The Dual Approach to the Exportation of European Governance

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Introduction

P. Anderson contends that the European Union (EU) is without historical precedent. For its origins were deliberately designed, but they were neither imitative of anything else nor total in scope; while the goals at which it aimed were not proximate but very distant. This was an entirely novel combination: a construction that was highly voluntarist, yet pragmatically piecemeal—and yet vaultingly long-range.¹

The EU exports “European” governance; that is, the EU encourages and supports the establishment and maintenance of “European” democratic member and candidate states without compelling state reform. The EU promotes state institutional democracy (according to an EU model of governance) and provides means for insuring that these institutions are democratic institutions according to the EU-advocated conceptions of governance. The EU has successfully established and supported conditions for enhancing state autonomy and state capacity in newly democratic European states in Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) in its recently completed expansion. The process of EU enlargement assures new member state autonomy and the democratic capability of the state to participate in the EU as members of the organisation. EU participation endorses recognisable state democracies that actively participate in the modern international arena according to “European” forms of interaction.

The EU’s success in exporting European governance to CEEC is two-fold. EU institutions and creations like the Copenhagen Criteria for Membership² advocate a European procedural form of governance. Procedural democracy occurs when the autonomous candidate state agrees to adopt the European procedures of governance.

Substantive European governance, the implementation of what the EU considers to be “democratic” procedure, is encouraged via transnational alignments. These alignments are contained within the EU and facilitated by the involvement of the state with EU actors. Substantive democracy arises from the state’s capacity to utilise adopted procedures in methods that are concurrent with the EU conception of governance. This paper will explore enlargement as a process in which EU institutions influence state sovereignty (understood as a capacity for autonomous policy-making) while building state capacity through a process of official negotiation coupled with decentralisation and trans-nationalisation. The paper argues that this is the effective process by which the EU successfully exports European governance to the CEEC without overtly pressuring states.

First, this paper will discuss the type of organisation of sovereignty (the model of federalism) in the EU in order to outline the peculiar institutional elements that enable the EU to export its model of governance in its expansion. EU expansion enhances statehood (understood both in terms of policy autonomy and governance capacity) in the applicant countries at the same time that it exports its own substantive form of governance. The paper will then explore the particular dynamics of EU enlargement to the CEEC.

I. Federal Theory of EU Governance and its Exportation

The adoption of EU governance extends throughout a candidate state. Rhetoric of the EU speaks of “drawing the peoples of Europe closer together.”\(^3\) EU governance through enlargement creates “a conceptual bridge between the domestic and the

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international,” according to Hurrell and Menon. In the EU, political provisions such as individual equality are regulated but not enforced (only through a court case contesting unequal treatment can an EU citizen be compensated for discrimination—no direct regulatory mechanism is in effect), rooted in law but required to be uniform in implementation in member or candidate countries. The EU invites governments to participate in EU governance, promising in return continued recognition and respect of state autonomy (recognised in this paper as the EU Treaties’ acknowledgment of states’ sovereignty over state territory) and the benefits of membership in the EU. State autonomy is further understood as the state central government’s ability to “formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society.”

However, the adoption of EU policies requires intra and sub-state participation as well as the agreement of the central government. This participation requires a certain state capacity arising, according to the EU model, from an administrative decentralization and deregulation that permits actors within the state to participate in the EU and EU member states independently of the central state government (e.g. vote in European Parliamentary elections or practice a trade in an EU Member state that is not the practitioner’s native state). The EU thus creates a kind of federal system in which state central governments maintain autonomy and state sovereignty. This federal system also

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5 When the paper notes that edicts against discrimination are not “enforced,” the paper means to reflect that the EU has no police or uniform method by which to monitor the effects of what the member states agree to implement. Such monitoring mechanisms are largely the expectation of member states. In agreeing to a EU policy, the states usually agree to adopt the policy and monitor it, as the states would state policy. This is an additional argument for EU recognition of state autonomy over state decisions and agreements.
enables the capacity of actors within the state (political parties, trade unions, employees and employers, etc.) to participate in EU governance separately from the central state government. This federal organisation in its expansion to the CEEC establishes a type of dichotomy that strengthens state federal autonomy and decentralises substantive state capacity through giving the power to participate in the EU to actors within the state.

Alfred Stepan categorises three types of federalism. The Soviet bloc under the USSR was a “putting-together” federalism, “a heavily coercive effort by a non-democratic centralising power to put together a multinational state, some of the components of which had previously been independent state.” A “holding-together” federalism, like that established in India, Belgium, and Spain, is a federalism established when “political leaders…come to the decision….” to establish a federal state in order to preserve a particular polity. A “holding-together” federalism creates a stronger centre than Stepan’s final category of federalism, a “coming-together” federalism. The EU is similar to the model of federalism found the United States, a “coming-together” federalism.

In a “coming-together” federalism, sovereign polities voluntarily give up some sovereignty in return for pooled resources and efficiency. While the EU lacks a Constitution, the Treaties constrain the member states in certain aspects (generally concerning the common market) while also limiting the influence of the EU institutions out of respect for state sovereignty. Overseen by EU institutions, the first pillar subjects

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8 Ibid, p. 22.
10 The first pillar of the EU includes the common market and the “four freedoms” of persons, goods, capital, and services.
related policies in member states to EU legislation concerned with the common European market. The second and third pillars, comprising issues concerning security and judicial interactions, are intergovernmental. Concerns that arise in these pillars are frequently mediated by the EU Council, in which all member states are equally represented. This system requires member state governments to engage in the EU forms of decision-making at the EU level and then to implement the decisions within the state in such a way as to permit the first pillar to function efficiently throughout the EU. In accordance with the voluntary nature of EU governance, state central governments agree to adapt their own policies within their territories to accommodate the agreed-to EU legislation.

In a CEE state, “European” governance and democracy is relatively new. CEE states are apprehensive after the previous forcible loss of sovereignty to the Soviet form of federalism, Stepan’s “putting-together” federalism. In the CEEC that applied for EU Membership, sub-state actors new to the EU form of decision-making and implementation were invited to align with more experienced EU actors. These experienced EU actors could provide policy models or helpful advice and information. (For example, a new CEEC political party would benefit due to information from a EU or EU member state political party concerning how to register voters or possible methods by which to publicise a EU decision and thus better implement a state and EU policy through the dissemination of information.) The engagement of the federal and the sub and supra-state actors in an ongoing negotiation process of decision-making and policy implementation can best be understood within the theoretical framework of what

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Dorvette Corbey labelled “dialectical functionalism.” Corbey used dialectical functionalism to interpret EU integration, but the theory is also helpful in explaining the exportation of EU governance through the EU type of federalism.

The adoption of EU policy in one area by the government of a member state or a candidate country prompts the involvement of sub-state actors in the implementation of that policy as well as in areas related to that policy. Corbey writes that

“Dialectical functionalism enables an understanding of the EU as a new form of governance by denying that integration is a zero-sum game: the EU curbs the formal autonomy of national states but encourages public intervention in adjacent areas.”

In “coming-together” or integrating with the EU system, candidate countries agree to adopt certain forms of governance in order to effectively implement the EU public policies.

Purely intergovernmental agreement is insufficient in the implementation of the “European” form of governance. The four freedoms illustrate this need; policy must be evenly implemented in EU member states in order for the four freedoms to remain uninhibited. For state actors to participate in EU institutions, such as the European Parliament and the Commission, states must also implement a European form of democracy or governance that permits sub-state and inter-state political discussion and the formation of transnational alliances, some of which may promote policies that undermine current state policies, stimulating intra-state political competition. Thus, while state governments themselves are recognised and respected as autonomous actors, different types of interest groups created through transnational discussion and political

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13 Ibid., p. 254.
participation in EU institutions and forums reinforce the capacity of non-federal state actors. This obliges federal adoptions of EU forms of governance permitting this independent, decentralised discussion and administration of policy to be substantiated by non-federal actor involvement. This enhances state capacity to participate in the EU.\textsuperscript{14}

II. EU Enlargement at the Federal Level: Building State Autonomy

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU found itself in a de facto leadership role. The new power vacuum created by the collapse placed the “successful” (in comparison with its single continental rival, the collapsed Soviet bloc) EU in the position of the European leader in governance. If the Union could establish unified political positions, the EU could expand from its predominantly economic competence to model a new, uncontested European order. The EU experienced rapid change in the early 1990s, absorbing a newly unified Germany and identifying a need to redefine its relations with CEEC. Internally, the EU recognised new concerns with stability and legitimacy as EU economic policies experienced “spill-over.” “Spill-over”\textsuperscript{15} began occurring when what were initially considered strictly economic policies began to affect national social and political policies. At the same time, the EU began to enlarge geographically as European states external to the EU sought the economic benefits of the EU internal market.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15} An example of “spill-over” is the Services Directive, which permits EU citizens to provide a service in a foreign member state but to provide that service in accordance with the national laws of their own member state. Member states are then concerned with the workers of some member states undercutting native employees through lower, non-unionised wages. For more information, review the problem of the “Polish Plumber.”
The Soviet bloc no longer presented an economic or political threat to bind EU member states together. Without external opposition, the EU lacked defined political centralisation within the Union. However, the EU had opportunity to solidify political purposes through expansion to CEEC. The EU and its member states could support the exportation of EU governance to these newly independent states. New internally determined authority was needed to contend with the “spill-over” as well as provide reason and criteria for the EU expansion in policy and size. Yet the EU lacks a central political authority. The EU is not a coercive or military alliance but a voluntary organisation. The newly autonomous CEEC did not require protection in the early 1990s, as the Soviet Union no longer posed an armed threat. Instead, EU Membership signified shared economic resources while, in accordance with the EU Treaties, acknowledging and enforcing overall State autonomy. This is a distinctly different regional model than the former Soviet bloc. In respecting state autonomy, the EU values state sovereignty over policy implemented within the state’s established territory. While joining the EU in some ways (largely economic) constrains state policy, it does not dictate state policy. The EU respects state autonomy.

EU respect for state autonomy is implicit in the Treaties, but it also necessary in insuring member state compliance with EU policies. The EU lacks the competence to directly enforce and sometimes even interpret certain decisions of its institutions. In order to successfully implement much EU policy, the EU relies upon state institutions. If a state is discovered to have not implemented policy, the judicial process by which EU institutions must challenge and require policy implementation is long and arduous, and

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not inevitably effective.\textsuperscript{18} It is important that the EU export governance rather than impose governance because the EU lacks the capacity to impose its positions upon current member states. Neither is the EU equipped to successfully compel candidate states to adopt the institutions and strategies necessary to implement EU policies. State autonomy is necessarily recognised to encourage real state participation.

In the early 1990s, CEE candidate countries required more specific criteria and rationale for EU Membership. The external pressure that the EU is able to exert upon potential candidate states depends upon internal state variables, such as the European preferences of state actors. Internally as well as externally, nationalist tendencies have limited and continue to limit EU influence within states. Newly autonomous CEEC contend with the economic benefits of EU membership and the reluctance to relinquish recently acquired autonomy to a supra state organisation.\textsuperscript{19} There was opportunity for new institution building within the CEEC as the collapse of the Soviet block discredited the old Communist institutions, creating a positive “push” factor towards the more “successful” (i.e. still functioning) EU. However, a “pull” factor away from EU membership promoted the newly attained national independence and autonomy of the state and its central government. At the federal political level, strong parties that had recently escaped the subordination of the Soviet regime were often reluctant to volunteer to the EU any newly obtained sovereignty over policy within the state territory.\textsuperscript{20} EU

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., pp. 296-306.
enlargement required reconciling membership with the CEEC goals of preserving state autonomy.

The EU did not directly interfere with state autonomy through its creation of incentive programmes for EU membership candidacy. In fact, through its interaction with the EU in the application process for membership, candidate states received the opportunity to enhance newly asserted state autonomy. The EU recognised and negotiated with the state governments as autonomous actors in the application process. The EU governance of enlargement then influenced the state through the choices of the state federal administrations, choices offered (with incentives) by the EU. The political writers Friis and Murphy determined that the successful export of EU governance was comprised of EU institutional respect for the capacity and legitimacy of the state central authorities, thus enhancing state central authorities, combined with the provision of EU resources for the candidate states. These factors encouraged without coercing enlargement, preserving and promoting candidate state autonomy.21

In June 1993, the Conclusions of the Presidency of the Copenhagen European Council clarified conditions of EU membership: “The European Council today agreed that the associated countries in central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union…as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required. Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope

with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.” The EU determined that to be considered a candidate for enlargement; the state must be capable of adopting the Union *acquis*, the total body of EU law thus far adopted by the member states and the EU institutions. The EU institutions have created voluntary benchmarks by which to measure the progress of institutional adoption and programmes designed to aid those states that should desire external advice and monetary support.22

The Europe or Association Agreements included conditions to further building democracy and the market economy. The CEEC in the Agreements moved unilaterally to emulate the EU model in legislation in a process that Nicolaïdis called “anticipatory adaptation.”23 Europe Agreements focused on the legal bases for free trade areas and economic liberalisation as well as the technical and legal assistance that the EU can offer candidate states in preparing for the adoption of EU policies. The Europe Agreements set up channels of political dialogue by which the EU and the candidate state federal administrations communicate. Accession Partnerships, begun in 1998, allowed individual candidate states to identify priority areas that require reform to adopt the *acquis* and to develop state-run and EU-aided programmes and coordinating mechanisms to achieve the successful incorporation of the *acquis*. The candidate states worked with EU institutions in “specifying the laws, the institutional and administrative reforms, and the human and budgetary resources they intended to deploy in the priority areas.”

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Results were known as the National programmes for the adoption of the *acquis* (NPAAs).\(^{24}\)

The agreements between the EU and candidate states influenced how candidate states interacted with non-EU internal and external actors as well. In the break-up of Czechoslovakia, the EU models of federal communication were carefully emulated in order to avoid jeopardising EU membership for both states. Both Slovakia and the Czech Republic desired to remain *EC-fähig*, so the countries settled differences peacefully, using EC-related methods to facilitate the separation and demonstrate official recognition of the different state autonomies.\(^{25}\) In Slovenia, EU interaction strengthened the central legislature. The upper house of the Slovenian bicameral legislature included employer and employee representatives.\(^{26}\) Well-established managerial groups and employer associations slowed needed foreign direct investment (FDI). As the state parliament party system stabilised with EU recognition, negotiation, technical assistance and advice, stronger parliamentary majorities enabled the government to pursue FDI.\(^{27}\) The Hungarian government was, in contrast, strengthened in its relations with multinational corporations through the adoption of EU standards. EU-inspired and supported corporate regulations enabled the Hungarian central authority to regain some state autonomy that had been lost to the political influence of new multinationals. The multinational

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\(^{27}\) Ibid., p. 9.
corporations were required to fulfil legislation introduced by the state in order to discharge Hungarian EU commitments.\textsuperscript{28}

EU enlargement governance involves few actors at the official EU level. The Commission and the Council largely interact with the executive administration of the candidate state in the enlargement proceedings. This makes it easier for the candidate state to surrender aspects of its sovereignty, a necessary stage in the accession to a supra state organisation. In addition, this interaction gives the federal administration the recognition of authority and, in line with Stockpol’s definition, state autonomy. The state-level executive and EU interaction is an asymmetrical process that the political analyst Dimitrova defines as “taking over the rules of a club.” Member states must procedurally incorporate the *acquis communautaire* in the EU’s “classical method of enlargement.”\textsuperscript{29} However, the states do agree to expose themselves to the EU’s supra national influence through the adoption of “European” governance.\textsuperscript{30}

EU authority derives from the Treaties and the *acquis*. The Treaties are by nature a voluntary construction that allow for Protocols and Opt-outs by various Member States that choose not to adopt certain portions of the Treaties at particular times. EU authority is consensual among its member states, and assumedly candidate countries that choose to enter the Treaties accept this consensus. The *acquis* is a legal establishment that explains and makes transparent the implications of the Treaties and must be adopted when a state agrees to the Treaties. The resources of the EU are made up of its regulatory capacity,

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 11.
financial instruments, access to the internal market, EU policies and “the less tangible resources of models of political and economic regulation and co-operation.”

The capacity to govern of the EU grows out of the relations between the actors and the institutions that interact with and within the EU. Thus far the ability of the EU to implement policies and maintain its institutions provides the EU with a type of functional legitimacy. Internal EU actors are not unitary, and they are not only made up of central governments that represent the member states; “the segmented nature of policy-making in the EU permits actors representative of and within (i.e. social actors) the Member States and the Commission to pursue a range of interests, sometimes contradictory, at any one time and create cross-cutting coalitions.” Candidate states are invited to enter the forums provided by the EU and pursue their own interests as equal EU Members. Actors within the candidate states are able to do the same.

III. Strengthening State Capacity: Decentralisation

The EU provided a stimulus for change, but CEEC institutions, accustomed to the centrally oriented governance of the Soviet “put-together” federalism, sometimes lacked the experience to implement decentralised “European” governance. The negotiations between the federal state governments and the EU followed a bargaining decision style in which member state governments perceived problems through national lenses (e.g. the federally-oriented NPAAs). Candidate countries customarily sought deals that were

31 Ibid., p. 214.
32 This “functional legitimacy” is contested on several grounds; however, conflicts concerning legitimacy have not halted the enlargement of the EU from twelve to twenty-seven Member States. This paper is not to discuss the legitimacy of the EU, only the means by which the EU successfully exports governance. This paper assumes that in choosing to join the EU, CEEC consider it to be a legitimate institution in some way.
positive for their central government, the autonomous state. The result of EU membership for some countries risked the creation of “hybrid regimes.” Hybrid regimes, or post-authoritarian regimes like some found in the post-Communist countries, retain or reconstruct former authoritarian powers within an outwardly democratic form. An example is a “delegative” democracy rather than a representative democracy. European influence in a hybrid regime depends upon whether the regime is able to stabilise or is in fact a transitory regime that will be followed by a real democracy.

Such a regime risked nominal European reform with no substantive change that permitted non-federal actors within the state to participate in the EU. Federal state actors might view such non-state sanctioned participation as competition against the autonomous central government. However, in participating in the EU, a candidate country opens its institutions and policies on several levels to influence from non-institutional EU actors. Additional EU actors include other member state governments, political parties, non-governmental organisations, trade organisations, and a myriad of interest groups. These actors can offer policies or support the goals of political parties that compete with the party or parties that make up the state’s central government.

Friis and Murphy note “four types of boundaries which are of critical importance to the EU system—geopolitical, institutional/legal, transactional and cultural.” The overlap of these boundaries, the “spill over,” requires actors in each sector to interact with actors and policies in other sectors, both within and without state territory. This

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decentralises the central government’s power to mandate state behaviour and policy, as the federal government must constantly contend with non-state EU-related actors that are active in each sector. Geopolitical boundaries have become increasingly blurred since the collapse of the Soviet Union. These include the political influences of non-state parties within different states. Institutional/legal boundaries refer to the expected behaviour and legal practices of all those actors within the EU _acquis_, made up of state governments, international businesses that operate in EU states, and a host of other national and international actors. Cultural boundaries have also proven to be permeable, as the idea of “the Europe for the Europeans,” first observed by Judt, has become a “foundation myth” of the EU.37

These boundaries become blurred, decentralising state authority with the state candidacy for EU membership. In order to adapt to the EU, candidate member state governments admit the EU into the state territory via the actors within the EU mentioned before. The state becomes a member of the EU intergovernmental politics while non-state actors become members of EU politics. The EU permits the exchange of ideas among Europeans and European organisations, and thus the state permits the influence of non-state originated European political dialogue to take place within the state and affect state political policy. The federal government is required to admit competing political philosophies and, should these philosophies gain sufficient support, permit the parties advocating these philosophies to gain federal power and implement the policies. This is an example of Corbey’s “dialectical functionalism” of EU integration as exhibited through EU membership enlargement and policy spillover.

Through connecting domestic political parties and institutions with corresponding actors in EU Member States, the EU facilitated geopolitical exchanges that allowed new CEEC institutions and parties to receive outside guidance in building their capacities to participate in state and EU politics and reform. Such linkages proved particularly effective in Slovakia, a multiethnic state that experienced strong political cleavages under the authoritarian Mečiar government. The Slovak Christian Democrats Party (KDH) ideologically and politically affiliated with other European conservatives, including the European Democratic Union (EDU), the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD) and the Christian Democrats (CD) International. Thus, the KDH earned eventual membership to each of these organisations and an association membership of the European People’s Party (EPP). Through these alliances, the KDH developed its own organisation and political policies and was better able to oppose the Mečiar coalition government.

Transnational connections insure that powerful political parties and institutions do not fail to fulfil their purposes or try to eliminate rivals. The transnational connections reinforce an informal monitoring system that brings EU attention to unsubstantiated surface reform. In Slovakia, despite a multiparty system, the Mečiar government lacked an elite consensus over the principles of democracy. The government attempted to exclude parties with strong alternate viewpoints, such as the Democratic Union (DU) party. The DU’s connections with Liberal International and the EU ELDR Party

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39 Ibid., p. 1227.
compelled the Mečiar government to permit the DU to participate in national elections. The Mečiar government lost its power in the 1998 democratic elections.

Institutional/legal boundaries expand through EU candidacy, sometimes affecting a candidate state’s status with the EU and its related benefits and actors. The EU incorporated a neutral bureaucracy and government transparency in its candidate criterion. Yet as EU institutions negotiated with the central government, EU-sponsored judgment of the impact of such criterion was difficult. The criterion was instead reinforced through the informal monitoring system composed of transnational alliances made possible by the EU membership candidacy. Dimitrova observes that central governmental political interference in the administration is a characteristic problem in post-Communist States. Although laws were passed protecting the apolitical nature of the bureaucracy, the central government channels did not always report violations of these laws. It was in the interest of the federal state government to maintain a politically influenced administration.

However, EU candidacy permitted the non-governmental organisation (NGO) the Access to Information Programme Foundation to be active in the CEEC. This NGO presented yearly reports on the civil administration of CEEC to other EU actors. The NGO’s work drew attention to Bulgaria’s implementation of the Law on Access to Official Information and civil servant training reforms, encouraging the state to fulfil its agreed-to obligations in administrative reform. In the Czech Republic, the exposure of federal resistance to civil service legislation and its implementation stalled the state’s

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candidacy process. In Croatia, Tudjman’s regime suppressed democratic expression in the media and oppressed opposition parties’ activities. The authoritarian conditions inhibited local and foreign business practices. International outcry carried in the EU media ended EU talks with the state. These talks have only resumed since Tudjman’s death and the installation of a new government. The new government has courted FDI in order to re-establish its international credential through international business relations. Success in this area will provide proof that the state can effectively adopt the EU *aquis*, a stated goal of the new government. Transactional boundaries, once effectively crossed, promote integration with EU through the adoption of EU transactional practices.

EU membership and candidacy insures cultural interaction as well. A large area of concern has arisen in the recognition and treatment of CEEC minority ethnic groups. As new independent states establish themselves in Europe, heterogeneous populations in single geographic areas have complicated the development of ideas of statehood and nationality. Eastern European interstate treaties frequently include provisions for the treatment of respective Diasporas. Article 15, the longest section of the 1996 accord between Hungary and Romania demanded mutual obligations from the states concerning Romanian and Hungarian minorities. The EU strengthens these arrangements through regulations establishing the treatment of minorities in the Copenhagen Document on the Human Dimension of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the

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41 Ibid., pp. 184-186.  
45 Ibid., p. 112.
Statement of and Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Recognised areas of state autonomy include the protection of minority populations within the State. Incorporated into NPAAs, these regulations create a legal basis for federal administrative action in the interest of different state ethnic groups. But, as the international secretary of the MKDH (Hungarian Christian Democratic) movement explained, the minority party’s international contacts were of utmost importance to us, as we represent not only the Christian Democratic values in this country but also the special interest of the Hungarian minority. There are quite intense tensions in Slovakia concerning the national question. One of the ruling parties in the government is the Slovak National Party, which attacks the Hungarian minority every day. For this reason, international contacts are very important for us, as we feel the support, the moral support of the CD parties of Western Europe, the EUCD, which has held a lot of conferences, of meetings, dealing with the minority problem in Europe, and has adopted several resolutions. One of these meetings was held in Bratislava. And, in this way, we can use these contacts when representing the interests of the minority at the international level, which has a positive attitude towards national minorities.46

The MKDH also established bilateral relations with the Northeast Italian South Tyrol’s People’s Party (SVP)47, cited as “the best example for us concerning the minority position.” The SVP provided encouragement and political instruction in a programme study offered in 1994 to 40 mayors from Southern Slovakia. The study advised the mayors concerning their practical duties.48

EU candidacy requires the entry of an autonomous state into an international organisation of cross-cutting cleavages and increasingly blurred boundaries. Thus the

47 The SVP represents the Alto Adige (South Tyrol) German population.
central government, while retaining officially recognised and reinforced sovereignty over policy implemented within its territory, loses centralised authority in the influence of actors within the state. This decentralisation insures the substantive effect of procedures the state authorities agree to adopt upon entering the process of EU membership. The state implements the procedures to which it agrees under the scrutiny of interested state and non-state actors. Actors that enter the state during this process provide transnational alliances that influence a state’s EU candidate status. This provides the EU and the state with an informal monitoring process of state practices that might interfere with European governance. This de facto system also provides methods, ideas, and policies by which the state or state actors can address the interferences with European governance.

Conclusion

Loukas Tsoukalis suggests, “Today’s mission of the Union may indeed be to export democracy, stability and modernity beyond its present borders.”

EU enlargement is a method of this exportation. The EU first offered membership to a CEE state that chose to either accept or deny candidacy. Upon voluntary admission into the EU process of membership, the EU recognised and reinforced state autonomy through EU institutional interaction with the state government. State federal actors chose to adopt EU procedures. At the same time, actors within the EU and the candidate country insured that continuous substantiated reform occurred through transnational exchanges and reinforcements. These transnational alliances decentralised state power through permitting non-state actors within the state to become involved in the EU and other

organisations involved in the EU. These alliances became possible when the state federal
government chose to enter the EU. Once involved, these alliances and organisations,
entering as a result of a federal state decision, could then influence the central state
government and how it was perceived within the EU. This double process of addressing
state acceptance of the EU and the EU admission of the state incorporated the state
administration as well as non-state actors within the state. Thus both the state structure
and those within the structure were incorporated into the EU and the EU structure
through the exportation of EU governance.
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