Women at the Gates: Gender and Industry in Stalin's Russia.

Lisa Kirschenbaum, West Chester University of Pennsylvania

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/lisa_kirschenbaum/3/

One of the characteristic complaints from the academy is the domination of public perception of our chosen fields of knowledge by writers whose knowledge of the field is limited, shallow and driven by commercial considerations. Even more characteristic is the refusal to enter the fray and look rather disdainfully at those who do attempt to provide a synoptic view of the span of a country's history, let alone those who attempt to do it in the form of an extended essay rather than an multi-volume enterprise that has taken years to write and demands almost as long to read. Fortunately none of this has weighed on Marshall Poe who has written a book precisely for the literate, non-specialist audience who would like to understand something of the deeper rhythms of Russian history.

Poe's book sets a cracking pace, beginning with the formation of the Slavic tribes and ending with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Poe argues that Russia is neither European nor Asian in its development, but cut its own path to modernity that proved very successful for many centuries. The peculiarity of Russia was rooted in its very late contact with the heritage of classical antiquity and Christianity: both arriving together in the tenth century. Equally important were the vast distances separating Russia from the centres of both European and Asian civilizations, leaving Russia comparatively free from either cultural or political domination. Even when Russia was conquered by the Mongols, the cultural impact was limited as the Mongols had little interest in Russia other than an asset to be mercilessly milked. When Russia emerged from the Mongol Yoke in the fifteenth century it confronted some of the most aggressive, dynamic and expansionist states in world history in the states of Renaissance Europe. Ill equipped to deal with this new threat the Russians had one advantage: their geography. They were sufficiently far from these states by land and by sea, which gave the Russians the time to adapt unlike other pre-modern empires, which collapsed when confronted by the dynamic states of Renaissance Europe. And how the Russians adapted. An autocratic state ruthlessly mobilized its scanty resources to meet the threat posed by the Europeans. By securing its borders, subordinating society to the needs of the state and mobilizing the economy to support the army, the Russian state had found an effective way to resist European domination and lead its country to modernity via a different route. Essentially the Imperial and Soviet states followed the model laid out in Muscovite times, suitably updated. Russia's moment in world history was this roughly 500-year period when it followed its own path to modernity. It ended when the Russian elites decided in 1991 that the unbridled consumerism of the West was more appetising than the relatively successful but still austere Russian path. The Russian moment passed away along with the Soviet Union and Russia joined the mainstream of Western history.

Poe presents a compelling thesis, told in a scintillating manner. Only someone with a profound knowledge of Russian history could produce such a coherent and compel-
ling account in such a confined space. The core of his thesis is convincing. Russia did indeed find its own way to modernity by meeting the challenge of the West successfully. One might quibble that the roots of this are to be found it's isolation from the classical and Christian heritage as Poe argues. After all the Scandinavian countries shared Russia's isolation up until the same time yet they rapidly became part of the mainstream of European development. Similarly he argues that the Mongols had little long-term impact on Russian history, but then adds that the Muscovite princes saw themselves as heirs to the Mongol khans, which suggests Mongol influence was rather deeper. Nevertheless, these issues and other issues are laid on the line precisely to stimulate discussion and in that they succeed. Because he writes in such a bold, muscular style unstifled with endless qualifications, the essentials of his argument are wonderfully clear to be debated, taken issue with and supported. I think he has provided an invaluable service to the profession, but much more importantly to the wider public. Anyone confronting Russia for the first time can be recommended this book without reservation.

Shane O'Rourke


This is a solid presentation of the perceptions and representations of the Kievan prince Vladimir between the eleventh and the early eighteenth century. Francis Butler traces how the saint's image evolved, from two early and defining depictions to the changing contexts of Muscovy and Ukraine. He concludes with a brief discussion of Vladimir's image after Peter I.

Butler has consulted most of the available written primary and secondary sources on Vladimir. He explains how Metropolitan Ilarion's *Sermon on Law and Grace* and the Kievan Primary Chronicle served as templates for most later versions. Most interesting here is the tension between the idea of Christianization as a break with the past, and the idea of continuity between a strong pagan Rus' and a strong Christian one. Thus Vladimir's siege of Kherson, for example, shows that he is successful in terms of a warlike, pre-Christian code, and that the Christian God supports him, too.

Butler raises a question that has long troubled scholars: why did it take several centuries to canonize the prince? Was it lack of miracles? Hostility on the part of Byzantium? The fact that few of the European rulers who similarly baptized their countries were canonized? After considering the various arguments, Butler suggests convincingly that it was Vladimir's key role as the founder of a dynasty that led to his prominence in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century depictions in Muscovy and Vladimir-on-the-Kliaz'ma. It is precisely for this reason, Butler argues, that the Russia of the Romanovs showed generally less interest in Vladimir. But just as Vladimir's diminished dynastic significance led to the waning of his popularity in Russia, a rise in specifically Kievan civic pride, along with the flourishing of the Kiev Academy, led to numerous new Ukrainian depictions. A particularly interesting hybrid of the imperial
Russian and Ukrainian approaches emerged in Feofan Prokopovich's play on Vladimir. The saint was both an all-Russian hero who converted Rus' to the Orthodox faith that united the Eastern Slavs (and set them apart from West Europeans) and a local figure in whom Kievans could take great pride. Finally, he also happened to be a great reforming ruler, just as was the Peter I whom Feofan, like so many great Ukrainian clerics, would serve so well.

This is a rich story, and Butler has presented it succinctly. His presentation would be stronger, however, if he had consulted a broader base of sources. While he discusses the productions of elite culture, it would have been interesting to see the productions of the more popular press: the mass-produced vitae produced by nineteenth and early-twentieth century monasteries, for example, or collections of spiritual verses (particularly those from the Kiev area), or lubki illustrations. Butler might also have engaged explicitly the vast corpus of theoretical writing on saints' lives and the interaction between their cults and their representations. As it is, his study will serve those interested in Vladimir better than those who are interested in thinking about saints more broadly. Some discussion of Vladimir's representations in the Uniate community, in the emigration, and how he was celebrated in the key anniversary years of 1938 and 1988, would have added more complicated dimensions and given the story more resonance. Finally, given that the title tells us that this is meant to be the history of an image across many centuries, it is especially regrettable that there is not a single illustration in the entire book.

Nadieszda Kizenko
State University of New York at Albany


In this important study, Serhii Plokhy resurrects the nearly forgotten religious context of the world in which the seventeenth-century Cossacks moved. He argues that the Christian churches in Ukraine had embarked on a project of confessionalization, which he defines as the "expansion of hierarchical authority in matters of internal church discipline and greater control over questions of the faith . . . and a growing role for the lay element in church affairs." (11) His task is to examine the role of the Cossacks in this process. In doing so, he enriches our awareness of the importance of the Cossacks, Ukraine, and Orthodox Christianity in the context of the religious wars of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe.

Plokhy points out, for example, that many Reformation ideas, especially those related to the "nationalization" of ecclesiastical institutions and those aimed at making the language of sacred texts and liturgical services comprehensible to the laity, were "neither new nor original to the Orthodox." (11-12) He highlights the symbolic importance of such notions as Kiev as a second Jerusalem and brings new force to the argument that the Cossacks were a catalyst in forming Ukrainian national identity. A particularly important chapter discusses the Khmelnytsky uprising as a war of religion: its nuanced and sensitive treatment of this incendiary topic is a tour de force. Plokhy
considers the uprising from the perspectives of the Cossack military leaders, Uniates, Polish Catholics, Jews, and the Orthodox Christian clergy of the Kievan metropolitanate. He raises the provocative question of why the events of the summer of 1648 made a far deeper impression on the social memory of the Jews than on that of the Poles. The issues are rarely discussed with such balance and impartiality.

Plokhy's confessionalization thesis is so convincing, and explains so much, that it would be better to resist the temptation to let it explain everything. Sometimes politics is just politics. When Patriarch Paisios of Jerusalem interceded on behalf of the Cossacks, for example, he was told that the Tsar could not send an army to reinforce Khmelnytsky because Muscovy had concluded an “eternal peace” with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This seems a straightforward diplomatic agreement. Was it really because “the Tsar, as a Christian ruler, could not violate his oath to another Christian monarch” (309) — and not just that a deal is a deal, whether one strikes it with infidels or heretics (or fellow true believers)?

Translations of terms ascribing identity, as Plokhy acknowledges, are notoriously difficult, particularly when the writers themselves use archaic terminology. But when Khmelnytsky wrote the Muscovite Tsar that “we have no peace from the godless Arians” (300), he probably meant contemporary Hagarenes, or Muslims, rather than the fourth-century heretics named after Arius. The word russkii is particularly ambiguous. Plokhy holds that in early modern Ukrainian and Russian texts, the terms Rus' and Rossiia were used interchangeably (14, 283). Perhaps. Plokhy, however, does not share the terminology or the consistency of his early modern subjects. Thus when the Cossacks use the words russkii or russkie to apply to themselves or their clergy, he calls them Rus or Ruthenian. But when the Muscovite Tsar similarly addresses the Orthodox Ukrainians and Belarusians in the Polish-Lithuanian army as russkie, Plokhy renders them as “Russian people.” And when Metropolitan Sylvestr Kosov distinguishes between russkii and rossiiskii, Plokhy renders both as Rus. The issue here is not the principle of imposing modern notions of nationality onto premodern people, it is simply being consistent when one does so.

Liturgical aficionados, who will be among Plokhy's enthusiastic readers, will want even more details. It is interesting that Metropolitan Joasaph of Corinth, together with the metropolitan of Nazareth, performs a “special rite” over Bohdan and Tymosh Khmelnytsky, but what was it? The Uniate bishop of Kholm served liturgies dedicated to the greater glory of Polish arms: were these molebny, inserts into the litanies at Mass, or homilies? The specifics would make clear just how important the action was. Non-specialists might welcome glosses for different reasons. Not everyone might realize, for example, that Tsars and Cossacks used sophisticated references to scripture in their correspondence: “May you not be a proverb and a byword to the enemies of the cross of Christ” (316), for example, is also a clever paraphrase of the Book of Job. Everyone would benefit from maps and illustrations: Oxford University Press is to faulted for not including even one in so expensive a book.

Throughout his study, Plokhy emphasizes on the one hand the specificity of this episode in Ukrainian history and its place within the broad European, but not Russian, context on the other. This is certainly fair enough. In the beginning of the seventeenth century Muscovy and Ukraine were clearly separate entities, facing different problems
in different contexts. But it is also precisely the seventeenth century that would be so momentous for the history of both entities. In a chain of events that would culminate with the Great Northern War under Peter I, both Muscovy and Ukraine would be subsumed for centuries into the Russian empire. (Despite Plokhy's usage of the term (112), in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Muscovy as such had ceased to exist.) The events Plokhy describes so minutely would affect the Orthodox Church in the Russian empire as a whole. Indeed, their legacy continues to haunt church-state relations in present-day Ukraine, present-day Russia, present-day Belarus, and the Diasporas of all three nations.

Plokhy knows all of this, and has discussed it elsewhere. But those who read only this book might also wish Plokhy had shared some of those insights, and provided greater historical context to the still-charged debates about church-state-nationality issues in the post-Soviet empire. Similarly, a broader discussion of the pan-Orthodox context would have illuminated common themes of interest to Orthodox Christians of whatever nationality. To name only a few: treatments of the nineteenth-century conflict between the Bulgarians and the Greeks over the supposed heresy of "phyletism," or venerating the national principle over a "larger" Orthodox one would benefit greatly from a comparison with the Ruthenians and the Muscovites in the period Plokhy discusses. Plokhy's discussion of the strong role of monasteries in the absence of a strong hierarchy would be enriched by comparisons with Byzantium, Muscovy, and the Balkans under Ottoman rule. And the strong lay opposition to Orthodox clergy's attending a joint sobor with the Uniates in 1626 (125) recalls the analogous situation in the Council of Florence-Ferrara in 1439. Such modest additions to his excellent study would have strengthened Plokhy's case for including the Cossacks, and Ukraine, into future histories of religious politics.

Serhii Plokhy has made a crucial first step in this direction. He has shown how a group traditionally associated with rebellion, war, and diplomacy made skillful use of contemporary religious discourse. He has raised the tantalizing issue of the Cossacks as spearhead of an Eastern Reformation. His work raises important issues for those interested in the history of the Cossacks, of Ukraine, and of nation-building and national identity. If this were all Plokhy did, it would have already been a contribution. But Plokhy has done more: his work, and the works one hopes it will inspire, should redraw the scholarly map of seventeenth-century Europe.

Nadieszda Kizenko
State University of New York at Albany


The Presidents of Germany and of Russia have proclaimed 2003-2004 the year of "German-Russian Cultural Encounters" (Kulturbegegnungen). By doing this they continue the big feast of the 300th anniversary of Saint Petersburg with dignity. Although Germany has always been considered to be the birthplace of Slavic studies, Prof.
Helmut Obst, the director of the Franckesche Stiftungen and author of the foreword of this book, makes a remarkable statement: he claims that both people still do not know each other and each other's culture. This assertion will not go down very well with many German slavists – let me only mention the impressive series of the "Westöstliche Spiegelungen" under the editorship of the late Lew Kopelew, the intermediary between Russian and German culture.

Within the framework of the great German-Russian year the Franckesche Stiftungen in Halle have taken the praiseworthy initiative to organize an exhibition around the splendid collection of drawings and engravings of the Russian connoisseur and collector Dmitrii Rovinskii (1824-1895). Rovinski did research in many Russian and Western libraries and archives for decades, which resulted in an impressive collection of 480 drawings and engravings connected with Russia. This collection was published in his Materialy dlja russkoi ikonografii, a well-known edition to specialists, but almost inaccessible outside Russia. Die Zarin und der Teufel is the catalogue of the exhibition in Halle; it contains one fourth of the Rovinski collection, not only the reproductions of the engravings, but also the historic commentaries by the author. The complete collection was edited on the CD-ROM D. A. Rovinskii. Materialien für eine russische Ikonographie, edited and prefaced by Herman Goltz (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003).

The catalogue gives a good idea of the Western perception of Russia from the sixteenth century, when the West discovered Muscovy, up to the beginning of the nineteenth century. You cannot escape the impression that the West was above all fascinated by the oriental, exotic splendour of Russia, its people and clothes. In this image the Cossacks and Tartars play a particular role. Especially since the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries the imagemaking in England was in top gear. Rovinski brought together many extremely interesting caricatures of Catherine the Great. The most famous is without any doubt "An Imperial Stride" by William Holland (1791), which was in turn inspired by the French original "L'Enjambe Impériale" of 1787. Catherine II with half-naked breasts tries to bridge the distance between Russia and Constantinople. The indecent or ambiguous comments of the European rulers speak volumes of the erotic fantasy of the envious Western powers – in the concert of the great powers Russia was clearly the younger intruder. And if the intruder is a woman on the throne, nothing good can be awaited. Vulgar and ambiguous is the commentary of the Turkish sultan who is looking right into the Empress' petticoats: "The whole Turkish army would not satisfy her." A devastating image of Catherine II is created in the cartoon "The Moment of Reflection or a Tale for Future Times," an innocent title for a venomous picture of the Empress in the face of death, depicting her as a devil.

The international rivalry in the Napoleonic era produced superb satirical cartoons. A splendid example of artistic engraving is "Les Russes à Paris" (ca 1814-1815), on which a Cossack and a Russian cavalryman declare their love to two Parisian young ladies.

To put it briefly, this edition is a feast for the eyes; it makes a hitherto hidden collection accessible and gives a survey of four centuries of thinking about Russia and the Russians. The title of the catalogue refers to a cartoon in which the devil presents...
Warsaw and Constantinople to the Russian Empress on a tray. It is an attractive title, but the book offers much more than the title promises. The negative images form but one part of our total conception of Russia. In the foreword it is rightly stated that it is better and healthier to have more than one image of a country. The catalogue also makes clear that our contemporary opinions and images of Russia seldom contain something new and that conceptions like “the Russian bear” are at least two centuries old.

Although Germans are said to be meticulous, there are some careless details to be found in the catalogue. The Dutch engraver Pieter Picaert for example is labeled as “Peter Pikart” (58) and it is amazing that the hero of Polish independence Tadeusz Kościuszko all at once is introduced as Kosciusko (173).

We hope that more of these splendid editions will be published in the German-Russian year of Cultural Encounters.

Emmanuel Waegemans
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven


This biography of Ivan IV Groznyi is the successful result of a collective effort of British scholar Maureen Perrie and Russian scholar Andrei Pavlovich Pavlov. It is the only “profile” of a medieval Russian monarch in the Pearson-Longman series “Profiles in Power,” which has so far published about fifty biographies of famous politicians, from Lloyd George to Nasser and from Mao to Gorbachev. As Maureen Perrie admits in her preface, it is mostly thanks to the work of Andrei Pavlov that Ivan’s biography came into the light. Chapters 4–9 were initially written by him in Russian and translated into English by M. Perrie. Nevertheless, the style of the book is consistent throughout. As we learn from the preface, it is presumably Pavlov’s careful scholarly style that dominates the whole book, as his parts were written first. And though the parts written by Pavlov mostly quote Russian secondary literature, Perrie has added English and American references where necessary. Still the book does not overwhelm the reader with an apparatus of sources and quotations, making it a very good read for scholars and students alike.

The success of this volume lies in the careful awareness the authors give to the Forschungsstand. In my recent studies I came to look upon most of Ivan IV’s biographies in English, Russian and German, be they popular or scholarly. Within an obviously popular series, it is all the more striking that this work, unlike most others, considers every new piece of secondary literature as well as gives us the sources. Therefore, readers can draw their own conclusions as to whether the authors’ assumptions are probable and the sources reliable.

Take the case of the death of the Tsarevich Ivan Ivanovich (192ff): the authors cite the popular knowledge that Ivan IV killed his son through his own hands, as well as other evidence that speaks of an illness of Ivan Ivanovich before his death. “It is difficult to come to any firm conclusion about the true cause of the death of Tsarevich
Ivan Ivanovich,” the authors claim and add: “What is much more important, however, is the fact that his death raised the issue of the fate of the dynasty itself” (193). Subsequently, they give an analysis of the dynastic issue that we really have the sources for.

The book is free from the guesswork and popularization of most biographies. Instead we get the factual evidence, the conclusions scholars have drawn from it, and a concise overview of contemporary scholarship. Very rarely the authors choose to comment on the literature, and rarely they give new interpretations; but when they explain crucial events their own way, it is all the more significant. First, they develop the thesis that Ivan inaugurated the Oprichnina against the great hereditary boyar clans who tried to dominate the Muscovite policy, as they were used to in olden times (124ff). Closely related to this is the second point, made mainly in the last chapter, that by means of terror and theater Ivan tried to introduce the system of autocracy he had derived from church literature against the traditional Muscovite system of government (206). A third thesis is that the Oprichnina never really ended but that the parting of the land into a Zemshchina and an Oprichnina zone – afterwards called “court” (dvor) – continued until the end of Ivan’s reign (170ff). These points may prove extremely stimulating for further scholarship.

I have some marginal remarks. Though in comparison to most recent German publications the book is carefully edited, it lacks the source of the quotation on page 133. Within the analysis of the 1570 “treason” and “punishment” of Novgorod I would have appreciated a more detailed treatment of Novgorod’s role in the Zemshchina, which might explain the logic of the war with Novgorod. Finally, the authors are unaware of Marshall Poe’s recent analysis of the Moscow—Third Rome theory (in Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 49 [2001]). His article would cast a new light on several passages in which the authors refer to this theory (e.g., 34, 206f.)

The book contains no pictures, but several maps and genealogical schemes that visualize the sometimes complicated relationships in the Muscovite Grand Princes’ family. In the appendix we find a concise chronology of Russian history from the ninth century until the Time of Troubles, a useful glossary of Muscovite terms, and a very comprehensive bibliography and index. I recommend it for scholars and students alike.

Cornelia Soldat


These two volumes comprise the results of a decade of work compiling the most complete information concerning Muscovy’s elite, known as the “boyars and duma men” from Kotoshikhin’s description of the Muscovite government in the seventeenth century. In Poe’s introduction, he writes that these volumes “expand upon [Robert] Crummey’s effort” and “provide a different view of the biographical information he offered” (I, 9). In *Aristocrats and Servitors: The Boyar Elite in Russia, 1613-1689* (1983), Crummey commented that in order to fully understand the duma men it “would require years of taxing archival work,” and in these volumes Poe (and his co-authors of the first volume) has taken on that task. These volumes add to Crummey’s work by including more members of the duma ranks (comprised of boyars, okol’nichie, dumnye dvoriane, and dumnye d’iaki), as well as including ceremonial court ranks (kravchii, kaznachei, postel’nichii), and finally information on the duma men’s entitlements (oklady). While questions about the duma men’s role in the Muscovite government would still fill volumes, *The Russian Elite in the Seventeenth Century*’s achievement is to provide the most complete information about each man in the duma ranks to date.

The first volume is the product of the authors’ achievement of uncovering the full data of the duma ranks from untapped archival information, in addition to exploiting previously published sources. There is a complete listing of all of the duma men, their position, and their yearly entitlement for each year from 1613 until 1713. If the year by year index is too unwieldy at first glance, the volume also provides a solution with a biographical index of each of the 505 men included in the duma ranks over the course of the century, including the year of their appointment to the duma, promotion through the ranks, and, for most, the year of their death. As the most complete presentation of all of the men of the duma ranks, this volume is a suitable companion to S. V. Veselovskii’s *D’iaki i pod’iachie XV-XVII vv.* (1975). Together Poe and Veselovskii have produced an exhaustive index of the individuals serving in the early-modern Muscovite government in all ranks.

As Crummey highlighted the role of the “new men” of the duma ranks in the seventeenth century in his work, Poe attempts to uncover the influence of these men upon the duma ranks quantitatively. Up until the 1650s, the approximately thirty men who comprised the duma ranks tended to come from the same families. Aleksei Mikhailovich abandoned the more traditional policy of replacing the duma men as they died, and appointed new men in policy of enlarging the duma ranks. From Aleksei Mikhailovich through Peter the Great, the duma ranks grew in accordance with the increasing size of the court overall, allowing new families to claim the elite rank. Most
of these new men came into the duma ranks through the position of dumnyi dvorianin, which Poe calls "a veritable conduit for new men of middling status" (I, 14). The dumnye dvoriane increased in size from one or two men under Mikhail Fedorovich to twenty-five under Aleksei, thirty-two under Fedor, thirty-nine in Sophia’s first year as regent, and forty-four upon Peter’s ascension.

It is in Poe’s introduction to his database of the duma ranks that he makes one of his most important points, demonstrating the correlation of the growth of new men into the duma and the growth of the court. He suggests that the rapid escalation of the size of the court and the duma occurred under Fedor, Sophia, and Peter, where each “attempted to shore up their position by distributing an unprecedented number of duma positions as patronage to allies and would-be allies” (I, 15). While the increase began under Aleksei Mikhailovich, his appointees largely came from his closest allies – his in-laws.

Poe’s second volume demonstrates the utility of the index, answering some of the questions arising about the duma men. Once again, Poe lays out his interest in terms of providing the data for Crummey’s arguments in Aristocrats and Servitors, in particular, to support Crummey’s assertion that privileges among the old duma men declined as a result of the rise of the new. Poe breaks this primary question into several discrete issues that are more readily addressed with his data, such as measuring the typical career span for a member of the duma ranks, and assessing the chance of promotion and the role of familial connections played in influencing advancement. All of these questions emanate from one central issue that remains difficult to answer – what constituted “status” in Muscovite society?

From his data, Poe reaches the conclusions that discounting men who entered the duma ranks as boyars and thus had no chance of promotion, only 25 percent of duma men received any promotion, and only 5 percent received more than one promotion. In general, the majority of men in the duma ranks were never promoted. Poe easily demonstrates that the growth of the duma men remained in direct correlation with the growth of the court. During the entire period under examination, the duma men comprised 1-3 percent of the entire court. Naturally, as the court increased, so too did the number of duma men. More importantly, this increase resulted in the increase of new men during the seventeenth century, particularly from among the ranks of the commoners. Since the number of princes in the court remained relatively stable, the increase in both the court and in the duma ranks could only occur as a result of allowing a broader spectrum of Muscovite society into the court. However, this result should not suggest that social rank ceased to be an important factor in appointments. As we would expect, men with familial connections to the traditional princely elite continued to be favored over their less connected counterparts. This included being appointed at a generally younger age as well as receiving higher rank upon first appointment.

Crummey was Poe’s graduate advisor, and his respect for Crummey might explain why, in the end, Poe emphasizes his agreement with Crummey’s work even when his meticulous research indicates disagreement. This undermines some of the accomplishments of the volumes, which offer many new insights about the nature of Muscovy’s elite. For example, the change of Crummey’s “Boyar Duma” to Poe’s “duma men” critiques the concept of the boyars as part of a government institution by em-
phasizing that these men were individuals close to the tsar, who may or may not have had advisory roles within the government. It is lamentable that Poe does not attempt to draw any connections between the growth of the duma men and the expansion of the administration, which might have broadened the appeal of the work to historians of early modern Europe. However, his detailed research and painstaking reconstruction of the ranks of the duma men is of undeniable value to all historians of Muscovy.

Matthew P. Romaniello


All these years historians have had it wrong: Russia's history should not be construed as that of a stumbling giant suffering from a "psychosis of encirclement" (4) and striking out at its tormentors. Rather Russia became in modern times - from approximately the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century - a warrior nation constantly on the offensive in accord with a carefully conceived strategy of conquest. This is the view of John LeDonne, who has set forth this thesis with detailed clarity and unqualified conviction.

Although no historical document laying out such a grand strategy is known to exist, the author contends that it most assuredly existed in the minds of the Russian elite. Certainly, contemporary Russia-watchers vouched that it was very real. In brief, Russia's expansionist policy, directed against its neighbors in three theaters, aimed at achieving hegemony in the Eurasian Heartland between the Baltic and the Caspian. In the west a successful strategy depended on trumping Sweden, Poland, and Prussia; in the south, defeating the Ottomans and Persians; and in the east, advancing toward China by driving across Siberia and establishing hegemony in Central Asia. Not only did expansionist Russia deploy armies to strike its perceived enemies, it also formed alliances with lesser polities, client states [e.g. Baltic Germans, Cossacks, Georgians, Armenians], along theater frontiers to exert pressure on the enemy. Grand strategy, as LeDonne sees it, became more than a game of marshaling armies: it involved leadership, logistics, organization, and mobilization of economic resources for, in effect, building a military-industrial complex to support engagements in the field.

Grand Strategy not only enunciates theory but also applies it in accounting for Russian expansion from early Aleksei Mikhailovich (1645-76) until the 1831 Polish Revolt. Part I details the "Formation of Russia's Grand Strategy, 1650-1743," noting particularly the critical role played by Peter I. Encompassing theater geopolitics, client states, and mobile armies - this section treats each in forming and implementing Russian strategy to the middle of the eighteenth century. Part II, "Hegemonic Expansionism, 1743-1796," examines how winning military victories against Sweden, the Ottoman Empire, and engaging in the Seven Years War, fostering economic growth, and manipulating client states played into Russia's drive for Heartland hegemony. The final section, "The Territorialization of the Empire, 1797-1831," chronicles both the apogee and ultimate failure of Russia's implementing a grand strategy. Here LeDonne
recounts Russia's strategic successes involving Italy, Holland, Sweden, and Turkey, 1799-1812; war with France, 1812-1815; and with Persia, Turkey, and Poland, 1815-31. Despite dramatic displays of Russian power the overall prospects for Russia became worrisome, especially after the Polish revolt. As LeDonne puts it: "The burden of empire had become too great for the traditional economy, which could no longer generate enough resources while the Coastland economies were entering a new phase: it would leave that economy far behind and expose the empire's fee of clay. Fortress Empire would conceal for another generation the inner rot that must follow the irresponsible stretching of a country's resources beyond their natural limits." (218).

The Crimean War and its aftermath provided clear indicators of this weakness. Besides laboring under the weight of a servile economy Russia had to adjust to the transformation of client Prussia into the mighty German Empire, which effectively barred easy strikes into the Heartland. By the early twentieth century a militant Japan also successfully challenged Russian hegemony in the third theater.

LeDonne's marvelously construed thesis brings a new understanding to historic Russia, particularly its role in Europe, but also in the Middle and Far East. By the author's own admission he drew upon Edward Luttwak's The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from Augustus to Diocletian as a model, noting parallels in matters of troop deployment and utilizing client states. In doing so he has linked aspects of "decline and fall" with "grand strategy" to make both more intelligible. LeDonne's treatment of what he terms the "major political entertainment of Fortress Empire," the military parade, is a creative notion and relevant symbol in depicting the demise of Russian grand strategy. This reliance on the "awesomeness" (LeDonne's word) which Russian "paradomaniya" (again, LeDonne's word) evoked as a substitute for the kind of earlier offensive action that had carried Russian forces into the Heartland is a thoughtful concept. Finally, LeDonne's discourse on grand strategy infrastructure - "barracks architecture" and its embodiment of neoclassical ideology and imagery - also deserves mention. That classical architecture and city planning held sway in the design of new and renovated Russian towns says much about the physical change wrought by a grand strategy adopted for hegemonic purposes.

LeDonne did not come upon this subject with dramatic suddenness. His Russian Empire and the World 1700-1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment (1997), more explicit about Russian geopolitics then the present volume, has in many respects anticipated the present volume. Indeed, in a work prior to both, Absolutism and Ruling Class: The Formation of the Russian Political Order, 1700-1825 (1991), LeDonne lays the ground work for his groundbreaking works on Russia and the world in the eighteenth century. For present-minded scholars this compelling work resonates in the similarities that its author discerns between imperial and Soviet grand strategy. Geopolitical focus on the Eurasian Heartland, deployment of massive armies, dependence on satellite neighbors, and collapse under the burden of a stultified economy suggest the potential of another sequel that probes Russia in geopolitical and strategic perspective. Although LeDonne alluded to these unmistakable Russian/Soviet parallels, he teased more than he has elaborated.

Albert J. Schmidt
The George Washington University
phasizing that these men were individuals close to the tsar, who may or may not have had advisory roles within the government. It is lamentable that Poe does not attempt to draw any connections between the growth of the duma men and the expansion of the administration, which might have broadened the appeal of the work to historians of early modern Europe. However, his detailed research and painstaking reconstruction of the ranks of the duma men is of undeniable value to all historians of Muscovy.

Matthew P. Romaniello


All these years historians have had it wrong: Russia's history should not be construed as that of a stumbling giant suffering from a "psychosis of encirclement" (4) and striking out at its tormentors. Rather Russia became in modern times – from approximately the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century – a warrior nation constantly on the offensive in accord with a carefully conceived strategy of conquest. This is the view of John LeDonne, who has set forth this thesis with detailed clarity and unqualified conviction.

Although no historical document laying out such a grand strategy is known to exist, the author contends that it most assuredly existed in the minds of the Russian elite. Certainly, contemporary Russia-watchers vouched that it was very real. In brief, Russia's expansionist policy, directed against its neighbors in three theaters, aimed at achieving hegemony in the Eurasian Heartland between the Baltic and the Caspian. In the west a successful strategy depended on trumping Sweden, Poland, and Prussia; in the south, defeating the Ottomans and Persians; and in the east, advancing toward China by driving across Siberia and establishing hegemony in Central Asia. Not only did expansionist Russia deploy armies to strike its perceived enemies, it also formed alliances with lesser polities, client states [e.g., Baltic Germans, Cossacks, Georgians, Armenians], along theater frontiers to exert pressure on the enemy. Grand strategy, as LeDonne sees it, became more than a game of marshaling armies: it involved leadership, logistics, organization, and mobilization of economic resources for, in effect, building a military-industrial complex to support engagements in the field.

Grand Strategy not only enunciates theory but also applies it in accounting for Russian expansion from early Aleksei Mikhailovich (1645-76) until the 1831 Polish Revolt. Part I details the "Formation of Russia's Grand Strategy, 1650-1743," noting particularly the critical role played by Peter I. Encompassing theater geopolitics, client states, and mobile armies – this section treats each in forming and implementing Russian strategy to the middle of the eighteenth century. Part II, "Hegemonic Expansionism, 1743-1796," examines how winning military victories against Sweden, the Ottoman Empire, and engaging in the Seven Years War, fostering economic growth, and manipulating client states played into Russia's drive for Heartland hegemony. The final section, "The Territorialization of the Empire, 1797-1831," chronicles both the apogee and ultimate failure of Russia's implementing a grand strategy. Here LeDonne
recounts Russia's strategic successes involving Italy, Holland, Sweden, and Turkey, 1799-1812; war with France, 1812-1815; and with Persia, Turkey, and Poland, 1815-31. Despite dramatic displays of Russian power the overall prospects for Russia became worrisome, especially after the Polish revolt. As LeDonne puts it: “The burden of empire had become too great for the traditional economy, which could no longer generate enough resources while the Coastland economies were entering a new phase: it would leave that economy far behind and expose the empire’s fee of clay. Fortress Empire would conceal for another generation the inner rot that must follow the irresponsible stretching of a country’s resources beyond their natural limits.” (218).

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*Albert J. Schmidt*

*The George Washington University*


These two works have in common their commemoration of St. Petersburg’s three hundredth birthday, but they go about it differently. George’s book is essentially a chronicle of the city’s history, from Peter to Putin by way of Pushkin and Petrograd. Gorbatenko’s is rather more subtle in its message and misleading in its bulk. The subtlety arises from treating the fascinating theme of Petersburg’s debt to the Netherlands: the author has said nearly as much about Dutch as Russian architecture. Because the text is replicated in both English and Russian and because the work is profusely illustrated, this ponderous volume consists of considerably less verbiage than the compact George volume. In addition to its prologue *St. Petersburg: Russia’s Window* contains sixteen chapters. The prologue chronicles the pre-Petrine past; three chapters treat Peter’s role in the city’s founding. After that the chapters are generally labeled in accordance with the reign – single ones devoted to the aftermath of Peter, the times of Elizabeth, Catherine II, Paul, and Alexander I. Subsequent chapter titles take their cue from cultural St. Petersburg – e.g., “Pushkin’s St. Petersburg,” “Dostoevsky’s St. Petersburg” and “From World of Art to Apocalypse.” Although the chapter on Pushkin has much to say about Nicholas I, the arts clearly interest the authors and are a very positive and dominant feature of this book. The five remaining chapters, however, have less to say about art than politics. In these chapters the Georges treat Russia’s two early twentieth-century revolutions and civil war as they related to St. Petersburg/ Petrograd/ Leningrad and the hard times that followed during the terror of the 1930s and the World War II siege. Although Leningrad, as it was then called, was declared a “Hero City,” it was hardly treated like one in the aftermath of the war. It remained only for Gorbachev and the post-Soviet regime of Putin to restore to St. Petersburg its sullied Petrine inheritance. At least, that is the way the Georges tell it.

Arthur, an American who studied and practiced law in St. Petersburg, and Elena George, a native Peterburgian, have written a very readable narrative, especially for the non-specialist. The authors’ love affair with the city and its culture allows their giving full sway to such themes as the architecture of Rastrelli and Rossi; the literature of Pushkin, Dostoevsky, Akhmatova, and Blok; music of The Five, Stravinsky, and Shostakovich; the Mariinsky/Kirov dancers, the World of Art personages; and many others who performed during this Silver Age on the world stage. The Georges tap into this culture, which on the eve of the Great War, had become, arguably, the most dynamic and creative in Europe. This reviewer regards their presentation of the arts and literature that St. Petersburg spawned as the best feature of the book. Conversely, their political commentary leaves the most to be desired. Mesmerized by Peter the Builder, they gloss over some of his glaring negatives. The same is true of their assessment of Putin. When they lump him with Radishchev, the Decembrists, Peter
Struve, and other Petersburg "progressives" and tout his notions about the rule of law and integrating Russia in "the world economy and political system," they strain credibility. By the end of 2003 Putin was behaving badly - blatantly authoritarian if we may judge from the parliamentary elections and his other actions. Clearly, the Georges are naively premature by identifying him with the St. Petersburg "idea on the occasion of the city's tercentenary" (590).

Despite this uncritical acclaim of Putin, the Georges' work should have a reasonably broad appeal and will occasionally titillate the specialist. Unfortunately, the bibliography is brief and the notes are often unrewarding. As a work of scholarship it falters besides Gorbatenko's more probing and sophisticated work on both Peter and the St. Petersburg landscape.

Regarding Peter, Gorbatenko's signal contribution is an analysis of what Peter perceived in his two West European travels, especially those to The Netherlands, and how his observations and experiences influenced the way he fashioned his capital on the Neva. Gorbatenko traces Peter's footsteps to Zaandam, Utrecht, Amsterdam, Naarden, Haarlem, Leiden, The Hague, Delft, Rotterdam, the towns of Zeeland, Maastricht. He presents convincing evidence, some documentary and some circumstantial, that what he saw played into his building schemes. Beyond analyzing the fruits of Peter's traveling itineraries, Gorbatenko assesses the role of Dutch masters and their Russian students in the making of St. Petersburg.

Lest one forget that this is a work on Russian architecture and town planning, the author allows the reader to view the first buildings of St. Petersburg (always keeping in mind, of course, their Dutch antecedents). These included not only such monuments and ensembles as Trezzini's Peter and Paul Fortress and church, the Admiralty, the Summer Garden, and the palaces of the governor and grandees, but lesser structures such as coaching inns, hotels, mills, canals, bridges, and embankments. The segment on "Peter as town planner: the idea of a 'New Amsterdam'" with its treatment of model building projects is especially prescient in comprehending Catherinian and Alexandrian city building and assessing St. Petersburg as a prototype for those sovereigns' undertakings. Gorbatenko does not limit his comment to the city buildings: he examines gardens and parks that evidenced Dutch influence. Not surprisingly, he sees a clear Dutch role in the laying out of "New Holland" behind Galernaia Wharf on the Admiralty side, an area which Gorbatenko believes reminded Peter of his beloved Zaandam. Finally, Dutch influence extended to Kronstadt, along the Petersburg Road (Petergofskaja Doroga), and to the palatial ensembles of Ekaterinhof, Peterhof, Oranienbaum, Tsarskoe Selo, and Strelna.

This is a well-researched work, one in which the author combines buildings and historical documents to avoid, as he states, "unsubstantiated hypotheses" (284). Gorbatenko also is high in his praise of Peter. Regarding the Dutch influence, he concludes "it was his [Peter's] guiding hand that made possible the startling number of different Dutch elements that played a part in the new capital's design" (286). Gorbatenko has filled a significant void in the study of Russian architectural history and in the reign of Peter the Great. In assessing the significance of both, the author has supplemented historical documents and on-site studies with old city views, maps, architectural drawings as well as old and new photographs. Incorporated into this work
and carefully integrated with the scholarly text, they are essential in articulating the thesis that the author expounds. Unfortunately, the book does suffer certain defects. It has no bibliography, although its endnotes may suffice. This is a work that cries for an index, but there is none! How could this be?

Aside from Gorbatenko's authorship, Novyi Amsterdam appears to have been a remarkably successful Dutch, Belgian, and Russian joint publishing venture. Under the editorship of Emmanuel Waegemans of the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, the work was as much a product of the Netherlands-Russian Archive Center in Groningen as any place in St. Petersburg; moreover, the project received significant funding from the Dutch government. The work has been nicely translated by Timothy Philips.

Albert J. Schmidt
The George Washington University


Recent scholarship on the English Industrial Revolution by Maxine Berg and others has shown that the rise of factories was not necessarily a losing proposition for workers in the handicraft industries, many of whom made a seamless transition to the new modes of production. In his book, Andreas Keller does not refer to this branch of the historiography, but reaches a similar conclusion, that the crafts industries of St. Petersburg were able to meet the challenges of industrialization and thrive in the new era. The capital city presented a special circumstance, of course, so Keller does not reject the standard view that industrialization had an overall deleterious impact on rural handicrafts. But without ever stating it directly, his book does suggest that an important sector of the Imperial Russian economy was better able to deal with the onslaught of modernization than historians have previously understood. And in part that was because the Russian government avoided the kind of problems Germany was facing with its crafts industries.

Despite the date given in the title, the book begins with the reign of Peter the Great, who in 1721-1722 established the first European-style craft guilds in the country. He did so for reasons of state, as part of his mercantilist effort to develop Russia's navy and supply the military, raise the quality of Russian craftsmanship, stimulate tax revenues through economic growth, build up St. Petersburg, and protect consumers. Corporate identity among guild members was a long way off, though, as Peter, and later Catherine the Great, prevented the guilds from gaining full monopolies over production. Both rulers sought to avoid mindless imitation of European policy on these matters and were in any case hamstrung by the social system. Peasants' rights to engage in crafts production were preserved from the start, as were the manufacturing privileges of both the state and the nobility. In her 1785 statute governing the handicrafts, furthermore, Catherine legalized small-scale non-guild crafts activity in the cities. All of this unintentionally benefited the long-term health of the guilds by forcing
them to respond to competition — something that was lacking among their counterparts in Germany, where the guilds stubbornly resisted the new ways of production and economic life.

As industrialization took off in the mid- to late nineteenth century, the tsarist government again refused to follow the European lead and abolish guilds as proposed by economic liberals in the bureaucracy. To a great extent this was a result of conservative resistance to reform and fear of social instability, but also a conscious desire to prevent the pauperization of a large segment of the working population — as officials were well aware had happened in Germany. Whatever the reasons, going slow on this type of "modernizing" reform, combined with major initiatives in technical education, had a positive impact. Many of the guild members of St. Petersburg were able to prosper up to the time of the revolution due to the large demand among the upper and middle classes of the city for luxury, high-quality, and individually designed consumer goods as opposed to the mass-produced items on offer by industry. Moreover, skilled craftsmen who left the guilds were able to find comparable and remunerative work in the factories. The fact that the guilds were able to adjust to the suddenly industrial environment tells us that the government's failure to adopt all aspects of the Western model was not an unmitigated disaster. As Keller makes clear, this society was relatively successful at preventing potential harm to St. Petersburg craftsmen, whether members of officially recognized guilds or "informal."

There are several problems with the book. For one, Keller limits himself to comparisons with Germany, whereas a brief overview of the situation elsewhere in Europe is needed to convey other relevant historiographical and historical contexts. Two, the book does not transcend its original incarnation as a dissertation. I suppose the purpose of the publisher is to make the fullness of this research available to scholars, but the density and length of the text will limit its audience to a handful of specialists when, had it been further revised and condensed, it would be more accessible to a wider group of Russian historians.

It's too bad because it deserves attention. As Keller's source discussion shows, remarkably little work has been done on the crafts industries, despite their predominance in pre-revolutionary manufacturing. This carefully researched monograph with its intriguing findings affirms the importance of the subject and has profound implications for the study of Imperial Russian history.

Steven G. Marks


This is a beautifully-written study of the Russian nobility and the rise of private life after the emancipation of the nobles in 1762, as refracted through the life of Andrei Bolotov. Newlin's work, one of the few to venture forth into the nearly endless sea of Bolotov's published and unpublished works, is an insightful mixture of history
and literary criticism, with an acute sensitivity to the question of mentalité. Newlin provides a richly-detailed mental map of the world of the “newly and nervously free nobleman” (74) represented by Bolotov. As a whole, Newlin’s work significantly deepens our understanding of late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century literature.

Newlin traces Bolotov’s artistic and personal development from his childhood to the end of his life in 1833. Over the course of his life, Bolotov produced hundreds of manuscript volumes describing, cataloging, and thoroughly examining his life. Newlin places Bolotov within the larger cultural context of the shift from classical pastoral, derived from Horace, to the “anxieties of the Russian pastoral.” These anxieties were considerable and ranged from the shock of leaving state service for the less-structured life of a landlord to the vexed question of serfdom. Newlin argues that Bolotov was one of the first to valorize private life, and for this reason, “Bolotov’s retreat to the countryside can even be viewed as an audacious and pioneering act.” (68) Newlin suggests that the emancipation of the nobility was a source of existential anguish as well as freedom, and led to an extended search for the object of service. For Bolotov, the answer was to serve God, but Newlin makes it clear that later answers would revolve around serving the peasants or the working class. In many ways, Bolotov was an exemplary transitional figure who stood with one foot in the old world and the other in the new. In one of his most brilliant chapters, “Barking Chronos: Time, Death, History, Memory,” Newlin deftly sketches the uneasy coexistence of different conceptions of time: the cyclical return of nature, the apocalyptic, and modern secular time marked by unending progress. Bolotov partook in all three at various times. His search for the signs of the impending end of days intermixed with expressions of belief in the progress of humanity. Similarly, Bolotov participated in the older tradition of chronicle writing as well as the sentimentalist literature newly arrived from Europe.

Based on a close and sensitive reading of Bolotov’s massive opus, the work is a model of biographical writing and literary criticism. Everyone with an interest in eighteenth-century culture, literature and mentalité, as well as in the origins of the intelligentsia, will read this book with profit.

Susan Smith-Peter
City University of New York / College of Staten Island


This work is a lightly revised dissertation dealing with the cultural, literary and intellectual fortunes of Napoleon’s image in nineteenth-century Russia. Molly W. Wesling uses Russia’s continuing fascination with Napoleon as a way to consider its national identity and its ambiguous relation to the West. For Wesling, Napoleon’s Russian image tells a story “about a nation in the thrall of a powerful outsider, and in search of itself.” (113) Using literary works, memoirs, and periodicals, Wesling presents three major stages of the Russian reception of Napoleon: the Enlightenment, the Romantic, and the post-Romantic.
According to Wesling, before 1812, many educated Russians saw France as the center of enlightenment, with Russia as less civilized. The reaction of society during Napoleon’s invasion was to overturn the Enlightenment dualisms of West and East, civilization and barbarism so ably mapped out by Larry Wolff. Noblewoman Maria Volkova spoke for the age when she wrote, “Thank God that we are barbarians, if Austria, Prussia and France are to be considered educated.” (14) Enlightenment concerns could merge with religious concepts, as when Count Fedor Rostopchin portrayed Napoleon as a demonized monarch visiting God’s wrath on the sinning Russian nation. As an anti-Enlightenment barbarian or as anti-Christ, the original reaction to Napoleon was one of complete rejection.

The pendulum swung the other way during the Romantic era. For Romantic figures such as the Decembrists and Pushkin, Napoleon became a symbol of protest against the stifling of the individual. The Decembrists portrayed Napoleon as a tragic hero who dared to remake his own fate and society. Pushkin presented himself as a Napoleon, creating his own myth in which he figured as a tragic hero and doomed poetic genius. Wesling notes the meteorological symbolism of the Romantics’ Napoleon — as a comet or meteor defeated by the Russian frost. The fully formed individual, it seemed, was always in danger from Russia’s chilly political climate.

The Romantic image was not without its critics, however, including Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. Wesling shows that Dostoevsky based Raskol’nikov partly on Napoleon in order to critique the concept of absolute power. Wesling quotes several nineteenth- and early twentieth-century writers who argued for the existence of sectarians (raskol’nik) who worshipped Napoleon. Wesling writes that “it seems possible that new access to long-forgotten archives will reveal further insights into this original phenomenon of Russian life.” (87) Unfortunately, Wesling does not utilize archival material on this question, leaving the existence, dimensions and beliefs of these sectarians a matter of speculation. If she had done so, she would have deepened our understanding of Raskol’nikov’s wider cultural meaning.

Tolstoy argued for the bankruptcy of the Napoleonic idea, which Wesling takes as the defining attitude toward Napoleon in the post-Romantic period. For Tolstoy, Napoleon was a bourgeois upstart who gambled everything on one game of cards and then went bankrupt. However, even Wesling’s own evidence suggests that some authors, such as Merezhkovsky, continued to use Napoleon as a symbol of freedom.

This development of Napoleon’s image is convincing and makes available much material on Napoleon. The writing on the Romantic era is by far the best in the book. Despite her fascinating subject matter, however, Wesling often lists and describes sources without sufficient analysis. This is particularly evident in chapter 3, “Sacred Spaces: Napoleon in the Russian City,” and the concluding chapter, “1912: The Centenary Celebration and Beyond.” She does not cite or engage with Alexander Martin’s 1997 work, Romans, Reformers, Reactionaries, which includes an in-depth analysis of Napoleon’s image in Moscow during 1812 and Rostopchin’s propaganda leaflets, both of which Wesling deals with, less effectively, in chapter 3. The concluding chapter offers undigested material on the twentieth-century image of Napoleon without tying together the themes of the book as a whole. In this chapter, she makes such statements as, “[b]y the time Merezhkovsky died in 1941, and Tsvetaeva hanged herself
that same year, Stalin had taken up Napoleon's tattered banner..." (150) without any supporting evidence or development. In her chapter on the post-Romantic image of Napoleon, she overlooks Dmitry Shlapentokh's 1996 *The French Revolution in Russian Intellectual Life, 1865-1905*, which includes an extended discussion of the image of Napoleon during this period. Even the better, earlier, chapters would have been considerably deepened if she had not ignored Richard Wortman's 1995 *Scenarios of Power*, vol. 1, which shows, in detail, how Alexander I and Nicholas I both appropriated and modified Napoleon's image in their own self-presentation. Although the general chronological structure of the book is sound, a reorganization of individual chapters would be useful to limit repetition. She was not well served by her editors, as evidenced by multiple typographical errors and incomplete citations.

With further revision, this work could have been a significant contribution to Russian cultural and literary history. While Wesling's narrative of the development of Napoleon's image in Russia is generally plausible, problems of organization and style limit the utility of the book.

*Susan Smith-Peter  
City University of New York / College of Staten Island*


Patrick O'Meara's biography of Pavel Pestel provides a very detailed and revealing account of a key Decembrist. Much of the historical literature on the Decembrist uprising of 1825 was produced by Soviet historians in an attempt to present this revolt as a part of a larger revolutionary trend that ultimately resulted in the Bolshevik successful seizure of power in 1917. O'Meara's work provides a detailed narrative and analysis of one of the key players in this watershed event in Russian history. The biography is divided into three parts. The first part traces Pestel's background and military service. Part two analyzes the development of the different Decembrist societies. The last part examines the attempted overthrow, the investigation and trial, and the legacy of Decembrism in Russian history.

O'Meara admits that there is not much information about Pestel's early life, but it is clear that he was from the elite of Russia. He was educated in the Corps of Pages and served as an officer in the Russian military. His experience in the Napoleonic wars and Alexander I's openness to more liberal ideas, like many other Decembrists, helped shape his views toward the political and social conditions of Russia. Pestel began to develop his vision of a constitutional structure for Russia early in his life. These ideas fueled the Decembrist societies and ultimately divided them concerning which path they should take toward an overthrow of the Russian monarchy.

Pestel's *Russian Justice* and other writings were the driving ideological force behind the Decembrist movement. As the different regional societies emerged Pestel contributed much intellectual guidance, but his ideas also created division among these fragmentary societies. Pestel's desire to kill the tsar and much of the royal family differed from more moderate members who advocated a constitutional monarchy.
O'Meara also reveals that Pestel was influenced by foreign ideas and looked to other countries for models of constitutionalism and republicanism, including Great Britain and the United States. Pestel's ideas are not totally beholden to foreign influences. O'Meara notes how his ideas were distinctly Russian. Some of Pestel's colleagues even suspected that he ultimately desired a dictatorial regime. Even though it is clear that Pestel is the chief ideologist of the Decembrist movement there was much division among the different societies about his personality and ideas. This biography gives a well-needed detailed discussion of the inner workings of these regional groups and how they crafted their ideology and planned their overthrow.

The last section of the book provides an illuminating account of the attempted overthrow, investigation, and trial. O'Meara uses the documents of the Investigating Committee to show the personal and political intrigue that surrounded this event and Pestel in particular. One of the greatest strengths of this work is the detailed analysis of the fate of the Decembrists and the ultimate decision to execute Pestel and the other four leaders. Through this biographical treatment, O'Meara provides a much-needed detailed account of the life of Pestel set in the context of this larger event in Imperial Russia. This book is an outstanding contribution to the literature on the Decembrist movement.

William B. Whisenhunt


Peter Pozefsky's study of the radical critic Dmitrii Pisarev attempts to fill a long-standing gap in the English-language literature on Russia's revolutionary movement. Widely regarded by contemporaries and future scholars as the enfant terrible of Russian radicalism, Pisarev has always paled in stature and political respectability alongside the ideologue Chernyshevsky and the heroic narodniki of the 1870s. Overshadowed by such flashy company, it comes as no surprise that the eccentric author of "Bazarov" and "Thinking Proletariat" has attracted comparatively little attention from historians. Lampert devoted considerable space to Pisarev in *Sons against Fathers*, but that was more than a generation ago. Venturi and Gleason barely mention him, while Brower's prosopographical analysis of the nihilist generation banishes personal and cultural factors to the sidelines. Pisarev certainly deserves more respect than this. As the leading critic for the thick journal *Russkoe slovo* in the 1860s, he imparted to Russian radicalism what Pozefsky calls "key aspects of [its] distinctive quasi-bohemian communal identity." (4) Many of these factors first appeared with Chernyshevsky - scientific materialism, utilitarianism, and a sneering disdain for the liberal intelligenetsia - but for Chernyshevsky these remained mere intellectual convictions, not a catalyst for a new political style, let alone a radical subculture. It was left to Pisarev and his colleagues at *Russkoe slovo* to forge "a new political identity, a new ide-
ology of everyday life and a new type of individual," all of which, as Pozefsky argues, "amounted to a subculture, the subculture of the radical intelligentsia." (19)

The book claims to provide a cultural history of nihilism in the 1860s, employing a hybrid method of discourse analysis and reader response to track the nihilists and map their milieu. To this end Pozefsky taps a variety of sources: published works from thick journals; unpublished materials from Pisarev's papers; contemporary novels; memoir literature; and, most interestingly, archival documents from the offices of the police and censor. It would seem that Pozefsky's sources and theoretical framework permit daily life and identity to take center stage: family relationships, friendship, sex, marriage, work, reading and writing, to name only a few things. Chapter titles further promise an ambitious exploration of the mental worlds and lived experience of nihilist subculture: "Reading as Revolutionary Practice"; "Love and the Invention of the Realist"; "Officials Discover Nihilism"; "Radicals as Readers"; "Did Russians Believe Their Novels?" It is a worthwhile and exciting agenda, but does Pozefsky make good on his promises?

Yes and no. On the positive side, the author delves deeply and thoughtfully into the cultural construction of the "realist," a supposedly new type of Russian intelligent driven by physiological urges and utilitarian calculations, all framed by a code of personal conduct deriving from the reigning scientific materialism of the day. As is well known, Pisarev built the realist's identity through a critical interplay with influential literary works (e.g., Eugene Onegin, Rudin, Fathers and Sons, and What Is To Be Done?), spelling out for his youthful readers why they should emulate the biologically liberated Bazarov rather than the pleasure-seeking and overly stimulated Onegin. The author incorporates examples from Pisarev's personal life to show how nihilists tried to put their ideas into practice, including some priceless romantic maxims from his correspondence with Lidiia Osipovna (e.g., "You are the kind of girl that it would not be difficult or boring for me to live with"; "I know how to enjoy [love] if it presents itself through you or through another woman"; "For family life what is needed first and foremost is mutual respect and an absence of physical aversion."). Whether or not such attitudes were representative of nihilist subculture is impossible to prove, but Pozefsky's thorough analysis of Pisarev's work does clarify its many linkages to the needs and expectations of his readership. His examination of official reactions to the nihilist bugbear likewise suggests that nihilism was as much a product of discursive imagination as it was a result of the social dislocation brought on by the Great Reforms. Just as Pisarev relied on literary representations of nihilist youth to construct his positive image of the "realist," so did police and censors employ virtually the same discursive strategies to imagine a diabolical enemy who – what else? – revoluted against traditional morals, blurred gender distinctions, and promoted rape and incest. The sad fact is that the nihilists as imagined by Russian officials were virtually nonexistent – stereotypes never are. According to Pozefsky, what did exist was a smorgasbord of linguistic signs, which youthful iconoclasts and their opponents selectively drew upon to assemble a radical identity that suited their own specific needs.

The Nihilist Imagination thus provides a useful and probing analysis of Pisarev's work and the cultural construction of nihilism in the 1860s by radicals and conservatives alike. Nonetheless, the book presents two flaws. First, except in one very brief
passage (196-201), Pozefsky does not really examine readership per se, at least not in the way that Roger Chartier and Robert Darnton — both of whom he cites — understand it to mean. Instead, two very lengthy sections (133-91) offer comprehensive coverage of conservative and radical reactions to Pisarev (including Pogodin, Strakhov, Dostoevsky, Shelgunov, Mikhailovskii, Tikhomirov, and Plekhanov, to name only a few), but do not consider the myriad ways in which ordinary readers at the base of nihilist subculture may have responded to Pisarev and nihilist criticism. Jeffrey Brooks' treatment of reading and literacy in the late imperial period offers a model for examining such slippery phenomena, but, surprisingly, no mention of this pioneering work appears in either the endnotes or bibliography. Secondly, for a work that purports to focus on radical subculture, there is remarkably little information on the lived experience of the nihilists or even the culture of reading. This is no doubt the result of limiting the source base to a body of literary texts. Although these texts may provide a tantalizing “blueprint for new forms of social relations,” we never get to see what the nihilists actually did with these plans. Instead, we are left with only the discursive half of nihilist subculture. In his efforts to avoid reducing nihilism to “social trends and political programs” and to demonstrate that “Russians shaped their discourses just as their discourses shaped them” (207-08), Pozefsky tends to gloss over the stuff of everyday life that makes nihilism such a compelling subject in the first place.

The book further suffers from a host of typographical mistakes (e.g., misplaced commas, syntactical errors, missing words and endings), including a particularly jarring one that appears on the first page no less (“Peasant unrest (1861), student demonstrations (1861), a rash of urban fires (1862), and an uprising in Poland (1863) . . . gave the government cause for second thoughts concerning its own efforts to transform the country.”) This is quite unfortunate, because it detracts from an otherwise useful contribution to the literature on Russian radicalism. Although by no means the last word on Pisarev and nihilism, The Nihilist Imagination has reopened investigation into a fascinating subject that has gone unstudied for too long.

Colum Leckey
Lincoln Memorial University

Cathy A. Frierson. All Russia is Burning!: A Cultural History of Fire and Arson in Late Imperial Russia. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2002. x, 318 pp. $24.95 (paper).

This is a remarkable book about the diverse role of fire in peasant culture, especially arson in late Imperial rural Russia. Although fire in Russia has not received the same press as famine, it had a more diverse impact on peasant life. In a positive sense it was pervasive — for fertilizing the fields, facilitating “gentle cookery” in the home, creating a “paradise” of warmth and light during the darkness of an interminable winter, and much else. On the deficit side fire’s not infrequent visitations were a scourge which ravaged the peasants’ wood and thatch villages taking with it a huge toll in human life, livestock, and woodlands as well as property.
While fire constitutes the essential of this work, many sub-plots flow from it: peasant mentalité and material culture, gender, village poverty, Russian backwardness, and obstacles to the creation of a civil society based on the rule of law. The peasant was faulted by educated Russians as responsible for many mishiefs—especially vengeful arson—although ignorance and carelessness also contributed hugely to rural conflagration. Witness Frierson’s graphic descriptions of fire-prone, bug-infested peasant households. Gender played in the drama of arson because women often were the ones who employed this self-help approach to the law and justice in settling old scores. Not surprisingly, this fire culture was regarded by the elite as a principal cause of Russian backwardness in material development and consequent exclusion from a rational, civilized Europe. Because of the enormous destruction wrought by fire and the peasant’s fatalistic approach to life, Russia increasingly was regarded an “unfortunate land forever to be denied modernity.”

Certainly, both Alexander III and Nicholas II and some of the nobility showed stunning awareness of the problem and initiated creative ways to mobilize the rural populace to abate this cycle of incendiarism. Frierson explains that authorities had a three-pronged strategy. The first was one of introducing rationally, geometrically planned villages to replace the cluttered and chaotic types that abounded. They were on familiar ground, for they were imitating what Peter I, Catherine II and Alexander I had done to reshape many Russian cities. Space and fire-resistant materials had been key to dissipating fires in the earlier undertakings as well. Village planners no doubt hoped that such a disciplined environment would also enhance moral values having behavioral consequences, e.g., reducing arson, diminishing covetousness, and encouraging neighborly assistance in combating conflagrations. The other two initiatives that the state and nobility took to counter fire—both largely unreported until now—were a Zemtsvo fire insurance program and the enlistment of peasants into volunteer firefighting units. Frierson details both these undertakings superbly.

In limiting her account to European Russia Frierson cautions her audience not to read more into her work than she intended. Yet in chronicling fire culture in the Russian village, she has given us a marvelous insight into peasant mind which helps explain later events as well as those contemporary with her narrative. True, this work, which covers specifically the period between 1860-1904, contains nothing about peasants’ torching noble estates in 1905-07 or similarly their opposing enforcement of collectivization a generation later. Yet this resistance to integration into the Communist order led to their portrayal by the authorities as covetous, stingy, and generally lacking any social responsibility. The “wily” Kulak of 1930 appears not much different from the peasant incendiary who acted out his independence superbly in the fire culture described so eloquently by Frierson.

Cathy Frierson has written a marvelously interdisciplinary work, captivating as well as important, in interpreting the last years of Imperial Russia. While any one familiar with the Russian past can vouch for the pervasiveness of fire, no one until now has put it all together. Considering fire’s impact on Russian cities, it remains for some one, perhaps Frierson, to chronicle that as well.

Albert J. Schmidt
The George Washington University
In Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia, Benjamin Nathans draws attention to the Russian Jews who lived outside the area to which the vast majority of the Empire’s Jews were restricted, the Pale of Settlement. His meticulous research forms the foundation for the telling of a familiar story in a different context, that of a minority community longing for acceptance and working toward integration. Nathans describes the process by which Jews hoped to enter Russian culture even as that community set up boundaries to keep them out. What emerges from this tale is a remarkable picture of an incipient civil society among Russian Jews, remarkable because of the obstacles Jews faced and the tenacity of Jewish leaders in pursuing their goals. The encounter Nathans presents here is not an encounter between individuals or between literary cultures; rather, it is a confrontation of elite groups negotiating for change, change that had the potential to transform the larger community.

Nathans documents how early efforts to integrate the Jews through public schools and the army failed and then shows how the country’s new Jewish merchant elite’s desire to become part of Russia’s hierarchy of estates spurred what he describes as a “gradual, cautious social transformation.” (79) When the Jewish merchants of St. Petersburg attempted to gain privileges for select groups of Jews in the mid nineteenth century, they began a process of integration that, though not complete by the fall of the Empire, had nonetheless begun to alter the position of Jews in Russian society. Nathans explains in some detail the workings of this transformation with the term “selective integration,” or state policies that allowed some Jews certain privileges, allowing these Jews to become more involved with Russians and Russian society. These privileges, the most important of which was the right to reside outside the Pale, allowed Jews to become more involved with Russian and Russian society. The phrase “selective integration” suggests the Jewish desire to become a part of Russian society but also the allegiance to the system of social estates both Russian and Jewish leaders respected. Illustrating the promise the Great Reforms held for Russian Jews, Nathans nonetheless also shows how that promise encouraged Russian leaders to stem any further progress in the following decades.

Nathans’ primary focus on the Jewish elite of St. Petersburg yields a nearly complete local study of that city’s Jewish community and makes apparent the need for further research into the workings of local Jewish communities in Russia and Eastern Europe, whether in or outside of the Pale. The Jewish elite of that city worked closely with government officials to effect policy. Nathans tells this complex story at great length with special attention to the census of 1897 and what it reveals about language use and ethnicity. He also reevaluates the growing historiography on the 1881 pogroms, concluding that the pogroms did not cripple the Petersburg Jewish elite and dash all hopes for integration and emancipation (187). Nathans confronts the historiography of Russian Jewish history and provides a subtle, perceptive analysis that challenges accepted views and encourages questions about emancipation and integration within the Russian context.
This study of elites, commercial, intellectual and legal, reveals the effects of governmental restrictions on individual choices. Nathans' exposition of the lives of Russian Jewish university students evokes the difficulties these students faced and the promise they expected would help them to integrate into Russian society outside the Pale. According to Nathans, Russian Jewish students did not face the same anti-Semitism that their peers encountered at German universities. Thus, when quotas were introduced in the universities, described as the most significant retreat from selective integration during the late imperial period, Jewish students felt the shock of betrayal. The most compelling part of Nathans' narrative concerns the experiences of Jewish law students and Jews' participation in the legal system. As Nathans explains, when Jewish lawyers challenged the Russian state regarding restrictions on Jews in court, they made possible the "articulation" of a civic identity, an important prerequisite for the development of a civil society within the context of the Russian empire (339).

Though the selective integration Nathans describes was far from an unqualified success, the entrance of Jews into Russian institutions of higher education and to the legal profession opened up the possibility of the development of a "voluntary Jewish community" (377). Nathans' well-founded arguments convince. By drawing attention to the methods Russian Jewish leaders employed to improve their status as subjects of the Empire, he encourages the reader to evaluate anew how Jewish leaders responded to government discrimination. Most importantly, Nathans highlights the potential for the development of Jewish civil society, even in a repressive empire. The title promises a more sweeping view of Jewish life outside of the Pale, but this tightly constructed work highlights groups within Russian Jewish society who began to change the boundaries of the Jewish and Russian communities. Nathans' superb study will long encourage scholars of Jewish and Russian history to examine further the contacts between the two communities on all levels.

Sean Martin Kent State University


Steven Marks has written a sweeping, compelling work about the influence of Russia and Russians on the twentieth century. Ironically, this influence on the modern world began as a reaction against it. In the 1800s Russia found itself in the throes of modernization - economic, political, and cultural. The experience elicited varied responses from radical thinkers who feared that Russia was losing its traditional bearings and sacrificing its soul to the West, which they abhorred as the source of evil. Marks is careful to point out that, while the ideas these people embraced did not necessarily get their start in Russia, the country's unique circumstances placed it in a position to shape them; in this way, "Russian thought has had a profound effect on the course of modern history" (6). Similarly, the author emphasizes that his work essentially breaks no new ground; an indication is his battery of sources, which are drawn
from published literature, not archives. Furthermore, he makes no attempt to be ency-clopedic in his coverage. Broadly speaking, most of the movements examined here fall into the categories of art or politics, although the impact of any one of them has been multifaceted. Science, to cite an example provided by the author, receives no atten-tion.

Marks's account begins with anarchism, the first Russian intellectual movement that sent shock waves around the globe. Anarchism acquired links with both socialism and revolutionary terror (the latter popularly thought of as the “Russian method”) long before those terms became synonymous with Bolshevism. Typical of the author’s approach, after describing the movement within its Russian context (with appearances by Bakunin, Nechaev, and Chernyshevsky), he examines the spread of its ideas abroad; to his credit, the survey includes not only Europe and the United States but also the world outside of the West. Books about Russian terrorists, for example, acquired a large readership in China, while India became a major center of anarchist and terrorist activity based on Russian models. Even after anarchism collapsed as a movement in the 1930s, its influence lived on in works by writers such as Camus, Sartre, Fanon, and Marcuse. Marks also sees its legacy in the notorious activities of Al-Qaeda. Giving equal time to non-violent anarchism, the author devotes a separate chapter to Prince Kropotkin, whose modern influence is manifested in environmentalism, the Arts and Crafts movement, and ecoradicalism.

Both Dostoevsky and Tolstoy receive individual treatment as well. Dostoevsky applied a psychological approach to characters in an urban setting while conveying the notion that freedom was to be found in spirituality, a notion deeply in accord with Russian Orthodoxy. Tolstoy was “one of the fathers of the modern counterculture” (102) whose ideas lay behind several twentieth-century movements, such as pacifism, vegetarianism, and sexual liberation, not to mention the peaceful nonresistance associated with Gandhi and the U.S. civil rights movement. While opposed to Western modernizing trends, the literary models they helped to create paradoxically undermined resistance to Westernization by bringing “non-Western cultural norms into alignment with what would soon be the European Modernist mainstream” (100). In addition, like many of the influential Russians examined by Marks, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy exerted an appeal on people and movements that would seem to have been opposed to one another (for example, communitarians and individualists) but nevertheless borrowed from these literary giants what suited their purposes.

Of all of the major ideas that fall under the author’s scrutiny, anti-Semitism is singular in its hatefulness. According to Marks, the Russian Black Hundreds came close to evolving a form of National Socialism well before similar groups in other countries. Much of the attention in this chapter logically goes to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The work fueled anti-Semitism around the world, often with the help of Russian émigrés who targeted the new Communist rulers of Russia along with the Jews, often equating the two groups. Hitler’s anti-Semitic thinking was inspired in part by Alfred Rosenberg and Dietrich Eckart, two Baltic Germans who used the Protocols as their foundational text.

Perhaps the chapters most “artistic” in emphasis are those dealing with, on the one hand, ballet and theatre and, on the other, abstract art. In the case of the former Marks
dwells in particular on the figures of Diaghilev, Stanislavsky, and Meierkhol'd. Diaghilev, in fact, exemplifies the interrelationships of some of the luminaries in the book, having been influenced by Tolstoy and Dostoevsky and their concept of artistic freedom. The performance tradition established by Diaghilev’s Ballets Russes had an impact on culture both high- and lowbrow, extending into the fields of music, visual design, clothing, and even mass entertainment. For the chapter on abstract art, Marks focuses only on those individuals who had the greatest effect on modern art, namely, Kandinsky, Malevich, Rodchenko, and El Lissitzky. He sees links between their work and the ideas of Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Russian folk art, theosophy, the Ballets Russes, the Moscow Art Theatre, and Meierkhol’d. This Russian avant-garde “gave twentieth-century humanity a new way of seeing and interpreting reality” (274), reaching into outlets as mundane as advertising and packaging.

The last part of the book deals, inevitably, with Russian Communism. Its most direct influence, says Marks, was on European and Third World authoritarian movements that welcomed its challenge to Western capitalism and imperialism. The author singles out the one-party dictatorship and command economy as Russia’s most notable contributions to twentieth-century history, a legacy of truly dubious value. In conclusion Marks notes that contemporary phenomena such as Islamic radicalism, neo-Nazism, and the militant arm of the antiglobalization movement suggest that the sentiments accounting for the earlier fascination with Russian ideas are still alive: Russia, however, has ceased to be “the icon of anti-Westernism, and nothing as vibrant, inventive, or capable of global appeal seems likely to replace it” (335).

At the outset Marks declares that his book is for a general readership, and it is true that specialists in Russian history are likely to be familiar with much of the material here. Nevertheless the author has brought together ideas and personalities in a way that enlarges our understanding of them and their influence on each other. He is careful not to overreach himself in his claims, and his arguments tend to be sound. Nevertheless, at times the reader might wish for more convincing evidence linking Russian phenomena with their effects and legacy around the globe. The prose occasionally gets a little thick, too. These, however, are relatively minor reservations. On the whole, Marks deserves respectful applause for tackling a large and provocative theme with care and insight. Instructors of courses on Russian and modern European culture will want to add his work to their syllabus.

James H. Krukones

John Carroll University


Rolf Hellebust has struck upon a topic that seems an obvious avenue for scholarly inquiry—once someone has the ingenuity to point it out. In this work, Hellebust creatively explores Soviet culture’s emphasis on the metalization of the body. While the metalworker’s omnipresence in Soviet iconography has been previously noted by
scholars, Hellebust’s focus is instead on metal imagery, especially imagery in which human flesh turns to metal.

Hellebust ranges widely to show that, in various cultures, metal has carried both positive and negative connotations. Metal has been associated with steadfastness and strength, with cruelty and intransigence. For the early Slavs, it possessed an “other-worldly status” that could be both protective and evil (16). For Russian revolutionaries, metal was simultaneously understood as “a source of suffering and enslavement,” and as “a tool for liberation” (28). While metal imagery was not restricted to Russia in the early twentieth century, Hellebust informs that the Russian case was particularly “unblinking” in its “amalgam of positive and negative.” (21) In addition, early twentieth-century questions about the future of man and machine were discussed “more openly” in the Soviet Union than elsewhere (1).

In the early-Soviet period, flesh-to-metal narratives tended to emphasize an individual’s positive identification with his work, his loss of self in the collective, and/or his martyrdom for the future. In the 1920s, Hellebust explains, the metal myth invoked “the mass-man” and “intimations of immortality” (63). Somewhat surprisingly, metallization of the body was treated less positively in socialist realist texts: in N. Ostrovsky’s *How the Steel was Tempered* negative metal images outnumber positive references; in the works of V. Popov metal imagery is never used to describe positive heroes; references to metal in F. Gladkov’s *Cement* typically underscore troublesome bureaucratic intransigence. Socialist Realist authors seemed more concerned than earlier Soviet writers with the “dehumanizing implications of metal imagery.” (86)

Despite the ambiguity of meanings associated with metal, the flesh-to-metal myth was attractive, especially in the early-Soviet period, because it helped to bridge the gap between Marx’s interpretation of history and the revolutionary future. Precisely because Russia was less industrialized than the West, an emphasis on metal and machine was a necessary part of the revolutionary state’s myth building. Because Orthodoxy did not oppose “spirit” and “matter” — but rather affirmed the suffering body as a site for spiritual transformation — the metallization myth propitiously drew upon Russia’s broader cultural history.

The pervasive use of metal imagery in early twentieth-century Russian literature is evident in Hellebust’s many examples. In the course of his work, Hellebust analyzes the flesh-to-metal motif where we might most expect to find it (in A. Pushkin’s *Bronze Horseman*, and in A. Gastev’s *We Grow Out of Iron*, for example) and where we might anticipate its absence (most notably, in the work of B. Pasternak). Through it all, Hellebust is refreshingly judicious, duly pointing out that some authors’ views of metallization evolved, that authors held divergent attitudes toward metallization whatever the historical period, and that, in certain cases, metal imagery’s importance was superceded (by glass, in E. Zamiatin’s *We*).

This is a highly insightful, nuanced work, the richness of which is only touched upon in this short review. Indeed, Hellebust’s exploration of literature is so fruitful that a reader cannot help but wonder how metallization of the body was expressed elsewhere. Hellebust anticipates this question by briefly discussing reasons he believes sculpture, painting, and music are less expressive of the flesh-to-metal myth. El Lissitzky and K. Malevich, for example, offer “interpretations of the body, rather than
depictions of its transformation" (67). I wonder if concerted analysis of other art forms might not prove more productive than Hellebust suggests, but it must be remembered that it is to Hellebust's credit that I ask the question at all.

Laura L. Phillips Eastern Washington University


Biographies provide historians with a useful insight into how historical events and processes leave their marks on everyday life; they also show the society's ability to develop a culture of consent and dissent. Life stories can reveal political and socio-economic ruptures. The twentieth century meant for Russia an epoch of cataclysms that began with the October Revolution and the Civil War, when peripheries played an important role in shaping a culture of violence. In the vastness of the hinterland where institutions of the state had traditionally weak roots, it was difficult in a time of civil war and foreign intervention to domesticate violence in its social and international context. This is the essence of the diaries of Petr V. Vologodskii, now published for the first time.

The edition by Semion Lyandres and Dietmar Wulff, based on the rich material of the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University, makes an impressive contribution to our understanding of the Russian Civil War. Previous studies on the anti-Bolshevik movement gave a one-sided perspective from the military leadership, i.e., that of Admiral Kolchak. Petr V. Vologodskii was a prominent Siberian lawyer who served in the Kolchak government. His diaries contain important information on Kolchak's political decision-making, but also on the personal networks of political and military leaders. From his heritage Vologodskii was a typical liberal thinker of the Siberian society as he was engaged since the 1880s in the Siberian autonomous movement that had its center at University of Tomsk. This explains why Vologodskii as oblastnik shows a strong anti-Bolshevik attitude after the October Revolution.

After the fall of the Tsarist autocracy Siberian regionalists, especially lawyers like Vologodskii, articulated their demand for Siberian autonomy within a future Russian federation. But the First Siberian Regional Congress, convened in October 1917 in Tomsk, took place under the conditions of civil war. The absence of nearly two thirds of the delegates curtailed the quorum. The main outcome of the congress was “to drive out the Bolsheviks and to restore order” (29). Further the delegates had no concrete idea what an anti-Bolshevik order should look like. The anti-Bolshevik upheaval of the Czech Legion along the Trans-Siberian railway gave a new impetus to regional autonomist tendencies and here Vologodskii's diaries begin. Vologodskii's purpose was to compile a historical document destined for posterity. (33)

On June 29, 1918 the Provisional Siberian Government was founded in Omsk. As the editors correctly point out, this government from the very beginning was marked by a bad omen: the West Siberian city and frontier town of Omsk presented an atmos-
phere of political intrigues so typical of Russia’s “Wild East”. As chairman of the Council of Ministers Vologodskii tried in vain to anchor the rule of law in political culture. However surprising this may seem, Vologodskii accepted Kolchak’s coup d’état in November 1918, because he saw in the Bolsheviks the greater danger. The shock of the Red terror was deeply rooted (1, 76.) Vologodskii had not only a thorough knowledge of Russian domestic politics; his diaries give also a good insight into the diplomacy of the US and Japan and their intervention in the Civil War in Siberia. With the collapse of the Kolchak regime under the attacks of the Red Army in the beginning of 1920 Vologodskii emigrated to China. Vologodskii’s diaries provide a good insight into Russian émigré life in Manchuria. Vologodskii became an eyewitness of the Chinese Civil War and not surprisingly he draws a comparison between the events in China and Russia. Like many Russian emigrants Vologodskii feared that the Chinese government would hand them over to the Bolsheviks (2, 109). With this excellent edition of Vologodskii’s diaries we now possess an import historical document that shows how deeply moving autobiographies written in a time of political and social upheavals can be.

Eva-Maria Stolberg

Bertrand M. Patenaude. The Big Show in Bololand: The American Relief Expedition to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002. xi, 817 pp. $70.00 (cloth); $29.95 (paper).

Just as the director of the American Relief Administration’s (ARA) mission to Soviet Russia in 1921-1923 predicted, the relief work he managed quickly disappeared from public memory and most historical accounts. By 1958, George F. Kennan rightly termed American relief activities – roughly two hundred Americans who oversaw the disbursement of $60 million in relief supplies in about twenty months – a “forgotten chapter” of the twentieth century. Indeed, aside from the ARA’s official history, only one monograph (and a mediocre one at that) on the topic has appeared in English. Russian-language accounts have been more numerous, though rarely more informative; they have too often contained only accusations of espionage and anti-Soviet activities “under the flag of aid.”

Bertrand Patenaude’s massive new book on the ARA’s Russia Unit is thus most welcome. Based primarily on an intimate familiarity with Russian Unit Records (numbering some 555 boxes), the book also brings to bear archival materials from across the United States, including documents from a handful of privately held collections. Patenaude brings these materials to life with his loose, vivid and engaging writing style.

The Big Show in Bololand – a title invoking some of the common slang of ARA workers – contains four sections roughly equal in size. The first provides an overview of the famine relief work, setting the stage with brief but informative background on agriculture and rural life in Russia, the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian Civil War, and Herbert Hoover, Chairman of the ARA. The chapters of the remaining three parts
consist primarily of a thematic presentation of one or another aspect of the relief effort: the symbolic importance of the automobile, for instance, or the problems of relying on Russian interpreters. Each chapter contains a series of variations on the theme, usually closely related anecdotes.

Patenaude clearly has great sympathy for the ARA workers. Even when using institutional records, he prefers to tell the story from the perspective of the relief workers (otherwise known as "relievers"). Describing internal ARA disputes, especially the appointment of an "outsider," Col. William Haskell, as director of the Russian Unit, Patenaude writes a balanced but by no means neutral account. Focusing on the experiences of the relievers in Russia, the book shows them in their moments of greatest enthusiasm and confidence as well as their moments of hubris and on rare occasion malfeasance.

The book also touches on some of the major issues of the period: the Progressive-era drive for efficiency, personified in Hoover the engineer; the poor state of the Soviet economy; the political fallout from the Soviet announcement of the New Economic Policy (only a few months before the arrival of the first ARA workers in September 1921); and the great potential, usually fulfilled, for misunderstandings between Soviet and American officials. Unfortunately, the book usually dispenses with these issues too quickly, leaving connections to broader historical events for the reader to make.

Patenaude effectively portrays the contentious relationship between American aid workers and their Soviet hosts. While ARA officials found cooperative attitudes in their previous work across war-devastated Europe, the Russian experience was entirely different. Much to the frustration of ARA workers up and down the hierarchy. Soviet officials seemed to relish placing obstacles in the path of American workers who prided themselves on their efficiency. The obstacles ranged from constant haggling over the terms of the aid all the way to the harassment and arrest of the ARA's Russian staff, and, on more than one occasion, American staff as well. Patenaude is surely right that the Politburo could not easily resolve some of the points of conflict (for instance, the transportation system that had been ruined by seven years of war), but also in blaming the top Soviet leadership for their ambivalence toward the ARA work.

Here a fuller account of the Soviet side of the story would have been very enlightening. What convinced Soviet leaders to allow a semi-official American agency, staffed primarily by former military men, relatively free rein in their country – and so shortly after the withdrawal of American support for the Bolsheviks' main enemies? What disputes emerged within the Politburo about the course of American aid? How did Soviet officials organize their own relief of the famine? Given Patenaude's Soviet expertise – indeed, he completed a dissertation on the transition to NEP at Stanford – such an account would add significantly to the value of the book for scholars of Soviet and international history.

As it stands, Big Show in Bololand is an achievement; it is without doubt the book to end all books on the ARA's Russia Unit. The relief workers have found in Patenaude not only their James Boswell but also their Ernie Pyle.

David C. Engerman
Brandeis University

The wealth of newly available archival materials in Russia has spurred groundbreaking research on the interplay of culture, politics, and society in the early Soviet period. One such study is the recent work by historian James T. Andrews, *Science for the Masses: The Bolshevik State, Public Science, and the Popular Imagination in Russia, 1917-1934*, which focuses on state efforts to promote science education as part of the Bolshevik drive for modernization. Andrews' detailed account makes many significant contributions to cultural studies, the history of education in the USSR, and the relationship between the state and society during the transition from NEP to early Stalinism. He shows the convergence of mass activism and state authority in the arena of science popularization, and the important roles played by volunteer activists during both the late Imperial and early Soviet periods. For Andrews, the great break in the movement to broaden popular scientific knowledge was not 1917, but 1928. At this time the Stalinist state redirected its focus from human enlightenment to serving the needs of the industrializing economy. Popular science had to become utilitarian and contribute to socialist construction. Nevertheless, mass participation and interest remained high. Stalinist culture, as Andrews shows, was paradoxical in its mixture of state coercion and popular militancy: Stalin refashioned the Bolshevik agenda for science popularization, but there was a receptive audience for this and considerable give-and-take between the state and society in its implementation.

*Science for the Masses* is divided into three parts. The first provides a history of the science popularization movement during the Imperial period. Before 1917, the state was not the major force behind scientific enlightenment; it was the intelligentsia, and their aim was education. Energized by a growing wave of civic activism, the movement intensified in the late nineteenth century as hundreds of voluntary societies formed with the express purpose of bringing scientific knowledge to a broader audience. The second part examines the fate of the popular science movement during the first decade of Soviet power. The Bolshevik state co-opted the movement for its own ideological and modernizing agenda, but as Andrews clearly shows, this meant very little in terms of change or disruption in the activities of the societies. Many of the pre-revolutionary societies and scientists continued to operate independently during the NEP years, and found strong support for their work in Narkompros and Glavnauka. Soviet Russia in the 1920s, like other European societies, looked to science and technology as a revolutionary force capable of transforming human consciousness. The third part of Andrews' book examines how after 1928, the Stalinist state subsumed the popular science movement as it undermined, attacked, and in most cases liquidated the pre-revolutionary societies. Andrews finds, though, that the state operated more through intermediaries than direct coercion, for it was radical scientists and Marxist voluntary societies that led the assault and then took over the popular science movement.

This study illuminates the making of Bolshevik science and education policy, and the ways in which this policy changed during the transition from NEP to early Stalin-
ism. Andrews shows how the Bolsheviks during NEP upheld a broad definition of enlightenment, and were quite responsive to Western science and scientific achievements, but this changed significantly after 1928. Yet, even as Stalinist culture became more insular and narrow in scope, it still maintained a futuristic and visionary sense of science and its possibilities, which proved very appealing to both workers and elites.

Andrews offers tantalizing glimpses into worker consciousness through his examination of evaluations, discussions, and questionnaires filled out by participants in the Communist Party’s popular science outreach programs. According to Andrews, many workers embraced the Stalinist vision of a modernized future with advanced technology accessible to all, and supported the official outreach programs as a means to improve their own job and career prospects. Workers boldly criticized the heavy propaganda content and instead demanded more information on how to use new technologies. Their responses, Andrews asserts, helped convince the state to revamp its approach to scientific enlightenment and rely more on Marxist voluntary societies.

Andrews’ work raises a number of questions, not all of which are answered in the book. It is understandable why the author limited his study to 1917-1934, yet it would also be useful to provide at least a brief epilogue depicting the fate of the popular science movement beyond this date. One would like to know more as well about the ultimate fate of some of the specific pre-revolutionary societies and scientists discussed in the first part of the book. More evidence is needed to support the author’s broad conclusions about the impact of worker criticism on Soviet policy-makers; it is questionable how representative the sampling of questionnaires and evaluations he used were, particularly of workers in provincial areas. Moreover, he devotes only a few pages to peasant audiences, which is disappointing. Finally, some chapters are quite dense and detailed, and may be inaccessible to the non-specialist or the casual reader.

The contributions of this study nonetheless outweigh these limitations. It is a valuable addition to the growing literature on the history of science and science policy in the Soviet Union, and deepens understanding of what “Stalinization” meant in the critical areas of science and education.

Elaine MacKinnon State University of West Georgia


Mittel zu einer besseren Gesellschaft (8) durch Expertenregulierung und Anwendung wissenschaftlicher Prinzipien. Die stalinistische Kultur sei daher, so Hoffmann, als eine besondere sowjetische Inkarnation der modernen Massenkultur zu verstehen. Sein Kulturbegriff ist dabei nach eigenem Bezeugen 'breit', er orientiert er sich explizit an Groys' These vom „Gesamtkunstwerk Stalin.“ (11, 161).


Die Resultate, die Hoffmann durch diesen Ansatz gewinnen kann, sind nicht alle neu, aber durch die Strukturierung erstmals so übersichtlich zugänglich: Die Normie-


Der eingangs propagierte europäische Kontext wird für die einzelnen Bereiche unterschiedlich stark aufgearbeitet. Gerade für den sich anbietenden und sehr gut skizzierten Bereich von Freizeit und Sport etwa fehlt eine Einordnung in die europäische Landschaft; und in Kap. 5 bspw. hätte man über die Hobsbawmschen 'erfundenen Traditionen' hinaus zahlreiche weitere methodische Anregungen wie auch Forschungsergebnisse zur nationalen Symbolik und Rhetorik in den dreißiger Jahren herbeiziehen können: so bleibt der - wichtige - Vergleich etwas an der Oberfläche. Allerdings ist ohnehin bemerkenswert, welche Themenfülle Hoffmann auf nicht einmal 200 Seiten unterbringt. So gelingt es ihm auch erst im Schlusswort, zentrale moderne Herrschaftsinstrumente wie Bevölkerungs kontrolle und Statistik anzusprechen (für andere Bereiche wie bspw. Wissenschaft und Medizin bleibt leider kaum Platz). Das versöhnlich rückwirkend mit der eher vagen Eingangsdefinition von Modernität als 'sozialen Interventionismus und Massenpolitik' (7), macht aber umso deutlicher, dass die zeittypisch-modernen Normen und Werte der dreißiger Jahre eben nicht ohne die besondere Ausprägung der sowjetischen Herrschaftsmechanismen und Institutionen, die Mittel und die Radikalität ihrer Durchsetzung, aber auch nicht ohne den Verweis auf den utopischen Gehalt der bolschewistischen Ideologie untersucht werden können.

Eva Maurer
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
The selling of Russian cultural riches after 1917 constitutes the fascinating theme explored in this collection. The export of these goods was primarily inspired by economic motives, as large parts of the world, after all, boycotted the socialist experiment, which had important repercussions on the mutual trade relations. Political barriers, such as the absence of embassies and/or sales representatives, hindered the cultivation of intensive economic contacts. As a result, a serious lack of hard Western currency arose soon after 1917; a lack that was even enhanced by the civil war and the famine in the years between 1920 and 1922. Foreign currencies were vital, though, to buy indispensable capital goods in the West. The Soviet Union might have been striving for an economic autarchy, yet the country still depended on the ideologically hostile capitalist world. But there was more to it. What would be an ideologically better way to settle the score with the ancient privileged classes of Russia, nobility, clergy and middle classes than by taking possession of their art collections, nationalizing and (partly) selling them abroad? Thus, these groups lost their property and as such became equal to the workers and farmers who did not have any possessions either. In short, it was an ideological triumph coupled to the ultimate humiliation of the previous "exploiters". The vast majority of the private collections simply became public property that could be used for trade as one pleased.

This was the pattern of the Soviet sales until 1928. Afterwards, museums in general and the Hermitage in particular became the targets of the Russian selling mania. It is not for nothing that this change marked the transition from the end of the New Economic Politics with its relatively high prosperity to a period in which the planned economy was outlined. Museum curators obviously tried to oppose this movement as much as possible, but in reality this was to no avail: only 114 of the 773 objects that formed part of the Russian crown jewels were left untouched in the diamond fund of the Moscow armoury after the sales during the period between 1927 and 1936.

These Russian sales obviously led to scandals abroad. Russian emigrants sometimes recognized their own possessions, which obviously led to the question whether the Russian actions were lawful or not. The answer to that question would sometimes lead to success. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance, clearly distanced itself from the French auctions in 1927, although in most cases, the sales would just continue.

This collection correctly observes that the final balance of these sales cannot yet be made. It is very obvious that several Soviet authorities were opposing each other and that a mutual planning was almost non-existent. The Soviet Union, furthermore, also corrupted the market by "dumping" large numbers of art objects on the international market. In addition, there were not enough experts who could estimate the correct value of the objects and at the end of the 1930s, this combination of limited knowledge in the economic and artistic fields led to the realisation that from then on, export
had to be stopped. As a general conclusion, it can be assumed that yet too little is known about this little glorious period in the Russian world of art. This collection is a valuable first step, though, which will hopefully be explored further.

J.S.A.M. van Koningsbrugge


Living in a cavernous Stalinist skyscraper can be an oppressive experience, to say the least. I thought so when I resided at Moscow State University (MGU) in the Lenin Hills more than four decades ago. Stalinism was on the wane then so it was easy to disparage both those soaring “gothic” edifices and the style that seemed to me to embody the villainies of the man and his rule. When I last visited my old haunt a few years ago, the structure seemed less forbidding but hardly more alluring: instead of projecting an aura of totalitarianism, it evoked revulsion in its dilapidated state. It was easy to rationalize that it now symbolizes a failed Communism that it once exalted.

Arguably, there is more to MGU and structures like it than I have just suggested. Indeed, Vladimir Paperny offers a far more sophisticated critique of Stalinist architecture by juxtaposing it with Constructivist works and style, which heralded the new Bolshevik state and prevailed during the 1920s. He labels the latter “Culture One” and calls the dominant Stalinist mode of the 1930s and 1940s “Culture Two”. But there is more to Paperny’s work than comparing these two architectural styles; rather they represent a cultural tension, which has been recurring throughout Russian history.

Paperny states in his preface (xvii) that “progressive” Soviet historians of the 1960s were extraordinarily vague in their recapitulation of early Soviet art while Western scholars unhesitatingly recounted Stalin’s responsibility for the numbing architecture of the 1930s-early 1950s. Hugh Hudson’s *Blueprints and Blood: The Stalinization of Soviet Architecture, 1917-1937* (1994) comes to mind. While Hudson shows how architectural Stalinists “destroyed an avant-garde movement of urban planners and architects, who attempted to create a more human built environment for the Soviet people” (dust jacket and introduction), Paperny discerns integrity in both modes and is less inclined to take sides.

*Architecture in the Age of Stalin: Culture Two* is not an easy read. However imaginative the author’s approach and however fascinating his digressions, they often lose the reader. Yet perseverance is rewarded. There are recurring themes. Destruction and construction are two: Paperny tallies losses and gains – the Kitai Gorod walls, Sukharevskaya Tower, the Iverskaya Chapel, and Konstatin Ton’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior (since rebuilt) on one hand and Ivan Zholtovskii’s “Paladian” apartment building on the Mokhovaia and Hotel Moskva in the Okhotnyi Riad on the other. The structures razed were ancient, not Constructivist, ones. This pulling down of old Kremlin edifices is reminiscent of Bazhenov’s demolitions in the 1760s in order to make way for a never to be realized palatial monolith. Indeed, “classicism” is another recurring theme with Paperny. It appears when he resurrects variously architects like
Bazhenov, Quarenghi, Rossi, and Rastrelli. He also touches on the tradition of Russian urban planning, whether the great undertaking in Moscow during the 1930s or Peter the Great's new northern capital three hundred years ago. I find it difficult to accept the author's suggestion that these [classical and folk architecture] traditions of Russian urban planning are entirely the invention of the 1940s. Even the nationalistic epoch of Alexander III did not have the slightest idea of them. It has always been assumed by Russian art historians that Russian cities — with the exception, of course, of St. Petersburg — developed sporadically and spontaneously, and that was the source of their charm (24). What of the great urban planning enterprises of Catherine II and Alexander I, or is Paperny being facetious?

Paperny distinguishes between Culture One and Culture Two variously. The former is horizontal or international, stretching across international boundaries. The latter is vertical, that is, residing in one country. To press home this point the author launches into a grand discourse of the border guard motif. Very interesting, although for some no doubt distracting! The “Collective-Individual” dichotomy is still another means of differentiating One and Two. The former was egalitarian and evoked the collective; the latter, the individual whether in housing or a garden plot. Nothing could be farther from Culture One than, for example, Grigorii Zakharov's 1953 project for the reconstruction of Liusinovskaia Street. Its six identical buildings, sixteen stories in height, suggest MGUs on parade! “Mechanical-Living” carries the ideas further — the mechanistic aspects of Culture One vs. the “live” features (e.g., animals, humans, crops). Joy and warmth also enter into this characterization of Culture Two. There is much, much more here, each a perspective of Culture Two. However maddening his style and construction — Paperny is nothing if not original. He exhibits humor, too, e.g., Stalin's confusing Hegel (Gegel in Russian) with Gogol!

Paperny's work appears in the Cambridge Studies in New Art History and Criticism, "a series which provides a forum for studies that represent new approaches to the study of visual arts." That works published in this series cover a broad range of subjects — "artists, genres, periods, themes, styles, and movements" and "are distinguished by their methods of inquiry, whether interdisciplinary or related to developments in literary theory, anthropology, or social history" (iii) further explains Paperny's place in such a series. There are numerous (a hundred to be exact) photos. While some are not of great quality, they are often unique and intriguing. The author took many himself and noted the date of his taking. The work is copiously endnoted (311-341) and contains a valuable chronology, 1930-56 (259-301), listing events in politics and culture in the left column and landmarks in architecture and the arts in the right. All of this points to a well-researched work which takes into account the needs of the reader to a much greater degree than can be said of many scholarly publications.

I began this review remarking about cavernous Moscow University in the Lenin Hills. Paperny regards it "the best symbol" of Culture Two and calls it one of the "monuments of contemporary architecture" (248). He concludes that while "it has nothing in common with professional architecture," it is a classic of another kind. Architecturally, it is best compared with St. Basil's in Red Square. Without either Moscow is unimaginable.

Albert J. Schmidt  
The George Washington University

This collection of articles by leading American, British, and Russian scholars examines political aspects of the Stalin-era command economy. Topics include the roles played by the leadership and central institutions of the regime, the defense sector, and the Gulag. Each entry summarizes the state of research before and after the opening of the archives. In an overview of the research presented in the volume, Joseph S. Berliner writes that prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, mainstream Western scholarship, making use of published materials, got it mostly right while the revisionists got it all wrong.

That said, the archives have allowed scholars to test their assumptions, as evidenced by the research presented here. Eugenia Belova's study of Party Control Commission materials, for instance, provides a fuller picture than we had before of the means by which the government attempted to intervene in the practices of factory managers. At the same time, as Belova shows, industrial and regional party elites forged close relationships to help avoid punishment for the many economic crimes Soviet managers were forced to commit in order to maintain production.

Other articles provide new insights into the leadership of the centrally planned economy. According to entries by R. W. Davies, P. Gregory, A. Tikhonov, and E. A. Rees, the three central institutions in charge of the economy, GOSPLAN, the State Supply Committee (GOSSNAB), and the Ministry of Finance faced numerous challenges that we were not wholly aware of earlier. For one, they were severely understaffed. Two, there was debilitating rivalry between all of them as well as intense lobbying and jockeying for position by Politburo members, industrial ministers, regional officials, and representatives of defense agencies. Three, we now have greater clarity on the arbitrary role played by Stalin in establishing economic targets during the Five Year Plans. But we also find out that after listening to differences of opinion within the Politburo and receiving reports from the regions on the effects of his policies, Stalin made frequent adjustments to his plans, including those involving forced grain requisition. Of course, those who argued with him too assertively paid for it with their lives.

All of this seems to give the lie to the notion of a fully unified command structure, and indeed Stalin's sense of the limitations of the Kremlin's reach led him to assert his authority over all the players in the economy through personal envoys, the proliferation of control agencies, and, finally, ever greater reliance on purges and repression. At the same time, as the authors of these articles make clear, there is no justification for revisionist claims that Stalin's policies were significantly shaped, undermined, or limited by any kind of autonomous local authority. There were no real checks on Stalin's supreme authority or on the highly centralized nature of the system, even if, as the authors here suggest, the old totalitarian model was overly simplistic.

Rather than overthrowing our understanding of things, this volume refines it. But there are some real surprises as well. Among them is the finding by Mark Harrison that Soviet statistics were accurate, at least in the defense industries, and that decision-
making on military production could be quite well informed. This claim is somewhat undermined by the lax methods of documentation shown by other articles in the book, but nonetheless, it does raise the possibility that some aspects of what has been called "bacchanalian planning" were more clear-sighted than we have believed. Another indication of this is the discovery (as outlined by Gregory) that Soviet planning was denominated in monetary terms rather than, as once thought, in terms of physical units. In other words, the command economy was capable of far greater, and more realistic, understanding of both budgetary constraints and supply and demand factors than Western scholars would have previously thought possible. Even more amazing is the persistence, even during the darkest days of the Great Terror, of reform proposals made by leaders of the State Bank and other financial institutions for a modified market economy and principles of sound finance, including the abolition of rationing and price controls. Stalin and the Politburo blocked these proposals and arrested those making them, but the fact that they continually resurfaced is evidence that sophisticated economic thinking could and did survive the purges.

The article I find most debatable is Oleg Khlevnyuk's, which artificially separates the political and economic rationales at play in the development of the Gulag. During the Great Terror, he writes, the purpose of repression was extermination, rather than the provisioning of slaves for industrial ventures, as was the case previously. But in making this argument, he overlooks both the extent to which prior to the Great Terror elimination of political opponents was a major reason for the existence of the concentration camps and the extent to which during the Great Terror the desire for greater numbers of prisoner-slaves was an operative factor. As Anne Applebaum's book Gulag: A History shows (p. 109 and passim), the Gulag was indeed overwhelmed by a sudden influx of new prisoners, but no one in the government had any different notion of their function there than before. Khlevnyuk also highlights the poor results of Gulag projects such as Belomor and BAM to suggest that the leadership did not favor the extensive use of slave labor. This is a dubious assertion considering the evidence, again presented in Applebaum's book, that Iagoda, Beria (despite some equivocation toward the end of his career), and above all Stalin seemed to think that slave labor was an effective means of rapid economic development, particularly, though not exclusively, in the remote regions of the territory.

This book is concerned with economics from on high, dealing largely with the central government and the relationship between state institutions and the industrial sector. As the authors point out, now that the archives are accessible, much more remains to be done, particularly at the enterprise level. But in establishing the political context, the book is essential reading on the Stalinist economy and should be the jumping off point for subsequent research.

*Steven G. Marks*  
*Clemson University*
Wendy Z. Goldman. *Women at the Gates: Gender and Industry in Stalin's Russia.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. xvii, 294 pp. $60.00 (cloth); $23.00 (paper).

Wendy Goldman’s richly documented study focuses on the sources, structure, and consequences of the unplanned increase in the number of women in the Soviet workforce during the years of the first five-year plan (1928-1932). Drawing on planning documents as well as reports from the factories and labor exchanges, she emphasizes that the economic dislocations caused by collectivization and crash industrialization—rather than central planning and recruitment—accounted for the large numbers of women who joined the industrial labor force in the early 1930s. For new women workers, the outcomes were ironic: far from producing the liberated “new life” (*novyi byt*) imagined by female activists in the 1920s, access to once male-dominated jobs actually reinforced gender segregation in the workplace and gender inequality more generally.

Goldman examines the recruitment and experiences of women in industry from the top, the middle, and the bottom. Until 1930, Soviet labor policy worked to “guard the gates” to the working class. Because the Bolsheviks feared that “foreign elements”—peasants and “backward” women—would dilute the “purity” of the working class, labor exchanges offered unemployment benefits only to those who had previous factory experience, and prevented those without such experience from entering the industrial workforce. Such policies had the support of local factory managers and male workers, who tended to view women workers as by definition unskilled. However, Goldman emphasizes, the Zhenotdel (Women’s Department of the Communist Party) consistently contested such exclusionary policies, and “struggled to broaden the definition of the working class by highlighting the problems faced by women.” (33)

With the elimination of the Zhenotdel in 1930, what Goldman terms “working-class feminism” suffered a serious setback. Nonetheless, many former Zhenotdel activists continued to lobby for women’s advancement and to challenge the “ethos of ‘productionism’” (35) that Goldman views as the defining feature of the first five-year plan.

The series of chapters that focus on the critical year of 1930 effectively convey the complicated interactions of planners’ efforts to regain control of the situation and female activists’ efforts to pressure both central planners and local factory managers to open new economic opportunities for women. Goldman emphasizes that the massive influx of women into the workforce was neither anticipated nor planned by the Party. She provides a detailed examination of how food shortages and inflation—the by-products of the collectivization campaign—induced women to seek industrial work. They found jobs largely by circumventing a labor exchange system still committed to “guarding the gates.” Only when a labor shortage of crisis proportions became evident in 1930 did the Party begin to make (largely unsuccessful) efforts to recruit women into the factories.

When the gates to the working class came “tumbling down,” female activists saw an opportunity to turn the state’s need for labor into a means of getting women workers into the better paid, better skilled jobs in heavy industry from which they had tra-
ditionally been barred. "For a brief moment," writes Goldman, "the aims of the Party leaders coincided with those of women at the local level" (209). With the blessing of central planners, brigades of women activists descended on factories, determined which "jobs were suitable for women" (144), and pressured local factory managers – who met the brigades with "overwhelming hostility" (163) – to hire women to fill them. The result was a redefinition of "men’s work" and "women’s work" that gave women access to new sorts of jobs, while at the same time producing rigid gender segregation in the factories.

With the second five-year plan came a commitment to rebuilding the gates to the working class by limiting the mobility of peasants and by finding ways to increase labor discipline and to slow the turnover among workers. The urban female population then became a vital labor reserve – one that did not require the state to build additional housing and that tended to change jobs less frequently than men. Ironically, women’s permanent and necessary inclusion in the industrial working class coincided with an abandonment of any pretense of transforming daily life, as services like child care became incentives to labor discipline rather than tools for liberating women.

Goldman persuasively argues that the "the construction of the Soviet working class cannot be understood apart from the deployment and contributions of women." (279). For Goldman, this "construction" has little to do with culture. Her study avoids any sustained engagement with recent work on this period that understands "construction" in very different terms, privileging questions of identity, resistance, the boundaries between public and private, and the notion of Soviet modernity. Such questions have important connections to the story of state policy’s effects on women and women’s effect on state policy that Goldman ably tells. While much of the recent literature appears in the footnotes, a bibliography would have been useful, particularly for students.

The book opens and closes with images of women workers on Soviet postage stamps from the 1930s, as reflections of the "importance the state attached to the role of women workers during the 1930s" (xvii). Yet as Goldman herself demonstrates in the very interesting chapter documenting sexual harassment and discrimination, the image of the self-assured, highly valued woman worker never entirely squared with reality. The book thus suggests, but does not explore, the role of representation and self-representation in the construction of a gender-segregated but highly female industrial workforce.

Lisa A. Kirschenbaum

West Chester University


Bereits hier wird deutlich, dass die (von Michaels übernommene, jedoch nicht ausschließlich angewandte) begriffliche Gegenübersetzung von „Europäern“ und „Asiaten“ bei weitem nicht zur Erklärung aller Machtgefüße allein ausreicht. Während die Heterogenität der Gruppe der „Europäer“ im Kasachstan der dreißiger und vierziger Jahre zwar angesprochen, aber nicht weiter verfolgt wird, bleibt die grundlegende Spannung zwischen urbaner bolschewistischer Ideologie und ländlichem Raum ebenso wie die Frage nach Geschlecht als Kategorie in Teil III zentral, wo Michaels die Nomaden (Kap. 5) und die Frauen Kasachstans (Kap. 6) als besondere Zielgruppen der Regierungspolitik ins Auge fasst. Gerade das letztere Kapitel zeigt deutlich, wie die Kategorien von Ethnie, Gender und Region ineinander greifen – so profitierten die kasachischen Frauen auf dem Land von der stalinistischen Refokussierung des Frauenbilds auf die Mutterrolle und den damit verbundenen Prämien für kinderreiche Mütter etwa in weit höherem Masse als etwa slawische Frauen in der Stadt.


Eva Maurer

Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
Veiled Empire by Douglas Northrop is meticulously unveiling the significance of Muslim gender and ethnicity under the challenge of Stalinist totalitarianism. Such a study requires a diverse range of materials and skills in languages. Having a good command of Russian and Uzbek that is reflected in a broad exploitation of Russian central and Uzbek archives, Northrop provides excellent scholarship in Oriental studies. His dissertation is a grand tour through different geographical landscapes, cultures and historiographies. Moreover, Northrop gives a good example of the encounter/clash between the Islamic world (Uzbekistan) and modern European colonialism (Soviet Russia). Rooted in Western Marxism, Bolshevik and especially Stalinist enlighteners believed that Muslim women were victims of patriarchal authority. In Communist view, the veil (hujum) was the visible symbol for this “mediieval darkness”. Northrop convincingly shows that the anti-hujum campaign that started in 1927 and lasted over fifteen years actually did not free Muslim women who indeed became victims in the struggle between Soviet enlighteners and their Muslim opponents. Moreover, it becomes evident from the sources presented by Northrop that apart from some few Communist activists among Uzbek women the debate over “veiling” or “unveiling” was run by men. Whether Russian communists or mullahs, it were men who designed the imaginative associations of the veil. In the tradition of European orientalism the veil represents the despotic and exotic savagery. Enlightenment, at least in the Stalinist era, aimed at making the mysterious visible. This also implies the political, economic and social control of Central Asian society. According the Stalinist enlighteners family life that traditionally belonged to the private sphere of Muslim (the hidden world) should become public. Actually, personal networks among Muslims (family, friends, and neighbors) were stronger than Soviet administrative measures. In resisting the anti-hujum campaign, sanctions of family, friends, and neighbors were quite subtle (subtle like the hujum itself). For most Uzbek women, unveiling was not acceptable as it meant a complete breaking-off with the family and social background. Even in party ranks the anti-hujum campaign and its social changes were not welcome. For example, one Komsomol secretary sold his sister for a bride price of 7,000 rubles. Uzbek women unveiled in the party cells, but kept silent in the discussion. Although polygamous marriages were forbidden by Soviet law, this procedure continued. Soviet legislation labeled this kind of traditional obedience as “byt crime”. However, how could a decree be credible when even wives of Uzbek communists preferred the hujum? Northrop’s fascinating book shows that Soviet “Cultural revolution” found its limits in the steppes and deserts of Oriental Uzbekistan. Moreover it gives proof that Stalinist enlighteners had no idea of Oriental culture and mentality. So, actually the Orient kept mentally veiled.

Eva-Maria Stolberg
University of Bonn

These days one seldom reads a book on appeasement in the 1930s that does not explain it as hard-nosed, sensible realism: France and Britain did not have the guns or the gold to confront the Nazi aggressor and thus they stalled, making unpleasant but necessary concessions, until a better day when they could say stop to Hitler. Hatred of communism and admiration for fascism were only casual factors. The reader will not find these lines in Hugh Ragsdale’s book on the Munich crisis in 1938. This book reverts to an old-fashioned, or counter-revisionist line, summed up nicely in a *Manchester Guardian* definition of appeasement published in February 1939: “... a clever plan of selling off your friends in order to buy off your enemies” (xv). The author focuses less on Paris and London than he does on Moscow, Prague, and especially Bucharest. Ragsdale’s narrative is not only about Munich and appeasement; it is also about his journeys through archives in Russia and Eastern Europe where he had some successes and some disappointments. The author has read Soviet, Romanian, and Polish sources seldom used to examine appeasement and the Czechoslovak crisis in September 1938.

In Ragsdale’s narrative there are inevitably familiar lines. The British, for example, thought that Herr Hitler “was amenable to reason” (4) and would prefer negotiation to war. The French believed that their only road to salvation lay in following a British line. “French foreign policy became so dependent on London,” Ragsdale says, “as to forsake its solemn treaty obligations in Eastern Europe” (5). General Maurice Gamelin, chief of staff and commander-in-chief, exaggerated the strength of the foe, “... apparently to persuade the French government that any strategy other than a purely defensive one was out of the question” (15). Poland was too self-absorbed to recognize its obvious national interests (well, obvious to almost all save the Polish government); so it ignored or scorned its potential allies and danced too close to its mortal enemy. Under Colonel Józef Beck, Poland sought the destruction of Czechoslovakia and obstructed efforts to form an anti-Nazi alliance including the Soviet Union right up until August 1939. “Bent on suicide,” says Ragsdale, quoting Telford Taylor in his thick study of Munich (9-10). And then there is Czechoslovakia, the primary victim in this narrative. Edvard Beneš, foreign minister and then president, led the Czechoslovak government. In the mid-1930s he courted the Soviet Union against Nazi aggression, but not too intimately, while at the same time he protested his good intentions to Berlin and insisted to his German interlocutors that in Paris he advocated Franco-German détente. This was a fine line to walk and not very pretty to see. But when the leader of a small state is wedged between much larger ones, pretty is not always convenient or possible. In 1938 Beneš was “full of illusions,” says Ragsdale, “perhaps misled by his own vanity” (134). In terms of results, Beneš’s policy was not more effective than Colonel Beck’s.

These characterizations will perhaps not be too surprising. Where Ragsdale stands out is in his curiosity to use East European and Russian archives in order to look at Munich from different perspectives, notably Romanian and Soviet. Unlike Poland, Romania was more willing to support a policy of resistance against Nazi Germany,
more willing to support France if France would take the lead, and willing also to co-operate with the Soviet Union. The Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, Maksim M. Litvinov, worked closely with his Romanian counterpart, Nicolae Titulescu, to negotiate a mutual assistance pact against Nazi aggression. Here is an interesting relationship worthy of the reader's attention. Although Titulescu fell from power in 1936, and the pact was not concluded, the Romanian government kept open its options and its cautious willingness to cooperate with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union also pursued an anti-Nazi line, though many historians have disputed this proposition, especially the Czech émigré historians Jiri Hochman, Igor Lukes, and Ivan Pfaff. These gentlemen will not like Ragsdale for he efficiently dispatches their little supported insistence that Stalin in particular was more interested in communist revolution than in resistance to Nazi aggression. Litvinov, the Soviet advocate of collective security, meant what he said about resistance to Nazi aggression; it was France and Britain led by Messrs. Neville Chamberlain, Edward Lord Halifax, Edouard Daladier, and Georges Bonnet, who would not take up Litvinov's proposals. For Romania and for the Soviet Union the position of France was key. If France acted forcefully to resist Nazi hegemony in Europe, the Soviet Union and Romania would have done likewise. Without France the Soviet position lost its legitimacy. Without this legitimacy Romania would not ally itself with the Soviet Union, nor for that matter would Czechoslovakia. Beneš would rather pitch in the towel than depend solely on Soviet support. France was key but France would not act without Britain and Britain would not act at all. Lukes et al. want to blame Stalin for doing in Czechoslovakia in the 1938, but as Ragsdale suggests, the guilty men were in Paris and London.

Ragsdale points to a large mobilization of the Red Army on Romanian and Polish frontiers in late September to demonstrate Soviet seriousness about supporting Czechoslovakia. While he does not think that a line of march across the mountainous terrain of Romania was likely, he speculates that the Red Army might have intended to roll across the open spaces of Poland to aid the Czechoslovaks, or fight the Germans, whether the Polish government liked it or not. This was a prospect that contributed to French paralysis, for France hoped to keep Poland from throwing in entirely with Hitler. The reader may remember that Poland wanted its share of Czech territory, the Teschen district, if Nazi Germany seized the Sudetenland. "Grovelling in villainy," Winston Churchill called it. Sometimes we forget that Poland was an aggressor before it became a victim.

Ragsdale is forced to speculate on Soviet intentions because he gained little access to Russian archives in Moscow. It is not easy to use these sources for the archivists often dole out files parsimoniously and capriciously, if at all. "Do the Russians," asks Ragsdale, "not want us to know their history, or do they not want to know it themselves" (185). This is a fair question and it begs a serious reply from archival authorities in Moscow. Unfortunately, we may wait a long time for an answer.

Michael Jabara Carley
University of Akron

Ella Schneider Hilton has written a remarkable account of a remarkable life. It was her fate to live through an extraordinary range of the last century’s tumult: born in Kiev in 1936 to Volga Germans, she started life in Stalin’s Soviet Union, fled to Nazi Germany during the war, spent years in postwar refugee camps, and emigrated only to find herself in indentured servitude in the segregated American South. Blessed with a superb memory, she chronicles her family’s experiences with a Zola-like eye for telling details that vividly recreate the discomforts, hardships, even the smells of daily life in difficult and often perilous circumstances. She offers a child’s perspective on the upheavals she experienced, which means that the reasons for much of what happened to her remain mysterious. But the opacity at one level is counterbalanced on another level by the details and perspectives that her insatiable childish curiosity brings to light.

Hilton begins her memoir on the day before her fifth birthday: June 22, 1941. That night the NKVD arrived at her family’s apartment and took her father away. She never saw him again. She, her mother, her grandmother, and her sister narrowly missed the same fate by fleeing to the countryside for several months. After the Germans captured Kiev in September, the family returned, and Hilton’s mother parlayed her German-language skills into a job with the occupying army. Two years later, as the Soviet army approached the city, the German army evacuated the family to Bavaria, where they joined millions of other *Volksdeutsche* refugees living as outsiders in Hitler’s Reich.

Hilton’s account of her early years in Kiev is brief but full of pungent details: the food, the flies, the chores, and the Volga Deutsche sense of alienation from Russia. Her descriptions of life as a refugee in Germany highlight the interrogations by Nazis trying to weed out Jews, the routine use of corporal punishment for children, the ubiquitous lice, the debilitating fear during the long hours spent in bomb shelters, the hatred of Communists. One day the women and children emerged from a bombing raid to find strange soldiers policing the area. Assuming the soldiers were Russians, the women cowered in fear until they noticed that some of the uniforms were worn by black men. Then they fell to their knees to praise their deliverance into the hands of the Americans.

After the war Hilton spent seven years in a DP camp in Germany with her mother and new stepfather, living in considerable deprivation and subject to pervasive discrimination at the hands of “real Germans.” Finally in 1952 the family was allowed to emigrate to the United States— but what they found was a far cry from America they had expected. Upon arrival they learned that they were in debt to a family in Mississippi who had become their sponsors. They spent the next year as indentured servants, picking cotton and living in a leaky, dilapidated shack. The family was in shock. As Hilton writes, instead of finding a land of opportunity, they had traded German fleas, bedbugs, and lice for ticks, chiggers, roaches, and poisonous snakes (179). She poignantly chronicles how hard the family found everything about their new life, from eating hamburgers with their hands to learning the intricacies of the Jim Crow system.
They benefited from the kindness of strangers, and after a difficult year they moved out, helped by members of a nearby church. Hilton eventually went to college, married, and had children. Having spent her entire childhood feeling “displaced” — as a German in the Soviet Union, as a Soviet refugee in Germany, as a DP in the postwar years, and as an immigrant in the American South — she finally found a home in American society.

Like all memories, Hilton’s should be treated with caution; sometimes her recollections seem tinged by the standard tropes of historical narratives that developed in later years. Her memoir is nevertheless a fascinating resource for scholars interested in the Alltagsgeschichte of Stalinism and World War II and indeed for anyone interested in looking at how the great events historians so often view from above are experienced at first hand by ordinary individuals. The autobiography is also of considerable value for scholars of refugees, not least because of its multinational scope: Hilton was a refugee in two countries under three quite different governments. She has written a powerful tale of a life both unusual in its details and, in a century of tremendous mass migrations, all too common in its general contours.

Barbara Keys
California State University, Sacramento


In November 1970 a crude-looking Soviet robot spacecraft touched down gently in an ancient crater on the Moon. Resembling a bathtub on wheels, it roamed the lunar surface for nearly a year, leaving behind its tracks in the dusty soil and beaming back spectacular images of the alien landscape. For the Soviet propaganda machine the Lunokhod rover literally was a present from heaven. While America basked in the glory of its first Apollo manned lunar landings, Soviet officials spared no effort to portray their Moon rover as a cheap alternative to the “wasteful” and “risky” Apollo missions, demonstrating that lunar exploration can just as well be performed by unmanned spacecraft. The Soviet Union, so they claimed, had never been in the race to put a man on the Moon. Remarkably, the Soviet claim was taken for granted by many in the West, despite the fact that numerous Soviet officials had made statements to the contrary before Neil Armstrong’s historic first steps on the Moon in July 1969. This, combined with information leaked from the US intelligence community and evidence of actual hardware tested in space, led a handful of Western “space sleuths” to conclude that the Soviet Union had covered up a massive effort to send cosmonauts to the Moon. Eventually, they were proven right almost twenty years later when glasnost’ finally lifted the veil on an undertaking comparable in scale to Apollo.

The Soviet Union’s failure to beat America in the Moon race is the central theme of Asif A. Siddiqi’s *The Soviet Space Race With Apollo*. Siddiqi is one of the most respected Western experts on the history of the Soviet space program. The book explores the Soviet Union’s manned space activities between 1966 and 1974 and is actually a reprint of the second half of Siddiqi’s *Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union*.
and the Space Race, 1945-1974, published by NASA in 2000. The first half of Challenge to Apollo has also been republished by the University Press of Florida as Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge and covers the origins of the Soviet long-range ballistic missile program, the events leading up to the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the rise of the Soviet piloted space program under the leadership of Chief Designer Sergei P. Korolev until his death in 1966. Reading this companion volume first is indispensable for a good understanding of the events described in The Soviet Space Race With Apollo.

The Soviet manned lunar effort was split into two components, a program to fly cosmonauts around the Moon and another to land cosmonauts on the Moon. While the USSR came relatively close to upstaging America in the first leg of the race, it never stood a real chance of landing men on the Moon before Apollo 11. There were many underlying reasons for the failure to meet those objectives, including poor leadership and infighting between leading designers. Moreover, the lunar program was not seen as a major priority by the Soviet military, who to a large extent controlled the purse strings of the space program. It always took a backseat to maintaining strategic parity with the United States and as a result was starved of the resources necessary to achieve success. Siddiqi also discusses the first flights in the Soiuz program (a series of missions to test docking and spacewalking techniques in Earth orbit) and looks at the origins of the Saliut space stations. Both Soiuz and Saliut would lay the foundations for the later development of the Mir space station and the Russian segment of the International Space Station now orbiting the Earth.

Most of the earlier English-language works on the Soviet space program are dated because they were published during the Soviet era. The Soviet Space Race With Apollo benefits from the massive amounts of information that have become available from Russian sources since censorship was lifted in the late 1980s. Scattered around in a vast amount of Russian books, newspaper and magazine articles, much of that information remained inaccessible to Western analysts either because it was never translated or because the source material was too hard to come by. Asif Siddiqi got down to the colossal task of collecting all the bits and pieced them together into a coherent story.

All this is not to say that this should be considered the ultimate history of the Soviet manned space program between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s. Many of the revelations of the past fifteen years or so have come from veterans involved in the program, who are inevitably biased and often make contradictory statements. A major problem for scholars of the Soviet space program is the dearth of primary documents from government and Communist Party levels as well as from the design bureaus, all of which remain largely off limits to researchers. It is not until those archives become accessible that a more definitive and objective history of the program can be written.

The book’s parent volume Challenge to Apollo received much acclaim in Russia itself, where, ironically, a comparable book on the country’s space history is yet to appear. Although perhaps a little too technical and detailed for readers with just a casual interest in the Soviet space program, this is without doubt the most comprehensive and accurate history of this particular aspect of the Soviet space program written to date.

Bart Hendrickx
Mercator Hogeschool, Ghent

The history of the book is almost as interesting as the story it contains. What is under review here is a paperback that holds the first eleven chapters or approximately half of a clothbound book first published in 2000 by the History Division of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. NASA, or the author, labeled the first version, *Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974*. The title of the larger, original volume actually clarifies and makes understandable the general direction or theme of this "smaller" work. Author Asif A. Siddiqi explains how the USSR succeeded in challenging the U.S., prompting its quest for the moon, but he also explores why the USSR failed, in turn, to meet and match America's Apollo program. For the Soviet Union the space race, so exciting at the beginning, fizzled at the end.

Siddiqi completed the larger work as a NASA Contract Historian in 1998, shortly before he entered a doctoral program at Carnegie-Mellon University under a National Science Foundation Fellowship. Actual work on the tome began sixteen years earlier when he compiled a chronology of the Soviet space program. After he entered Texas A&M University at the end of the 1980s, completing B.S. and M.S. degrees, he started to flesh out the outline story he began in 1982. Success marked this effort as seen in the appearance of articles in prestigious journals, presentation of scholarly papers at conferences including AAASS, and reception of honors such as the Robert H. Goddard Historical Essay Award for 1997. A published poet in his native Bangladesh before he turned to space science and Soviet history, Siddiqi's narrative style is characterized by sensitivity and clarity.

Siddiqi's first of a two-volume republished work, *Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge*, reviews the period 1945 to 1965. He makes clear that he is not surveying the gamut of Soviet rocketry and space efforts. Instead, he hones in on those developments leading to the first intercontinental ballistic missile, the first satellite, the first human in space, the first multiple crew in space, and the first EVA. Whole categories of space-related subjects are ignored such as lunar and planetary probes. Thus Siddiqi focuses on activities attracting international attention and acclaim and posing the greatest challenge to, and hence response from, the United States. As chief designer of the basic launch vehicle (R-7) that in modified form led to all the firsts listed above, Sergei P. Korolev dominated the two decades covered in the book. Perhaps inadvertently, certainly inevitably, the author wrote a biography of this engineering giant upon whose broad shoulders the Soviets stood to reach outer space.

Korolev, however, is only the centerpiece on a huge banquet table with place settings, goblets, and silverware for a hundred important guests. These guests are the institutions and personalities making up the bureaucratic world that enveloped, sometimes nurturing – sometimes strangling, Soviet rocketry. The author scrutinizes in encyclopedic detail many of the 200 institutes and bureaus and the 25 ministries responsible for designing, constructing, testing, and launching the R-7 rocket. In terms of individuals, Siddiqi identifies four basic groups that collaborated or battled with each
other in their quest for scarce resources, political favor, and programmatic leadership: engineers, artillery officers, plant managers, and Communist officials.

After October 1, 1958, NASA and its chief executive officer gave leadership and direction in the US to rocketry development and space exploration. Such was not the case in the USSR. In a country infamous for its pervasive, centralized authority, the space "program" existed in a state of near anarchy. Of the many surprises revealed in the book, one of the more extraordinary is the fact that immediately after Sputnik the Russians had absolutely no idea what to do next. Each advance in the space "program" depended on the capricious whim of party leaders, the victory and/or defeat of proposals from design bureaus, and the public announcements in America of NASA's plans. Siddiqi wonderfully succeeds in penetrating, exploring, and exposing the inner workings of the labyrinthine institutions supporting Soviet rocketry. He accomplishes this via extensive research in Russian and Western published documents, official histories, biographies, memoirs, archives, plus interviews and correspondence with key players including Nikita Khrushchev's son, Sergei.

While the author has produced a beneficial study, the publisher made two errors. First, the body of the text is printed twenty characters to the inch or the same size found in most footnotes. Thus the extensive footnotes in this book critically discuss sources in a print that is 25 percent smaller than the tiny characters in the narrative. Sight-challenged scholars and reading-challenged students, not to mention the general public, are not going to pore over this work cover-to-cover. In fact Sputnik and its companion (no pun intended) volume are most likely to be used and used extensively as an encyclopedia. And this leads us to the second error. The index is much too small for a reference work. All items in the index that refer to two or more pages of text should be listed and, when appropriate, cross-listed under topical subheadings. The University Press of Florida can partly redeem itself by publishing an expanded index in normal print as a separate, but slender, third volume to the pre-existing set of two.

James K. Libbey
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Russia's Uncertain Economic Future. Edited by John P. Hardt. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003. xxii, 481 pp. $98.95 (cloth); $35.95 (paper).

Problems emerged when the Russian Federation abandoned the command economy of its Soviet predecessor. The rapid removal of the government from economic decision-making during the tenure of President Boris Yeltsin led to calamitous results. Productivity dropped; unemployment jumped; inflation reached triple-digit levels, and the social safety net virtually disappeared. Russia plummeted to the economic nether world in 1998. A bad harvest, low oil prices, and a financial contagion from East Asia combined with the government's default on domestic debts caused the country's securities, banks, and currency to collapse.

This debacle actually helped the federation enjoy a partial recovery in 1999 and 2000. The ruble's three-fold devaluation promoted exports, inhibited imports, boosted production, and reemployed Russians especially in consumer-oriented light industry.
Under these circumstances the GDP increased a combined fourteen percent - the best performance for any Moscow government since the 1970s. The economy’s positive direction coincided with Vladimir Putin’s accession to power, first as prime minister (August 7, 1999), then as Yeltsin’s replacement (December 31, 1999), and, finally, as Russia’s second elected president (March 26, 2000). Two factors explain the skyrocketing career of this former KGB colonel: Putin’s popular decision to inaugurate a second military campaign against Chechnya and the improving economy. It is the latter and the favorable period immediately following the 1998 economic meltdown that is the subject of *Russia’s Uncertain Economic Future*.

The study is actually a report on the Russian economy commissioned by the U.S. Congressional Research Service from a request by Senator Robert F. Bennett and the Joint Economic Committee. Although published by M. E. Sharpe, the book has the feel and format of a government publication. Indeed, the volume is one of nine studies printed for the Joint Economic Committee since 1959. Each one focuses on communist or former communist nation(s). Not surprisingly, most of the twenty-five authors/co-authors listed in the current study work for the government or for companies and think tanks with direct or indirect links to Capitol Hill. Thus mavericks such as Marshall Goldman and Stephen Cohen who might have enlivened the text were not invited to participate. Regardless, the editor, John P. Hardt, represents the typical contributor. He serves as Senior Specialist in Post-Soviet Economics at the Congressional Research Service.

Naturally, this Congress-inspired study is organized first and foremost to be a useful tool for members of the national legislature. Twenty-three chapters are grouped under four major (shortened here) headings: Past Performance; Economic Challenges; Long-term Prospects; Russia’s Economic Future and the U.S. Editor Hardt thoughtfully prepared not one, but two abbreviated recapitulations, a two-page “Highlights” and a ten-page “Overview.” Hence busy politicians or their staffers can secure a quick preview and basic understanding of the larger work or they can determine via these surveys those papers of interest that need to be read in their entirety. Moreover, each chapter is set up like a briefing paper with a table of contents and a summary for an introduction. This helpful organization is followed by unwelcomed inconsistencies in the use of references and footnotes. Only four authors append a bibliography to their studies; one author cites zero sources in a chapter filled with fascinating, though undocumented, data on eight major Russian industries ranging from cement to software.

Despite these inconsistencies, each study or chapter consistently supports the overall theme of the book. *Russia’s economic future is simply not predictable*. Precisely because the federation remains a nuclear power, its economic and political health is a major concern to American policy makers. Ominously, the contributors to this text find a disturbing set of mixed indicators on Russia’s economic progress, including those centering on the links between the financial and political life of the country. These indicators include, among others: a privatized economy that is contradicted by the continued presence of monopolies; a favorable balance of trade that depends heavily on the dependable price of energy exports; a rational and collectable flat income tax that is accompanied by an irrational and corruptible bureaucracy; a reputedly mar-
ket-oriented administration that demonstrably restricts the marketplace of ideas; a democratically elected president who seems to be constructing an authoritarian state.

Russia's Uncertain Economic Future amply fulfilled its initial role. It gave U.S. lawmakers access to expert information on the ups and downs of the federation's financial health in the two years after the 1998 economic collapse. The real question is whether the volume has an extended shelf life for the larger, academic community. And the correct answer may very well depend on the individual reader and what s/he expects to glean from this collective effort. Several authors, for example, comment on Putin's need to promote judicial reform. Their discussion became obsolete shortly after the book went to press. On the other hand, there are several groups of studies that continue to make the book valuable and worth the price of admission.

First, several studies have long-term value because they are broadly conceived. William H. Cooper's survey of Russia's economy from 1992 to 2000 is thoughtful, thorough, and replete with useful statistics. By the same token and for the same period, superb articles on Russian defense spending and U.S. bilateral assistance were prepared respectively by Christopher J. Hill and Curt Tarnoff. Second, two authors deserve the ear of academe because of their comments on the human condition. Forget Stephen King. Well-known demographer Murray Feshbach and political scientist Judyth L. Twigg will curl your hair with real-life horror stories about the chilling decline of Russia's human assets. Finally, two authors capture the essence of the book with essays on the long-term prospects for Russia's economic governance. Recently retired economist James R. Millar concludes that Russia's economy will march inexorably toward the open market. Political scientist Peter J. Stavrakis sharply disagrees. He argues that Russia's market is held hostage by political elites who are busily creating a predatory state. Take your pick.

James K. Libbey
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Jewish Life after the USSR. Edited by Zvi Gitelman, Musya Glants and Marshall I. Goldman. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2003. vii, 286 pp. $55.00 (cloth); $22.95 (paper).

The editors acknowledge that this book is a collection of papers presented at the Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University in 1999. Being a thorough study of demographic, political, cultural, and ethnic processes of the post-Soviet populations, its purpose is to offer a background understanding and a guideline to policy planners involved in redefinition and reconstruction of the Jewish communal life in the former Soviet Union. Following a brief introduction, fourteen chapters are grouped under four sections: 1) Jews and the Soviet Regime; 2) Politics, Identity, and Society; 3) Reconstructing Jewish Communities; 4) Jews and Russian Culture.

Without a doubt, Jews in post-Soviet Union are undergoing an identity crisis/transformation. Although the term, Jewish, carries multiple connotations whether it be religious, ethnic, or cultural, Yaacov Ro'i concludes that religion made a significant contribution... as an inalienable part of the Jewish heritage and culture rather
than as a way of life, system of faith and worship, or spiritual value (23) in chapter 1, "Religion, Israel, and Soviet Jewry's National Consciousness."

Then, Zvi Gitelman in chapter 3, "Thinking about Being Jewish in Russia and Ukraine," seems to echo a similar conclusion of Yaacov Ro.'i's study by summarizing that most Russian and Ukrainian Jews' sentiment and biology have largely replaced faith, Jewish law and lore, and Jewish customs as the foundations of Jewishness (55).

Furthermore, in chapter 4, "E Pluribus Unum? Post-Soviet Jewish Identities and Their Implication for Communal Reconstruction," the authors conclude that Judaism is largely irrelevant to Jewishness by saying that belief in God, observance of Shabbat and kashrut, and circumcision are all rated as quite irrelevant to being a "good Jew." What makes a good Jew is knowledge of history and culture and, especially, feeling pride in one's Jewishness and remembering the Shoah (71).

According to the reasoning and argument in these three chapters, there seems a subtle deconstruction of prominent religious elements of being Jewish in the former Soviet Union. In other words, the post-Soviet Jews have grown into being secular, cultural, and ethnic Jews rather than fundamentally religious Jews. In sum, Judaism as a religious belief has perceptibly become dispensable and therefore, unrelated to the Jews as concluded by the authors of these three chapters. In essence, they say that Judaism as a religious system no longer defines Jewishness. However, my concern is: is this absolutely true and universally applicable to every Jewish group in the former Soviet Union? Well, there are always exceptions.

In chapter 9, "Feasting, Memorializing, Praying, and Remaining Jewish," Alanna Cooper casts another perspective for us to consider, noticeably contrary to the three chapters discussed, by reporting on the Bukharan Jews who have incessantly kept their religion and Torah. These Bukharan Jews even proudly proclaim that they did ninety percent of what the Torah said (emphasis added 143). This is certainly an extreme case of an isolated group of Jews who faithfully and vigorously preserve not only their ethnic and cultural identity but also their faith and religious expressions. Now, can it be conclusively said that post Soviet Jews are only secular, cultural, and ethnic Jews? In retrospect, it might not be that easy to jump to this conclusion by only looking into the Jews in the cities because there are always particularities in unique contexts as indicated by Cooper's study among the Bukharan Jews.

In chapter 12, "Jewish Converts to Orthodoxy in Russia in Recent Decades," Judith Deutsch Kornblatt completed her research among those who became Russian Orthodox as adults. This study demonstrates the strength of belongingness in a confused time in a specific context. That the conversion experience of Jews into the Russian Orthodox Church is very complicated implicates an investigation into their intertwined Russian-Jewish national and religious identities. Kornblatt discovers that baptism did not make these believers more Russian, but more Jewish (emphasis added 218). For instance, one convert states, "The more I am a Christian, the more I feel myself a Jew." (217) What does this mean? She further explains that baptism serves as a means for the Jews to escape from Soviet ideology. Jews becoming Russian Orthodox Christians gain double blessings as God's chosen people twice. Therefore, Jewish conversion to Russian Orthodoxy has tremendous sociological, psychological, and spiritual implications.
Because of the wealth of the materials presented in this book, it is almost impossible to summarize it in several short paragraphs. However, those who are interested in detailed study of a certain subject area are encouraged to read the chapters accordingly. Apparently, the Jews in the former Soviet Union are in a dynamic transition. Although the essays collected in this book deliver only snapshots, the valuable information presented is much more than merely an introduction. Everyone who wants to take the first few steps in learning about Jewish Life After The USSR in a serious and scholarly manner is encouraged to read this book.

Alan L. Chan
Chinese Lutheran Church, San Francisco, CA