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Article
Uncertain Litigation Cost and Seller Behavior: Evidence from an Auditing Game
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper
  • Ping Zhang, Syracuse University
  • Bryan K. Church, Georgia Institute of Technology - Main Campus
  • Lucy Ackert, Kennesaw State University
Department
Economics, Finance and Quantitative Analysis
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2001
Disciplines
Abstract
Investigates difficulties that arise in estimating expected litigation costs in an auditing game in the United States. Effect of effort level on certain and uncertain costs of performing the engagement; Frequency of observed fee offers below the total expected cost of an engagement; Institutional arrangements and damage-sharing regimes; Theoretical and behavioral predictions.
Citation Information
Ping, Zhang, Bryan K. Church, and Lucy F. Ackert. "Uncertain Litigation Cost and Seller Behavior: Evidence From an Auditing Game. " Working Paper Series (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta)17.2001.