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The Public and Private Benefit of an Impure Public Good Determines the Sensitivity of Bacteria to Population Collapse in a Snowdrift Game
Environmental Microbiology
  • Robert Smith, Nova Southeastern University
  • Aimee Doiron, Nova Southeastern University
  • Rodrigo Muzquiz, Nova Southeastern University
  • Marla Fortoul, Nova Southeastern University
  • Meghan Haas, Nova Southeastern University
  • Tom Abraham, Nova Southeastern University
  • Rebecca Quinn, Nova Southeastern University
  • Ivana Barraza, Nova Southeastern University
  • Khadija Chowdhury, Nova Southeastern University
  • Louis R. Nemzer, Nova Southeastern University
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
9-4-2019
Disciplines
Abstract

When cooperation is critical for survival, cheating can lead to population collapse. One mechanism of cooperation that permits the coexistence of cooperators and cheaters is an impure public good, whose public benefits are shared, but with a private benefit retained by the cooperator. It has yet to be determined how the contributions of the public and private benefit affect population survival. Using simulations and experiments with β‐lactamase‐expressing bacteria, we found that for a given amount of public and private benefit, the population was most sensitive to collapse when initiated from an intermediate fraction of cooperators due to the near‐concurrent collapse of the cooperator and cheater populations. We found that increasing the ratio of public to private benefit increased sensitivity to collapse. A low ratio allowed cooperators to survive on their private benefit after the public benefit could not rescue the cheaters. A high ratio allowed the cheaters to survive to high concentrations of ampicillin due to the high public benefit. However, small increases in ampicillin caused a rapid decline in the entire population as the private benefit was insufficient to allow self‐rescue of the cooperators. Our findings have implications in the persistence of populations that rely on cooperation for survival.

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Additional Comments
Presidents Faculty Research and Development grant #s: 335347, 335318
ORCID ID
0000-0003-2744-7390
DOI
10.1111/1462-2920.14796
Citation Information
Robert Smith, Aimee Doiron, Rodrigo Muzquiz, Marla Fortoul, et al.. "The Public and Private Benefit of an Impure Public Good Determines the Sensitivity of Bacteria to Population Collapse in a Snowdrift Game" Environmental Microbiology (2019) p. 1 - 37 ISSN: 1462-2912
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/lnemzer/47/