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Article
Cross-modal confusions between perceived and imagined events
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition
  • Linda Henkel, Fairfield University
  • N. Franklin
  • M. K. Johnson
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2000
Abstract
Two experiments tested the prediction based on the source monitoring framework that imagination is most likely to lead to false memories when related perceived events have occurred. Consistent with this, people were more likely to falsely remember seeing events when the events had been both imagined as seen and actually heard than when they were just heard, just visually imagined, or imagined both visually and auditorily. Furthermore, when people considered potential sources for memories or more carefully evaluated features of remembered events, source errors were reduced. On average, misattributed ("false") memories differed in phenomenal qualities from true memories. Taken together, these findings show that as different qualities of mental experience flexibly enter into source attributions, qualities derived from related perceptual events are particularly likely to lead to false claims that imagined events were seen, even when the event involves a primary modality (auditory) different from the target event (visual).
Comments

Copyright American Psychological Association, 2000

Published Citation
Henkel, L. A., Franklin, N., & Johnson, M. K. (2000). Cross-modal confusions between perceived and imagined events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 26.2, 321-335.
DOI
10.1037/0278-7393.26.2.321
None
Peer Reviewed
Citation Information
Linda Henkel, N. Franklin and M. K. Johnson. "Cross-modal confusions between perceived and imagined events" Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition Vol. 26 Iss. 2 (2000)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/linda_henkel/5/