Melbourne Business School

From the SelectedWorks of Mara Olekalns

Summer August 4, 2012

Negotiator Resilience.docx

Brianna B Caza
Mara Olekalns

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/mara_olekalns/34/
Not So Smooth: The Role of Efficacy in Promoting Negotiator Resilience

Brianna Barker Caza
Asper School of Business
University of Manitoba

Mara Olekalns
Melbourne Business School
University of Melbourne

Symposium Presentation
So Smooth: The role of Efficacy in Promoting Negotiator Resilience

ABSTRACT

Negotiator resilience is an important but understudied concept in the negotiations literature. We integrate the negotiations and resilience literature to demonstrate that adversity in negotiations can lead to a variety of responses ranging from counterproductive to constructive and resilient. Further, we propose that negotiation efficacy (NE), defined as a general confidence in one’s negotiation abilities, is an important resource that promotes constructive, resilient responses to negotiation adversity. Using an experimental design with a sample of MBA students we test these predictions. Our findings indicate that NE is an important resource that influences constructive responses to negotiation adversity. We discuss the implications for these findings for both negotiation research and practice. We hope that this paper will serve as an important launching point for future work on negotiator resilience.

Keywords: negotiation, resilience, negotiation adversity, efficacy
So Smooth: The Role of Efficacy in Promoting Negotiator Resilience

Like many aspects of organizational life, negotiations are punctuated by unpredictable negative events. The idea that negative events interrupt negotiating processes is reflected in the literature on turning points, defined as moments in which the direction of a negotiation is changed (Druckman, Husbands, & Johnson, 1999). Negative events often mark choice points for negotiators where they can either ruminate about the unexpected change, ultimately stalling or perhaps even halting their negotiation progress, or they can choose to recover from these setbacks and move forward, adapting their negotiation strategies when necessary. Although much of the broader organizational literature has focused on minimizing exposure to negative events, such an approach is neither realistic nor sustainable, especially in negotiations. Simply put: negative events cannot always be avoided or controlled, and frequently cannot be predicted. Similarly, even the best prepared negotiator cannot anticipate every negative event. It is therefore important to focus not on how negotiators can eliminate the occurrence of such events but instead on how they can constructively respond to them, using them as opportunities for resilience.

In addition to uncovering variance in responses to adverse events in negotiations, we draw on the broader work resilience literature to identify the conditions under which negotiators respond constructively, rather than
counterproductively. Specifically, we look at negotiation efficacy as a resource that may help negotiators to be resilient in the face of negotiation adversity. By looking at both whether negotiator resilience occurs and when it occurs, this paper will help to advance our understanding of the negotiation process in important ways. In the next section, we define negotiator resilience by focusing on each of its two critical subcomponents: negotiation adversity and response to adversity, and make predictions about the roles of negotiation adversity and negation efficacy in producing negotiator resilience. Then, we present data from MBA students testing these predictions. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for research negotiation and practice.

Negotiator Resilience: Responding Constructively to Adversity

Resilience is the result of a dynamic process of positive adaptation after experiences of adversity, that is, an ability to learn from challenging events and to apply this knowledge in the face of future negative events (Caza & Milton, 2012; Luthar, Chichetti & Becker, 2000). Resilience involves positive adaptation to events that threaten the viability, the function, or the development of a system (Masten, 2014). In the context of negotiations, we construe of negotiator resilience, as being characterized by adaptation of negotiation strategies in ways that help to redirect a dysfunctional process into a more constructive relational process in the face of negotiation adversity. As such, two important components of negotiator resilience are: negotiation adversity and negotiator responses to this adversity. In the following section we detail each.

Negotiation Adversity. In negotiations, individuals face both ongoing and abrupt challenges (Drukman & Olekalns, 2013). Examples of ongoing challenges include the need to reach agreement despite different and often opposing preferences.
NEGOTIATOR RESILIENCE

(Northcraft & Neal, 1987), as well as the need to continually revise their plans in light of information about their opponents’ needs and interests (Olekalns & Weingart, 2008). In addition to these chronic challenges, negotiators can encounter acute and unexpected events that interrupt their negotiation (Olekalns & Smith, 2005). One important source of adversity within a negotiation that can be especially impactful on the negotiation process is relational adversity. Because negotiators are interdependent, relying on each other to achieve their goals and preferred outcomes, the negotiation relationship itself can be the source of both ongoing and abrupt challenges. Not only must negotiators weather these challenges in the moment in order to reach agreement but, because relationships are often on-going, those challenges need to be weathered in a way that preserves and strengthens those relationships for the benefit of future negotiations. O’Connor, Arnold and Burris (2005), for example, show that negotiators who reach impasse in their first negotiation are likely to again impasse (or obtain poor outcomes) in a subsequent negotiation. As such, in order to understand negotiator resilience, it is essential not to just look at immediate reactions to adversity, but also long-term negotiation behavior. To do so, in this research, we seek to differentiate negotiators who display resilience and move past early relational adversities to have productive negotiation relationships with the same partners in the future from those who do not.

One trigger of relational adversity is having low power in an unequal power negotiation. We adopt a relational view of power, which highlights mutuality or degree of dependence between two negotiators, as in indicator of power (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; Wolfe & McGinn, 2005). Negotiators have unequal dependence, and a power differential, when one negotiator relies more heavily on the other to obtain outcomes; they have equal dependence, and no power differential, when they both
NEGOTIATOR RESILIANCE

have equivalent alternatives. In unequal dependence negotiations, the negotiator with lots of alternatives has relatively high power, whereas the negotiator with relatively fewer alternatives will have low power (Kim, Pinkley & Fragile, 2005).

While all negotiations can have the potential for negative relational processes, negotiating from a position of low power in a negotiation with non-mutual dependence especially likely trigger relational adversity and therefore likely to contribute to bad negotiation outcomes. Unequal (non-mutual) dependence is likely to trigger an adverse relational negotiation situation for the more dependent (low power) negotiator because it impedes her or his ability to get a desired outcome from the negotiation. Further, having low power is psychologically taxing for individuals. Negotiating when there is unequal dependence is often associated with greater anxiety and perceived threat, greater vigilance, and less effective negotiating than mutual dependence (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2003; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Rubin & Zartman, 2000; Rusbult & van Lange, 2003). As such, the experience of low power in an unequal dependence negotiation is likely to make the negotiation seem less pleasant.

Additionally, research on high power negotiators’ behavior in unequal dependence negotiation suggests that low power negotiators may have trouble establishing a positive relationship with their counterparts. Having high power with several viable alternatives leads these individuals to have high aspirations (Pinkley, 1995), and the resources to obtain these aspirations, and often leads them to act more boldly in their own self-interest during the negotiation. For instance, Magee, Galinsky and Greenfield (2007) have shown that negotiating from a high-power position with strong alternatives lead negotiators to move first and make stronger first offers. Other research has shown that high-power negotiators also fare better when faced with highball first offers (Schweinsberg, Kua, Wang & Pillutla, 2012). These findings,
combined with researching showing that individuals with high power are not motivated to pay attention to other people (Fiske, 1993; Lee & Tiedens, 2001), suggest that negotiating with a high powered individual may contribute to more adverse negotiation experiences, both subjectively and objectively than when individuals are negotiating in situations where there is no power differential. When both partners have similar alternatives, and relatively equal dependence the negotiation process is likely to be smoother because there are no power differences triggering relational adversity.

**H1a. Negotiators with low power in unequal power negotiations will report more adverse negotiation experiences than negotiators with equal power in early negotiations**

**H1b. Negotiators with low power in unequal power negotiations will have less positive initial negotiation outcomes than those with equal power.**

**Negotiator Resilience.** While the literature reviewed above suggests that negotiating from a position of low-power can trigger relational adversity that could potentially halt or impede the negotiation process, and even perhaps corrode future negotiations between the same negotiators, this does not always happen. The negotiation literature has demonstrated that such adverse events can contribute to either negative or positive change in the negotiation process (Druckman & Olekalns, 2013). As such, negotiation adversity can be considered a trigger that changes the pattern of interaction (Druckman, 2004). Negotiator’s responses to this trigger can either make this adverse event a stopping point in the negotiation, or it could lead to a turning point, or departure in the original pattern of relating within the negotiation.

Negotiators can respond to adverse events in one of three main ways which determine the role of the adverse event in their negotiation process. Two responses to
adverse events – persisting with an initial strategy despite adversity or giving up and walking away from the negotiation – are counterproductive and have negative consequences for the negotiation. Yet, psychologically, many negotiators are prone toward such responses. In adverse situations, when people feel threatened, they often restrict their information processing and enact well-learned, rigid, responses to this threat (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981). This means that negotiators who feel threatened by negotiation adversity may become rigidly attached to a single strategy, despite it not yielding the results they wanted. Alternatively, they may just give up and walk away. Not only can these two strategies result in undesirable negotiation outcomes for the current negotiation, they are also likely to compromise the quality of future negotiations.

Yet, importantly, from our perspective, negotiation adversity can also serve as an important turning point which offers negotiators an opportunity to re-frame the negotiation issues and strategies. When facing adversity, negotiators may choose to adjust their strategy, and to adapt it in a way that improves their relationship with the other negotiator, halting (and perhaps even reversing) a negative pattern of interaction. The adverse event becomes a positive interruption, an opportunity for sensemaking (Weick, 1995) and re-strategizing. In this way, seemingly negative events can inspire what we are terming negotiator resilience. We define negotiator resilience both as persisting with the negotiation in the face of adversity, and also learning from the experience and adapting strategies in ways that help to redirect a dysfunctional process into a more constructive relational process. When faced with adversity, individuals may feel initially inclined to become more self-protective and competitive, which may stall or even halt the negotiation process. It is important for negotiators to overcome this urge and take steps to ensure a positive relational
NEGOTIATOR RESILIENCE

process, especially when negotiating with long-term partners (such as an HR manager). A key question, then, is what contributes to negotiator resilience in the context of negotiation adversity? As our goal in this paper is not to document the potential for negative spirals after adversarial negotiations, but instead to look at what factors impact when these negative events do not occur, we sought to understand which factors may contribute to more productive responses to negotiation adversity.

Drawing from the literature on resilience and negotiations, we consider whether negotiators’ self-based cognitive resources, that is, their negotiation self-efficacy, affect how negotiators respond to relational adversity.

*Negotiation efficacy as a resource for Negotiator Resilience:* There is good reason to believe that negotiator’s sense of general efficacy about their negotiating ability will influence how they manage the negotiation process in the face of negotiation adversity, both in the short term, as well as in the long term. Self-efficacy refers to individuals’ beliefs in their capabilities to produce certain outcomes or goals, and is an important precursor to agentic behavior (Bandura, 1997). When faced with adversity, individuals' belief that they can still control the outcome will impact their decision to persevere (Bandura, Pastorelli, Barbaranelli & Caprara, 1999). Moreover, research has shown that self-efficacy is linked to adaptive and flexible behavior in the face of adverse circumstances (Bandura & Wood, 1989; Bandura, 2001). In this way, self-efficacy should not only motivate individuals to continue trying, but it will also help them to learn, grow, and adapt their strategies. Additionally, research has shown that efficacy is associated with more relational, interdependent cognitive and behavioral patterns which cultivate positive social relationships with others (Bandura, Caprara & Pastorelli, 1996). Drawing from this research, we hypothesize that self-
efficacy will be linked to negotiator resilience, by producing more relational negotiation strategies:

\textit{H2a. Initial levels of negotiation efficacy will be associated with more relational negotiation strategies when individuals encounter negotiation adversity.}

Further, we expect that the use of relational negotiation strategies will have a positive effect on negotiation efficacy levels after negotiating in an adverse situation. By acting relationally, despite adversity, individuals will have more confidence in their own negotiation skills. As such, there will be a positive, virtuous cycle wherein adversity that is overcome through the use of relational strategies will build confidence in one’s general negotiation abilities.

\textit{H2b. The use of relational strategies during negotiation adversity will be positively associated with levels of negotiation efficacy after the negotiation.}

\textit{Long-term Effects of NE on Negotiator Behavior}

As previously mentioned, negotiator resilience is not only displayed in the moment that adversity is experienced, but also afterwards, in future negotiations. Negotiation experiences often have a spillover effect on future negotiations, especially when individuals are negotiating with the same partner. If individuals emerge from a negotiation feeling efficacious, and confident in their ability to negotiate, we believe this will further enhance their relational focus in future negotiations.

\textit{H3a: Post-Negotiation Efficacy will be associated with future relational behavior strategies.}

However, we believe NE may play an even more critical role in promoting relational behavior after experiences of negotiation adversity. In other words, we predict that there will be an interaction between experiences of adversity and NE such
that experiences of negotiation adversity will activate the effect of NE on relational behavior. We expect that low levels of NE will lead individuals who are in adverse negotiations to feel threatened, and therefore tend toward rigid, well-learned self-protective negotiation behaviors (Bandura, 1986; Staw et al., 1981) that may sacrifice their relationships in order to protect their own interests. Research has shown that individuals with low efficacy tend to become preoccupied with the risk of failure when they face challenges (Bandura & Wood, 1989). As such, we expect that when individuals have little confidence in their ability to negotiate effectively, and they encounter adversity, they will become preoccupied with their failures, and are likely to act less relationally and more competitively in future negotiations with the same partner.

However, we expect that negotiators who have faced adversity, been able to act relationally in the moment, and therefore have high levels of NE after the adverse negotiation will feel confident enough to take steps to preserve the negotiation relationship in later negotiations. Bandura and Wood (1989) have shown that self-efficacy increases individuals’ willingness to take risks. As such, individuals who have experienced negotiation adversity and have NE may believe they can continue to control the process and avert exploitation if they switch to a more risky, less self-interested relational strategy.

\[ H3b: \text{Experiences of Negotiation Adversity will moderate the effect of negotiator resilience such that negotiation efficacy will affect resilience in unequal power, more than equal power relationships.} \]

METHODS

Overview: To test our theory, we placed negotiators into either an ‘easy’ or ‘difficult’ initial negotiation situation and then measured the amount of “adversity”
NEGOTIATOR RESILIENCES

they perceived during the negotiation as well as the actions that they engaged in while negotiating. To create these two different experiences, we manipulated negotiators’ alternatives that that they have to reaching agreement in a present negotiation. Many previous studies have operationalized negotiator power as BATNA (e.g., Magee et al., 2007; Scheepers, de Wit, Ellemers & Sassenberg, 2012). When both negotiators have several alternatives, the negotiation becomes ‘easier’ because power is relatively equal, and both partners perceive that they can invoke those alternatives and walk away at any point. However, when only one negotiator has many alternatives while the other has none, the negotiation becomes ‘difficult’ for the negotiator with few or no alternatives because she or he cannot walk away. This negotiator would perceive her/himself to have low power, and therefore the negotiation will be experienced as adverse. After randomly assigning negotiators into a low or high powered position, we had them complete two consecutive job contract negotiations (New Recruit and Outside Offer), described as taking place one year apart, with the same partner. We collected data on their efficacy, experiences, and strategies at three points in time. Our aim was to understand how self-efficacy moderates the relationship between negotiation difficulty and negotiators’ strategy choices within and across negotiations.

Participants: We asked 58 masters level participants to complete the two consecutive job contract negotiations. Each participant was randomly assigned to the role of recruiter or job candidate and remained in the same role throughout both negotiations.

Conditions: Participants pairs were assigned randomly to one of two conditions: mutual vs non-mutual interdependence manipulated by recruiters’ BATNA. In the first negotiation, we manipulated adversity by either by giving the recruiter a significantly higher BATNA, creating a situation of non-mutual
NEGOTIATOR RESILIENCE

dependence for the applicant (low power, adverse condition), or the same BATNA, creating equal dependence between the applicant and recruiter (non-adverse, control condition)

Data Points. We gathered data from participants at three points in time, as summarized then explained in detail below.

Time 1: Baseline; before 1st negotiation: measured negotiation efficacy
Time 2: Directly after 1st negotiation: measured negotiation efficacy
Time 3: A week after the 1st negotiation, while planning 2nd negotiation: measured subjective experience of the negotiation (own and other actions), and measured planned response to 2nd negotiation (future action).

Before and after the first job negotiation, participants completed a self-efficacy scale adapted to negotiation. Also, a week after the first negotiation, participants responded to open-ended questions about their own and partners’ behavior in the first negotiation and their strategy for the subsequent negotiation. These questions assessed the degree to which they perceived their partners’ actions as relational, and the degree to which their own strategy to negotiate with this same partner in the following negotiation was relational.

Measures.

Negotiation Efficacy. We used a measure of negotiation efficacy using a seven-item scale of general self-efficacy (Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001) adapted to the negotiation context. This scale had high internal consistency.

Past and Future Relational Behavior. To measure relational behavior during the first negotiation the two authors coded the responses to the open ended questions described above. Specifically, the two coders each independently coded participants’ descriptions of their own and partner’s past actions as either facilitatory (moved the
negotiation forward) or inhibitory (moved the negotiation backward). Once this coding was done by each of the authors independently, all cases were discussed. In this discussion there were two instances of discrepancy between the two coders, but these were resolved after during the discussion. To measure future relational behavior strategies the authors followed the same coding procedure to code the participant’s own future actions relative to their partner’s actions. Together, this coding approach of both past and future actions yielded four categories: cooperative spillover (cooperative-cooperative sequence of actions), competitive spillover (competitive-competitive), competitive de-escalation (competitive- cooperative), and competitive escalation (cooperative-competitive).

**Analysis.** We first analyzed effect of the adversity manipulation on the impact of the initial negotiation outcomes. Then, to test the effects of adversity on own, partner’s and future actions using an ANCOVA in which adversity was the independent variable, and Time 1 and Time 2 Efficacy were covariates.

**RESULTS**

**Effect of Unequal Dependence on Perceptions of Adversity.** We first tested our initial hypotheses regarding whether unequal dependence led to greater perceptions of adversity in the negotiation and worse outcomes of the initial negotiation for low-powered negotiators. Results supported H1a and H1b. Specifically, more individuals in the unequal dependence negotiations reported that the most significant event of the negotiation was negative as opposed to positive or neutral (53.4%) significantly more than did individuals in the equal dependence power condition (5.4%). Secondly, job candidates who had low power in the unequal power condition ended up with significantly worse outcomes in the first negotiation, with lower point scores for their job contracts and lower salaries. Both of these
analyses support our first prediction that unequal dependence is a trigger for adverse negotiation experiences for low power negotiators. Next we turn toward understanding whether negotiation efficacy explains why some negotiators have productive, relationally oriented reactions to such experiences while others have more counterproductive non-relational approaches.

**Effects of Negotiation Efficacy on Relational Behaviors**

*Short term effects of Negotiation Efficacy.* We first examined the short-term effects of Negotiation Efficacy (NE) by looking at whether pre-negotiation NE impacted relational behaviors in the first negotiation. Our analysis indicated that, as predicted, level of NE before the negotiation predicted more relational behaviors during the negotiation, regardless of whether or not the negotiation ended up being adverse, supporting H2a and suggesting that having general confidence in negotiation abilities leads people toward more relational strategies.

Further, we found that there is a subsequent positive relationship between reported relational behaviors during the first negotiation and general NE after the negotiation. Specifically, we found that negotiators who reported their own behavior as being facilitatory, and whose negotiation partners rated them as making facilitatory moves, had significantly higher levels of reported NE after the negotiation (m= 4.55) than those who reported inhibitory behaviors in the negotiation (m= 3.89).

*Long-term Effects of Negotiation Efficacy.* The second step of our analyses was aimed at understanding how general NE impacted longer-term negotiation behavior. Our results indicated that when planning for the second negotiation with the same partners, job candidates who planned to continue with a cooperative approach had the highest NE (m= 4.60); participants who reported planning to either continue with a competitive approach or even escalate the competitiveness of their approach
NEGOTIATOR RESILIENCE

had a moderate level of NE (m = 4.10); and finally participants who reported planning to de-escalate the competitiveness of their approach had the lowest level of NE (m=3.43). These results support H3a and suggest a significant effect of NE on negotiators’ long term strategies. In other words, it seems that negotiators with the highest NE were most likely to display cooperative spillover.

Interaction Effects of Adversity and Efficacy. In order to uncover resilience patterns and the effect of NE on negotiators’ long term strategies with the same negotiation partner under adverse conditions, we examined the interaction between adversity and general NE. Figures 1-2 visually display these interaction patterns. In short, our results showed that NE only became important when negotiators faced adversity. In the no-adversity condition, when power is equal, job candidates tended to maintain cooperation or escalate competition in the 2nd negotiation regardless of efficacy. In other words, level of NE does not seem to have a significant effect when power is equal (no adversity).

However, in the negotiation adversity condition, when power was unequal, efficacy played a statistically significant role in job candidate’s long term negotiation behavior. Specifically, 50% of low NE candidates planned non-relational competitive strategies whereas 77.7% of negotiators with high NE reported taking more risky, relational paths of that involved either persisting with cooperation despite experience relational adversity or even finding ways to de-escalate the competitiveness they felt in the first negotiation to increase relational quality in the second negotiation. This suggests that the buffering role of general NE becomes activated under conditions of adversity and leads to more relational behavior, supporting H3b.

To summarize, our first set of analyses (testing H1a-b) established that unequal dependence leads to more difficult negotiations with poorer outcomes for the
NEGOTIATOR RESILIENCE

low powered negotiation. However, our subsequent analyses showed that not everyone will respond negatively to such events. In fact, many responded constructively, with relational behavior. Further, these analyses showed that negotiators’ were more likely to report taking actions that moved the negotiation forward when they had high NE than when they had low NE (H2a-b). Future actions were also predicted by NE, and more specifically, we found interaction between self-efficacy before the negotiation started and adversity suggesting that experiences of initial negotiation adversity activate the effect of NE on later negotiations (H3a-b). Candidates who had the lowest NE were most likely to display competitive escalation (respond to cooperation with competition), whereas as those with the highest NE were most likely to display cooperative spillover (respond to cooperation with cooperation). When job candidates were faced with adversity, negotiators with low NE persisted with a competitive strategy (competitive spillover) whereas as those with high NE were willing to pursue the more risky paths of maintaining cooperation (cooperative spillover) or changing the negotiation dynamic.

INSERT FIGURES 1-2 HERE

Discussion

Our findings have important implications for negotiation research and practice. First, our research serves as a starting point for developing an understanding of the concept of negotiator resilience. Second, our results highlight the importance of general negotiation efficacy (NE) in fostering negotiator resilience. Third, our results suggest an important virtuous cycle between efficacy and relational behavior. We elaborate on each of these three below.
NEGOTIATOR RESILIENCE

First, our results demonstrate that there are negotiators who show resilience, and help us to better understand the concept of negotiator resilience, which we believe will serve as an important launching point for future research on negotiator resilience. Given the relational nature of negotiations, this form of negotiator resilience is more complicated than psychological resilience as it entails adopting cooperative strategies in order to build a strong relational foundation that an agreement can be built on. Drawing from both the negotiation literature and broader resilience literatures, we proposed a definition of negotiator resilience that has two important properties. First, we proposed that negotiator resilience entailed not only persisting with the negotiation process (immediate reaction), but learning and adapting negotiation strategies when necessary (long term reaction). Second, due to the interdependence of negotiators, negotiators must act relationally in order to be resilient in the negotiation process. This can be counter to individuals’ tendency to act self-protectively when faced with adversity.

Our results from this experimental study with MBA students engaging in a two-part negotiation with the same partners confirmed that the phenomenon of negotiator resilience as defined above does indeed exist. Several of our participants were able to overcome early negotiation adversity by acting relationally in the moment, despite the adversity, and then continuing to do so in later negotiations with the same partner. Moreover, still others seemed to use the experience of negotiation adversity as a turning point and opted to change their negotiation strategy to becoming more relational when encountering adversity in the first negotiation. We believe that both of these responses demonstrate negotiator resilience, but we hope that future research will help us to better understand the different forms that negotiator resilience can take by looking more deeply into the interplay between
NEGOTIATOR RESILIENCE

short-term reactions and more long-term responses to adversity. Specifically, it would be interesting to see if negotiation outcomes are more positively influenced if individuals initially respond positively to adversity and sustain this positive response over time, or if the adversity actually prompts a positive change in negotiation strategy.

The second key contribution of this study is the finding that general negotiation efficacy (NE) is an important resource for negotiator resilience. The importance of this personal resource becomes apparent through our last set of interaction analyses. Specifically, these results provide evidence that one’s sense of confidence in their negotiation skills (general NE) can be a protective factor promoting constructive responses to adversity. When applicants faced adversity, those with high NE were more likely to switch in their second negotiation from a competitive to a cooperative strategy in order to both preserve the relationship and get the best outcome possible. These individuals not only persisted with the negotiation process despite adversity, but they also became even more relational in their strategy which is essential for future positive negotiation processes. NE seems to enable individuals to avoid some of the “not so smooth” tendencies of low power negotiators. Efficacy has been conceptualized as being a source of power and agency for individuals (Bandura, 1997; Gecas, 2001), and our research supports this notion. It allows them to overcome a tendency to be rigid to self-protective strategies, and instead is associated with more cooperative negotiation behavior particularly in the context of adversity.

A third important implication of our findings is the on-going relationship between NE and relational negotiation behavior which suggests a virtuous cycle. Specifically, our longitudinal data shows that initial NE was associated with the use of more relational strategies during the first negotiation, but also that use of relational
NEGOTIATOR RESILIENCY

strategies increases post-negotiation general NE, which in turn encourages further relational behaviors in future negotiations. Such positive spillover effects between efficacy and relational behavior between negotiations provides evidence that helping negotiators to build confidence in their general negotiation skills from the start is critical for long-lasting positive negotiation behaviors.

We hope that this research, which conceptually establishes the construct of negotiator resilience, and highlights the role of negotiation efficacy as promoting this resilience, will lead to future research on this important topic. Future research should look more closely at the role of negotiation efficacy in promoting resilient behavior in larger samples and under different types of negotiation adversity. It would also be important to uncover other important resources which may impact resilient negotiation behavior.

Conclusion

Negotiator resilience is displayed when negotiators not only persist with the negotiation process, but positively adapt this process in the context of adversity. This means that resilient negotiators must resist the urge to be self-protective, and instead stay relationally focused in both current and future negotiations. In doing so, the dyadic relationship between negotiators can emerge stronger after being challenged in this first negotiation than it was before, or in the absence of such a challenge. Our experiment demonstrated how two negotiating partners (i.e., students playing the roles of job candidates and employers) can use a personal resource of general NE to emerge stronger when encountering negotiation adversity. This suggests that having high levels of NE when encountering adversity will allow individuals and to develop some degree of immunity to future threats as it the negotiator has emerged strengthened,
NEGOTIATOR RESILIENCE

and even more confident in his/her abilities to make adjustments and adaptations during the course of future negotiations.

References


NEGOTIATOR RESILIENCE


NEGOTIATOR RESILIENCE


