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Article
Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
  • Lynn A. Stout, Cornell Law School
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
12-1-2002
Keywords
  • ATDs,
  • Antitakeover defenses,
  • Staggered board provisions,
  • Negative wealth effect
Abstract
Over the past two decades, academics have generated a large empirical literature examining whether antitakeover defenses like poison pills or staggered board provisions decrease the wealth of shareholders in target corporations. Many studies, however, rely primarily on ex post analysis-they consider only how antitakeover defenses (ATDs) influence shareholder wealth after the corporation has been formed and, in some cases, long after the ATD was adopted. This Response argues that it may be impossible to fully understand the purpose or effects of ATDs without also considering their ex ante effects. In particular, ATDs may increase net target shareholder wealth ex ante if they encourage nonshareholder groups to make extracontractual investments in corporate team production. The Response reviews recent empirical evidence suggesting that shareholders do in fact perceive ATDs as beneficial ex ante. It also explores some implications for contemporary corporate scholarship and the attempt to measure the wealth effects of antitakeover rules.
Comments

This article predates the author's affiliation with Cornell Law School.

Publication Citation
Published in: Stanford Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 3 (December 2002).
Citation Information
Lynn A. Stout. "Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem" (2002)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/lynn_stout/12/