Empirical Analysis of Judicial Decisions
Synonyms
Definition
Evidence shows that, contrary to what believed traditional legal theorists, judges when making decisions are not merely making a pure exercise of interpretation of the law. They are influenced by factors such as panel composition, material and nonmaterial benefits, pressure groups, etc., and may follow distinct trends. This chapter presents some models that explain judicial behavior or judicial decisions. Recent (and not so recent) empirical literature has been providing a rich debate in this still recent discussion.
Introduction: Why Care? Judicial Outcomes and Economic Performance
If judges have a substantial amount of discretion in deciding cases, then it is important to know the motives and the value systems which influence their exercise of discretion. (C. Hermann Pritchett 1968)
Coase (1960) taught us that courts and court outcomes – i.e., judicial decisions – impact the...
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