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Natural Born Peacemakers? Gender And The Resolution Of Conflict

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GENDER AND THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT

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Forthcoming In

Two males sit apart, staring at each other from the corners of their eyes. A female approaches one and takes him by the arm, pulls him towards the other male. She alternates between the two and eventually brokers peace. In a different scenario, two males are again in conflict. A third male inserts himself between them, screaming at them or physically separating them to prevent the conflict from escalating. He keeps them separate and harangues them into submission (De Waal, 2009). Female as peacemaker, male as peacekeeper. These examples fit with our intuitions about how gender might shape the way that conflicts are resolved. Women, with their stronger emphasis on preserving social harmony, choose less confrontational strategies than men. Men, with their stronger emphasis on autonomy and status, choose more assertive strategies than women. What is intriguing about the opening examples is that they describe the resolution of social conflicts by chimpanzees.

In this chapter, I explore whether the gender differences that Franz de Waal observes in his chimpanzee colonies are paralleled in our human world. Is there evidence that women and men approach conflicts differently, and with what consequences? Two theoretical frameworks, summarized in Figure 1, suggest that we should anticipate gender-based differences in conflict resolution. They represent the two sides of the gender coin. Relational self-construal theory, which proposes that women and men think about their relationships with others differently, underpins predictions about how women and men will behave. Social role theory, which proposes that we hold different expectations of how women and men should behave, underpins predictions about how we react to gender-role congruent and incongruent behaviors.

The first framework invokes relational self-construal, differentiating between *interdependent self-construals*, in which individuals recognize that they rely on the actions of others to achieve their goals, and *independent self-construals*, in which individuals see themselves as standing apart from others. Women are thought to hold more interdependent self-construals and, as a consequence, are more focused on preserving relationships with others. Men are thought to hold more independent self-construals that lead to a greater emphasis on the transactional aspects of negotiation and, as a consequence, are more focused on maximizing individual outcomes (Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O'Brien; Gray, 1994). The different relational self-construals held by women and men predict different approaches to conflict resolution and negotiation. The greater communality and other-concern attributed to women implies that they will favour strategies that protect and preserve their relationships. The greater agency and self-concern attributed to men implies that they will favor strategies that protect and enhance their personal outcomes.

The second framework invokes social roles (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Social roles contain a set of behavioral expectations for how individuals do and should behave: They are both descriptive (what women and men do) and prescriptive (what women and men *should* do).   These prescriptive stereotypes convey the expectation that women should be more communal than men, displaying characteristics such as warmth and other-concern, whereas men should be more agentic than women, displaying characteristics such as ambition and self-reliance (Rudman & Phelan, 2008). This framework, which identifies the standards against which women's and man's strategies will be evaluated, gives us some insight into the consequences for women who violate role expectations. To negotiate effectively, women need to enact agentic behaviors that clearly violate prescriptive gender

stereotypes (Kray & Thompson, 2005).   Because these violations are experienced as negative (worse than expected) women incur social costs. When men negotiate, they do not violate prescriptive stereotypes because they are expected to act agentically. Should they decide to enact a more collaborative negotiation style, they get a boost to their social outcomes because they have a created a positive violation (better than expected behaviors; Kulik & Olekalns, 2012).

Insert Figure 1 here

Although they are closely intertwined, 'sex' and 'gender' are distinct constructs. 'Sex' refers to our biological makeup, and our classification as 'female' or 'male' is often based on our observable external characteristics. 'Gender' captures the socio-cultural expectations that follow from differences in our biological make-up. Both relational self-construal and social role theory reflect societal beliefs about how women and men will, and should, behave.   The different self-construals held by women and men, and the gender-based expectations held of women and men, reflect the gender roles that have developed within specific societies. These sociocultural expectations follow from our physical make-up, based on the activities that women and men perform. The division of labor between women and men, based on their biological sex, thus informs gender role expectations (Wood & Eagly, 2010).   In conflict and negotiation research, although researchers derive their hypotheses from gender role theory they typically use biological sex to signify gender.

Resolving Conflicts

The most common measure of conflict styles is the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Style Inventory. Variations on this scale are provided by the Blake and Mouton Grid,

and by Rahim's Conflict Style Inventory. Common among these scales is their placement of conflict resolution styles in a two-dimensional space in which one dimension assesses concern for self and one dimension assesses concern for other. This two-dimensional typology yields four conflict resolution styles: avoiding(low other concern, low self concern); accommodating (high other concern, low self concern); competing (low other concern, high self concern); and, collaborating (high on both other and self concern).

Choosing a conflict resolution strategy. Several studies, using a range of self-report instruments, establish that women favor more communal, relationship-oriented strategies than men. Women endorse collaborating (Brahnam, Margavio, Hignite, Barrier, & Chin, 2005) and compromising (Holt & DeVore, 2010) more strongly than men. They favor constructive, rather than destructive, approaches to conflict resolution (Davis, Capobianco & Kraus, 2010). Conversely, men favor more agentic, self-oriented strategies than women. Not only do they score more highly on competing than women (Brahnam et al., 2005; Thomas & Thomas, 2008), but they are also more likely to use destructive, rather than constructive, approaches to conflict resolution (Holt & DeVore, 2010). In organizations, managers and peers (but not subordinates) report males as expressing more anger than females (Davis et al., 2012). Although each of these studies used a different measure, jointly they are consistent with the intuition that women and men favor gender-congruent conflict management styles. The outlier is men's preference for avoidance as well as competing (Brahnam et al., 2005), a pattern that fits with a classic fight (compete) or flight (avoid) behavioral pattern.

The same preference for gender-congruent behaviors is also apparent in how disputants in mediation and mediators resolve conflict. Again, women favor more

conciliatory, other-oriented strategies than men. Two studies investigated how women and men disputants behave during mediation. In their analysis of thirty Israeli couples in divorce mediations, Pines, Gat and Tal (2002) found that men adopt a more rights-based approach than women, relying on legal precedent and rational argument to justify their claims. In comparison, women focus more on the relational aspects of the situation, stressing their contribution to and sacrifice within the relationship as a means for justifying their claims.

Further insight into the role played by gender in divorce mediations is provided by Olekalns, Brett & Donohue (2010). Using a word count program to analyze communication, these authors showed that whether or not mediations ended in agreement was more strongly influenced by what wives said than by what husbands said. Mediations were successful when wives avoided blaming in the first quarter of the mediation (using *I* more than *you*). Mediations were also successful when husbands converged to wives' high levels of positive emotion, but were unsuccessful when husbands converged to wives' low levels of positive emotion.

On the other side of the mediation table, gender affects mediators' style. Differentiating between an instrumental, problem-solving mediation style and a transformative style focused on enhancing communication between disputants, two differences emerge. Female mediators are more likely than male mediators to endorse a transformative style, and they are also more likely than male mediators to endorse process-focused interventions. Conversely, male mediators are more likely to endorse directive actions (Nelson, Zarankin & Ben-Ari, 2010).

Evaluating and adapting conflict resolution style. The different expectations conveyed by female and male social roles imply that the same conflict resolution strategies, when used by women and men, may elicit different reactions. Consistent

with this proposition, recent research shows that mediators' gender is critical to whether impartiality or empathy play the greater role in establishing a mediators' trustworthiness. Whereas impartiality is a stronger predictor of trust in female mediators, empathy is a stronger predictor of trust in male negotiators (Stuhlmacher & Poitras, 2010), suggesting that disputants look for gender-incongruent cues to establish mediators' trustworthiness. This finding is consistent with negotiation research showing that women are given greater latitude to violate social role expectations when they are in other-advocacy roles, than when they are in self-advocacy roles (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013).

The social role construct highlights the importance of context, more generally, in shaping how women and men resolve conflicts. It hints at the role others' characteristics, including gender, might play in shaping how individuals resolve conflicts. In short, *who* is involved in a conflict affects the relationship between gender and conflict style. Focusing on friendships and romantic relationships, Keener, Strough and Davis (2012) found that in disputes with same-sex friends both women and men were equally likely to use agentic strategies, but that women were more likely than men to use communal strategies. However, in disputes with romantic partners, women and men were equally likely to use communal strategies, but men were more likely then women to use communal strategies. Focusing on organizational relationships, Davis et al. (2012) found that female managers' use of active destructive behaviors (winning, demeaning others, retaliating) was unaffected by subordinates' gender. Male managers, however, used fewer of these active destructive strategies in their interactions with female subordinates than in their interactions with male subordinates.

Jointly, these findings show that both women and men tailor their conflict resolution style to the social context. An interesting implication of these two studies, and one that is ripe for further research, is that whereas women are more likely to adapt their strategies in a social context (friends, romantic partners), men are more likely to adapt their strategies in a professional context.

Summary. Three key findings emerge from research on conflict resolution styles.   The first is that, consistent with the different self-construals attributed to women and men, women favor more communal and process-oriented conflict resolution styles whereas men favor more agentic and task-oriented conflict resolution styles. The second key finding is that, consistent with social role analyses, the actions of women and men are evaluated differently: whereas female mediators gain trust through demonstrating impartiality male mediators gain trust through empathy. The third key finding is that social context plays an important role in how women and men resolve conflicts.   Studies to date suggest that women are more likely to take into consideration who they are in conflict with in social relationships, whereas men are more likely to take into consideration who they are in conflict with in professional relationships.

Negotiating Contracts

The persistence of the gender wage gap has motivated researchers to return to the question of whether the poorer economic outcomes of women can be attributed to differences in how women and men negotiate. Research over the last decade has shown that gender affects negotiations in more complex ways than by directing women to a more accommodating strategy and men to a more a competitive strategy. Instead, gender impacts at several points in the negotiation (Babcock & Laschever, 2003).

It is clear that in terms of economic outcomes, men outperform women. Recent research adds to past meta-analyses (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 2999; Walters, Stuhlmacher & Meyer, 1998), establishing that women are less willing to negotiate and consequently less likely to obtain promotions, that they perform more poorly in salary negotiations and that, when they negotiate with other women, they are less effective at value creation than men (Crothers, Hughes, Scmitt, Theodore, Lipinski, & Bloomquist, 2010; Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008; Grieg, 2010; Miles & LaSalle, 2009). Although it is easy to attribute these differences in economic outcomes to differences in the negotiating styles of women and men, the evidence supporting this assumption is far from clear: Walters, Stuhlmacher and Meyer's (1998) meta-analysis showed that only 1% of the difference in women's and men's preference for competitive strategies can be attributed to gender. If there are differences in the economic outcomes of women and men, it is not because women are less competitive than men. This observation has highlighted the importance of understanding not just what women do, but when and where they do it (Sondak & Stuhlmacher, 2009).

Self-construal and negotiation. Although women and men do not differ in their willingness to act competitively in their negotiations, how they plan for and approach a negotiation is underpinned by their different self-construals. The first point of difference is in the opening and closing moments of a negotiation. At both points in time, women make choices that are more consistent with a communal representation of relationships whereas men make choices that are more consistent with an agentic representation of relationships. A recent study showed that whereas 42% of men are willing to initiate a negotiation, only 28% of women are willing to do so (Eriksson & Sandberg, 2012). Given this greater reluctance to negotiate, it is

unsurprising that women are more likely than men to accept the first offer that they receive and to express more relief than men at having their first offers accepted (Kray & Gelfand, 2009). Women and men also differ in the opening offers that they make and that they elicit from their opponents.

Opening offers play a critical role in determining negotiators' outcomes because they anchor the negotiation. Negotiators signal what is an acceptable outcome for them, and also shape their opponents' expectations about what it takes to reach agreement, through their opening offers. Higher opening offers predict better outcomes. Compared to men, woman make less extreme opening offers, and make offers that are more favorable to their opponents (Eckel, de Oliviera & Grossman, 2008; Miles, 2010). Underlying these different opening offers we find different beliefs about entitlements: whereas men believe they are entitled to higher salaries than others, women believe they are entitled to the same salaries as others (Barron, 2003). The more egalitarian attitudes of women appear to create economic disadvantage (Curhan et al., 2008) and, as women's relational concerns increase, so economic outcomes worsen (Amantullah, Morris & Curhan, 2008).

A second manifestation of women's greater relational concerns is their greater empathy (Pelligra, 2011) and their better perspective taking-ability (Horgan & Smith, 2006). There is mounting research evidence that the ability to step into another negotiator's shoes improves outcomes: the better able negotiators are to incorporate the other party's interests into their proposals and to frame those proposals in a way that demonstrates the benefits to others, the better able they are to influence others (e.g., Maddux, Mullen & Galinsky, 2008). Because women are better than men at interpreting non-verbal behaviors (Horgan & Smith, 2006), they are likely to detect subtle cues that indicate the other party's reactions to proposals. This may explain

why women perform better than men when they are able to see each other and to maintain eye contact with their negotiating counterparts than when visual cues are absent (Swaab & Swaab). It may also account for why women are less likely than men to be influenced via email and to behave in a more hostile manner in virtual negotiations (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2002, 2007; Katz, Amichai-Hamburger, Manisterski, & Kraus, 2008; Stuhlmacher, Citera & Willis, 2007). These findings suggest that women become more self-protective when they are unable to read the other negotiator and that, as a result, they obtain poorer outcomes.

A third manifestation of women's greater relational concern is their attitude to the use of ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics. A recent meta-analysis of behavioral ethics, generally, suggests that women follow a more ethical path than men (Kish-Gephart, Harrison & Trevino, 2010; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2012). The broad trend is replicated in women's and men's attitudes to a range of ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics, including competitive behaviors, misrepresentation, making false promises, and faking positive and negative emotions. In each case, women rate these tactics as less acceptable than men (Cohen, 2009; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2011; Ma & McLean Parks, 2012; Schweitzer & Gibson, 2008).

Social roles and negotiation. Social roles set the expectations that we hold of how women and men should behave. These prescriptive stereotypes, and their violations, appear to play a central role in women's economic and social outcomes (Kulik & Olekalns, 2012). It is therefore important to consider how the activation of male and female gender stereotypes affects negotiation outcomes. One line of research suggests that when women link effective negotiation to male-stereotyped behaviors their performance deteriorates. When male gender stereotypes are implicitly activated, women are placed at a disadvantage. Men outperform women

when effective negotiation is linked to male-typed behaviors such as assertiveness or when negotiation is described as diagnostic of ability (Kray, Thompson & Galinsky, 2001; Kray, Galinsky & Thompson, 2002). This effect is boosted when negotiators also have high power (Kray, Reb, Galinsky & Thompson, 2004). Conversely, when effective negotiation is linked to feminine traits, women outperform men. These findings suggest that both men and women perform better when they believe that stereotype-congruent traits are predictive of success (Kray, Reb et al, 2004; K et al., 2002). When stereotypes are explicitly invoked, negotiators adopt stereotype-incongruent behaviors (Kray et al., 2001). When negotiators have high power, stereotype incongruent behaviors are also triggered by the desire to make a positive impression: under these conditions, men are more likely to concede to others whereas women are more likely to claim a greater share of resources (Curhan & Overbeck, 2008). Women may thus benefit from contextual cues that prime negotiation or explicitly prime gender stereotypes.

These findings, together with evidence that women do behave in a gender congruent way in the opening and closing moments of negotiations, suggest that they are more sensitive than men to the potential costs of violating social roles. This sensitivity is well-justified because women who negotiate incur social penalties: the very act of initiating a negotiation results in women being perceived as less likeable and more demanding (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013; Bowles, Babcock & Lai, 2007). Consequently, at least the reluctance to initiate negotiations might be attributable to their anticipation of the social costs that they incur when they do negotiate (Greig, 2010).

The expectation that women are more concerned about preserving relationships may invite others to act exploitatively. Focusing on the use of deception,

Kray, Kennedy and Haselhun (2012) showed that women elicit more deception than men. Moreover, recent research shows that women are less likely than men to retaliate against unfair behavior (eg Singer et al., 2006; Zak et al., 2005), suggesting that they less likely to 'fight back' in pursuit of economic outcomes. It is therefore unsurprising that, although women are more trustworthy, they are less willing to trust others and are more attuned to the possibility of betrayal (Buchan, Croson & Solnick, 2008; Hong & Bohnet, 2007; Maddux & Brewer, 2005). They are also more likely to base their actions on the perceived trustworthiness of others (Pelligra, 2011).

Social roles and context. The discussion of conflict styles identified the possibility that women and men may adapt their behavior to the social context within which conflicts occur. In negotiations, there is considerable evidence that women are more sensitive to context than men. One benefit of this greater sensitivity is that they are better able to match both the nonverbal and verbal behaviors of the other party, leading to better outcomes (Flynn & Ames, 2006; Maddux et al., 2008). Research shows that women adjust their behavior in anticipation of others' reactions. Unlike men, women adjust their negotiating styles depending on whether they are negotiating for themselves or on behalf of others (Bowles, Babcock & McGinn, 2005). Their level of assertiveness increases when they negotiate on behalf of others, resulting in better outcomes in other-advocacy negotiations (Amantullah & Morris, 2010). Finally, women are more likely to persist when male counterparts say "no" than when women counterparts say "no". However, they change styles in order to continue the negotiation: consistent with women's greater propensity to mask their feelings, women express disappointment with their male counterparts indirectly through non-verbal cues (Bowles & Flynn, 2010).

Many of the negotiations studied in pursuit of gender differences focus on compensation issues (Stuhmacher & Walters, 1999). Compensation negotiations have been identified as a protoypically male domain, and so it is possible that women are doubly disadvantaged in compensation negotiations (e.g. Gray, 1994). Not only are they negotiating for themselves, they are also negotiating on a topic that may be seen as 'inappropriate' for women. Two recent studies test the hypothesis that women may perform as well as – or better – than men when they negotiate about more gender-congruent issues. Bear (2011) focused on the relationship between the gender congruency of the issue under negotiation and the preference to avoid negotiating. She showed that women were more likely than men to avoid compensation negotiations. However, men were more likely than women to avoid negotiations about access to a lactation room. Extending this finding, Bear and Babcock (2012) showed that women outperform men when they negotiate about a female-typed topic (lamp-work beads) but that men outperform women when they negotiate about a male-typed topic (halogen headlights). These findings suggest that gender stereotypes define what is an appropriate negotiation for women, and that the economic and social costs that women incur may be more evident when they violate stereotypes by negotiating male-typed issues.

Women are also sensitive to their opponent's gender. Erikssson and Sandberg (2012) show that women's willingness to initiate negotiations, but not men's willingness, is affected by their opponent's gender: women are more likely to initiate negotiations with men than with other women. Although counter-intuitive, women's reluctance to persist in their negotiations with other women may have some merit. Research shows that women are most frustrated by conflicts with other women, more likely to compete and retaliate when negotiating with other women and are least

cooperative in response to other women (Scharleman, Eckel, Kacelnik & Wilson, 2001; Schroth, Ben-Chekal & Caldwell, 2005; Sutter, Bosman, Kocher & van Winden, 2009).   More recent research shows that women incur the greatest loss of trust when they enact a competitive strategy in negotiations with other women (Olekalns, Kulik, Simonov & Bradshaw, 2011). This pattern of behavior casts the finding that two female negotiators obtain poorer economic outcomes than two male negotiators in a new light, suggesting it may be the result of escalating competitiveness and relational damage rather than women's greater willingness to accommodate other female negotiators.

Finally, in an investigation of deception in negotiation, Olekalns, Kulik and Chew (in press), showed that deception was lowest in all-female dyads and highest in male-female dyads. However, negotiating style and opponents' trustworthiness modified this basic pattern. Olekalns et al. (in press) reported that, in male-female dyads, deception consistently increased when untrustworthy opponents used an accommodating strategy. In all-female dyads, the decision to deceive an opponent was more complex. Of particular note was that whereas low trust encouraged women to withhold information when their female opponents competed, high trust encouraged women to misrepresent information when their female opponents accommodated.

Summary. The key findings in negotiation research parallel those from the dispute resolution literature. First, there is evidence that women and men manage several aspects of negotiation differently, and in ways that reflect their different self-construals. Women are more likely than men to avoid negotiations, they ask for less than men, and they end negotiations as quickly as possible by accepting the first offer. They also display greater empathy and better perspective-taking skills. As a result,

they perform better in face-to-face where they can 'read' the other negotiator, than in electronic negotiations where this is not possible.

Second, there is evidence that social roles affect how negotiations unfold. An intriguing set of findings shows that women perform poorly only when male-stereotyped behaviors are linked to negotiation success; they outperform men when they believe that female-stereotyped behaviors are the key to negotiation success. A more readily predicted set of findings shows that women incur social costs when they initiate negotiations, and that the anticipation of these social costs underpins their reluctance to negotiate. Finally, the anticipation that women place greater emphasis on preserving relationships appears to invite exploitation: unfair offers and more deception.

Third, the broader social context also affects how negotiations develop. Paralleling the finding that women are more successful when female-stereotyped traits are linked to effective negotiations, they are also more successful when negotiating about female-typed topics. Women also adapt their actions based on an opponent's gender: women are less likely to initiate negotiations with other women, report greater frustration when negotiating with other women, and also evaluate stereotype violations by female opponents more harshly than do men. Finally, in their decisions to deceive an opponent, women are more sensitive than men to social cues: an opponent's trustworthiness, gender, and negotiating style.

Negotiating Boundaries

Women's employment negotiations dominate the research on gender differences in negotiation. Yet these contract negotiations, despite their considerable economic impact, form only a small part of the negotiations that women and men engage in. Employment contract negotiations occur at quite distinct and constrained

points in individuals' careers: at organizational entry, on promotion or role change, or following a move to a new employer. In between these career moments, individuals negotiate on an almost daily basis. While many of these negotiations take place within their organizations, an equal number occur outside of organizations in the day-to-day lives of men and women. It surprising, then, that these day-to-day negotiations receive relatively little attention (see Stuhlmacher & Linaberry, 2013, for a review of work-life negotiations).

One obvious area for negotiation is in the division of household tasks. Paralleling women's general reluctance to negotiate, Mannino and Deutsch (2007) report than even though wives are typically dissatisfied with the division of household tasks they are also reluctant to renegotiate that division of labor. Thebaud (2010), using International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data, tested the relationship between household income and the division of household tasks. Specifically, she tested whether the relative earning capacity of men and women in the same household is reflected in how housework is allocated. She argued that housework allocation gives us insight into household bargaining, specifically the extent to which men who earn less than their partners exchange income for household tasks. Although, in general, men with lower incomes than their spouse do report doing more housework than men with higher incomes, the increase in housework (1.5 hours per week) does not restore parity. Women, no matter what their income, do more housework than men. These findings imply not only that women have failed to negotiate an equitable exchange, but that they may be punished for the counter-normative behavior of earning more than their husbands via an expectation that they continue to do more of the housework.

In the same way that career changes punctuate work lives, a series of socially

defined transitions punctuate lives outside of work. One such transition is pregnancy. At the point a women announces her pregnancy in the workplace, she also needs to negotiate changes to her work arrangements. Despite a general reluctance to negotiate, women are more likely to ask for flexible work arrangements than men based on their child care responsibilities (Hornung, Rousseau, & Glaser, 2008). Although women and men are equally likely to negotiate parental leave following the birth of a child (Brandth & Kvande, 2002; Greenberg, Ladge, & Clair, 2009) the rationale for their requests differs. Like men in divorce mediations, men negotiating parental leave use rational arguments that incorporate their work responsibilities. Like men in negotiations more generally, they persist through moments of adversity, in this case unsupportive managers.

Women, because of their legal entitlements, do not need to craft arguments in support of leave. However, they do incur social penalties not incurred by men: whereas the announcement of a pregnancy decreases women's perceived competence, it boosts men's perceived likability (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2004). This change in status might explain why women who negotiate the terms of their maternity leave are perceived as more difficult than women who do not do so (Liu & Buzzanell, 2004). The difficulties spill over to the point when maternity leave ends, affecting women's ability to negotiate their re-entry into the workforce with responsibilities comparable to pre-parental leave responsibilities (Miller, Jablin, Casey & Lamphear-Van Horn, 2006).

A very different kind of life transition occurs when adult children need to negotiate care arrangements with elderly parents who have had multiple falls. Horton and Arber (2004) showed that how the discussion about fall prevention is approached depends on whether it is initiated by sons or daughters. Sons, in negotiations with

their mothers, take either a protective or a coercive approach whereas in negotiations with their fathers they take no specific actions other than maintaining respect. Thus, through their negotiation styles, sons relegated their mothers to a more powerless and submissive position than their fathers. In comparison, daughters employed the same strategies of engaging and negotiating with both mothers and fathers. They thus established a more empowering relationship with their parents, giving them greater input into the decisions surrounding their ongoing care.

Summary. Once the focus moves from contract negotiations to other kinds of negotiations, research centers more around the impact of social roles than the impact of women's and men's self-construals. Nonetheless, there are some striking parallels between the findings described in this section and the previous sections on conflict resolution and contract negotiations. Social roles and gender-based expectations discourage women from negotiating an equitable (decreased) housework load, but encourage them to negotiate the terms and conditions of their maternity leave. Despite their greater willingness to negotiate on a gender-congruent topic, women who do choose to negotiate the terms of their leave and re-entry into the workforce as perceived as more difficult than those who do not, incurring the same social costs that they incur in contract negotiations. Women and men, in negotiating care arrangements with elderly parents, treat mothers and fathers differently.

Questions Not Yet Answered

Emotion, and the role of emotional expression in negotiation, has emerged as a central theme in negotiation research. This research has explored how the expression of emotions affects opponents, in particular their willingness to give concessions. There is a consistent body of research that shows anger, directed towards an opponent, increases the size of concessions (van Kleef & Sinaceur, 2013).

Disappointment, on the other hand, affects opponents' offers seemingly because it triggers guilt in the other party (Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, Steinel & Van Kleef, 2011; Nelissen, Lelieveld, Van Dijk & Zeeland, 2011). Whereas negative emotions appear to improve a negotiator's individual outcomes, positive emotions improve the relationship with opponents. Negotiators who express positive affect are seen as more desirable future negotiation partners (Kopelman, Rosette, Thompson, 2006), and positive affect increases negotiators' willingness to implement a final agreement (Mislin, Campagna & Bottom, 2011).

These findings are of interest because of growing evidence that emotions are gender-typed. Plant, Hyde, Keltner and Devine (2000) report that, in general, women are expected to express more emotions than men. The exception is anger, which is perceived as appropriate to men but not women. Consistent with this general observation, research shows that women who express anger are accorded lower status and perceived as less competent than men who express anger (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008; Schaubroeck & Shao, 2012.). It is then unsurprising that, in relationship conflict, women suppress anger whereas men express anger (Fischer & Evers, 2011). Conversely, in a study of sexual attractiveness, Tracy and Beall (2011) found that happiness was highly attractive when expressed by women but highly unattractive when expressed by men. These findings suggest that women should not display either genuine or strategic anger in their negotiations. Doing so is unlikely to yield the benefits associated with anger, and highly likely to incur social costs. There may be merit in expressing more gender appropriate emotions such as disappointment in order to improve individual outcomes. However, it seems that Babcock and Laschever's (2007) recommendation that women display unrelenting niceness may present a better strategic route in negotiations. What is clear is that expressing the

same emotions may have different consequences for female and male negotiators. Research is needed to clarify how a negotiator's gender, and that of her or his opponent, affects the impact of emotional expression in negotiation.

In investigating gender effects, research has focused almost exclusively on two-party negotiations. How gender might affect outcomes in multi-party negotiations is an unknown. Evidence from small group research, however, hints at the likelihood that what women do, and how it is perceived, will differ depending on a team's gender composition. In ultimatum bargaining games, all-male groups make more generous allocations to an opposing team than all-female or mixed-gender groups (Hannigan & Larimer, 2010). In negotiations, men perceived their team's performance to be increasingly poorer as the number of women in their team increase (Karakowsky, McBey & Chuang, 2004). And, in their investigation of loan payment default in micro-credit groups, Anthony and Horne (2003) found that as the number of women in a group increased, repayment defaults decreased. Research also suggests that the impact of team composition is more subtle than a simple majority vs minority effect. For example, Loyd, White and Kern (2011) showed that – independent of group size - women are perceived as warmer, more competent and better leaders when they are the only female team member or when there are three women in team. Research also suggests that gender diversity affects group performance only when gender faultiness are activated (Pearsall, Ellis & Evans, 2008), and that gender dissimilarity has its strongest effect on perceptions of relationship conflict within teams when team members have a strong gender social identity (Randel & Jaussi, 2008).

This collection of findings does not yet give us a coherent insight into how the gender composition of groups affects perceptions of group performance, individual

group members, and perceptions of group members. However, it does suggest that

whether women are perceived to have violated stereotypes, whether a group is

perceived to have high relationship conflict, how and when alliances form, and the

resource allocation decisions made by groups are affected by their gender

composition. These findings have implications for multi-party negotiations. They

suggest that women will be most influential in such negotiations when they are in a

clear minority (the only woman) or a clear majority (more than two women), but that

they may lose influence when there are two women in a multi-party negotiation.

They also suggest that how women form alliances may be critical to the perceived

success of a negotiation: same gender alliances may increase the salience of gender

faultlines, which may in turn increase a sense of relational conflict and discord. The

same issues arise when we consider negotiating teams: the extent to which women

can influence their teams and the extent to which those teams may focus on relational

conflict is tied to a team's gender composition.   Finally, in inter-team negotiations,

the gender composition of teams may inadvertently shape resource allocation which

appears to be more egalitarian when teams are mixed-gender or all-female (Hannigan

& Larimer, 2010). Although these implications are intriguing, research is yet to

systematically explore how multi-party and team negotiations are affected by the

proportion of women and men participating in negotiations.

Implications and Applications

I started this chapter with the question of whether women are natural born-

peacemakers. The conflict styles research that I reviewed suggests that the answer is

"yes". This research shows that women tend to favor gender-normative behaviors

when resolving conflicts, either directly or as third-parties. The answer, in relation to

negotiation, is more complex.   To the extent that women avoid negotiation, they

behave in a gender-congruent way by averting interpersonal tension. And, in planning negotiations, they appear to be guided by more egalitarian principles. However, once in a negotiation, they are as likely as men to implement a competitive strategy.

Both compliance and non-compliance with gendered expectations carries costs for women. When women comply and accommodate their negotiation partners, they undercut their ability to claim resources for themselves. If they accommodate when they are negotiating on behalf of others, they are perceived as incompetent leaders (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013). As third-parties, their trustworthiness hinges on their ability to implement gender-incongruent techniques (Stuhlmacher & Poitras, 2010). Women are thus caught in a double-bind, not clearly benefiting from either complying with or violating gender stereotypes. A potential cost of this double-bind is that it places women in a self-perpetuating negative spiral (Ely, Ibarra & Kolb, 2011): women, initially reluctant to negotiate, incur either economic or social costs when they initiate negotiations, thus reinforcing their inclination to avoid negotiating. In the following sections, I describe three pillars that underpin a broad strategy designed to support women who negotiate for improved outcomes.

The first pillar

Much of the discussion about how to improve women's outcomes has centered focused on "fixing women" (Ely et al., 2011). Such an approach focuses on how women can better manage their negotiations to offset the negative consequences of asking. Recently, Kulik and Olekalns (2012) identified two sets of strategies that might mitigate the costs incurred by women who negotiate. The first set of strategies focuses on offsetting the negative violations that women incur when they initiate negotiations. These negative violations, the result of behaving in a gender-

incongruent way, trigger backlash and resistance on the part of an opponent. One reason for this backlash is that, in the absence of other information, opponents are likely to make a person-based attribution (Kulik & Olekalns, 2012). This tendency may reflect a broader attributional bias in which not only are women's and men's actions evaluated against different standards, but women's actions are more likely to elicit person-based attributions whereas men's actions are more likely to elicit situation-based attributions (Ragins & Winkel, 2011). Women can benefit by adding information that redirects the attribution for their 'ask' from a person-based one to a situation-based one. Perceived demandingness decreases and perceived likeability increases when women provide normative information by referring to their skills or to 'industry standards', or create external attributions for requests by saying they were encourage to ask by their mentor. These strategies increase perceived legitimacy of their 'ask' and enhance the other person's willingness to work with them in the future (Bowles & Babcock, 2008; Tinsley, Cheldelin, Schneider, & Amanatullah, 2009).

The second set of strategies amplifies positive violations, that is, heightens gender-congruent characteristics. These strategies reflect Kray and Thompson's (2005) suggestion that women will gain the most benefit in negotiations if they harness and work with gender stereotypes. Reflecting this advice, Kray & Locke showed that women can boost their negotiations by flirting with their opponents. Flirting points to the role of gender-congruent influence in negotiation. Guadagno and Cialdini showed that influence strategies are gender-marked, and that women gain influence by using gender congruent strategies such as flattery, supplication and an appeal for sympathy (Bolino & Turnley, 2003; Gordon, 1996; Guadagno & Cialdini, 2007). A second route for harnessing gender stereotypes is to use gender-congruent language. The use of linguistic devices such as tag questions and qualifiers, while

signaling powerlessness (Mulac & Bradac, 1995), reduce social distance and improves outcomes in interdependent settings such as negotiation (Fragale, 2006). Inclusive language ("we" and "us") similarly reduces social distance and leads to improved outcomes (Donnellon, 199; Simons, 1993). These linguistic strategies, because they reduce social distance, are congruent with the expectation that women strive for social harmony.

The second pillar

These strategies are only one part of a broader strategy to increase women's willingness to negotiate, and their ability to protect both their economic outcomes and relationships when they do so. The second pillar of this strategy focuses on what organizations can do to eliminate structural biases that maintain and promote gender bias. There are four actions that organizations can take: promote a collaborative culture, reframe negotiation, reduce ambiguity, and analyze network access.

Promote a collaborative culture. Kray et al.'s (Kray et al., 2001, 2002; Kray et al., 2004) research showed that women perform poorly when negotiation success is linked to male-stereotyped behaviors such as being assertive and rational, and pursuing personal interests. However, when the behaviors associated with negotiation success are linked to female-stereotyped behaviors such as communicating clearly, showing good listening skills, and having insight into the other negotiator's feelings, women outperformed men (Kray et al., 2002). This finding suggests that, in the same way that women's negotiation success increases when they negotiate about gender-congruent topics, their success increases when they believe gender-congruent skills lead to negotiation success. Organizations can embrace this finding and consider whether their culture encourages a purely agentic, male-stereotyped approach to negotiations or if it also supports a communal, female-stereotyped approach to

negotiations. Promoting a more collaborative culture that links negotiation success to problem-solving should improve outcomes for women and, because those skills reflect a principled problem-solving approach to negotiation, should also benefit the organization as a whole.

Reframe negotiation. How organizations frame requests also affects women's outcomes. Women are more likely to negotiate, and to negotiate to the same level as men, when they are told they can 'ask for more' but not when they are told 'payment is negotiable' (Small, Gelfand, Babcock & Gettman, 2007). This finding suggests that very small changes in how organizations talk about making requests (asking vs negotiating) may give women the confidence to improve their outcomes.

Reduce ambiguity. Bowles, Babcock and McGinn (2005) demonstrated that women's negotiation performance worsens as ambiguity about a negotiation increases. At least two factors contribute to this ambiguity.   The first factor is the degree to which negotiating for improved outcomes is seen as a legitimate organization activity: women are more successful in their negotiations *when* institutional policies legitimize negotiating (Niederle & Verstlund, 2008). This legitimization is important because women are reluctant to initiate negotiations; understanding when negotiating is appropriate within an organization creates clearly defined opportunities for women to ask. This means that women are 'invited' to negotiate for the resources that they need. It is also important because it shifts attributions about the underlying reasons for negotiating from the women to the situation. When women initiate negotiations in clearly defined and organizationally normative contexts, they should be more protected from backlash. Organizations that establish transparent policies for when it is appropriate to negotiate will assist women in becoming more effective negotiators.

The second factor is the degree to which organizations clearly define *what* is negotiable. Women may be reluctant to negotiate because they are unclear about what is negotiable. In the absence of clear information, both women and men need to predict what is negotiable both in terms of the range of negotiable issues and the upper bounds of what is possible.   This ambiguity advantages men, who see more of the world as negotiable than women (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). It also advantages men because the men predict that the upper limit on what is attainable to be higher than women (Babcock & Laschever. 2003). Organizations that provide transparent information about salary ranges and appropriate standards encourage women to ask (Bowles et al., 2005), and to set their 'asks' at appropriate levels.

Analyze network access. Differences in women's and men's network access may further heighten differences in what women and men believe to be negotiable. When deciding when and what to negotiate, individuals are likely to draw on their networks to disambiguate what is normative.   However, because women and men differ in how they build networks, this strategy is likely to perpetuate gender-based differences in negotiation outcomes. Men's networks include mainly men and few women, are multipurpose, and are composed of many shallow ties. Women's networks are typically composed of fewer deep ties. Their networks include both men and women, but the two groups serve different functions: women turn to men in their network for resources and women and to other women for friendship and social support (Ibarra, 1992; Ragins & Kram, 2007).

Because men build trust on in-group membership whereas women build trust on personal relationships (Maddux & Brewer, 2005), women are likely to be at a disadvantage in their ties to men: the relationships between women and men are likely to be characterized by lower trust because, for men, women are out-group members.

As a result, men may restrict the information that flows to women about when and what to negotiate. Because the other female ties in a network all share this gender disadvantage, they cannot correct this information bias. Women consequently enter negotiations with a distinct informational disadvantage. Organizations might then consider how to better develop women's networks. Formal mentorship schemes and other activities that develop and strengthen women's ties to men provide one mechanism for overcoming this informational disadvantage.

The third pillar

The final pillar focuses on women's development programs.   What kinds of training should organizations deliver to enhance women's negotiation effectiveness? Ely et al. (2011) outline three skill sets that are especially important for women who engage in negotiations: recognizing what is negotiable, managing the process, and planning. They focus less on prescriptive advice about how to negotiate a good deal, and more on managing the specific challenges that women encounter.

The domain of negotiation. Two factors come into play in determining the domain of negotiation. First, women see less of the world as negotiable than men (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). Consequently, they operate in a narrow domain of the most the 'traditional' items that can be negotiated and fail to recognize opportunities to negotiate items outside of this narrow range. Second, women appear more comfortable negotiating on gender congruent issues (Bear, 2011; Bear & Babcock, 2012). As a result, they may further constrain the domain of negotiable items because gender-congruent issues such as work flexibility are more available than gender-incongruent issues. Using a program to workshop what is negotiable, or inviting human resource managers into the program to talk about what is negotiable, helps women to broaden the domain of negotiable issues.

Managing the process. Women are not only reluctant to negotiate, but they are also reluctant to push through moments of adversity. Unlike men, who continue to negotiate through difficult moments, women end negotiations at that point (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). Although ending negotiations clearly fits with the desire to preserve relationships, it means women are disinclined to push through for better outcomes. Many of these moments of adversity can be described as *moves*, deliberate tactics that negotiators use to assert power and signal resistance to a woman's proposal (Kolb, 2004). Caught in the moment, it can be difficult to respond constructively to such tactics. Women may therefore benefit from their perspective-taking ability: by placing themselves in the other party's shoes prior to negotiating, they may better anticipate and prepare for an opponent's moves. At the same time, women need to learn how to respond effectively to such moves, by *turning* the negotiation. Kolb (2004) identified five broad turns that help women level the playing field (restorative turns) and redirect the negotiation to a more collaborative style (participative turns). Training programs can coach women in recognizing moves and to develop their skill in using turns.

Planning to negotiate. Good planning is essential for any negotiator, but women should be encouraged to plan for gender-specific challenges alongside the more routine planning that characterizes all negotiations.   For women it is especially important to generate broad lists of negotiable items and to incorporate both gender congruent and gender incongruent items in their lists.   It is also important for them to consider the reasons that a manager or peer might resist their proposals, and to develop strategies for promoting their needs. In developing these strategies, and based on their knowledge of the individuals they negotiate with, they need to anticipate the moves that they might encounter and to plan how they can turn the

negotiation. They might also assess their networks and other organizational

relationships, and consider how to gather the support necessary to support their

proposals. Training programs can kick start this process by incorporating planning for

a forthcoming negotiation into the schedule. They can further assist by offering

'negotiation clinics' and setting up peer support groups to help women think broadly

about how to approach their negotiations.

Conclusion

Women and men do, to some extent, approach both conflicts and negotiations

in gender-congruent ways. Gender differences are more clearly apparent in how

women and men resolve conflicts, surfacing in more subtle ways in negotiations. As

conflict resolvers, women favor more communal and process oriented strategies than

men. As negotiators, although women and men are equally likely to act

competitively, only women incur the social costs of doing so. As self-advocates,

women incur penalties for acting assertively; as other-advocates; women incur

penalties for not acting assertively enough.   What this chapter highlights is the very

important role that social context plays in both modifying women's and men's

strategies choices, and in shaping the reactions that those strategy choices elicit. To

fully understand how gender affects conflict resolution and negotiation, we need to

understand not just what strategies are used but the context within which they are

used. Much of the research on gender has focused on contract negotiations. We are

yet to explore, in equal detail, the role that gender plays in other kinds of negotiations:

the domain in which negotiations occur, the role of emotional expression, and the

impact of gender composition in team and multi-party negotiations are among the

topics that would benefit from further research.

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Figure 1. Gender-based differences in self-construal and social role expectations

| SELF-CONSTRUAL | interdependent | accommodating other- oriented communal | Women 'should' accommodate Women incur social costs when they compete | warm empathic communal | female | SOCIAL ROLES |
| | independent | competing self-oriented agentic | Men 'should' compete Men gain social benefits when they accommodate | ambitious self-reliant agentic | male | |