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But Can I Trust Her? Gender and Expectancy Violations in Negotiation

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Women who negotiate incur social backlash, being perceived as more pushy and demanding than women who do not negotiate. In two experiments, we test the boundary conditions for this backlash effect. Using a simulated employment contract negotiation, we explore how the strategies that women use, who they negotiate with (E1) and the organizational context within which they negotiate (E2) affects one social outcome, women’s perceived trustworthiness. We compare the how men and women evaluate the use of a gender-congruent accommodating style or a gender-incongruent, competing style (E1) in either an agentic or a communal organizational culture (E2). In both experiments, we show that women are more likely than men to reassess a female negotiator’s trustworthiness based on the whether she implements an accommodating or a competing strategy. In Experiment 1, we further demonstrate that in their negotiations with other women, female negotiators who accommodate preserve relational trust (identity, integrity) but prime the use of sanctions (deterrent trust) whereas those who compete erode relational trust but also reduce the salience of sanction. In Experiment 2, we show that the impact of strategy choice on a female negotiator’s perceived benevolence is attenuated in a communal culture but amplified in an agentic culture. Extending our E1 findings, in negotiation with women but not with men, female negotiators who implement an accommodating strategy in an agentic culture increase the salience of sanctions but those who implement a competing strategy in an agentic culture decrease the salience of sanctions.
Evidence for the gender wage gap continues to accumulate. Across a range of occupations, socio-economic groups and countries, analyses of incomes show that women still lag behind men in their earnings. The gap appears when women enter the workforce and continues to grow throughout their careers (Blau & Kahn, 2007; Dey & Hill, 2007). Analyses conducted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) show that, across OECD countries, that on average women earn 18% less than men (OECD Social Policy Division, 2010). Moreover, women’s earning potential is consequential not just while they are working, but also once they retire. As a result of this salary shortfall, women retire with approximately half the savings and benefits of comparable male colleagues (Hoffman, 2008).

How women and men negotiate their employment contracts contributes to their different salary outcomes. The poorer economic outcomes that women obtain in their negotiations (Crothers et al., 2010; Miles & LaSalle, 2009; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2008) can be attributed to cognitive and behavioral differences in how women and men approach negotiations. Compared to men, women are more likely to consider the long-term relational consequences of pushing for improved negotiation outcomes. As a result, they give greater weight to preserving ongoing relationships and less weight to protecting economic outcomes than men (Gray, 1994). This cognitive difference has important implications for how women approach negotiations: they are reluctant to initiate negotiations and engage in a range of behaviors that signal a more accommodating style (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Bowles, Babcock & McGinn, 2005). While these behaviors might build better relationships, they also invite exploitation and erode economic outcomes.

Although women may improve their short-term economic outcomes by implementing a more competitive approach, this approach is not viable in the long-term. Implementing a competitive approach incurs immediate social costs for women, whose ability to obtain
positive social outcomes is compromised by the very act of negotiating: they are perceived as less likeable, more pushy and more demanding (Bowles, Babcock & Lai, 2007). Eroding social outcomes has long-term consequences in ongoing relationships, such as those within organizations, where colleagues’ willingness to work with women in the future is affected by the extent to which women are perceived as likeable and undemanding (Bowles et al., 2007). The loss of social capital also has long-term consequences for women’s economic outcomes. Because economic and social outcomes are inter-twined in negotiations (Curhan, Elfenbein & Xu, 2006; Curhan, Neale, Ross & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008) a negative reputation is likely to spill over from one negotiation to the next (O’Connor, Arnold & Burris, 2005). This spillover effect means that female negotiators, because they are perceived as pushy and demanding, are likely to trigger a more competitive approach that impedes problem solving in both current and future negotiations.

Trust, defined as confident, positive expectations about the actions of another person (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, 1998), is a critical social outcome in negotiation. It underpins negotiators’ willingness to engage in information sharing and problem-solving, behaviors that are central to negotiators’ ability to build mutually beneficial outcomes (Butler, 1999; Pruitt, 1981). These behaviors are activated when the other party is perceived as trustworthy and inhibited when they are untrustworthy. Despite the central role of trust in negotiation, research has yet to investigate how women’s perceived trustworthiness is affected by their negotiating behavior. In two experiments, we address this gap in our knowledge by investigating a range of factors that might protect or erode women’s perceived trustworthiness in negotiation. Our goal is to test how the actions of women throughout a negotiation, assessed against expectations of how they should behave, influence their trustworthiness. To do this, we examine how the use of either an accommodating or a competing strategy influences trustworthiness. We place these assessments in context and
test whether the impact of these strategies is affected by who women negotiate with (women or men) and the organizational culture (agentic vs. communal) within which women negotiate.

**Assessing Trustworthiness in Negotiation**

Impressions of others, including trustworthiness, can form rapidly at the start of negotiations as the result of category-based judgments (Curhan & Pentland, 2007; Meyerson, Weick & Kramer, 1996). These initial impressions of trustworthiness are critical because they establish a baseline of expectations for how others will behave in the negotiation. The extent to which negotiators conform – or fail to conform – to these expectations can trigger revisions to perceived trustworthiness and change the other party’s negotiating strategy.

We focus on how societal expectations of women – prescriptive gender stereotypes – shape assessments of trustworthiness. To understand the dilemma faced by female negotiators, we turn to theories of social perception and expectancy violation. Stereotype Content Model (SCM) helps us to understand how stereotypes shape our expectations of others by establishing a baseline against which we assess behavior. This model, developed by Fiske and her co-workers, differentiates social groups based on their placement on the dimensions of competence and warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). Several social groups, including women, are described as mixed valence, that is, high on one attribute and low on the other. According to this model, women are expected to be warm but not competent whereas men are expected to be competent but not warm (Cuddy, Fiske & Glick, 2004). These different impressions of women and men also convey different behavioral expectations, which in turn form the basis of prescriptive gender stereotypes. Prescriptive stereotypes establish a clear behavioral expectation that women not only will but should behave in a warm, communal manner (Kray & Thompson, 2005; Rudman & Glick, 1999).
The stereotyping of women as warm brings with it the idea that women will be trustworthy, because warm people engage in behaviors that preserve and build relationships. These expectations provide a baseline for assessing what happens when women make strategic shifts that challenge behavioral expectations, for example by incorporating competitive behaviors into their negotiation repertoire. In negotiation, individuals’ attention is drawn to events that stand out from the flow of behavior and interrupt the negotiation process because such events violate behavioral expectations (Druckman, 1986; Jett & George, 2003). These highly salient events can either erode or build trust over time: actions that trigger negative attributions erode trust whereas those that trigger positive attributions build trust (Olekalns & Smith, 2005). When women initiate a negotiation, their actions are likely to attract attention because they are implementing a set of agentic behaviors that violate stereotype-based expectations.

Any expectancy violation motivates individuals to re-appraise their impressions of the violator (e.g, McKnight, Cummings & Chervany, 1998). Critically, according to Expectancy Violation Theory (EVT), when women behave agentially they not only violate expectations but they do so in a distinctly negative way by behaving ‘worse’ than expected (e.g., Burgoon, Stern & Dillman, 1995). When the violation is negative, the re-appraisal process triggers backlash, that is, a series of social and economic reprisals that follow from violating gender stereotypes (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Rudman & Glick, 1999). For example agentic women attract more personal derogation than agentic men (Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs & Tamlin, 2004). Backlash is also evident in negotiations: women who negotiate are perceived as less warm, more pushy and more demanding than those who do not (Bowles et al., 2007). This evidence, together with EVT, suggests that women who negotiate will jeopardize their perceived trustworthiness because they generate a negative expectancy violation.
In negotiations, jeopardizing trustworthiness is problematic because trust— itself a social outcome - is intimately linked to economic outcomes as well as other social outcomes, such as reputation and a willingness to work together in the future. Any actions that signal a lack of trustworthiness thus trigger a vicious cycle in which women obtain poorer economic and social outcomes. In this research, we explore the conditions that mitigate such negative re-assessments of trust. In Experiment 1, we focus on whether the strategies employed by women and who they negotiate with can prevent negative expectancy violations and re-assessments of trust. In Experiment 2, we consider whether the behavioral norms created by different organizational cultures can protect women against the backlash that they incur when they initiate a negotiation.

**Experiment 1**

In this experiment, we investigate how the strategies that women use and the gender of their negotiation partner affect women’s perceived trustworthiness in negotiation. We compare how men and women evaluate a female negotiator who employs either a gender congruent, accommodating style or a gender incongruent, competing style.

**Negotiation Strategies**

Gender stereotypes imply that women have a higher concern than men about the long-term consequences of their actions, including the likely impact on future relationships. In a negotiation context, these stereotypes imply that women should engage in accommodating behaviors that emphasize preserving their relationship with the other negotiator over improving their personal outcomes (Amanatullah, Morris & Curhan, 2008; Croson, Marks & Snyder, 2008; Kray & Thompson, 2005). Consistent with these gender-based expectations, research shows that women do act in ways that preserve their relationships: they are less willing to initiate negotiations because they anticipate high social costs (Greig, 2010; 2008); their behavior is more influenced by social incentives – working for the team – than by profit.
incentives (Katz, Amichai-Hamburger, Manisterski & Kraus, 2008); they are more egalitarian and ask for less than men (Eckel, de Oliveira & Grossman, 2008); and, they experience more relief when their initial offers are accepted (Kray & Gelfand, 2009).

The accommodating strategy seemingly favored by women places greater weight on preserving the relationship between negotiators than on improving individual economic outcomes. Competing, which emphasizes improving individuals’ outcomes over preserving relationships, provides a clear counter-point to an accommodating style (Pruitt, 1981). In this experiment, we contrast the use of an accommodating and a competing strategy to determine how stereotype violations affect women’s perceived trustworthiness. Accommodating and competing strategies clearly align with the behavioral expectations created by female and male gender stereotypes, respectively. Focusing on these behaviors consequently provides an unambiguous test of the use of how gender-congruent and gender–incongruent strategies affects women’s perceived trustworthiness.

By contrasting these strategies, we are able to assess the social consequences of implementing a strategy – competition – that is intended to improve women’s economic outcomes but violates gender-based expectations. Considered within an EVT framework, women who implement a competitive strategy incur a negative expectancy violation and erode their trustworthiness because they are behaving in a gender-incongruent way. Conversely, women who implement an accommodating strategy are working within stereotype-based expectations and should protect their trustworthiness. We expect that:

H1a: Women who use a gender-congruent, accommodating style will be perceived as more trustworthy than women who use a gender-incongruent, competing style

The Negotiating Context: Who Women Negotiate With

The backlash literature presents mixed findings about how an observer’s gender affects reactions to women. Two experiments showed that women and men react similarly to
stereotype violations: women in positions of authority were viewed equally negatively by men and women and successful women were equally likely to be disliked and derogated by men and women (e.g., Heilman et al., 2004; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). However, the weight of evidence suggests that women will be judges more harshly by other women than by men. Findings from the behavioral economic literature show that in contexts that hold cooperative potential, such as trust and investment games, women report lower levels of trust in others than men (Buchan, Croson & Solnick, 2008). In negotiations, women are less willing to work with anyone who initiates a negotiation (Bowles et al, 2007). These findings are consistent with backlash research showing women were more harsh than men in their evaluation of females in leadership positions (Garcia-Retamero & Lopez-Zafra, 2006) and also more likely to rate agentic women as socially unacceptable (Rudman, 1998). On this basis, we hypothesize that, independent of negotiating style:

**H1b:** Female negotiators will be rated as more trustworthy by male opponents than by female opponents.

Finally, we consider whether the negotiating style employed by women interacts with the gender of their negotiating partner, to affect their perceived trustworthiness. Again, several lines of research suggest that women may be more sensitive to variations in behavior than men. As negotiators, women are more context sensitive than men: they are better able to ‘read’ the behaviors of the other party and the situation, and to modify their behaviors accordingly (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). This pattern is consistent with Kelley and Stahelski’s (1970) triangle hypothesis, which states that cooperatively-motivated individuals show greater sensitivity to the behavior of others and modify their behaviors accordingly. Importantly, cooperatively-motivated individuals are highly sensitive to and responsive to the competitive behaviors of others. Conversely, competitively-oriented individuals are less sensitive and less responsive to the behaviors of others. This pattern of behavioral adaption
supports the idea that women, who are more cooperatively-motivated than men, are also more likely to detect and respond to differences in their negotiating partners’ approach. Based on these findings we hypothesize that:

\textit{H1c: Female negotiators will be perceived as most trustworthy when they use a gender-congruent, accommodating style and are negotiating with another woman; they will be perceived as least trustworthy when they use a gender-incongruent, competing style and are negotiating with other women.}

\textbf{Method}

\textit{Participants.} Eighty undergraduate and masters-level students (60 females, 20 males) took part in a simulated employment contract negotiation. Participants had an average age of 21 (SD=2.6 yrs) and average of 1.2 years work experience (SD=1.7).

\textit{Design.} We tested our hypotheses in a Employer’s Gender (M, F) \times Employee’s Negotiating Strategy (competing, accommodating) ANCOVA design, with post-negotiation trust as the dependent variable and pre-negotiation trust as the covariate. Dyads were allocated in a semi-randomized manner, to ensure an even distribution of MF and FF dyads across the two negotiation styles. Employees in this negotiation were always female; employers were either male or female. All analyses were of employers’ perceptions of the female employee in the negotiation.

\textit{Procedure.} Participants negotiated a simulated employment contract. Written instructions assigned participants to the role of either an employer or an employee, described the task, and gave a payoff schedule that described the points awarded for each possible contract. Negotiators were required to reach agreement on eight issues. The Negotiating Strategy manipulation, as described below, was embedded in the instructions that participants received.
A negotiating strategy manipulation, adapted from Weingart, Hyder, and Prietula’s (1996) and Allred’s (1999) description of negotiating styles, was embedded in the instructions. We conducted a pilot to identify the three behaviors most strongly characteristic of a competitive and an accommodating approach. Based on the outcome of this pilot work, we told participants in the competing condition that strategies for effective negotiation included resisting attempts at being persuaded, appearing firm and pressuring the other person. In the accommodating condition, we told participants that effective negotiators showed empathy, expressed positive expectations or optimism, and created openings for the other negotiator. Additionally, participants in the competitive condition were told that their goal was to achieve the best possible outcome for themselves, while the goal for those in the accommodating condition was to strengthen their relationship with the other person. To reinforce the appropriate style, participants were asked to write down two things that they could say or do to ensure that they either improved their individual outcomes (competing style) or strengthened the relationship (accommodating style).

Measures. Before and after the negotiation, participants completed a 27-item scale measuring trust. We drew items from several trust scales to develop our questionnaire (Lewicki & Stevenson, 1998; MacAllister, Lewicki & Chatervedi, 2006; Mayer & Davis, 1999) Subsequent factor analysis identified 4 sub-scales: Identity-based trust (e.g., “This person’s interests are the same as mine”); integrity-based trust (e.g., “This person will try to be fair in her dealings with me); benevolence-based trust (e.g., “This person is concerned about my welfare”) and deterrence-based trust (e.g., “If this person doesn’t do what she says she is going to do, I can get even”). Table 1 shows scale correlations and reliabilities.

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Insert Table 1 here
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Results

A series of ANCOVAs (Employer’s Gender x Employee’s Negotiating Strategy), with post-negotiation trust as the dependent variable and pre-negotiation trust as the covariate, showed that Employer’s Gender and Employee’s Negotiating Strategy interacted to affect 3 forms of trust: identity based, $F(1, 36) = 7.59$, $p<0.01$, $\eta^2=0.17$; integrity-based, $F(1, 36) = 11.79$, $p<0.005$, $\eta^2=0.25$; and deterrence-based, $F(1, 36) = 6.43$, $p<0.05$, $\eta^2=0.15$. No main effects or 2-way interactions were significant.

To interpret these 3-way interactions, we calculated the change in trust by subtracting post-negotiation trust scores from pre-negotiation trust scores. For identity- and integrity-based trust, a positive difference reflects an increase in trust. However, for deterrence based trust, a negative difference indicates a lower willingness to impose sanctions, implying an increase in trust. As can be seen in Figure 1, the biggest changes in trust occur in female-female rather than male-female dyads. Our results show that female negotiators who employ a competing style erode integrity- and identity-based trust when they negotiate with other women. In contrast, these forms of trust are relatively stable across styles when women negotiate with men. We also found that women are most likely to impose sanctions on female negotiators who use an accommodating style and least likely to do so when female negotiators use a competing style. As was the case with other forms of trust, men showed smaller adjustments to trust in response to a female negotiator’s strategy,

__Insert Figure 1 here__

Finally, although our theorizing and hypotheses are about women’s social outcomes, because we used a quantifiable negotiation it was possible to calculate women’s economic outcomes. Our analysis showed that women’s individual outcomes were not affected by
Employer’s Gender, Employees Negotiating Strategy or their interaction (F(1,37) = 0.14, 1.1, 1.5, respectively)

**Discussion**

Independent of whether they negotiated with men or women, female employees built or preserved relational forms of trust (identity-based, integrity-based) when they used an accommodating style. However, the consequences of a competitive style depended on who they negotiated with: whereas relational trust was preserved when they negotiated with men it was substantially eroded when they negotiated with other women. This same pattern is not evident in assessments of deterrence-based trust. Whereas men again appear less sensitive to the negotiating style used by female negotiators, both an accommodating and a competing style led to reassessments of deterrence-based trust by women: the salience of sanctions increased when female negotiators used an accommodating style and decreased when they used a competing style.

In their negotiations with other women, neither a gender-congruent accommodating style nor a gender-incongruent competing style yielded unambiguous benefits for women. Instead, they faced a trade-off between preserving relational trust (integrity, identity) but priming the use of sanctions or eroding relational trust but minimizing the salience of sanctions. The same dilemma was not evident when women negotiated with men. In these negotiations, an accommodating style both built relational trust and reduced the salience of sanctions, suggesting that ‘playing nice’ reaps benefits for women when they negotiate with men. Female negotiators who competed in their negotiations with men also incurred fewer costs: relational trust was maintained and the salience of sanctions did not change as the negotiation unfolded. Our results suggest that women cannot implement a negotiation strategy without considering the gender of the other negotiator. Although women can protect or build their social outcomes in their negotiations with men, they cannot
unambiguously do so in their negotiations with other women. Instead, in negotiations with other women, female negotiators must decide whether it is more important to build relational forms of trust or to decrease the salience of sanctions and choose their strategy accordingly.

**Experiment 2**

In Experiment 1, we focused on the role that prescriptive gender stereotypes play in establishing behavioral expectations. A second source of expectations is established by the situation. Strong situations, which provide normative information about appropriate behavior, reduce ambiguity (e.g., Mischel, 1977). Not only do they establish clear guidelines for what is and is not appropriate behavior, they also over-ride person-based attributions in the trust formation process (McKnight et al., 1998). Consistent with this proposition, Bowles and Babcock (2008) showed that women benefit when they are able to attribute their actions to external factors: By shifting attributions from themselves to the context, women are able to mitigate the backlash associated with negotiating. We expand on the idea that women may benefit when attributions about their behavior can be shifted to the negotiating context. We focus on how this shift can be accomplished not by changing women’s behavior, but by changing the norms associated with a negotiating context.

Organizational culture is an important source of information about how individuals should behave in their workplace relationships. Consequently, it provides an alternative set of behavioral expectations against which women’s behaviors can be evaluated. One way that organizational cultures differ is the emphasis that they place on agentic versus communal behaviors (e.g., Chatman & Barsade, 1995; Kabanoff, 1991). Agentic cultures are highly individualistic, emphasizing and rewarding individual performance and success. The norms associated with an agentic culture align with the behaviors that characterize a competitive negotiating style. As a result, they create a strong situation that legitimizes the use of competition. In contrast, communal cultures focus on collaborative behaviors that build
relationships, rewarding team rather than individual performance. These norms align with an accommodating strategy that preserves relationships, creating a strong situation that supports accommodation.

In this experiment, we test how fit between women’s negotiations strategies and the behavioral norms established by organizational culture affects their trustworthiness (Kulik & Olekalns, 2009). Research about person-job (Heilman, 1983) and person-culture fit (O’Reilly, Chatman & Caldwell, 1991) has established that individuals report greater levels of job satisfaction and organizational commitment, obtain better performance appraisals, and are less likely to leave an organization when there is a match between their goals and values and those of their organization. These findings imply that congruence is critical not only to how individuals experience their workplace, but also to how the workplace assesses individual actions. We build on the idea of fit to explore how congruence between negotiating styles and organizational culture affects women’s perceived trustworthiness.

When integrated with EVT, research on person-culture fit implies that women are most likely to be perceived as trustworthy when their negotiation strategies are congruent with organizational culture (competing in an agentic organization, accommodating in a communal organization). This is because their behaviors, which do not violate culture-based expectations, do not invite close scrutiny. However, if they choose to use incongruent strategies, EVT predicts that trustworthiness will be boosted in agentic cultures whereas it will be eroded in a communal culture. This is because the use of an accommodating strategy in an agentic culture is a positive violation (better than expected behavior) whereas the use of a competing strategy in a communal culture is a negative violation (worse than expected behavior). Supporting our conclusion, Kray and her co-workers demonstrate that economic backlash can be offset when stereotypically female traits are associated with effective negotiations (Kray et al., 2001, 2002, 2004). On this basis, we hypothesize that:
H3a: **Females who use an incongruent strategy (accommodating) in an agentic culture will be perceived as most trustworthy and females who use an incongruent (competing) strategy in a communal culture will be perceived as least trustworthy.**

Finally, we consider how the style-congruence interaction is affected by who women negotiate with. Several lines of research suggest that the effects predicted in H3a will be amplified when women negotiate with other women but attenuated when they negotiate with men. As we demonstrated in Experiment 1, women are more likely than men to penalize other women, and they are more sensitive to contextual cues (also Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). Consequently, we expect that the culture-strategy interaction will be amplified when women negotiate with other women and attenuated when they negotiate with men.

H3b: **Females who use an incongruent strategy (accommodating) in an agentic culture will be perceived as most trustworthy by women and females who use an incongruent (competing) strategy in a communal culture will be perceived as least trustworthy by women.**

**Method**

**Participants.** One hundred and sixty undergraduate and masters-level students (120 females, 40 males) took part in a simulated employment contract negotiation. Participants had an average age of 22 (SD=4.8 yrs) and average of 3 years work experience (SD=3.9).

**Design.** We tested our hypotheses in a Employer’s Gender (M, F) x Organizational Culture (agentic, communal) x Negotiating Strategy (congruent, incongruent) ANCOVA design, with post-negotiation trust as the dependent variable and pre-negotiation trust as the covariate. Dyads were allocated in a semi-randomized manner, to ensure an even distribution of MF and FF dyads across the Organizational Culture and Negotiating Strategy conditions. Employees in this negotiation were always female; employers were either male or female. All analyses were of employers’ perceptions of the female employee in the negotiation.
Procedure. Participants negotiated a simulated employment contract. Written instructions assigned participants to the role of either an employer or an employee, described the task, and gave a payoff schedule that described the points awarded for each possible contract. Negotiators were required to reach agreement on eight issues. The Negotiating Style and Organizational Culture manipulations were embedded in the instructions that participants received.

Experimental manipulations. We used the same manipulation as described in Experiment 1 to prime either an accommodating or competing style. Employers always received instructions that were congruent with their organizational culture; employees received instructions that were either congruent or incongruent with organizational culture. The organizational culture manipulation was adapted from Chatman and Barsade (1995). These instructions were supplemented by a list of four core values attributed to the organization (Carter Brown), and identified through an online search of the mission and value statements of existing organizations. To establish an agentic culture, participants received the instructions shown below. They also read a description of the organization’s four core values: respecting individuals, valuing excellence, valuing achievement and striving for value creation (see Table 2).

“In preparation for your negotiation, you have been researching Carter Brown. As a result of your research, you have obtained the following information. This information was reinforced by their annual celebration for high achieving individuals, “Individuals are the reason for our success”, which you attended as part of the recruitment process.

Carter Brown’s President and the Board are the driving force behind its corporate culture. They are proud of Carter Brown’s reputation in the industry as an individualistic organization. At Carter Brown, individual effort and initiative
are highly valued and rewarded and competition among individuals and departments is considered the best road toward innovation and corporate success.

Both employees and outsiders categorize Carter Brown as having a very individualistic culture that celebrates achievement by individuals."

Insert Table 2 here

To establish a communal culture, participants received the instructions shown below. They also read a description of the organization’s four core values: being partners, valuing their people, showing compassion and valuing collaboration.

“In preparation for your negotiation, you have been researching Carter Brown. As a result of your research, you have obtained the following information. This information was reinforced by their annual celebration for high achieving teams, “Teams are the reason for our success”, which you attended as part of the recruitment process.

Carter Brown’s President and the Board are the driving force behind its corporate culture. They are proud of Carter Brown’s reputation in the industry as a team-based organization. At Carter Brown, cooperation and teamwork are highly valued and rewarded and cooperation among individuals and departments is considered the best road toward innovation and corporate success. Both employees and outsiders categorize Carter Brown as having a very collectivistic culture that is strong in team spirit.”

Measures. We used the same measures of trust described for experiment 1. In this experiment, scale reliabilities were as follows: identity-based trust (α=0.83), integrity-based
(α=0.84) trust; benevolence-based trust (α=0.89); and deterrence-based trust (α=0.77). Scale inter-correlations are shown in Table 3.

Insert Table 3 here

Results

A series of ANCOVAs (Negotiating Strategy x Organizational Culture x Employer’s Gender) showed that benevolence-based trust was affected by a 2-way interaction between Negotiating Strategy and Organizational Culture and deterrence based trust was affected by a 3-way interaction between Negotiating Style, Organizational Culture and Dyad Gender. No significant effects were found for identity- or integrity-based trust. To interpret the significant interactions, we subtracted post-negotiation trust scores from pre-negotiation trust scores. For benevolence-based trust, a positive difference indicates increased trust whereas for deterrence-based trust a negative difference indicates increased trust (a lower willingness to impose sanctions).

Insert Figure 2 here

A Negotiation Strategy x Employer’s Gender x Organizational Culture ANCOVA showed that, controlling for pre-negotiation benevolence-based trust, Organizational Culture and Negotiating Style interacted to affect perceptions of post-negotiation benevolence-based trust, F(1,79)=4.54, p < .05, η²=0.06. No other significant effects were found for benevolence-based trust. This 2-way interaction is shown in Figure 2. Consistent with H3a, our analyses shows that perceptions of trustworthiness were boosted when negotiators use an incongruent (accommodating) style in an agentic culture, creating a positive violation.
However, we also note that negotiating style does not affect perceived trustworthiness in a communal culture.

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*Insert Figure 3 here*

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A Negotiating Strategy x Organizational Culture x Employer’s Gender ANCOVA, controlling for pre-negotiation deterrence-based trust, revealed a 3-way interaction between Employer’s Gender, Organizational Culture and Negotiating Style affected deterrence-based trust, $F(1,79)=10.33, p < .005, \eta^2=0.13$. No other significant were found for deterrence-based trust. To better understand this interaction, we undertook an analysis of simple effects, again using ANCOVA. Breaking down this interaction by Employer’s Gender, we found that the Organizational Culture x Negotiating Style remained significant when employers were female, $F(1,40)=17.63, p < .001, \eta^2=0.29$, but not when employers were male, $F(1,40)=1.15$, ns. We thus have support for H3b for deterrence-based but not for other forms of trust. We observed the biggest changes in deterrence-based trust in an agentic culture. As can be seen in Figure 3, in female-female dyads, women in agentic culture were more willing to impose sanctions on female negotiators who used an incongruent (accommodating) strategy and least willing to impose sanctions on female negotiators who used a congruent (competing) strategy.

Although our hypotheses addressed women’s social but not their economic outcomes, because we used a quantifiable negotiation it was also possible to calculate women’s economic outcomes. Our analysis showed that women’s individual outcomes were not affected by Dyad Gender, Negotiating Style, Organizational Culture or any interactions between these variables (all Fs < 1).
Discussion.

Our findings provide mixed support for the predictions we derived from EVT. Consistent with H3a, we found that organizational culture provides an alternative baseline against which to assess behavior. In the case of benevolence-based trust, our analysis showed that within an agentic culture a positive violation (an accommodating strategy) boosted women’s perceived trustworthiness. However, paralleling our E1 results, we found that in female-female dyads the use of an accommodating strategy in an agentic culture also increased the salience of sanctions. Our results show that negotiators are more attentive to female negotiators’ strategies in an agentic than a communal culture, suggesting that strong collaboration-based norms can buffer women who negotiate against the loss of trust.

Viewed from a trust perspective, this buffering effect may occur because the greater emphasis on relationships within a communal culture encourages others to give women the benefit of the doubt. As is the case with affective trust, others may need to encounter multiple violations of expectations over time before they revise their assessment of a female negotiator’s trustworthiness (Lewiciki & Weithoff, 2000). Conversely, because agentic cultures are more attuned to individual outcomes, less evidence may be need to be accumulated before the assessment of a female negotiator’s trustworthiness is revised.

General Discussion

In this research, we focused on the social consequences for women who negotiate. Drawing on SCM and EVT, we tested how women’s negotiating styles and the context in which they negotiate affects their perceived trustworthiness. We were especially interested in identifying the factors that mitigate against the erosion of trustworthiness. Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that women were more sensitive than men to female negotiators’ style and external cues provided by organizational culture. In Experiment 1, we identified a Catch-22 for female negotiators: in negotiations with women, an accommodating style
simultaneously increased relational trust (identity, integrity) and increased women’s willingness to impose sanctions on female negotiators. Experiment 2 provided further insight into the assessment of deterrence-based trust, showing that negotiating style has less impact on willingness to impose sanctions in a communal culture than in an agentic culture.

**Implications for Theory and Practice**

In reviewing previous research, we found mixed evidence that who women negotiate with will affect how they are perceived. Drawing on recent behavioral and neuro-economic research, we predicted that women would be more sensitive than men to the gender-congruency of female negotiators’ behaviors. We found support for this hypothesis across both experiments, demonstrating that female negotiators are most likely to erode their perceived trustworthiness when they violate either gender-based or culture-based expectations and are negotiating with other women. Men seemed relatively immune to variations in female negotiators’ behavior, so that women’s trustworthiness was unaffected by whether or not they conformed to gender- or culture-based behavioral norms.

Women built relational trust when they employed a gender-congruent, accommodating style. The benefits of an accommodating style were amplified when female negotiators created a positive expectancy violation by using it within an agentic organizational culture. Nonetheless, playing to gender stereotypes was not a uniformly winning strategy for women. While ‘playing nice’ yielded unequivocal benefits for women in their negotiations with men, it had repercussions in their negotiations with other women: while a gender-congruent strategy built relational trust, it simultaneously increased the other negotiators’ willingness to impose sanctions (deterrence-based trust). This effect was amplified when women accommodated in an agentic culture. Conversely, when women competed they eroded relational trust but also decreased willingness to impose sanctions.
This pattern parallels the classic backlash effect in which women trade off likeability for competence, and vice versa. Deterrence-based trust reflects negotiators’ willingness to impose sanctions on another person. Imposing sanctions is an external form of control that ‘guarantees’ trustworthy behavior, specifically compliance with commitments (Yamagishi, 1992; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). It can thus be interpreted as an attempt to ensure that negotiators will implement and honor their agreements. The use of sanctions may be primed because, although accommodation is known to preserve relationships (Allred, 2000), it is also associated with the characteristics of ineffective (incompetent) negotiators (Kray & Thompson, 2005). It may therefore cast doubt on women’s ability to successfully conclude the negotiation and implement the final agreement. The organizational behavior literature has clearly demonstrated that women face an unenviable trade-off between likeability and competence. Our findings demonstrate a comparable effect in relation to the sub-components of trust that examined: women who negotiate face a trade-off between establishing relational trust and inviting sanctions.

Drawing on EVT, we predicted that women would preserve or enhance their trustworthiness when they created positive violations. Our findings provide partial support for EVT, showing that positive violations enhanced relational trust. Women who conformed to stereotyped expectations (E1) or positively violated organizational norms (E2) built relational trust. However, the variations that we observed in deterrence-based trust highlight a limitation of EVT when individuals need to combine multiple cues (E2). In the second experiment, employers were able to compare women’s behavior to norms created by gender stereotypes and organizational culture. When these two sets of norms were aligned, women’s strategy choices were less critical to their perceived trustworthiness than when they were misaligned. This pattern suggests that when there are strong expectations of a collaborative, relationship-oriented style (gender norms + culture norms), women give female
negotiators the benefit of the doubt. The result of strong, congruent cues signaling the importance of the relationship means that female negotiators need to amass more evidence about a female negotiators’ (un)trustworthiness over time before they consider imposing sanctions. Misalignment between gender and culture-based expectations, however, did trigger a reassessment of the need to impose sanctions. This finding raises the question of how individuals set behavioral thresholds when they are faced with multiple but conflicting expectations. Our results suggest that negotiators turned to a third, and implicit, set of expectations – those generated by stereotypes of ineffective (accommodating) vs effective (competing) negotiators. When strategy aligned with gender expectations the stereotype of an ineffective negotiator was primed, and concerns about female negotiators were amplified and the salience of sanctions increased. When strategy aligned with organizational expectations, the stereotype of an effective negotiator was primed, concerns about the female negotiator were attenuated and the salience of sanctions decreased.

Overall, EVT most effectively predicted perceived trustworthiness in Experiment 1, when only one set of cues was salient. In Experiment 2, when employers had access to multiple reference points, EVT was less successful in predicting perceived trustworthiness. Our findings point to the need for refinements to EVT, specifically the need to consider how individuals combine multiple and potentially conflicting norms to set threshold expectations about others’ behavior. More broadly, our findings show not only that context affects how identical behaviors are evaluated (e.g., Biernat & Vescio, 2002) but also shows that context affects how multiple cues are combined to shape the threshold against which behaviors are evaluated.

Based on our results, we are able to identify several strategies that will help women to mitigate the social costs of negotiating. First, women seem better able to protect both relational (identity, integrity) and transactional (deterrence) trust if they negotiate with men.
Consistent with our extension of Kelly and Stahelski’s triangle hypothesis to gender, men appear to be less sensitive to both negotiation styles and context. Second, women reduce the impact of their behaviors when there is a viable external attribution for negotiating. However, we note that while external attributions offset relational concerns, they do not offset concerns about women’s competence. We add to past research that shows attributing negotiations to external offers or advice offsets backlash (Bowles & Babcock, 2008), by demonstrating that strong contextual norms provide a plausible (and dominant) measure against which to assess women’s actions. Finally, our results suggest that in their negotiations with other women, female negotiators need to be especially attentive to signaling not just their good intentions but their ability to implement agreements. Consequently, they need to combine the gender-congruent accommodating strategies that preserve affective trust with actions that build cognitive trust: creating small wins that signal an ability to keep commitments, signaling firmness and explicitly invoking reciprocity may assist women to signal the importance of deal-making alongside of the importance of relationship-building (Lewicki & Weithoff, 2000; Thompson, 2005).

**Limitations and future directions.**

In both experiments, we found variations in social outcomes (trust) but not in economic outcomes. This appears to be good news for women: we are able to identify a set of strategies that will enhance their perceived trustworthiness without eroding their economic outcomes. Nonetheless, we did not replicate the poorer economic outcomes women usually obtain when they negotiate with men. A possible explanation is that, by using a scoreable negotiation, we presented our negotiators with a very structured task in which what was negotiable and the range of possible outcomes was clearly defined. Bowles et al. (2005) demonstrated that when women negotiate within an unambiguous economic structure, their disadvantage is removed. Our findings are consistent with Bowles et al.’s results (also
Bylsma & Major, 1992; Rousseau, 2001) but suggest that while women’s economic outcomes are protected under these circumstances, there is still potential to erode social outcomes.

One avenue for future research would be tests how social outcomes are affected when the economic structure of a negotiation is more ambiguous.

Our conclusions are also limited to one-shot negotiations. However, social outcomes are especially critical in on-going relationships such as those with an employer. In organizations, initial impressions of likeability and trust not only create a filter for subsequent actions, but also become ‘inputs’ for later exchanges (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). They have the potential to affect the benefits that employees receive from their supervisors, which in turn affects employees’ turnover intentions (Dienesch & Liden, 1986; Harris, Kacmar & Witt, 2005). Similarly, in negotiations, social outcomes such as reputation carry-over from one negotiation to the next, affecting long-term strategy choices by other parties to the negotiation (O’Connor et al., 2005). We are able to identify the factors that shape impressions of women’s trustworthiness in their initial encounter with an employer. However, it is important to test these findings – and their implications – in a series of negotiations that better replicate an ongoing employment relationship.

Conclusions

In these experiments, we sought to establish the conditions under which female negotiators protected or eroded a specific social outcome, trust. Our findings show that there is no straightforward path to protecting trust. Women are at least risk of eroding trust when they negotiate with men. In their negotiations with other women, they must navigate a highly nuanced negotiation landscape. Our results clearly show that, in the absence of other strong behavioral norms such as organizational culture, women face an unenviable trade-off between maintaining relational trust and priming the use of sanctions. Whereas a gender congruent, accommodating strategy protects relational trust, it also primes the use of
sanctions. Conversely, a competing strategy reduces the salience of sanctions but also erodes relational forms of trust. These effects are amplified in an agentic organizational culture and attenuated in a communal culture. Consequently, women need select their strategies mindful of the context within which they negotiate and may need, on a negotiation basis, to decide whether building relational trust or reducing sanctions is more important. As is the case with the classic backlash phenomenon, our result suggest that women cannot simultaneously build relational trust and limit sanctions.
References


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