Are Benevolent Dictators Altruistic in Groups? A Within-Subject DesignExperimental Economics
DepartmentEconomics, Finance and Quantitative Analysis
AbstractWe use a within-subject experimental design to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct features of individual preferences: altruism in a two-person context, risk aversion in monetary outcomes, and social preferences in a group context. We find that altruism is related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their self-interest in a group tax redistribution game which we interpret to be an expression of social preferences.
Citation InformationAckert, Lucy, et al. "Are Benevolent Dictators Altruistic in Groups? A Within-Subject Design." Experimental Economics 14.3 (2011): 307-21.