What We Know and What We Should Know about American Trial Trends

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More than a few people noticed that the American court system was seeing ever fewer trials before Marc Galanter named the phenomenon.  But until Galanter mobilized lawyers and scholars to look systematically at the issue, inquiry was both piecemeal and sparse. Over the past three years, in contrast, Galanter’s research and his idea entrepreneurship, crystallized in the “Vanishing Trial” label, has spawned if not a huge literature at least a substantial one. We have now gotten the benefit of sustained scholarly inquiry by researchers of many stripes. Their work has been largely, though not entirely, empirical, and so we have gained a good deal of positive knowledge.

This brief essay first summarizes some of that knowledge—in particular, the chief features we know about the shrinking civil trial docket in federal district courts. Next, it proposes four areas of future investigation necessary to understand the contours of the trend and to assess its causes. Then, I bring together the causal hypotheses that have already been proposed, none of which has yet been securely tested. Finally, in an appended bibliography, I list data sources, reports, and scholarly analyses that will be useful to those doing future work.

* Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. My thanks to John Lande for inviting me to comment on Marc Galanter’s 2005 Annual Distinguished Alternative Dispute Resolution Lecture, “A World Without Trials?” This paper is expanded from those brief comments. I received helpful comments from the members of the Washington University Workshop on Empirical Research in Law, and as always, from Sam Bagenstos. Any remaining errors are, of course, my responsibility.


I. WHAT WE KNOW.

Because the federal courts’ information infrastructure is relatively fully developed, our knowledge is richest as to federal civil trials. These are only a very small portion of the American civil docket, let alone the entire court system. They leave out not only federal criminal cases, and not only state court cases, but also the many adjudicative events that we classify as administrative “hearings” rather than court “trials”—social security disability hearings, workers’ compensation hearings, federal contract dispute appeals, and so on. In numbers, these dwarf the federal civil docket. Nonetheless, the federal civil docket looms large in importance if not in volume, if only because the federal bench is the most prestigious and federal procedures set the norms for other adjudicative arenas. In any event, given that we know so much more about federal civil trials than any other kind, it seems useful to begin there. So, after four Vanishing Trial symposia and numerous other articles, we know the following:

The district courts, taken as a whole, reports a decrease in the number of civil trials held. The major data source for this claim is information gathered for a variety of court administrative purposes by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO). The shrinking trial docket is evident when one counts cases according to the figures in the AO’s published tables, which classify cases by the adjudicative stage they reach prior to termination, and therefore enumerate cases that reach the trial stage regardless of whether they are resolved by a trial verdict. It is equally observable when one uses other measures of trial rates available after manipulation of the raw AO data—counting cases terminated by jury or judge verdict, or counting cases in which a jury or judge verdict is coded as producing “judgment for plaintiff,” “judgment for defendant” or “judgment for both.” In addition, there is a great deal of confirmatory evidence of other types. Just to pick an example, a Wall Street Journal article last December, headed “Trial-less Lawyers” described how law firms and corporate general counsels have been responding, recently, to the shrinking trial docket.

Moreover, we know something about the character of the decline of the federal civil trial. The evidence suggests, for example, that over the past twenty-five years, jury trial rates have fallen much less than have bench trial rates. Jury trials have gone from about 2.5 percent of dispositions in 1979 to under 1 percent of dispositions in 2004—in raw numbers, from 3,526 to 2,529. This is a notable
change, to be sure; a 30 percent numeric decrease, and a 60 percent decrease as a proportion of dispositions. But bench trials have diminished much more; from about 4.5 percent of dispositions to about .5 percent (a decrease of close to ninetentahts), and 5,852 to 1,422 (a decrease of 75 percent). In other words, in federal courts, the jury trial may be shrinking, but it is the bench trial that is vanishing.

In addition, looking at the cases by substantive type, we know a good deal about the components of the federal civil trial docket. Tort cases in particular used to go to trial at a markedly high rate, but no longer do. Prior to 1996, tort cases made up the largest group of tried cases (bigger than the next two categories combined until 1976), but now rank second. Contract trials, too, have declined from the second to the third largest category. On the other hand, civil rights trials (which include statutory causes of action like employment discrimination suits, as well as constitutional litigation) have emerged as the largest single component of the trial docket, because even though they too are seeing a slowing trial rate, the change has been slower than for other case categories. The fourth biggest portion of the federal civil trial docket is prisoner civil rights cases, which have a complex history. The first important trend in this case category was the growing docket, prior to 1996. This was caused first by a precipitous increase in the inmate filing rate (measured as new suits per incarcerated person) in the 1970s, and then, even after the filing rate stabilized around 1980, by the tripling of the nation’s incarcerated population. Restriction of prisoners’ rights in 1996, by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, prompted a decline of over 40 percent in prisoner filings over the last 10 years. But prisoner’s civil trials remain crucial to understand because, simultaneously, even though (like all the major case categories) inmate cases are reaching trial more rarely than they used to, they have grown just a bit closer to the ordinary low trial rate.

I could go on, summarizing some of the more minor points the accumulating literature has established—observations about magistrate judge trials, multidistrict litigation, length of trial, and the like. More important than any of these, however, are the things we do not know. If the goal is to understand why trials have declined, there seem to me to be four urgent areas of future inquiry, which apply both to the federal civil docket and to any other docket in which many trials are held. In none of these areas will traditional case research provide much in-

10. Hadfield, supra note 7, at 714, 715 fig.1.
11. Galanter states that the trial rate for tort cases was 16.5 percent of dispositions in 1962; the total trial rate that year was 11.5 percent of dispositions. See Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 3, at 466; 533-34 tbl.A-2. By in 2002, only 2.2 percent of torts were resolved by trial, compared to the similar 1.8 percent of all dispositions. Id.
12. Id. at 536 tbl.A-4.
13. Id. at 467-68; 536 tbl.A-4.
14. Galanter reports that 19.7 percent of all (non-inmate) civil rights cases saw trial in 1970, compared to 10 percent of all cases; in 2002, 3.8 percent of civil rights cases were tried, compared to 1.8 percent of all cases. See Galanter, Vanishing Trials, supra note 3.
16. Galanter reports that “at its peak in 1970, 4.5 percent of prisoner petition terminations were by trial; just 1 percent were by trial in 2002.” Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 3, at 472. Because the overall trial rate was 10 percent in 1970 and 1.8 percent in 2002, that means that the inmate petition trial rate went from .45 of the overall rate in 1970 to .56 of the overall rate in 2002. Note that Galanter is following the AO’s categorization, by considering together both inmate civil rights cases and habeas petitions. This is a bit misleading, because the two types of cases follow entirely different patterns.
sight; reported opinions are simply beside the point, for these questions. Rather, research will primarily need to use statistical information about case outcomes, docket and pleadings research, and interviews and surveys. The next part of this essay surveys what we should be trying to find out about American trial trends.

II. WHAT WE SHOULD KNOW

A. Confirmation

There can be little question that the number of trials is in decline. The magnitude of the decrease, however, is questionable. Gillian Hadfield’s auditing work suggests that the actual magnitude of the decline may well be smaller than the AO data suggest.17 Even in the federal civil docket, it would be useful for researchers to understand better the mundane issues that are clearly producing some noise in the data. Some of the observed vanishing trial phenomena is probably a statistical artifact of the AO’s 1987 docket coding changes, and its odd choice to include non-final terminations in the denominator of its published tables. In addition, there has been a change in the coding of magistrate judge trials that needs investigation. Confirmation and clean data are essential for more nuanced causal analysis.

Finally, it would be useful to confirm that the evident trends are not actually the result of a shift from court to administrative litigation. In the absence of national administrative data, this could be done with a few individual district studies.

B. Disaggregation

Even more urgent is disaggregation. We simply do not know much about the experience in different courts. Has the shift in the mean percentage of trials in the court system as a whole been accompanied by a shift in the variance among courts? Are any differences among trial rates by court caused by different approaches to similar cases, or are they rather artifacts of the courts’ different dockets? Similarly, we do not really understand much about the different trial rates by case type and the differential shifts in those rates over time. Again, are these real features of the docket, do they simply mask correlative differences among districts, or are the rates based on the individual/collectivity status of the parties? Disaggregation would uncover the kind of variation that allows hypothesis testing.

More particularly, trial data should be disaggregated by system (that is, by district for federal court and by state for state court); by type of case; and by type of litigant (public, corporate, individual). The more detailed descriptive statistics that would emerge will be interesting in their own right. In addition, there would emerge plenty of room for multivariate inferential statistics. Furthermore, disaggregation would allow analysis to include potentially confounding non-causes. For example, changes in employment discrimination doctrine may well have an important impact on that portion of the trial court docket. Considering employment cases separately would allow this kind of possibility to be tested.

One of the questions that needs answering is—Where have all the trials gone? Though everybody has a favorite candidate, there is little evidence with which to assess which non-trial outcomes have taken up the slack left by the trial, let alone if a particular feature of these non-trial outcomes is driving changes in trial rates. To answer that question will require improved data on the non-trial outcomes. These include: (A) non-final terminations of two types—large-scale dispositions such as class action consolidation and multidistrict litigation transfers, and individual dispositions such as removal or venue changes; (B) settlement via arbitration, mediation, or simple agreement; (C) non-trial adjudication by dismissal of one kind or another, or summary judgment; and (D) unilateral withdrawal or default by either party.

D. Disputes vs. Trials

Finally, we need to understand vastly more about the disputes from which litigation develops, and how the underlying dispute landscape has changed over time. This information is impossible to come by globally, but has sometimes been developed for individual case types. For example, in topical areas in which insurance is universal or near universal, closed claims files can often be used. Without information about changes in the number and nature of disputes, we run the risk of mistaking changing litigation trends for causes rather than effects.

III. HYPOTHESES

If these four areas of inquiry are developed, researchers will be in a much better position to examine hypotheses about causes of the decline in trials. After reading the accumulating research, I have compiled a list of plausible hypotheses:

I. Changes in case mix have caused the decline in trials.
   A. Cases have gotten bigger and more complex;\footnote{18} costlier cases are less trial prone, because high transaction costs “enlarge the overlap in settlement ranges.”\footnote{19}
   B. There has been a decreasing proportion of cases in substantive areas that are more trial prone.\footnote{20}
   C. The increase in amount in controversy required for diversity jurisdiction\footnote{21} has contributed, because it has promoted a relative decline in filing of diversity cases, which are particularly likely to reach trial.\footnote{22}

\footnote{19. Galanter, \textit{Vanishing Trial}, supra note 3, at 517.}
\footnote{20. See, e.g., Burbank, \textit{supra} note 5, at 583-84 & nn. 46-48.}
\footnote{22. See, e.g., Burbank, \textit{supra} note 5, at 584.}
D. The decline of inmate civil rights filings since 1995 has contributed.23
E. The increase in (non-trial prone) cases in which individual plaintiffs sue collectivities has contributed.24

II. Changes in litigant abilities/needs/desires have caused the decline in trials.
A. Less experienced lawyers25 and judges26 want to avoid trial.
B. The push-effect of risk: Litigants, particularly organizational litigants, increasingly want to avoid trial because they (rightly or wrongly) perceive trial as increasingly risky.27
C. The pull-effect of alternative dispute resolution: Perhaps litigants, especially corporate and governmental defendants, are influenced by the growing salience of positive accounts of settlement as collaborative, reparative, and otherwise attractive,28 or the negative valence increasingly attached to trial as opposed to settlement.29
D. As the economics of the plaintiffs’ bar has developed, so that it is now characterized by more robust capitalization, diversification, and case selection, plaintiffs’ counsel have become a more even match for the defense. This increased ability to invest in discovery and other litigation development pushes defendants to settle.30
E. Increasingly well-trained lawyers are more skilled and better able to read signals and devise bargains, improving settlement prospects.

III. The courts are decreasingly interested in or able to provide trials.
A. Increase in civil dockets coupled with resources constraints create a growing number of cases per judge and depresses trials.31
B. The press of criminal business – more federal prosecutions, more sentencing work, and less plea bargaining – depresses civil trials.32
C. Managerial judging ideology, embraced by courts beginning in the 1970s, depresses trials.33

25. See American College of Trials Lawyers, supra note 2, at 22-21 (discussing the possibility that young lawyers have less trial experience than in earlier times); see also Koppel, supra note 8.
27. See American College of Trial Lawyers, supra note 2, at 18-20 (discussing counsels’ increasing fear of juries).
28. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is the Adversary System Really Dead? Dilemmas of Legal Ethics as Legal Institutions and Roles Evolve, in CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS (Jane Holder et al. eds., 2004).
30. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Vanishing Civil Trial: Getting What We Asked For; Getting What We Paid For, and Not Liking What We Got?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL. STUD. 943 (2004).
31. Cf. Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 3, at 519 (casting doubt on this hypothesis).
D. The rise of the “law-giving” judge depresses trials, as judges increasingly adjudicate cases via law (dismissals, summary judgments) rather than facts.\textsuperscript{34} 
E. Doctrine has grown more clear, creating less uncertainty about results, which promotes both settlement and legal, rather than factual, adjudication.

IV. Procedural reforms and innovations now provide alternatives to trial, making trial less attractive.
A. Class actions combine many trials into one settlement.
B. Multi-district litigation promotes settlement.
C. The rise of alternative dispute resolution, whether free-standing or court-annexed, voluntary or mandatory, has increased settlement.\textsuperscript{35}
D. Expanded pretrial discovery depresses trial in three ways.
   1. Where once a trial subpoena was necessary for some types of investigation, pretrial discovery can now reach all known information.\textsuperscript{36}
   2. Expansive discovery produces information, which in turn promotes shared expectations about trial damages, which promotes settlement.
   3. Expansive discovery imposing substantial costs means that law is cheaper than fact.

V. The decline in trials is just one result of our society’s general “turn against law”—which is promoting a shift of law from hard to soft; rigor to bargaining, negotiation.\textsuperscript{37}

Some of these hypotheses are undoubtedly true; others will turn out to be demonstrably false. All are worth testing.

\textsuperscript{34} Miller, supra note 33, at 1071; Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Towards Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 571 (2004).

\textsuperscript{35} As Steve Burbank suggests, this actually elides two different possibilities: “ADR is keeping out of court cases that are disproportionately those that would have gone to trial, and second, [...] court-annexed ADR is causing more settlements than otherwise would have occurred before trial.” Burbank, supra note 5, at 585. For the limited data that exist, see Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843 (2004).

\textsuperscript{36} See Yeazell, supra note 30, at 949.

\textsuperscript{37} Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 3; Galanter, World Without Trials, supra note 3; Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285 (2002); Resnik, supra note 4, at 813-14.
APPENDIX

The source list below includes several datasets that I have posted for public access at: http://schlanger.wustl.edu (under “Resources”).

I. Nationwide Federal Civil Cases.
   A. Available data sources:
      1. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Terminated cases. The major data source about the federal civil docket is transmitted by district court clerks to the AO, which compiles it into a database.38 It is available in four formats, and is also the basis of many of the reports cited below.
         a) Published reports: under a variety of titles39 as the Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts.
         b) Raw data. The AO database is available from the Inter-university Consortium on Social and Political Research. The study numbers are 8429; 3415; 4059; 4026; 4348. See www.icpsr.umich.edu.
         c) Somewhat processed data. Several researchers have merged the civil portion AO data, which requires some processing. My version of this database is available in Stata format at http://schlanger.wustl.edu (under “Resources”), along with code to replicate the aggregation of the various datasets. For more details on assembling and using the database, see the web-published Technical Appendix to Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra note 15, at http://schlanger.wustl.edu (under “Publications”).
      5. Federal Judicial Center’s data on 54 district courts’ use of ADR referrals (38 districts are complete for all years 1998-2005). Data are available, courtesy of the Federal Judicial Center, at http://schlanger.wustl.edu (under “Resources”).

39. A complete list of titles and citations, assembled by Mark Kloempken, is available at http://schlanger.wustl.edu (under “Resources”).
B. Reports using the above:


C. Scholarly investigations of trial rates using the above, at least in part.

- **Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years of War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255** (2005).
- **Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differentiating Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Assessment of the Changing...**


D. Other relevant data focused reports and scholarship.


II. Federal bankruptcy data, including on trials.


III. Federal criminal data, including data on trials.

A. Raw data: Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base (See I.A.1, above).

B. Published reports:

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IV. Nationwide State Court Data: Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Court Statistics Project of the National Center for State Courts.
A. Raw data:
- Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2001 (ICPSR 6587).
- Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 1996 (ICPSR 2883).
- Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 1992 (ICPSR 3957).
- Additional data from the Court Statistics Project of the National Center for State Courts on dispositions, available at http://schlanger.wustl.edu (under “Resources”).
- Annual publication: Examining the Work of State Courts.
- State Court Statistics, 2002 (ICPSR 3990).

B. BJS AND NCSC Reports.
1. Bureau of Justice Statistics, all civil trials:

2. Bureau of Justice Statistics, contract trials:
3. Bureau of Justice Statistics, tort trials:

C. Scholarly articles:

V. Studies in state courts, with more limited geographical reach.
A. RAND Institute of Civil Justice. The RAND ICJ jury verdict database includes all state trial courts of general jurisdiction in the states of California and New York; Cook County, Illinois (Chicago); the St. Louis, Missouri, metropolitan area; and Harris County, Texas (Houston), from 1985 until the present.
1. Raw Data:
   - Jury Verdicts Database for Cook County, Illinois and All Counties in California, 1960-84 (ICPSR 6232).
   - Survey of Tort Litigants in Three State Courts, 1989-90 (ICPSR 9699).
2. RAND Reports. Anything noted as available online can be found at http://www.rand.org/publications/CP/CP253/CP253.pdf.
   - ERIK MOLLER, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985, RAND MR-694-ICJ (1996). Describes all civil jury verdicts reached from 1985 to 1994 in the state courts of general juris-
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diction in 15 jurisdictions across the nation (including identifying trends in these verdicts).

- MARK A. PETERSON, A SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS: TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS, RAND P-7222 (1986).

B. Other studies, as reported in scholarly articles:

- Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 267 (1975) (sampled civil cases in two California counties from 1890 to 1970).
- Stephen Daniels, Continuity and Change in Patterns of Case Handling: A Case Study of Two Rural Counties, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 381, 401 (criminal trials in two Illinois counties from 1970 to 1940-60).

VI. State Court Criminal Trials.

A. Raw Data:

- Census of State Felony Courts, 1985 (ICPSR 8667).
- The National Judicial Reporting Program; 1986 (ICPSR 9073); 1988 (ICPSR 9449); 1990 (ICPSR 6038); 1992 (ICPSR 6509); 1994 (ICPSR 6855); 1996 (ICPSR 2660); 1998 (ICPSR 3316); 2000 (ICPSR 3802); 2002 (ICPSR 4203).

B. Reports:


VII. Articles examining, explaining, or otherwise relevant to the vanishing trial phenomenon.


John Lande, *Shifting the Focus from the Myth of “The Vanishing Trial” to Complex Conflict Management Systems, or I Learned Almost Everything I need to Know about Conflict Resolution from Marc Galanter*, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 191 (2005).


Stephen C. Yeazell, *Getting What We Asked For, Getting What We Paid For, and Not Liking What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial*, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943 (2004).