule – 1957 to 966 – Nkrumah left Ghana that hitherto maintained an impressive foreign account reserve bankrupt with foods and other consumer goods in short supply and all government services deteriorated beyond recognition.

The main reason attributed for this level of decay as revealed by a commission of inquiry instituted by the National Liberation Council (NLC) that took over power from Nkrumah-led government was large scale corruption in which Nkrumah was fingered. Nkrumah was accused of exceeding official spending largely to fund the expanded bureaucracy. There were also reported cases of loan defaults by government corporations, excessive mileage claims, disproportionate family allowance, unnecessary contract awards, loan default by party loyalists and bestowals to CPP (Wikipedia, 2009a). At this time, corruption was widely spread and accounted for the rapid depletion of public funds. Scholars have attributed this trend to the under-developed nature of the native bourgeoisie who relied essentially on the State for primitive capital accumulation (Alavi, 1979). The subsequent military coups in Ghana cited corruption and decay in the bureaucracy, declining social values and social infrastructure as basis for the coups and sort to legitimise their regimes by canvassing a need for change.
Official corruption and the use of the State for primitive capital accumulation became the norm among the military and their civilian collaborators. The various inquiries instituted by various governments revealed various levels of corruption which reached unprecedented heights between 1972 and 1978 when General Ignatius Kutu Acheampong was Head of State. When Fred Akuffo seized power in July, 1978 there was general dissatisfaction among the citizens on his handling of the massive level of corruption levied against Acheampong and his team who were alleged to have walked away with their loots while the citizens faced a difficult period that included massive migration to neighbouring countries like Nigeria. The military as an institution became restive and a mutiny emanating from the rank and file ousted the regime of the top brass in the army. Jerry Rawlings, in June, 1979 executed a coup and embarked on a house cleansing exercise that only slightly fell short of a revolution. With the support of a disenchanted public, Rawlings set two objectives; 

1. to rid the country of corruption and 
2. to hand over power to a popularly elected government.

The “house cleansing” exercise was the major effort to combat corruption with the public execution of top military officials including there former military Heads of State and five other army generals. For Luckham (1998), the transformation in Ghana from a military to a civilian autocracy started with a collapse of an authoritarian military regime from within, i.e. after revolts by junior officers or men in the ranks, with the support of civilians in Ghana who were disenchanted with the misrule of the ruling elite. One can conclude here that the strong state was used to advantage by the ruling elite both military and civilian for primitive capital accumulation. Ghana under Rawlings used the division between the military elite ad the rank and file to commence the transition to civil rule that appear to have endured, the question is has this created the required base for sustainable development.


Rawlings handed over power to Hilla Limann in 1979 after the house cleansing exercise to rid the country of corruption. However, the Limann regime was cut short on 31st December, 1981 because the institutionalised corruption that first brought Rawlings to power had again reared its ugly head. Rawlings instituted the Provisional National Defence Council that sought to involve the citizens in governance by preaching that people demand accountability from leaders as they were there to serve the people. Arising from both internal an external pressures, Ghana under Rawlings was forced to adopt
constitutional rule in what Luckham (1998) termed a “co-opted” transition in which an existing autocratic regime used the benefits of incumbency to win contested elections and liberalise her rule in a carefully pacted extrications of the military regime from power with the military controlling the agenda. From the onset, the outcome cannot be described as a free democratic regime. Further to this, the linkage with the international global economy created a State with a character that cannot assume a weak autonomous status. The weak fiscal base of the State and external pressure for a shift from authoritarian to democratic rule dictated that the State adopt a type of democracy that rest on the ability of the State to manage the economy more efficiently (i.e. the good governance from the perspective of international financial institutions) but which are also conditioned by externally imposed economic policies again dictated by BWIs.

Arising from this development, despite the popular position of Rawlings to establish a government that will serve the people, the state adopted the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in April, 1983 with the robust financial support of the World Bank and the IMF. The main objective of the SAP was removal of the distortions which presumably prevented the Market from allocating resources efficiency. Polices were therefore designed to engender a private sector-led economic growth. According to Kwei (2000), these polices included:

- The introduction of a flexible exchange rate system to replace the fixed one.
- A drastic cut in government expenditure with the introduction of cost-saving measures in public departments and services. These measures included a massive retrenchment of workers in the public sector.
- Removal of subsidies from healthcare and education and tax reforms.
- The state also sold or divested several public enterprises through privatisation and commercialisation of such public enterprise, and
- The removal of restrictions that were considered to have hindered the effective functioning of price mechanism, thereby promoting a reform of trade liberalisation.

Continuing, Kwei (2000) observed that the implementation of SAP in Ghana was adjudged to be the most successful in Sub-Saharan Africa. This assessment was as a result of the macroeconomic impact of the programmes on national output. Ghana’s GDP at this period recorded positive growth rates (averaging about 5 percent per annum) in contrast to the negative growth rates recorded throughout the 1970s and part of the 1980s.
Despite this success story, SAP did not impact positively on the living standards of the larger majority of the citizens especially in the rural areas; neither was the programme able to place Ghana like other African States that embraced the programme on a sustainable path to development. Mkandawire (1999) citing other scholars, concluded that while SAP may have solved inflation, balance of payment crisis, disequilibria and market distortions, the programme has “not placed Africa on a sustainable path of development” because the programme not only failed to stimulate investment but that even the most touted success recorded only produced anaemic growth rates in per capital income. Although GDP growth rate during Rawlings reign hovered around 5% per annum Kwei (2000) observed that there were no indications that the country was on a path of attaining sustainable development in the years ahead. This is evidenced by the trend of economic growth in the key sectors of the economy. Ghana like most other African countries has a narrow and unstable fiscal base that denied the State the wherewithal to provide for a minimum of its commitments even in normal times (Mkandawire, 1999). Ghana is largely dependent on the export of raw materials, i.e. timber and cocoa into a global market that is highly unstable. Industry, i.e. manufacturing, construction, mining and quarrying, electricity, water and gas does not account for a significant percentage of Ghana’s GDP. Of this, the contribution of manufacturing was only about 9.2%. Manufacturing is dominated by import substitution, industries producing food products, beverages, tobacco, textiles, timber and wood products, refined petroleum, vehicle chemicals and pharmaceuticals, cement and metals. Hutchful (cited in Kirsten Harrison, 2003) concluded that Ghana clearly lacked the capacity to “an innate supply-side response to the crude market stimulation initiatives” of SAP. Although mining and quarrying contributed an average of 5.6% to the GDP between 1994 and 1998, the sector was dominated by foreign capital. The increased flow of foreign capital into Africa, Ghana inclusive, largely went into mining … or speculative portfolio. Rather than laying the path for sustainable growth, SAP, Mkandawire observed, resulted in a “revival of the monocultural primary export economies of yester-years. Ghana for example, is going back to the days of gold and cocoa exporting country (Mkandawire, 1999)

The Rawlings era was forced to grapple with the contradictions arising from the expectation of WBI to see the state shed power on the local scene by reducing itself while it embark on some of the most far-reaching restructuring of the economy through measures that require a strong state despite the implication of this contradiction for the attainment of a stable polity. Ghana like all other states that
embraced SAP was also required to provide physical and social infrastructure to facilitate private capital investment and therefore become a worthy member of the global community.

On this last account, Rawlings concentrated commendable efforts in developing physical and social infrastructure. It is to the credit of Rawlings that a solid foundation was laid for the development of infrastructure. The regime instituted the Road, Education and Energy funds that have greatly improved those sectors of the economy. Among other achievements recorded which were attributable to the strong character of the state was the ability to override vested partisan interests on matters that affect the economy. Further to that was the devolution of key sectors of the economy (that include education, infrastructure development and healthcare) to the district level and the creation of 110 districts through non-partisan district level elections. Annual government subventions by law went to the districts directly to fund the key sectors. The District Assemblies enhanced participation in governance at the local level and generally improved living standards. Devolution of power as a strategy for improving living standard is considered appropriate (Akhide, 2009) and this is evidenced by the positive impact it has on Ghana’s development. The Human Development Index trends revealed that Ghana has been recording upward movement from 0.442 in 1975 to 0.517 in 1990, and 0.540 in 2000.

The issue of corruption was also put on the front burner during the period of Rawlings rule (1981 – 2000). A number of bodies were set up to address the issue of deep-rooted corruption in Ghana. They include the People’s Defence Committee (PDC) and the Workers Defence Committee (WDC) constituted on Rawlings ascension to power after his 2nd coup in 1982. The Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR) was set up in November, 1984. The CDR was a merger of the PDC and WDC. In addition to these bodies, public tribunals were set up so as to invigorate the fight against corruption. Other bodies instituted to fight corruption included the Citizens Vetting Committee (CVC), the National Investigation Committee (NIC) and the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ). The large number of agencies instituted to fight corruption is a pointer to the fact that corruption was quite endemic and that the various bodies may not have been able to effectively address the problem. Rawlings admitted the deep rooted nature of corruption when he was reported to have sad “There is still injustice and corruption. We have not learned in the past 10 years how to build a just and decent society in which every patriotic Ghanaian can find avenues to exercise his or her responsibility and moral authenticity. Indeed, it is quite intimidating to recognise how much there is still to be done
The high level of poverty was said to account for widespread corruption in Ghana during the period.

A corruption perception index for the years 1998 – 2000 scores Ghana 3.3 and 3.5 in 1998 and 1999 respectively out of a maximum score of 10. The ranking of Ghana amongst other African countries within the period revealed that Ghana placed 10th out of 18 countries in 1998 and ranked 11th out of 19 countries in 1999. In 2000 Ghana placed 6th out of 21 other African countries. Wikipedia (2009c) posited that these figures are a clear indication that corruption in Ghana as in most African countries, was problematic as the extra judicial killings undertaken to cleanse the society of corruption could not reduce to the barest minimum the incidence of corruption in that country. This is not to say however that the drastic measures was totally ineffective in curbing corruption as issues relating to corrupt practices were kept on the front burner.

The strong personality of Jerry Rawlings and the deep involvement of the state (i.e. a strong State) was largely responsible for the achievement recorded during the Rawlings administration, although for most part, Government sort a balance between satisfying the conditions set by WBI and instituting a democratic regime that guarantee fundamental human rights, improving living standards and the other basic principles required in a neo-liberal state. Despite the achievements, Rawlings years were not able to create an impressive growth in the economy that was sustainable.

Post Jerry Rawlings’ Era and Sustainable Development in Ghana
Ghana, no doubt has experienced some growth when compared with other African States. In the World Bank ranking and development index 2009, Ghana is ranked amongst countries with medium human development. As already indicated, countries in this category include China, Turkey, Tunisia, South Africa, Morocco, Egypt and Togo among others. According to the Human Development Report (UNDP, 2009), they are so classified because they have a Human Development Index (HDI) of between 0.500 and 0.799. Despite this classification, Ghana is still a low income country because the GDI per capital is US $875 or less as at 2005. It is a developing country where the living standards are far from being considered adequate. The figures on Table I indicate that 78.5% of Ghana’s population live below $2 a day while there are a significant percentage of children (22%) under 5 years of age are under-weight. Infant mortality rate in the country is 68 out of every 000 live birth while maternal mortality
rate is put at 560 per 100,000 live births. These figures give a clear indication that there are problems associated with the healthcare delivery system in that society in terms of accessibility, affordability and availability. Only about 18% of the population in Ghana use improved sanitation with obvious implication for diseases spread in the country. Life expectancy at birth remains at 59.1 years when compared to Iceland 81.0 years, Norway 79.3 and Morocco 70.4 years. Ghana ranked 135 out of 177 countries on the 2007/008 United Nation’s Human Development Index which are measured by life expectancy, adult literacy and per capital income. The USAID/Ghana Strategy Statement (2006) revealed, that educational opportunity remain limited as only 78% children who enrol on the first grade actually complete sixth grade while access to basic education remains challenging for girls, children with disability and those living in the three northern regions of the country.

Table 2 presents some selected indications of the structure of trade in selected countries in 2005. The Table reveal that Ghana is highly dependent on importation of goods and services while primary exports (Gold and Cocoa) largely dominate merchandise export. The USAID/Ghana Strategy Statement (2006) also revealed that although Ghana has one of the world’s largest known reserve of gold, the sector is dominated by foreign capital. Specifically, the statement noted that Newmont of the United States of America and Goldfield of South Africa together have the rights to mine vast amounts of Ghana’s identified gold reserves with the gold produced by Goldfield alone generating 12% of Ghana’s foreign exchange.

Ake’s (1996) position on the strategic position of the means of production holds true, that a country that does not control her means of production is at the mercy of those who control it. The rich mineral resources owned by Ghana are mined and processed for that country. The possibility of moving from a primary producer to an exporter of manufactured goods appears bleak especially within the framework of a globalized world dominated by the industrialised societies. Export of manufactured goods constitutes only 12% of merchandised exports in Ghana. Net foreign direct investment and other private flows which are both 1.0 of GDP cannot be considered adequate. Ghana is increasingly viewed as a gateway for American companies to the sub-region searching for suitable business environment. The country is the largest non-oil producing purchaser of United States of America’s exports in sub-Saharan Africa, while the country’s free market policy reforms have made the country attractive to traders and investors from the United States of America.
Although the agricultural sector still accounts for a higher percentage of the country’s employment, small holder farmers and owners of micro-small-and-medium enterprises, which constitute the vast majority of Ghana’s entrepreneurs, still find it difficult to access credit.

The successful succession processes in Ghana gives signals of a bold move to consolidate the democratic process however it has not translated to economic transformation of the Ghanaian economy. For Nigeria, available evidence does not indicate that the democratic process is yet to gain foot in the country for obvious reasons.

First, the leadership in Nigeria is engulfed in a crisis of self confidence arising from the discredited elections. The result of the 2007 presidential elections are still a matter of litigation in Courts while the election results in about two thirds of the States in Nigeria are still been contested in courts across the country. A number of these results were upturned in favour of the opposition political parties. The implication of these developments is that the political leadership at the centre and local levels are more concerned with securing there positions in office than focus on issues of development. Further to this Nigeria unlike Ghana is finding it difficult to play an active role in international politics.

Second, sourcing development capital is still crisis ridden. The low level of development of the productive forces has not placed the country in good stead to develop the industrial sector and specifically the manufacturing base. With an increasing demand for capital goods in the world market, Nigeria is a weakling in the global market. The country is largely dependent on oil as a major source of revenue despite the crisis surrounding its production and distribution processes. The high level of corruption in Nigeria ensures that revenue from oil receipts end up in private pockets.

Third and of particular interest to this study is an emerging trend among the political class and the elite corps in Nigeria. It is now becoming fashionable for family members of the political class, retired military officers and those of retired bureaucrats to contest and win elections into public office because they have the monumental wealth at their disposal to do so. Given that public office is adjudged as the easiest way to primitive capital accumulation a lot of investible funds are largely been consolidated in the coffers of few families in the country. This development is worrisome as the positive role played by the CHEABOLS in the development of the South Korean economy might not readily play out in
Nigeria. This conclusion is derived from the fact that the political class in South Korea was not the same as the economic class which the CHEABOLS represented and as such the political leadership was boldened to push the economic class in the direction it desired under a State driven economic development programme.

The emerging realities in Ghana and Nigeria as both countries adopt a democratic system under the eagle eyes of BWIs, confirms the suspicion of many that the system appears unable to engender sustainable development. The success story of the developed capitalist societies derived from the economic opportunity to access resources from the colonized regions. The socialist states were able to shut out the world and using authoritarian regimes developed their economies. The “Asian Tigers” seized certain opportunities that existed at the point of their economic take off to propel economic growth (Tenuche, 2001). Specifically, the “CHEABOLS” played key roles in the development of the South Korean economy under the watchful eyes of authoritarian regimes.

Emerging democracies are no more in a position to exploit these opportunities; rather they have to develop in a globalized economy within the constraints imposed by external forces largely directed by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI). It may however not be totally correct to lay all the blames of the inability of emerging democracies to positively propel economic growth in their societies at the door steps of external impositions given the basic character and nature of the state in emerging economies. It would appear that political development like economic development must emanate from within to be sustained.

**CONCLUSION**

The concept of liberal democracy as currently propagated by WBIs’ appears to have gained roots in Ghana. The question however is, can this translate to sustainable development in that country?

Available indicators that suggest improvement in the quality of living standards, shows that Ghana has recorded some appreciable growth compared with countries classified as having low human development like Nigeria in spite of her huge oil resources. However, there are no indications to show that Ghana is on the part to attaining sustainable development in the near future as she is still largely dependent on raw material exports with faint hope for genuine industrialisation. The achievements
recorded under the liberal democracy framework have only created a conducive atmosphere for easy exploitation of available resources in that country by the advanced industrialised economies.

To attain development, there is every need to commence a process of growth internally that is sustainable to propel development. This would require strong State intervention to provide the required leading ideological framework. Investment capital must be sourced and properly channelled to achieve this objective. Events in history have shown that this has not been possible without strong State intervention as it happened in Russia, South Korea, China, among others. The concept of liberal democracy has served as a limiting force as concepts such as freedom, fundamental rights are often used to cover the crude methods of capital accumulation by the elite, a development that is becoming entrenched in developing societies. The concept has also created the leverage for uninterrupted exploitation of developing societies by the industrialised world.

REFERENCES


Tenuche M. (2001). Liberalization and Industrial Development in Nigeria. Anyigba Journal of Arts and Humanities, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Kogi State University, Anyigba. 1(1): 110


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Source: Adapted from UNDP (2007:229-233)
### TABLE II: SELECTED INDICATORS OF STRUCTURE OF TRADE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (2005)

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Source: Adapted from UNDP (2007:286-288)